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Turbulent Waters

Cross-Scale Conflict and Collaboration in River Landscape Planning

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Turbulent Waters

Cross-Scale Conflict and Collaboration in River Landscape Planning

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied
van Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Large rivers have two faces. On the one hand, they fill people with dread because of the risks they pose; on the other hand, they are attractive because they provide a living and are a source of enjoyment. Living in the delta of three large rivers, the Scheldt, Meuse and Rhine, the Dutch are used to living with water. For centuries they limited the risks by building dams, dikes, drainage systems and sluices to regulate the rivers. In return, they benefited from rich soils for arable and dairy farming, river-related resources, such as sand and clay extraction, the latter used for brick making, and fishing. The rivers are also important transport arteries, for goods as well as people, and a source of enjoyment and a recreational resource: swimming in summer, skating during periods of ice in winter, sailing, rowing and strolling along the river dike or quayside. In addition, the continually changing face of the rivers make them a source of inspiration and contemplation. Over the centuries, many functions of the rivers have changed and there are now fewer river-related economic activities, the emphasis being on the maximisation of bulk transport. But although living near the river is no longer a necessity because people have other sources of income, they remain attractive for living and recreation.

Both faces of the rivers have made them a source of dispute between government authorities and citizens as well as a basis for collaborative relationships between these parties. In the past, disputes have been about things like disagreements over a new canal for year-round transport or payment for dike repair. Today, disputes are often about government plans to reduce flood risks, which are not welcomed by lower-tier authorities or the local population, and if local residents come up with their own plan this may also be a source of discord between government authorities and citizens and between government authorities. In the past, government authorities and landowners were convinced that the water would always win unless they collaborated; the landowners provided labour and resources in exchange for a say in decisions about the nature and execution of public works (Blockmans, 2009), although this did not prevent floods occurring. For centuries polder boards provided a structure within which water problems could be discussed. The general public, however, did not have any influence over decision-making on water management issues, although they were often affected most when floods occurred. Today, after centuries of infrastructure works, government authorities and citizens are heavily divided about measures to increase flood safety. This is mainly due to the change in the position of citizens. While government authorities

still govern, the public are no longer passively 'governed', but have become self-confident, assertive and active citizens. At the same time, the scale at which decisions are taken is different. Whereas decisions on water management measures, such as dikes and sluices, used to be made locally, in the polder, nowadays the state is an important actor, particularly when large infrastructure works are concerned. This means that decision-making often takes place at the national level. As floods are no longer common occurrences, government authorities and citizens do not see each other as a natural ally in the field of water management. This study will show how conflict and collaboration become apparent in the interaction between government authorities and citizens in today's Dutch river landscape planning.

1.1 Rationale

The rationale of this study derives from the effects of a changing world on the relationship between government authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning. Society faces numerous challenges, including climate change, overpopulation, urbanisation, rural depopulation, pollution, scarcity of natural resources and globalisation, some of which have a direct impact on river landscape planning. Climate change is expected to lead to higher river discharges, requiring drastic measures, while increasing urbanisation puts pressure on government authorities to act, since the Dutch rivers are confined to the main channel between ever higher dikes, preventing outward expansion into the flood plain to accommodate periods of increased discharge.

Another phenomenon that has become apparent during recent decades is the problematic relationship between government authorities and citizens. In our risk society (Beck, 1992), citizens have to deal with various risks that can radically affect their lives, particularly large projects like those in the Room for the River (*Ruimte voor de Rivier*) programme, within the context of a shifting balance of power between the state, society and the market. The Dutch government has responded to the transformations in the economy and society over the last twenty to thirty years by moving from a state-centred towards a less-state centred model of governance, which in turn has made it more dependent on regional and local support (Peters & Pierre, 2001). In this model, national government has to deal with lower-tier authorities, civil society organisations and citizens. This transformation, which is also referred to as multilevel governance,¹ denotes a vertical 'layering' of governance processes at different tiers of government. It involves two processes. The first is a shift in the division of tasks between institutions at different levels of government, which has opened up opportunities for negotiated arrangements either to complement or replace legalistic-hierarchical institutional relationships. The second is a decentralisation of responsibilities that has created a system in which institutions at one level can enter into exchanges with institutions at any other level that are characterised more by dialogue and negotiation than command and control (Peters & Pierre, 2001). For the

government department in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat, this meant becoming an executive agency, focusing on regional services. A sizeable chunk of the flood defence budget went to the provincial authorities and the responsibility for operating and maintaining many defences was transferred to the water boards (Warner et al., 2008a). In practice, this implied that Rijkswaterstaat delegated the design and implementation of most river projects to other government authorities. This was seen as a logical development because water management is now closely related to land use planning and design, which is largely a responsibility of lower-tier authorities. At the same time, it complicated the planning process because regional and local interests also have to be met. On the other hand, the fact that lower-tier authorities are closer to citizens may be an incentive for a change in the relationship between government and the public.

1.2 Aim

Government–citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning has a history that goes back for centuries, as described in later chapters. Although this study focuses on the period since 2000, policy developments that emerged before this date have had considerable impact on what is the main theme of this study: the interaction between government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning. In 1996, the Dutch government published the Room for the River policy in the wake of two periods of high water levels in 1993 and in January 1995, when 200,000 people had to be evacuated from their homes for safety reasons. Growing concern about climate change also contributed to the idea that it was time to act. The Room for the River policy implied a shift of focus in water management: rather than taking measures outside the main river dikes, such as lowering groynes, the emphasis shifted to measures inside the dikes, such as dike relocations, bypasses and ‘green’ side channels. However, an emergency Major Rivers Delta Plan (*Deltaplan Grote Rivieren*) to build better defences along the Rhine and the Meuse had to be implemented first. This plan was based on dike reinforcements planned decades ago but cancelled as a result of fierce public protest. It proved to be a temporary blip in the trend towards a new water policy (Warner et al., 2008a). In 2000 the state secretary for water management presented the Room for the River White Paper, a policy programme with 39 river projects scattered along the rivers Rhine and Meuse to improve flood safety. Additionally, emergency water storage was planned to prevent situations arising in which residents would have to be evacuated in a hurry. As it seemed sensible to designate in advance which areas would be eligible for emergency flood storage in extreme events, the official policy document included a map with ‘search areas’ showing which polders were provisionally set aside for these functions. Instead of classifying the calamity plan as confidential, the state secretary decided to widely publicise it (Warner et al., 2008). The launch of Room for the River, with the inclusion of 39 river projects and the ‘search areas’ for emergency flood storage, caused much unrest among government decision-makers and the public. A few people,

for example in Overdiep Polder, however, made a virtue out of necessity and made their own plan, first with the help of farmers' organisation ZLTO, and later, the plan was elaborated with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the provincial government.

Against this background, the relationship between government authorities and citizens was influenced by certain other trends, such as the emerging lack of trust between government and citizens, changing ideas about how to deal with risks, which impinge more on peoples private lives, and the changing institutional setting. These form the starting point for this study, which set out to improve our understanding of cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning and whether this leads to conflict or collaboration.

1.3 Questions

The central question in this study is what factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning. The following sub-questions were formulated:

- What does cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning mean?
- How do citizens organise themselves to make their voice heard?
- How do government authorities interact with citizens and other governmental agencies?
- How does cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning proceed?
- What are the outcomes of cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning?

The first question, about the meaning of cross-scale interaction, implies an investigation of the properties of social interaction, which then have to be placed into a coherent scheme. While government can be divided into national, regional/provincial² and local authorities, the unit of analysis for citizens is the local group. To address the second question, an inventory has to be made of how people organised themselves and which strategies they chose to get their opinions across. The third question, about the way government authorities relate to citizens and other government agencies, can be answered by applying the analytical framework developed to answer the first question. Here, empirical data from three case studies are used (see below). The same analytical framework was also used to obtain answers to the fourth question, about the process of interaction between government authorities and citizens, and the final question about outcomes. The answers to these five questions can be used to identify factors and

mechanisms that influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning.

1.4 Approach

The above questions guided the approach taken in this study, a combination of a framework-led method and multiple case studies. The framework developed in this study is an operationalisation of social interaction, the central theme of this research. The properties of social interaction identified at the beginning of the study were used to construct a basic framework, which then evolved interactively during the course of the study using the results of the inductive analysis of empirical data from the three cases. Deductive analysis of the developed concepts was then used to give the framework its final shape, the CSI framework for cross-scale interaction.

The case studies which form the empirical basis of this study are the Dike Relocation in Lent, Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Locations of the three case studies



The Dike Relocation in Lent case study concerns a government plan to relocate the dike some 350 metres land inwards and excavate a side channel in the floodplain to relieve a bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent on the north bank and the city of Nijmegen on the south bank. The plan was designed to accommodate a river discharge of 18,000 m³/s in the Rhine, which was set by the national government. The Department of Water Management, for which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act, and the municipality of Nijmegen were involved, as well as the inhabitants of Lent, represented by three local groups.

The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study concerns a government plan to

prepare the polder to accommodate excess river water during periods of unusually high river discharges. It includes an inlet and an outlet in the polder and a dike surrounding the main villages. The main actors were the Department of Water Management, for which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act, Gelderland provincial government, the municipality of Ubbergen and the residents of Ooijpolder, represented by the local group High Water Platform (*Hoogwater Platform*).

The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study is an initiative by local people to redesign their polder to create a retention area with nine terps (raised mounds for the construction of dwellings and farm buildings and as places of refuge during flooding) for nine of the 17 families originally living in the polder. The main actors involved were the Department of Water Management, for which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act, Noord-Brabant provincial government and the residents, represented in the Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder*). The plan provides for a lowering of the water level in the river Meuse of about 30 cm.

1.5 Structure of this thesis

This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 the subject of this study, cross-scale conflict and collaboration in Dutch river landscape planning, is set against the background of European and Dutch water management policy. Recent developments in water management policy and the resulting tensions are discussed and the interaction between government authorities and citizens is looked at from a historical perspective. Chapter 3 starts with a description of the perspective taken to study cross-scale social interaction, followed by a description of the development of the framework for cross-scale interaction (CSI). The presentation of the CSI framework includes the introduction of the various properties of social interaction: the government authorities' and local groups' potential to act, their power building, their interaction strategies and the interaction outcomes. In addition, the organisational culture and traditions of the government authorities, the culture and traditions of the local groups and the impacts of these on their actions are described. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this study, including a discussion of the research question and design, followed by the research methods and process. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters in which the case studies are described. The subject of Chapter 5 is the Dike Relocation in Lent. A case narrative takes the story from the start of the project to the final decision by the national government. The case is then analysed by describing the properties of the framework, starting with the interaction between the government authorities and the local groups, their interaction strategies, their power building, potentials to act, and finally their cultural background and the impact on their actions. The other cases, the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder, are dealt with in the same way in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The CSI framework and the research results are discussed in Chapter 8, which also includes suggestions for further research. In Chapter 9 conclusions are drawn linking the findings to the research questions.

Chapter 2 Setting the scene

This chapter sets the scene within which the interaction between the government authorities and citizens took place. It examines recent developments in Dutch and European water management policy and the changing roles of government and citizens in river landscape planning against the background of developments in society during recent decades.

2.1 Dutch and European water management policy

The high water events in the rivers Rhine and Meuse and near floods of 1993 and 1995 precipitated a breakthrough in Dutch water policy (van Stokkom et al., 2005), forcing the advocates of dike reinforcement to reconsider their arguments. The occurrence of two high water events in quick succession seemed to confirm the relationship between climate change and flooding, a connection that opponents of dike reinforcement had made earlier. It was an important reason for the advocates of dike reinforcement to abandon their approach and look at another paradigm, opening the way for an alternative flood protection strategy. In the latter half of the 1990s a flood risk management policy based on the 'Room for the River' concept was developed and formally adopted in legislation in 2000 (van Heezik, 2007). This shift cannot be seen in isolation from developments in water management policy in neighbouring countries in northwestern Europe.

As in the Netherlands, water policy in other European countries had been undergoing a change in approach during the 1990s. The traditional focus on building flood defences was gradually replaced by a focus on managing flood risks (de Bruijn et al., 2007). Generally, the nature of flood risk management in different countries depends on their legislative and administrative systems, their cultural context, the types of floods that they experience (ibid.) and their history in the field of river management. For example, in the UK (particularly in England and Wales) the Making Space for Water policy covers all sources of flooding and contains an integrated portfolio of approaches. It highlights the importance of spatial planning (Samuels et al., 2006). In the Dutch Room for the River policy, spatial planning is also key to water management (Wolsink, 2006), which includes taking measures outside the dikes, such as excavating flood plains, as well as inside the dikes, such as relocating dikes and creating bypasses and (green) side channels.

Besides raising dikes and creating retention areas, the German approach includes flood prevention measures like promoting smart adaptation in and around houses (Steenhuisen et al., 2007). In France improvements in flood risk management address land use management in floodplain areas (Gilard & Givone, 1997) and, more recently, flood prevention measures (Établissement Public Loire, 2008).

This re-examination of the risks of flooding were provoked mainly by the severe floods and high water periods during the 1990s and early 2000s. Other factors were the anticipated rise in sea levels and increasing river discharges resulting from climate change (Mitchell, 2003), the consequent increase in potential damage to residential and commercial properties, and the need to provide a wider portfolio of risk management options, such as flood warnings and awareness raising, spatial planning, home-owner adaptations, insurance, and emergency planning (Johnson et al., 2007).

Flood risk management is defined as the combination of all activities that aim to maintain or improve the ability of a region to cope with peak discharges or extreme rainfall events (de Bruijn et al., 2007). It has to be considered within the context of sustainable water management. The principles of sustainable water management were set out in the Dublin declaration in 1992 and have subsequently been further developed and expanded in the form of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Central to IWRM is the need to manage all aspects of water and water use in a systematic manner and to manage both water and land across the catchment as a whole, also called the 'river basin approach'. From the wider sustainable development perspective, IWRM has to be integrated with other aspects of development, including rural-urban development (ibid.).

As they faced the threats of flooding, most European countries became aware that water problems cannot be solved nationally and require an international approach. The major challenge for international flood risk policy is to overcome the dependence of downstream countries on upstream countries not shifting their problems downstream. Solidarity between upstream and downstream countries is considered crucial. Examples are the cooperation within the International Commission on the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR), the political agreement on a mutual approach between the German federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and the provincial government of Gelderland and Rijkswaterstaat (van Stokkom et al., 2005), and the EU Floods Directive. In the case of the Rhine, the Netherlands depends on the flood risk policy of Nordrhein-Westfalen, while both countries are attempting to achieve an acceptable level of safety based on the probability of flood occurrence. In the Netherlands, general safety standards are fixed by law and imposed by national government, whereas in Germany standards can differ locally depending on historical water levels and local implementation of river measures. Solidarity is important because the effects of German flood policy can improve or worsen the situation in the Netherlands. Higher dikes in Germany can increase the amount of water flowing across the border, whereas retaining the water in areas along

the river in Germany can reduce the volume of water in the river entering the Netherlands. Incidentally, the Netherlands has contributed financially to flood protection measures in Germany. Germany depends on Dutch flood policy to a much smaller extent. Flooding in the Netherlands near the German border may flow behind the dikes via the hinterland back into Germany. In turn, the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen depends on the cooperation of other German federal states upstream as their flood risk policies have downstream effects. Apart from solidarity, international cooperation also provides for coordination of information, exchange of best practices and connecting different policy fields that contribute to flood protection. In addition, involvement of the European Union opens up possibilities for access to European funds (Steenhuisen et al., 2007) for river-widening measures.

2.2 Government–citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning from a historical perspective

Current relations between government authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning have to be viewed in the context of public protests against dike reinforcements, which started in Brakel in the 1970s. This section therefore takes a historical perspective and explores the following questions: Who are the government authorities and who are the citizens, what are their views, and where do they derive their strength from? To understand the context of government–citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning we first examine the key developments in society.

As Dutch river landscape planning and the actors involved are part of Dutch society it is useful to briefly describe some general societal processes. Booher's (2004) breakdown of key developments in today's society provides a useful framework to illustrate this. It sheds light on new spaces for governance processes and the awareness of interdependency, the increasing uncertainty among citizens, a more cultural diverse society with many languages, values, perspectives and styles, and the changing role of trust in government practices.

First, the government is increasingly aware that policy success depends mainly on the involvement of other actors, such as non-governmental organisations and other societal groups, which creates new arenas for governance processes.³ Booher (2004) describes the emergence of new arenas for action, including collaboration between government agencies and institutions outside the political realm. Like many governments in Europe, the Dutch government recognised these changes in society and reconsidered its role, tasks and approach, which led to a rethinking of the government–citizen relationship. The 'Modernising Government' programme that the Dutch government adopted at the beginning of 2000 aims to improve public services, develop a new governmental steering philosophy that balances central and decentralised steering, develop plans for

reorganising and restructuring national government, and improve 'external management', including developing new forms of cooperation and a more service-oriented attitude. In this programme citizens are seen as active participants (van den Brink, 2009). It reminds citizens of their own responsibilities and government departments and lower-tier authorities of their responsibilities. For example, municipalities cannot keep planning new developments outside the dikes and expect Rijkswaterstaat, the Dutch executive agency for water management⁴ to protect them with structural defences (Warner et al., 2008a). The construction of urban extensions in the flood plains in recent decades has exposed the limited competences of Rijkswaterstaat, as it could not prevent these developments going ahead. At the same time they have shown that flood risk problems have to be solved by cooperation between government agencies, civil society organisations and citizens. Whereas at first the challenge was to collaborate with other national government departments responsible for agriculture and nature conservation (Disco, 2000; van Hemert, 1999), since 2000 the emphasis has shifted to delegating river projects to lower-tier authorities, the provinces, municipalities and water boards. This also meant the transfer of responsibilities for public consultation and participation, the idea being that these authorities are closer to citizens and more open to public participation. However, new opportunities for citizen involvement in the work of lower-tier authorities proved to be rare (Verhoeven, 2006) and seemed to remain stuck in the experimental stage (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). Some, like Edelenbos and Klijn (2005), suggest that public involvement needs to be embedded more firmly in institutional processes to prevent interactive processes becoming meaningless and useless in formal decision-making.

Second, citizens are increasingly uncertain about the processes and outcomes of government decision-making, for example regarding potential natural or other disasters, about the capabilities of traditional government agencies, prompted, for example, by the unintended and sometimes negative effects of infrastructure works, and about the limits to centralised hierarchical control by government agencies (Booher, 2004). People know that life is full of uncertainties. Most people have learned to live with day-to-day uncertainties by adopting certain cognitive heuristics and strategies, using technical devices such as smoke detectors, and relying on institutions, emergency services and insurance to accommodate or compensate for the effects of uncertainty. However, there are different views on the acceptability of risks and their consequences (Leach et al., 2002). In public discussions, policy analysis and decision-making, it appears as if the world is fully understandable and can be predicted. Among politicians, recognition is growing that policies that ignore uncertainty about technology and about the physical world often lead in the long run to unsatisfactorily technical, social and political outcomes (Granger Morgan et al., 1990). Until recently, Rijkswaterstaat pretended to know everything in detail (van Hemert, 1999), whereas within the organisation experts and policy makers used to openly discuss the uncertainties of flood risk management.⁵ Although uncertainty is now a standard issue in reports and studies, it remains a difficult subject, particularly to explain to the public. A case in point is the

flood safety standard for dikes of a probability of a flood occurring once every 1,250 years, which proved to be hard to comprehend for citizens because such a flood could occur three times in a short time period, or in ten, twenty or thirty years time. Moreover, people do not take account of the risks posed by rivers, as is shown by their attitudes after the various high water episodes in the 1990s. For a while those who lived near the rivers were more aware of the risks, but soon picked up their daily routines and carried on as before (Benning et al., 1995). However, the newly adopted Room for the River policy, which focuses on expanding river capacity rather than dike reinforcement, made people aware that reducing flood risks implies the sacrifice of land, houses or freedom.

Third, today's society is becoming more culturally diverse, which means that decision-makers have to address a range of societal groups in their own languages and taking account of their values, perspectives, cognitive styles and world views. The inclusion of different stakeholders and creating mutual understanding through deliberation and dialogue are important if solutions are to be found for complex and controversial policy problems (Booher, 2004). Government agencies like Rijkswaterstaat have to deal with people's desire to be involved in the development of government plans, while trying to increase the legitimacy of those plans. In practice, public involvement has still been arranged in traditional ways (Verhoeven, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006), such as information meetings and consultation, while legitimacy is gained largely through the support of lower-tier authorities (see Chapter 5).

Fourth, the trust component in government–citizen relationship is changing (Booher, 2004). Formerly an inherent component of traditional government practices, nowadays building trust is not self-evident in governance processes. In the past, people had confidence in constitutionally embedded institutions or derived trust from these structures. In the current network society, characterised by various interacting networks in which actors have to collaborate by transcending institutional boundaries, trust cannot be assumed (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Putnam (2000) shows in his book *Bowling Alone* that trust in society is disappearing, how we have become increasingly disconnected from one another, and how social structures, whether they be the church or political parties, have disintegrated. As a result, social capital is declining. Critical scholars, such as Wuthnow (1998), argue that trust is not declining, but that the form trust takes is changing. As far as uncertainty in the field of flood risk management is concerned, trust is a key factor in the extent to which citizens rely on the government. Trust is becoming increasingly important as greater emphasis is placed on horizontal forms of governance (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). Other scholars, such as Maloney et al. (2000), state that the role played by government authorities in the creation or maintenance of social capital is neglected. In addition, the implications for governance cannot simply be read off from associational activity and 'stocks' of social capital. Booher (2004) argues that it is a government's task to work with others to find solutions, but also to create trust during this process. For Rijkswaterstaat, this proved to be difficult to achieve. Despite the decentralisation of its main tasks, it still operates in a largely

top-down manner (Roth et al., 2006a; Wiering & Immink, 2006). This traditional approach stems from its mission statement, which includes ‘to work on protecting the country against flooding’.⁶ In the Netherlands, water is considered to be a national security issue and security is a matter of defence, in this case defence against the water, for which Rijkswaterstaat is responsible (Roth et al., 2006a). A cooperative process does not fit easily into the national security discourse, which is the main reason why finding joint solutions and creating trust are still rather noncommittal activities in river landscape planning. As a former MP said: ‘I do hope that the attitude of Rijkswaterstaat towards the region changes from doing something *for* the people to doing something *with* the people’.⁷ This would imply a shift in the organisation’s practices and thus a shift in its organisational culture. However, the citizen’s role in this regard is not unequivocal. Although people expect total security against flooding, which reflects a passive attitude, they also want to have a say in government plans to reduce flood risks and behave as active citizens. This leads inevitably to interaction between government and citizens. Based on these developments arising from the network society, this section has shown that government–citizen interaction is shaping governance practices in the Netherlands. The next section describes how government authorities and citizens have interacted in Dutch river landscape planning since the 1960s. The changing role of government and citizens are described as two different contexts.

Changing role of government

Various scholars argue that Dutch spatial development has become deadlocked (de Swaan, 2008; Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000), partly due to the government’s unresponsiveness to developments arising from society. For example, spatial development increasingly depends on an integrated approach, but the Dutch government continues to tackle problems in a sectoral way despite various attempts to develop a more integrated approach. A close look at the field of river management demonstrates that in the last thirty or so years Rijkswaterstaat has been forced to respond to actual developments, including the effort to adopt a more inclusive approach. However, as the case studies described in Chapters 5 to 7 show, this proved hard to achieve. This is illustrated in the following brief historical overview of the changing role of Rijkswaterstaat.

For more than 200 years Rijkswaterstaat exercised responsibility for Dutch river management through technocratically devised, state-controlled projects (e.g. Nieuwe Merwede and Bergsche Maas at the end of the 19th century, the canalisation of the river Meuse after the 1926 flood, and various dike reinforcements after the 1926 flood and the 1953 flood in the southwest of the Netherlands). This changed after the 1970s. Projects became more flexible and integrative as nature conservation started to play an important role and power shifted towards civil society, local authorities and international bodies (van der Werff, 2004). During the 1970s Rijkswaterstaat’s approach came under attack from fierce environmental opposition and public protests. The controversy with environmentalists concerned the final element in the Delta coastal

defence works, the closure of the Oosterschelde, the original plans for which were changed from a dam into a storm-surge barrier that only fully closes in event of a storm driven by northwesterly winds. Public protests were directed at dike reinforcements, which were considered harmful to the river landscape, and the demolition of historic dike houses in the village of Brakel. They objected to Rijkswaterstaat putting engineering objectives first rather than attempting to integrate measures into the landscape. Environmental groups adopted the critique and put the preservation of cultural and historical monuments and ecological values in the river landscape onto the political agenda (van Eeten, 1999; Wiering & Driessen, 2001; Wolsink, 2003). This resulted in the establishment of two advisory commissions, a common Dutch approach to resolving political and policy controversies. In 1977 the Becht Commission (*Commissie Becht*) recommended reducing the flood protection standard for dikes from a probability of flooding of once in 3,000 years to once in 1,250 years. Consequently, part of the proposed dike reinforcement was cancelled (van Hemert, 1999). However, due to a new calculation method the dikes had to be much higher than had been foreseen, resulting in a renewal of protest actions (Wiering & Driessen, 2001). In 1993, the report of the Commission for Assessing the Principles of River Dike Reinforcement (*Commissie Toetsing Uitgangspunten Rivierdijkversterking*), chaired by Kees Boertien, opened a policy window for implementing the necessary raising and strengthening of the dikes in a way that preserved the landscape. In the following year the adoption of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Act made EIA obligatory for all proposed dike reinforcement works (Wiering & Driessen, 2001; Wolsink, 2003), which implied that conservation of landscape qualities had become standard policy. As a result, the policy controversy over the need for dike reinforcement in which the advocates of raising the dikes stood diametrically opposed to the opponents faded into the background. As van Eeten (1999:144-145) states: 'Though the dike improvement critique used valid arguments through a point-by-point rebuttal of the dike improvement argument through an accurate exposure of the uncertainties underlying it, the critique fails to offer an alternative'.

The reorientation that came into being within Rijkswaterstaat was elaborated in various projects, such as *Infraplan*, *Ketenbenadering* (Chain Approach) and, *Besturen via de Spiegel* (Governing via the Mirror). The new 'open planning process' (*open planproces*) showed that policy making was considered an activity that had to be implemented with broad public involvement (Pestman & van Tatenhove, 1998). Learning from infrastructure planning practice, in the second half of the 1990s Rijkswaterstaat started an experiment called InfraLab, which led to the development of Infraplan, a methodology for improving the development and decision-making processes of projects and broadening the support base (van Enthoven, 1996; Wolsink, 2003). During the same period, the 'need and purpose' (*nut en noodzaak*) debate emerged as a planning instrument designed to ensure a more smoothly running process. As part of the 'funnel procedure' in which each subsequent step reduced the margins for choice, this instrument was mainly used to speed up the planning cycle, allowing only a few months

for discussion after which the debate was closed (Wolsink, 2003). The instrument met with much criticism and proved to be ineffective. These experiments did not therefore result in a change in the organisation's approach. A 1999 report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR*) concluded that institutional changes ('stakeholder planning') were needed to achieve high levels of governance. This report played a major part in the shift in the approach taken by Rijkswaterstaat and condemned the practice by government of unilaterally imposing projects as an obstacle to legitimacy. Furthermore, as the decision-making procedures were not designed to generate public support, the outcome was often the creation of resistance (Wolsink, 2003).

Meanwhile, the tendency to decentralise and outsource important government tasks did not pass Rijkswaterstaat by. In the early 1990s Rijkswaterstaat became an executive agency focusing on regional services, which included the transfer of a considerable part of the flood defences budget to the provinces and responsibility for maintaining the dikes to the water boards (Warner et al., 2008). The high water events in 1993 and 1995 interrupted this decentralisation exercise. An emergency Major Rivers Delta Plan (*Deltaplan Grote Rivieren*) to reinforce weak dikes and build emergency defences along the rivers was drafted and passed at lightning speed. But this plan proved to be a temporary revival of the traditional approach within a trend towards greater public involvement (ibid.).

Although the Room for the River policy of 1996 remained heavily dominated by national government (van der Werff, 2004; Wiering & Immink, 2006), it opened up some opportunities for Rijkswaterstaat to take a more receptive attitude to other stakeholders (Roth et al., 2006a). The policy required a style of governance based on reaching negotiated solutions with local inhabitants, government agencies at various levels, ministries and others. It required a new approach based on coordination and integration, negotiation, participatory design and implementation, and stakeholder involvement (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

To summarise, while the command and control approach has persisted (Wiering & Driessen, 2001), it has been regularly pushed into the background by attempts to adopt a more adaptive approach. The inclusion of other interests and objectives has put a severe strain on the adaptability of Rijkswaterstaat. In the new configuration of state and civil society Rijkswaterstaat's new role as a governance actor has turned out to be more or less successful. As the focus of this thesis is on government-citizen interaction, the next chapter presents an analytical framework which focuses, among other aspects, on how government authorities are equipped for their task of acting with other stakeholders, especially citizens.

Changing role of citizens

During the last few decades the part played by the public in Dutch river management

has changed from a 'passive' role in which people are consulted at a late stage of the planning process to an 'active' role of engagement in the process. This active citizenship encompasses different forms of collective protest, initiated in the 1970s by residents in Brakel, who put black flags on the dikes to express their disapproval of dike reinforcements. This later developed into resistance against government authorities' spatial claims (e.g. emergency water storage in Ooijpolder; see Chapter 6), cooption into an advisory group of a project organisation (e.g. dike relocation in Lent; see Chapter 5) and taking the initiative to make their own plan (e.g. terps plan in Overdiep polder; see Chapter 7). The case studies are examples of citizens organising themselves to oppose government plans or take the initiative in planning their environment. They took action because they felt their views were insufficiently reflected in government plans (Chapter 5 and 6) or they did not trust the government to include their views in government plans (Chapter 7).

Today, citizens are well aware that their actions will not be judged as simply NIMBY (not in my backyard) protests. They come up with alternatives and know how to couch the issue more in terms of the national interest. The farmers in Overdiep polder intended to transform their polder into a water retention area with a flood probability of once in 25 years. In doing so they combined the public interest with a viable economic perspective for their farming operations.

Others, like the High Water Platform, established by citizens in Ooijpolder opposing the plan for emergency water storage, avoided the NIMBY label by stating that they 'would basically be willing to make sacrifices for the interest of national security, if argued on solid grounds'.⁸ Another characteristic is that the local groups in Overdiep Polder and Ooijpolder adopted more easily than the local groups in Lent, the relevant policy discourse to show their ability to speak in terms familiar to experts and were able to use specialised knowledge (Pellizzoni, 2003).

Whereas in the past opposition by citizens was mainly based on rejection of government decisions which did not meet, or inadequately met, their wishes, nowadays it mostly starts with non-reconciliation, but changes into a constructive approach in which alternatives are proposed and attempts are made to start a dialogue. Today, citizen protests take a communicative approach and display strategies that include research, as recent studies of citizen protest groups show (Roth et al., 2006a; van Dijk & van der Wulp, 2009). This recognises the agency of citizens as 'makers and shapers' who set agendas rather than as 'users and choosers' of interventions or services designed by others (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000). As 'makers and shapers' citizens may be aware of the fact that government authorities consist of people who have different views and values. As such, government authorities are not considered impersonal, internally consistent, monolithic and single-minded organisations. This means that the development and implementation of policy is a 'messier' process that is also more susceptible to outside influences. Citizens may see themselves as one of many actors

that may influence policy making and decision-making. The active citizenship fits in with the new model of the Dutch government in which citizens are seen as active participants (Ossewaarde, 2007).

Citizens who form local groups to oppose government plans to reduce flood risks can theoretically be viewed as social movements. Fraser (1997) considers social movements to be an essential element of the democratic process because of their capacity to formulate oppositional views. Social movements imply a widening of discursive contestation. This political-process approach allows us to explore the ways in which citizens mobilise political and sociocultural contexts, 'frame' issues and develop 'repertoires of contention', including novel tactics to appeal to supporters as well as to put forward their arguments to decision-makers and the wider public. These insights contribute to an understanding of the phases of the movement, or 'cycles of contention' (Mayo, 2005). As participants in government–citizen interaction, citizens are viewed here as active and organised in local groups.

Chapter 3 A framework for analysing cross-scale interaction

The case studies in this thesis will be analysed within a conceptual framework of cross-scale social interaction: the CSI framework. This chapter is devoted to this framework. First, the foundation will be laid by a literature overview, before turning to the framework proper, followed by the embeddedness of the framework in current literature.

3.1 Towards the CSI framework:

A process view of cross-scale social interaction

As described in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to understand the relationships between government authorities⁹ and local groups in river landscape planning and whether this leads to conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue or collaboration. The essence of these relationships is their social interaction, which is the main theme of this study. Before explaining the framework for cross-scale interaction (CSI), this section discusses a process view of cross-scale interaction.

Social interaction has been discussed by many European theorists, including Weber, Parson, Simmel, and later in the works of Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault, to name a few. The concept of social interaction used to be limited to the fields of social psychology (Aguinis et al., 1996; Tajfel, 1982), sociology (Elster, 1989; Etzioni, 1968; Giddens, 1976; Hare et al., 1965) and anthropology (Wolf, 1982). Later it also became a theme in other disciplines, like sociolinguistics (Tannen, 1995; van Dijk, 1997), planning (Forester, 1994; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995) and ecological economics (Rudd, 2000). Drawing on these disciplines, the aim of the present section is to develop a process view of cross-scale social interaction as the first step towards comprehending the interactions between government authorities and local groups in Dutch river landscape planning.

This approach implies a cross-disciplinary study rather than viewing a particular aspect of social interaction from a specific discipline. It seeks to provide an overview of social interaction and its properties rather than a substantive investigation of what is at issue in the social interaction. It offers the opportunity to understand the conditions within

which social interaction takes place, how the actors actually behave, and how social interaction proceeds to an outcome. In other words, it reveals the relationship between government authorities and local groups by placing the properties of their social interaction within a coherent scheme.

As social interaction is about action which occurs between two actors, Elster (1989:13) can be taken as a point of departure, especially his statement that the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals.

From Elster's perspective, an action can be explained by seeing it as the end result of two successive filtering operations. The first filter is made up of all the physical, economic, legal and psychological constraints on the individual. The actions consistent with these constraints form his opportunity set. The second filter determines which action within the opportunity set will actually be carried out and consists of the actor's motivations (which may be outcome-oriented, as in rational choice theory, or not outcome-oriented, as in social norms).

Etzioni (1968) takes a slightly different view of social interaction. He is particularly interested in what he describes as 'potential capacity to act'¹⁰ of 'collectivities', which can be members of a social category that has a set of shared values in common rather than only interests. Collectivities have a 'potential capacity to act by drawing on a set of normative bonds which tie its members' (ibid.:98,99). This capacity to act can be referred to the ability, motivation and support necessary for people to take action.

The capacity to act can be found in the work of scholars that have studied the concept of social capital. In the literature, the term refers to social networks, norms and sanctions that facilitate cooperative action among individuals and communities (Halpern, 2005). Putnam (2000:20) argues that networks involve mutual obligations; they foster norms of reciprocity: 'I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that you (or someone else) will return the favour. Sanctions are the result of non-reciprocity: 'if you don't go to somebody's funeral, they won't come to yours'. Reciprocity, however, only functions well if people are trustworthy, if people take responsibility for their conduct and obligations. Putnam emphasises the importance of trust: 'a society characterised by generalised reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society' (ibid.:21).¹¹ This means that trust is an important factor for social capital. According to Stoker (1998:23) the actors' capacity to act also consist of resources, which can be described as skills, money and land. In addition, whether an actor is an individual or group, identity is always a factor. Castells (1997:7) states that in today's world, the search for identity (collective or individual, ascribed or constructed) has become the fundamental source of social meaning. Social identity is therefore part of the actor's capacity to act.

To summarise, social interaction occurs between two actors, which can be either individuals or social groups. When an actor is a group, as in this study, its capacity to act can be considered to be composed of trust, resources and social identity, and a motivation to act based on rationality and social norms (for further elaboration, see section 3.2.1). An actor's capacity to act and motivation to act give insight into its potential to act.

The actors' basis for action further consists of varying combinations of both cohesive relations and control networks (Etzioni, 1968). The former refer to maintaining social relations and the latter have to do with building power to control.

To understand how actors maintain social relations, the concept of framing may be useful for interpreting collective and organisational processes (Steinberg, 1998). In the literature there are two distinct interpretations of frames. The first views frames as mental orientations that organise perception and interpretation. This interpretation focuses on the way people experience, interpret, process or represent issues, relationships and interactions in conflict setting. The second interpretation sees frames as interactional co-construction by focusing on how parties negotiate meaning in interactions (Dewulf et al., 2009). In this study, the concept of framing is interpreted and used mainly in the sense of mental representation, with less attention to the discursive aspect of frames. Frames are used to give meaning to the actors' position in their interaction with others through the use of various frame types.

Etzioni's concept of 'control networks' is based on the assumption that the realisation of most societal goals requires the application of power. He defines power as 'a capacity to overcome part or all of the resistance, to introduce changes in the face of opposition' (Etzioni, 1968:314). As such, power is a property of social interaction (Emerson, 1962:32), or, as Wrong (1968:673) argues, 'people exercise mutual influence and control over one another's behaviour in all social interaction'. In the literature, power is considered to be an important resource for 'getting things done' and appearing powerless can have far-reaching negative consequences for one's ability to perform effectively. Power is related to the control of critical resources. Powerful actors are those who have access to people, information, expertise or other resources that are critical and in short supply. Power is also inversely related to dependence. In an asymmetric power relationship, the person with less power is more dependent on the person with more power for valued resources. In other words, the more dependent people are on others, the less powerful they are considered to be (Lee & Tiedens, 2001). Power can therefore be viewed as relational and relative. Actors are not powerful or weak in themselves, but may be powerful in relation to other actors in some respects and weak in relation to other actors in other respects (Etzioni, 1968:314; Wrong, 1968:673-674). Giddens' (1976) term 'dialectic of control' expresses the idea that the 'power-full' are never fully independent of the 'power-less', which implies that the 'power-less' always have some power and hence some control over the 'power-full' (Olga, 1996:89-90).

Following Giddens, Healey (2003:113) argues that just as social relations operate on several levels at once, so power relations are expressed in the dynamics of interaction between actors. The dynamics of power relations, however, are difficult to manifest as they are continually in a dialectic and 'restless' flux due to struggles in various arenas at various levels at once. Social interaction can thus be viewed as a multilayered process with a power dimension. As Lukes argues in *Power: A Radical View* (1974), the visible power of formal government decision-making arenas is always complemented by the informal and less visible ways in which power and influence is mobilised (Healey, 1997:59). Power, Lukes suggests, may be understood as having three dimensions. The first is based on the traditional pluralists' approach, the second is essentially put forward by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) in their consideration of power's second face, and the third is developed by Lukes (Gaventa, 1980:4).

Lukes' three dimensions of power consists of a one-dimensional view, a two-dimensional view and a three-dimensional view.¹² The one-dimensional view, also characterised as 'visible power', includes the visible and definable aspects of political power – the formal rules, structures, government authorities, institutions and procedures of decision-making (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). This means that contest over interests are assumed to be visible, which in turn are presumed to be relatively open (Gaventa, 2006). It emphasises the exercise of power through decision-making and observable behaviour. Robert Dahl, a proponent of this view, defines power as occurring in a situation where 'A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do' (Dahl as cited in Lukes, 1974:11). A's power, therefore, is defined in terms of B; the extent to which A prevails is determined by its higher ratio of 'successes' and 'defeats' over B. Observable behaviour then becomes a key factor in the pluralist approach to power. Dahl's *Who Governs?* (2005) expresses the pluralist belief that the political arena is an open system in which everyone may participate and express grievances, which in turn leads to decision-making. Those who propose alternatives and initiate issues which contribute to the decision-making process are demonstrating observable influence and control over those who failed to express any interest in the political process. The pluralist approach assumes that in an open system, all people, not just the elite, would participate in decision-making if they felt strongly enough about an issue and wanted their values to be expressed and represented. Non-participation is thought to express a lack of grievances and agreement with the way the leaders are already handling the system. Political inaction is not a problem within the one-dimensional system; it merely reflects the apathy of ordinary citizens with little interest in or knowledge of political matters and their acceptance of the existing system, which they see as being of common benefit to society. While pluralists consider politics to be primarily a concern of the elite, ordinary people can have a say if they become organised, and everyone has indirect influence through their right to vote in the electoral process. Pluralism recognises a heterogeneous society composed of people belonging to various groups with differing and competing interests. Conflict is also recognised as not only an expected result, but as a necessary instrument which enables

the determination of a ruling class in terms of who the winner is.

The two-dimensional view of power, also described as 'hidden power', is less obvious and more difficult to engage (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). The entry of certain interests and actors is privileged over others through a prevailing 'mobilisation of bias' or rules of the game (Gaventa, 2006). It sees a monopolistic system of inequalities created and maintained by the dominant power. The elite have the means and the political resources to prevent political actions that would not benefit them and to push forward those that would. The elite determine the agenda of both decision-making and non-decision-making and in so doing establish their dominance and the subordination and compliance of those at the bottom of the power hierarchy. The two-dimensional view of power also involves analyses of potential issues, grievances, non-decision-making and non-participation. It stresses both overt and/or covert conflict. Barach and Baratz (as cited in Lukes, 1974:19) state that if 'there is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in which case non-decision-making is impossible'.

The three-dimensional view of power, also characterized as 'invisible power', is about shaping meaning (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). It adopts the consideration of hidden social forces and conflict, which exercise influence by shaping the consciousness of the individual or organisation, through internalisation of powerlessness, and/or through domination ideologies, values and forms of behaviour (Gaventa, 2006). As well as decisions and non-decisions, this view incorporates other ways to control the political agenda which are not made deliberately by the choice of individuals or groups. This third view of power seeks to identify 'the means through which power influences, shapes or determines conceptions of necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of conflict' (Gaventa, 1980:15). In other words, it involves specifying how A gets B to believe and choose to act in a way that reinforces the bias of the system, advancing the cause of A and impairing that of B, usually in the form of compliance. Passive acceptance of situations or circumstances that are in conflict with one's interests occur even when the subordinated realise they are being repressed. They submit quietly because they fear sanctions, but also because they have gone through a 'psychological adaptation to the state of being without power' (Gaventa, 1980:16). They recognise their powerlessness and see no possibility to reverse it, and therefore submit to their hopeless situation with lethargic acceptance.

Rather than analysing the dynamics or dimensions of power, or how much power is given to actors, the objective of this study is to manifest what forms of power actors are building in the relationship between government authorities and local groups; in other words, the actual exercise of power (see also Newman, 2001). A potentially useful angle to analyse power in this way comes from French and Raven (1959), who developed a model based on social power that has been applied in numerous situations of social interaction. It consists of five power bases: coercion, reward, legitimacy, expert and

reference. This model – with some alterations – also seems applicable to social interactions in a river landscape setting.

To summarise, social interaction has been differentiated into the actors' potential to act, which comprises their capacity and motivation to act, their interaction strategies and their power building.

We now turn to the outcomes of social interaction. Etzioni (1968:483) argues that in capitalist democratic societies there is a tendency to build consensus before implementing a policy. This is in line with Habermas' communicative action theory, in which action is geared to reaching mutual understanding. Communicative action is motivated by the need to arrive at a rational consensus. For Habermas the structures of communicative rationality are to be found in the formal structures of speech; rational principles of deliberation are implicit in the structure of ordinary linguistic communication: language, reason and action are inherently intermeshed. The participants in communicative action are assumed to be prepared to reach a mutual understanding, that is, their attitude is communicative rather than strategic (oriented towards achieving their own ends). As such, they are assumed to be accountable, capable of justifying their actions and expressions. When 'the consensus underlying smoothly functioning communicative interaction breaks down', discourse comes in. Through discourse the actors seek to attain a rational consensus, the ideal speech situation through which agreement can be achieved. Speakers seek to justify the claims they are making or to show by their actions that they are sincere, but this does not happen in cases of distorted communication that stem from conflicts (Habermas, 2002:xiv-xv). According to Habermas, conflicts cannot be entirely suppressed, but must not become openly manifest, because they threaten the identity or self-understanding of one or more actors. In Habermas' view, the outcomes of interaction are 'discourse' or 'rational consensus'. As a communicative action theorist, Forester (1982:447) acknowledges that conflict is a possible outcome of social interaction, but it is not an ideal situation since it 'often yields little new understanding or dialogue, and even less negotiated agreement on public action'. He therefore focuses on moving a conflict into debate (with the help of a moderator), negotiation (helped by a mediator) or dialogue (assisted by a facilitator). Drawing on Forester's view, we can place the outcomes of social interaction along a continuum, with conflict at one end and collaboration at the other end. Whether one believes conflict to be a part of human nature or contingent upon social learning or social influence (Tidwell, 1998:4), conflict is always present. Collaboration in the sense of a joint operation or action is assumed to be the most effective way of joint action. Hence, in our framework, conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration are viewed as possible outcomes of social interaction.

Social interaction can be distinguished in many ways (Etzioni, 1968). For this study it is limited to direct and indirect interactions. Members of a group may interact directly with members of another group, indirectly through institutional or organisational

umbrella organisations, or via elected members of the municipal council, provincial council or members of parliament. Another option is interaction via the media.

Studying social interaction without taking the actors' culture and traditions into account would imply the exclusion of an important source of action, because culture is an explicit or implicit element in the way people act. Rather than viewing actors as driven by instrumental rationality, in which social action is reduced to self-interest, and to divorce their assumed goal of maximising personal gains from the social and cultural contexts, they are seen here as representatives of different meaning systems (Poncelet, 2001). As Bourdieu (1977:2-5) notes in his 'theory of practice', these meaning systems are founded in the social interactions that take place in the different settings actors live in. They are informed by various forms of social and cultural knowledge, values and beliefs and have various aims and purposes. As these meaning systems are renewed and reproduced by actors who themselves also change over time, history is part of this approach to analysing the actors' culture and traditions.

To summarise, social interaction depends on the actors involved, the context and the form it takes. Additional important factors are how actors articulate their values during social interaction and how these become embedded in discourses and practices. These can be revealed by taking a process view of social interaction. This starts with the properties of social interaction, which are conceptualised in the actors' potential to act (comprising their capacity and motivation to act), their power building, their interaction strategies and the outcomes of their interaction. In addition, the actors' culture and traditions and the impacts of these on their actions are analysed.

The basic analytical tool in this study describes what the actors said. The main reason for this is that social interaction involves communication. Much of the thinking of ordinary people does not follow the patterns of inference, abstractions and generalisations that science itself characterises. People do learn and store a great deal of information about their lives (Baumeister & Newman, 1994:676-677). One means of understanding these patterns of thought and interpretation is the study of dialogues. Dialogues may bring people together but it may also divide them, depending on what is communicated and how (Tidwell, 1998:87). In people's communication emotions play a central role. In some social interactions actors abandon emotions as much as possible while in others emotions are prevalent. Generally, the actors' cognitive and emotional states are interwoven. The cognitive states of actors include the ways in which statements, stories and descriptions are designed and received in conversation (Maynard & Peräkylä, 2003); the emotional states of actors are those qualities that are manifested in mental, bodily or behavioural symptoms (Gerrod Parrott, 2001). Actors seek to achieve a situation in which their emotions are accepted by others and feel secure and feel free to express themselves. This study examines how people's everyday understanding of the world is related to their actions in the government-citizen relationship. The key objects of the analysis of social interaction are fragments of talks,

discussions and writings. Besides the content of the actors' communication (e.g. arguments, motivations, opinions), the focus of the analysis is on how they communicate with each other in order to understand what they try to achieve with specific expressions.

Cross-scale social interaction

In the commons literature, cross-scale interaction refers to linking institutions both horizontally (across space) and vertically (across levels of organisations) (Berkes, 2002), or to an interplay between social organisations (Young, 2002). In this study, cross-scale interaction is interpreted primarily as vertical social interaction (across hierarchical organisational tiers and with local groups). Practice has shown that these cross-scale social interactions in the field of water management usually occur with the help of a water expert. Horizontal social interaction (across space) is not an issue in this study because local groups operate locally to achieve local objectives. Vertical cross-scale social interaction, between government and civil society¹³ and between government agencies, is not a new phenomenon. For centuries citizens, usually landowners and farmers, have been represented in water boards that operate at the regional level (see also Chapter 1) and Dutch government has a history of accommodating social interests (Pierre & Peters, 2000).

Young (2002) locates the central concern within the realm of vertical institutional interplay or interactions between institutions operating at different levels of social organisation. He particularly draws attention to the functional interdependencies of institutions. Recognising that 'functional interdependencies arise when substantive problems of activities that two or more institutions address are linked in specific terms' (Young, 2002:264), functional interdependencies between government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning may arise when land-use and water management problems are at stake. The question that Young poses may also be relevant here: 'Are there ways to manage cross-scale interactions to minimise conflicts of interest or to maximise efficiency in the pursuit of common goals?'

From state-centred to less-state centred

The change from a state-centred model towards a less-state centred model of governing that has taken place in recent decades, in the literature also referred to as government versus governance,¹⁴ implies that government is dependent on regional and local support for its policy, not only from lower-tier authorities but also from local groups trying to get their voice heard. New forms of governance will affect the relationship between state and society. As can be concluded from this study, the creation of a more participatory style of governing does not mean that government is in fact less powerful, but it does mean that state and society are bound together in the process of governance. If anything, the state may actually be strengthened through its interactions with society. As Fischer (2000:217) puts it: 'Citizen involvement in both defining a problem and searching for its solutions is an important factor in building legitimacy required to

implement policy effectively.' The state may have to abdicate some aspects of its nominal control over policy, especially in the policy formulation stage. On the other hand, it tends to gain substantial control at the implementation stage by having in essence co-opted social interests that might otherwise oppose its actions (Pierre & Peters, 2000:49).

There is a chance that governance fails as result of difficulties in establishing long-term coalitions and the limits to the various techniques for government steering (Stoker, 2000). Jessop (1998:38) puts this in perspective as he argues that markets, states and governance all fail. Failure is a central feature of all social relations. Stoker (2000:104-107) identifies four reasons to expect governance failure. Although these were based on an urban setting, they also seem applicable to river landscape planning.

The first reason for governance failure may be the absence of a process of engagement and re-engagement of partners. At a lower tier of governance, this may be due to the absence or breakdown of a continuous process of dialogue and negotiation. At a higher tier of governance there must be some social purpose, and a capacity to produce more effective long-term outcomes than could have been produced by the market or imperative coordination by the state. In the field of Dutch river landscape planning, the absence or breakdown of a process of dialogue and negotiation may occur at all levels of government, national, regional or local. In addition, it may be presumed that instead of a social purpose at a higher tier of government, a combination of restructuring of government services and maintaining imperative coordination may be an underlying cause of governance failure.

The second reason for governance failure may be the occurrence of a specific type of conflict. While recognising that social conflicts are endemic (Hirschman, 1995), they should not automatically be seen as undermining governance as they can provide the energy and drive for governance. Stoker (2000:105) distinguishes two types of conflicts, divisible and indivisible. The former includes a never-ending series of conflicts, which is characteristic of market societies, and these conflicts can be managed as long as they are divisible, which means that the subject of the dispute can be reduced or increased in size or effect. Such conflicts lend themselves to compromise and the art of bargaining, but they are never resolved entirely and so the scene is always set for the next round of negotiation. The cumulative experience of muddling through numerous such conflicts is at the heart of an effective governance system (see also Healey, 2003). Indivisible conflicts hamper or disable governance. Conflicts which are driven by matters of religion, language or ideology and which have an either/or character present considerable difficulties to governance. They are not inherently irresolvable, but in so far as they figure strongly they are likely to make the compromise and messiness central to governance appear inadequate. Conflicts in Dutch river landscape planning are divisible rather than indivisible. However, if one views place attachment in the Dutch river landscape as a type of 'cultural religion' in which people feel their living environment to be an intrinsic part of their identity, this implies that indivisible conflicts also occur.

The third reason to expect governance failure has to do with government authorities operating in an increasingly globalised world and in the context of a complex architecture of government agencies. Governance therefore involves making links between different spatial scales. The perception of appropriate timescales may also vary between these levels. Effective action at the local level may depend on decisions taken at a higher level. Some actors may enter the governance relationship with a very localist perspective, whereas for others the boundary is regional or national. Reconciling these different spatial perspectives is complicated. In the same way, what to some people is a short-term timescale may appear to be an eternity to others. Governance arrangements generally work to a longer-term horizon, but groups of citizens and politicians are likely to interpret 'long term' to such varying degrees that governance failure may result. Dutch river landscape planning involves both spatial and timescale problems between the various actors. The extent to which these problems occur will be considered in the case studies described in this study.

A fourth reason for governance failure is the tension between two conceptions of 'good' government. One, the 'overhead' conception of democracy, relies on a range of new management techniques to enable government decision-makers to understand public wishes and oversee government, and in turn be held to account by the public. Another, which might be called the 'stakeholder model', argues that effective governance requires the direct involvement of various interests, both in the making and the implementing of policy. The latter downplays the role of the formal electoral processes and the representatives it produces. The tension between these two models and their competing claims for legitimacy can be a source of governance failure. In Dutch river landscape planning, the tension between these two models is felt by all actors involved. In the case studies it will be made clear to what extent this disables governance practices.

Public demand versus government responsiveness

In the changing relationships between the state and society, Pierre and Peters (2000) identify a fundamental paradox: on the one hand the public appears still to demand that government exert some control over the processes and outcomes of governing (and appears weak or indecisive when it does not meet the public demand), and on the other hand the public appears to resist control from government. This can be explained in two ways. First, this resistance may be to do with evasive and overt resistance or, more positively, the role of the public as a source of policy ideas and the need for broader citizen engagement in making policy. The question that arises is whether this paradox is an issue in this study and, if so, whether it has a negative or positive implication.

The literature on public administration shows that a bureaucracy tends to be selective in its response to pressures from interest groups and citizens. Albrow (1970:118), for example, notes that 'the public speaks, yet it is the official who chooses when to listen, to whom, and with what degree of attention'. As Etzioni-Halevy (1985:52) puts it: 'The bureaucracy displays a distinct tendency to be more responsive to the better established,

the more articulated, the more powerful among the interest groups'. Whether this holds for today's government authorities will be considered in the case studies described in this study.

Multilevel governance

Cross-scale social interaction also includes a form of multilevel governance, which generally refers to negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels. It denotes a vertical 'layering' of governance processes at these different levels (Peters & Pierre, 2001). According to Peters and Pierre (ibid.:132), an important incentive that propelled the emergence of multilevel governance is the changing division of labour between institutions at different levels of government over the past couple of decades. This has opened up opportunities for negotiated arrangements, either to complement or to replace the legalistic, hierarchical institutional relationship. Another development is recent administrative reform in which a 'new public management' style reform divides the political-democratic element of government from the managerial-service producing sector of government. Decentralisation has reshuffled institutional relationships and created a system in which institutions at one level can enter into exchanges with institutions at any other level and in which the nature of the exchange is characterised more by dialogue and negotiation than command and control. This point about multilevel governance raised by Peters and Pierre also arises in this study. Whether this tends more towards dialogue and negotiation or towards command and control will be described in the three case studies.

Knowledge, hindering and framing

Some aspects of social interaction need special attention: the role of knowledge, the use of hindering, and the concept of framing.

Knowledge

Knowledge can be considered to be a societal property or an asset (Etzioni, 1968:135). As well as existing in the minds of individuals, knowledge is stored in collective facilities (from libraries to servers), is made available for collective action (e.g. when an organisation retains experts), and is shifted from the service of one societal goal to the service of another (e.g. laboratory employees who are transferred from one government service to another) (ibid.:135-136). In this study the focus is primarily on knowledge made available for collective action.

Today's Dutch river landscape planning draws largely on technical/scientific knowledge rather than public knowledge, which is grounded in day-to-day practice. This makes it relevant to address the relationship between experts and citizens here. Beck's Risk Society (1992) and Giddens' (1990) work present an overly instrumental-calculative interpretation of the citizens' cognitive orientation in this relationship (Fischer, 2000:61). In this view, citizens make deliberate choices between recognised alternatives

when seeking the assistance of experts. Wynne (1996) argues that underlying this perspective is an overly rationalistic conception of the citizen–expert relationship. What is required is a more cultural and constructivist analysis of this relationship. In fact, the public’s relationship to expert systems is more complex, as exemplified by public perceptions of the uncertainties of physical risks. Based on studies such as the research into the opposition to nuclear power by Welsh (1993), Wynne (1996) shows that dissent among experts is frequently generated and supported by the existence of a public backdrop of doubt and disaffection. At critical moments, dissent in the expert community may well follow the lead of dissent by citizens (Fischer, 2000:64). Even when citizens do believe in experts, this faith is much more conditional and more fragile than standard interpretations reflect. Lay people are often more sceptical of, more ambivalent to, and more alienated from expert institutions than is generally recognised. This implies that a better understanding is required of the kinds of knowledge that lay people bring to the task of assessing risks (Irwin, 1995). Studies of public risk perception reveal the neglect by experts of two basic dimensions of risk perception. The first concerns the social context in which risks are embedded: Is the risk imposed by distant or unknown officials? Is it engaged in voluntarily? Is it irreversible? Second, experts make assumptions about the character of the risk situation that are quite removed from the experiences of those at the actual site (Fischer, 2000:65). Relating the role of experts in their field of study to their role in today’s society, Fischer (2009:299-300) states that experts are used to working in a top-down manner. Instead of a top-down flow of knowledge, there is a need to interconnect the top and the bottom. In other words: what is needed are democratic spaces for citizens to deliberate empirical outcomes, contextual assumptions and the social meaning of conclusions. Whether this demand is an issue in this study will be addressed in the case studies.

Hindering

From the literature we can conclude that hindering is a common tactic in social interaction between government authorities and citizens. Government authorities may be strongly motivated to obstruct a planning process if this is felt to be necessary. In the planning literature this behaviour is often linked to a NIMTOO (not in my term of office) approach to decision-making. Worried about highly controversial decisions that may affect their careers, politicians or bureaucrats may refuse to pass laws and delay the implementation of existing regulations (White, 1993). Also, competition between political principals and bureaucrats may make the administrative apparatus a resource worth competing for in an effort to influence programmatic control over public policy and its elaboration, and thus the planning process. Political principals may opt for stringent control over the administrative apparatus in order to assure compliance with their goals (Aberbach & Rockman, 1988). As officials have a crucial role in the formulation as well as the elaboration of public policy, it will be difficult to exert this control. This raises questions about how well politicians know what is actually happening and the extent to which non-compliance by officials will hamper government action.

In the social movement literature, citizen protest encompasses a wide variety of actions ranging from conventional strategies of political persuasion, such as lobbying, voting and petitioning, to confrontational tactics, including marches, strikes and demonstrations that disrupt day-to-day life of a community. Whereas conventional strategies are usually directed at influencing decision-making to stop or hinder progress with a specific project or plan by adopting the same means of political expression used by political parties and interest groups, confrontational tactics aim to obstruct daily life to draw attention to a particular goal. Less visible forms of protest are also possible. These are often attributed to ordinary people, as described in Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* (1987). In situations of close surveillance people find other ways to resist. For example, in feudal Europe, peasants and slaves worked very slowly or poorly when doing tasks for their lord or master. They did the wrong thing and 'played dumb' when confronted by their bosses. They craftily sabotaged constructions or told jokes or spread gossip about their superiors. Today's citizen protests may, for instance, have a NIMBY (not in my back yard) character. Following Dear (1992), the NIMBY syndrome can be recognised by the expression of three concerns: the perceived threat to property values, personal security, and neighbourhood amenity. NIMBY conflicts seem to follow a three-stage cycle (ibid.). The first stage is Youth: news of the proposal breaks, lighting the fuse of conflict. Opposition tends to be confined to a small vocal group residing very near to the proposed development. NIMBY sentiments are usually expressed in the rawest, bluntest of terms, often reflecting an irrational, unthinking response by opponents. The second stage is Maturity: battle lines are solidified as the two sides assemble ranks of supporters. The debate moves away from private complaints and into a public forum. As a consequence, the rhetoric of opposition becomes more rational and objective. More measured voices express concerns about property value decline, increased traffic volumes, and the like. The final stage is Old Age: the period of conflict resolution is often long and drawn-out, and sometimes inconclusive. Victory tends to go to those with the persistence and stamina to last the course. Typically, at this stage, some kind of arbitration process is adopted, using professional or political resources. Both sides make concessions. If positions become sufficiently entrenched, a stalemate may ensue, victory again falling to those with staying power. However, as Welsh (1993) and Wolsink (1994) have argued, it is a mistake to interpret numerous expressions of localised interests as being based purely on parochial concerns. They may represent a form of collective public rejection of a specific development in particular, and the relationship between science and society in general. Whether the above-mentioned forms of hindering by government authorities and citizens are at issue in this study will be described in the case studies.

Framing

Framing is inherently present in social interaction. Actors may use a single frame or several frames. In this study the following four frames are prominent: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame and a collaborative frame.

The emergence of a power frame depends on the way actors talk and behave in their

interaction. From Gray's (2003) list of nine categories of power frames, four were identified as relevant: authority/positional, resources, expertise and personal. The first refers to the actual ability to make decisions on the basis of a formal role assignment. The second category concerns power derived from possessing resources (e.g. time, money, staff) that others do not possess. The third is about possessing relevant or unique knowledge and experience that others do not have. In the fourth frame an individual interpersonal style grants credibility and power in interaction (e.g. charisma, competent communication skills, negotiation experience).

An identity frame is based on how people view themselves in relation to the other, or 'them'. In general, as Gray (2003:21) puts it, people think of themselves as belonging to certain social categories that have given characteristics, such as being a Dutchman, a policeman and a rock fan. A social identity can be considered as a self-image that is created through membership of a social category. These social categories or group characteristics then become part of the definition of who that individual is; they become a part of the person's self-identity. Identity, then, is shaping and being shaped by the individual's social and cultural experiences and memberships. The identities of social groups are constructed through processes of comparison with other groups and often in opposition to the identity of another group. When people compare the group they belong to with others they usually pay attention to the differences between the groups and the similarities within the own group. When people's identities are threatened, this implies that people's beliefs and values are called into question, which inevitably leads to conflict.

Gray (2003) identifies five possible sources of identity frames. The first is the core identity of the group, like minority or ethnic status, birth or affiliation with a racial or cultural structure, or identity linked to a subculture or subgroup. The second is the societal role of the group, such as gender, defender, victim, activist, etc. The third is place. For example, a family may feel rooted in the soil: this is 'our' village, this country is my home. The fourth emphasises an institutional, representative role within an agency, organisation, or association, or identification with a profession or occupation, such as a federal employee, logger or politician. The fifth source of identity is interest-based; it refers to particular concerns or issues, to a non-geographic community or interest group promoting particular causes or shared values. Whereas in the literature identity frames are particularly related to what people say about themselves, in this study hardly any respondents characterised themselves according to Gray's typology. Instead, interviewees used Gray's characterisation frame when making statements about how they perceive someone else (Gray,2003:23-24). For practical reasons, the characterisation of others is therefore also viewed as part of the identity frame.

A conflict management frame is a category that deals with the actor's preferences for managing or dealing with a conflict. Gray's (2003) nine types of conflict management frames can be ranged along a spectrum, from the least active (avoidance, passivity) to

the most active (struggle, sabotage and violence), with a 'middle' category of fact-finding, joint problem-solving, and authority decides based on expertise. The fact-finding frame encompasses a wide range of studies or any type of research or investigation. The joint problem-solving frame comprises community or joint action, common ground, mediation, conciliation and collective processes. The authority decides based on expertise frame includes government authorities or institutions that make the decision because they have the technical knowledge and expertise. As this study investigates social interaction by active local groups, the focus is on the 'active' or 'middle' category frames (struggle, sabotage, violence, fact-finding, joint problem solving) and authority decides based on expertise rather than the 'least active' frames (avoidance and passivity).


Actors who collaborate jointly against their opponents use a collaborative frame. Gray (1989:10-17) argues that when parties engage in multi-organisational partnerships or alliances, they do so for two distinct purposes: to capitalise on a shared sense of purpose among the potential partners, or to attempt to resolve conflicting purposes. Another motivation to collaborate may be the recognition that parties depend on each other to achieve a shared aim. Which motivations are applicable in this study will be made clear later.

3.2 Framework for analysing cross-scale interaction (CSI)

In this section, the theoretical findings are assembled into a framework for the analysis of cross-scale social interaction, the CSI framework. Following an explanation of the relevance of culture, the properties of social interaction, the government authorities' potential to act,^[15] comprising their capacity and motivation to act, the local group's potential to act, comprising their capacity and motivation to act, the government authorities' and local group's power building, interaction strategies and the outcomes of interaction are defined.

The framework is represented in Figure 3.1. In the vertical dimension, the figure depicts the two actors, the government authorities and the local group, and the interaction between them. In the horizontal dimension, the figure depicts a causal flow from the most 'underlying' phenomena such as culture and resources to the most 'emergent' phenomena such as conflict or collaboration. In this section, the framework will be described in the downstream direction of the causal flow, starting with the culture concept. In the chapters analysing the case studies the framework will be applied in the reverse order, starting with the phenomena of interactions. This is the direction of explanation, of repeatedly asking the why question (or variants of this question, such as 'Where does this come from?' or 'What are the underlying factors?'). This is in line with the 'progressive contextualisation' methodology proposed by Vayda (1983), which amounts to starting out from the directly relevant observed phenomenon and putting it in its explanatory context in space and time.

Figure 3.1 Framework for cross-scale interaction (SCI)



3.2.1 The importance of the cultural context

Within anthropology there are two distinct views of culture. On the one hand, there are scholars who explain everything that happens in the world in cultural terms: how we behave, how we interact, how we get things done, the groups we belong to, the organisation we are part of, the country we live in, the period in which we live, the things we think are important and the conflicts we have. The overall idea is that culture explains everything. Adherents of this theory are known as 'culturalists'. At the other extreme are the 'constructivists', who assert that people freely assemble their own culture. Young people who grow up in cities are partly influenced by their parents, MTV, their friends, their football team, school, etc. This implies that youngsters are not raised in one culture, but live in a multiethnic society. The new ethnic is dynamic and heterogenic and results in 'culturally hybrid' people (Volkskrant, 2009).

This study assumes that the ‘cultural’ truth lies somewhere in the middle (Sahlins, 1976). Social interaction cannot be understood without taking the culture of actors into account. People, groups and organisations often have, and self-consciously cultivate, an internal culture that is different from the culture in which they are embedded. In other words, actors often share beliefs, norms, ways of working together, forms of decision-making, etc. that are distinct from others. This implies that the cultural embedding, or ‘the situatedness, the social and cultural contexts from which actors are interacting, is an important factor in understanding and interpreting cross-scale interaction’ (Healey, 2003:62-65).

As culture is a factor in people’s lives and behaviour, history can provide insight into the evolution of culture. The analysis of social interaction will therefore include a historical analysis of the organisational culture¹⁶ and traditions of the government authorities involved in Dutch river landscape planning and the historical background and traditions of the people – organised in local groups – living in the case study areas.

3.2.2 Authorities’ and local group’s potential to act

This section describes the authorities’ and local group’s potential to act.

Authorities’ potential to act

The authorities’ potential to act gives insight into their possibilities to interact with others, and the factors and mechanisms that influence them. The authorities’ action potential comprises their capacity to act and motivation to act. The term ‘authorities’ refers to government in the sense of public administration, which is linked to pursuing the public good through the creation of civil society and social justice.

Authorities’ capacity to act

Drawing on Nelissen et al. (2000), who use the term ‘governance¹⁷ capacity’, and Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), who use ‘institutional capacity’, in this study the term ‘authorities’ capacity to act’ will be used. The authorities’ capacity to act can be defined as their mandate (legal responsibilities), resources (budget and people), coordinating mechanisms (i.e. contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and agreements) and consistency (including a harmonious uniformity of narratives within different governmental bodies) based on political organisation, authority and legitimacy.

Mandate

Before authorities are legitimated to act they need a mandate, the commission that is given to a governmental body to work on a certain subject.

Resources

The main resources of authorities that enable them to act are power and influence through

policy-making, including the allocation of public money and decision-making (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In this study resources include budget and people.

Coordinating mechanisms

Although in the public policy literature coordinating mechanisms generally refer to an intervention system as a mode of governing interaction between the state and its citizens, groups and organisations, the most common being either laws or policies (Kooijman, 2000:151), this study follows the interpretation of Fukuyama (2001:10), who states that important coordinating mechanisms are contracts, hierarchies and bureaucratic rules. Instead of positioning coordinating mechanisms under the economic function of social capital, as Fukuyama does, in this study they are considered to be one of the properties of the authorities' capacity to act.

Consistency

Since authorities in this study are different governmental bodies, it is also important to achieve a consistency between the various governmental narratives. Consistency refers to the congruency between governmental agencies' articulated beliefs, claims and actions. Thus, inconsistency can manifest itself in two ways: in terms of apparent contradictions between beliefs or claims, and in terms of perceived contradictions between framings and tactical actions (between what the government agency says and what it does) (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Authorities' motivation to act

The authorities' motivation to act consists of the following properties: political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

The normal run of government policy falls between two extremes. At one extreme is the situation in which advice by government officers is neither solicited nor accepted by the political heads of the government; at the other extreme, legislation or policy measures are conceived, prepared and executed by civil servants without the intervention of their political chiefs. In general, politicians are likely to get their way on measures important to them and officials are likely to get their way on many others (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985:56). As politicians have primacy in the government of democratic societies, their priorities are considered a major driving force behind the motivation of government authorities.

Organisational ambition

Bureaucratic organisations provide arenas for the interplay of contending internal factions (see Aberbach & Rockman, 1988), a situation in which interest groups also play a part. Within these organisations, groups compete with each other to promote their own interests. At the same time, to meet their policy ends bureaucratic organisations must seek mutual adjustments with each other, usually by forming internal alliances, exchanging favours, persuasion, threats or manipulation (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1985:44). As the playing field of

politicians and officials, bureaucratic organisations therefore have their own priorities: the organisational ambition.

Personal vision

In the traditional view, an official was seen as an instrument for the efficient pursuit of predetermined political goals. In classical rules of bureaucracy, neutrality was a virtue because moral or political preconceptions could distract officials from loyal adherence to their organisation. Technical competence was regarded as essential for effective public administration, but professional values were not supposed to replace legal or organisational imperatives. Later, increasing importance was placed on a sense of personal responsibility in public service. In recent years, the intention is to ensure that the normative orientation of officials falls within the parameters of the accepted values of politicians (see Lui & Cooper, 1997). In our framework, we simply accept that, besides political and bureaucratic priorities, the personal opinions of officials play a role in governmental motivations. Individual actors within organisations may think that a certain decision would be unwise in the long term or that a certain plan is particularly innovative or deserves support, and let these opinions influence their actions.

Local group's potential to act

The potential to act of a local group is an indication of whether there is a sufficient basis for collective action and what factors and mechanisms influence this. A local group's action potential comprises its capacity to act and its motivation to act.

Local group's capacity to act

In this study knowledge about social capital will be applied to get insight into the local group's capacity to act. Based on Granovetter (1985), Ostrom (1999) and Putnam (2000), social capital is defined as the common resources of a group that facilitate collective action for the benefit of the group. The central interest of the social capital perspective is to explore the elements and processes in the production and maintenance of the collective asset (Lin et al., 2006). De Groot and Tadeppally (2008) call this phenomenon 'collective social capital' to distinguish it from private social capital, which is a resource held by individuals rather than groups. To analyse the collective social capital of a local group, this concept is broken down into three elements: resources, trust and collective identity. Resources are important for collective action. Their value is enhanced by trust and collective identity, which are the two main prerequisites for efficiency in collective action. Trust ensures low transaction costs, allows the group to maintain peaceful and stable social relations and avoids its members becoming imprisoned in endless mutual checks. Collective identity allows people to quickly agree on one narrative.

Resources

Resources are defined as those goods that are valued in a society (Lin, 2001). Hence, resources are intrinsically related to power in the sense that resources have to be mobilised to be able to act (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004). Drawing on Arts and van Tatenhove (ibid.)

and Putnam (2002), we can say that the resources held by the members of a group make up their dispositional force (the money, knowledge, skills, land and time individuals have), bonding force (the capacity to act as a group), bridging force (the capacity to connect to other groups) and linking force (the capacity to be heard and to influence).

Trust

Trust is directly related to social capital (Putnam, 2000; Herreros, 2004). There is broad agreement that effective social networks and pervasive interpersonal trust enhance efficiency in social relations. Trust is generally viewed as a critical constituent of all human relationships and comes into play when there is confidence in the other actor, despite other uncertainties, risks and the possibility for them to act opportunistically (Gambetta, 1988; Mitzal, 1996). This study recognises two types of trust. The first is confidence in the course and the outcome of a collective action (i.e. the expected benefits), also referred to as process trust (Eshuis & van Woerkum, 2003). The second is faith in other people, or relational trust. Regarding the former, the gains from cooperation are an important motivation to act collectively (Elster, 1989). Regarding the latter, trust is largely a product of the social relations in groups and the obligations they imply (Granovetter, 1985). In other words: personal ties in a group are an important factor in building trust. These ties tend to arise with repeated interaction over time and are akin to an irredeemable investment in the group (Hechter, 1987:47). People will then have solidarity ties to their partners. In the short term, people may have some interest in misusing the trust of their partners – for example, some people may think they have little impact on the outcome of collective action, which is a strong inducement to free ride (Elster's free riders problem) – but this would result in the loss of possible cooperative gains and in the distrust of uncooperative partners (Mitzal, 1996:63). Trust is not obvious, because actors are always conscious of the possibilities of distrust. It is related to the specific circumstances in which individuals consciously contemplate alternative courses of action (ibid.:74-75).

Fukuyama's theory may be useful for studying relational trust. He suggests that levels of spontaneous interaction differ between cultures and so people in different cultures exhibit different levels of trust and trustworthiness to various members of society. He defines this phenomenon as the capability to form new associations and to cooperate within the terms of reference they establish (Buchan & Croson, 2004). The question that arises in this study is whether local groups that have a high ability to interact spontaneously carry more weight in their relationship with the authorities than those that have a low ability to do so.

Social identity

As social identity is at issue when groups are involved, this is considered a component of social capital. Social identity is a social construction, a result of categorising by others. As social interaction influences how identities are shaped, they are altered from time to time. Social identities play an essential role in helping people make sense of their world by providing some measure of predictability and control. Following Northrup (1989), social identity is regarded as a dynamic, ongoing process in which people, alone and in groups,

attempt to establish, maintain and protect a sense of self-meaning, predictability and purpose. People have a multiplicity of overlapping 'subject positions', each more or less contingent. The boundaries of any social group necessarily serve to identify outsiders as well as insiders. Within the group there is an awareness of 'us' in contradistinction to 'them', who are not a part of 'us' (Crow, 2002). Group action thus draws upon particular identities at particular moments and group processes can dissolve and reform identities (Leach & Scoones, 2007).

In this study, identity is relevant for collective action: a new collective identity is constructed to create and mobilise a constituency. In other words, some sort of identity is necessary to translate individual into group interests and individual into collective action. This dimension of identity is not necessarily a consciously chosen strategy, although it is a precursor to collective action (Bernstein, 2003). It can evolve more or less spontaneously, but then more work must be done to build the organisation and recruit active members.

Here, the identity construction is studied by outsiders, including the researcher.

Local group's motivation to act

A local group's collective action will have several motives that coexist and reinforce each other (Elster, 1989). The motivation for collective action is inspired to a large extent by the rational choices people make. According to Lin (2001), a local group takes action for two main reasons: to protect existing valued resources and to gain additional ones. In this view, collective action only occurs when resources are at stake, but there are surely other motivations than purely economic ones. Tarrow (1994:4-6) identifies four properties of motivations for collective action: collective challenges, common purpose, solidarity and sustaining collective action. This study recognises two motivations of collective action: common purpose and solidarity.

Common purpose

An important reason for people to act collectively is common purpose. People may band together in collective action to prosecute common claims against opponents, authorities or elites. If accepted, such a claim can be considered as an expected benefit, something gained by collective action. Expected benefits are one of the motives for deciding to act collectively. Whether people decide to join a collective action or not depends on the available information to the individual concerning the benefits that are expected to accrue from an alternative set of rules compared with the benefits likely to be gained from continued use of status quo rules (Ostrom, 1990). A further consideration is the possibility of the collective action delivering the desired results.

Solidarity

Another motivating factor for a local group to take collective action is solidarity.¹⁸ Kabeer (2005:7) describes solidarity as the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with them to achieve their aims. Crow (2002:121-128) emphasises that people have values in

common which provide a shared basis for their collective endeavour. Solidarity means that people give up personal gain for the benefit of others. Affective ties, such as social relationships based on friendship or family, may strengthen solidarity, not only through recruiting people to become members of the local group but also by helping to keep people in a group once they have joined (Hirsch, 2003). The form that solidarity takes varies according to the 'included' or 'excluded' status of particular individuals and groups and to the degree to which they hope to transcend their excluded status. Solidarity may therefore take different forms for those who are more and those who are less excluded (Kabeer, 2005:7-8).

3.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group

The application of power is a principal way to get things done. Most societal actors, however, do not face a choice between getting things done voluntarily or through the exercise of power, or between exercising power or not getting things done, but rather between varying degrees and kinds of power to apply (Etzioni, 1968:321). Drawing on the social power model of French and Raven (Raven, 1992) and Nesler et al. (1993), this study recognises seven types of power used by actors: coercion, legitimacy, reward, hindering, knowledge, media exposure and sociability.

Coercion

Coercion means compulsion by force of authority for the purpose of achieving the actor's aim. Coercion denotes a real physical threat, or the threat of being fired or fined. It can be considered as an integral part of state authority (Etzioni, 1975:5). Friedman (1973:152-154) states that government is an organisation of legitimised coercion. The special characteristic that distinguishes government from other coercive organisations (such as criminal gangs) is that most people accept government coercion as normal and proper. Government will coerce legitimately by coercing only to the extent that its citizens have agreed to be coerced (McChesney, 2003:231). Although coercion is probably the only effective power for authorities when they are confronted with highly alienated lower-tier authorities and other actors, it is likely that it reduces effectiveness because of its adverse affect on social interaction (Etzioni, 1975:13). For this study a distinction is made between direct and indirect coercive power.

Direct coercive power

Modern states fulfil Weber's criterion of having a legitimate monopoly on the use of force (Cooper, 2000:15), which can be differentiated into three forms: warfare, policing and punishment (Steinert, 2003). While the government will exercise restraint in using war, policing and punishment are common means to ensure the efficacy of regulatory mechanisms. The abstract availability of physical violence and the possibility of a penalty are considered the last resort of government to be effective. The order provided by the government is vital for survival, but the state cannot exert overwhelming strength because

this will prevent society from functioning properly. This is the delicate equilibrium between government and civil society (Cooper, 2000:15-16). In this study exerting force is defined as direct coercive power which may be exercised in the form of police work and imposing penalties when people do not comply with the law. For example, if someone does not pay their taxes the government will send in the bailiffs, or ultimately a jail sentence will be imposed; or if a proprietor does not move after the government has repeatedly issued notice of expropriation, the owner's property may compulsorily purchased. This type of power is relevant to this study for situations in which citizen protests exceed the limits considered acceptable by law.

Indirect coercive power

Coercion can also be exercised in an indirect fashion (Giddens, 1987:169), which is here referred to as indirect coercive power. It is mainly exercised via the law, contracts, rules, procedures and hierarchical relationships, or more implicitly through a high turnover of officials by frequently moving staff members to different positions. The threat of indirect coercive power may also be effective. Whether this threat is considered realistic depends on the authority's credibility to match words with deeds. Threats are used to get the other actor to change their position against their own will, which implies an indirect form of coercion.

Legitimacy

In all cases, the notion of legitimacy involves some sort of code or standard accepted by the individual by virtue of which an actor can assert his power. Although there are various grounds for legitimacy, acceptance of the social structure or other social norms is the point of departure in this study. If actors accept the legitimacy of the social structure of their group, organisation, or society, especially the social structure involving a hierarchy of authority, they will accept the legitimate authority of other actors who occupy a superior office in the hierarchy (French & Raven, 2001). The same applies to the social norms of reciprocity, equity and responsibility (Raven, 1992).

Legitimate power

The use of terms like 'I have a right to', 'should', 'ought', 'required to' may indicate that legitimacy is at issue. A particular result ought to be accepted because it is fair, because the law requires it, because it is consistent with precedent or sound policy considerations, or because it is legitimate as measured by some (other) objective standard (French & Raven, 2001). Legitimate power is most obvious when it is based on some formal structure, also referred to as 'authority pressure'. Apart from position, there are forms of legitimate power which draw on other social norms: reciprocity (e.g. give and take mechanisms), equity ('I have worked hard and suffered, so I have a right to ask you to do something to make up for it'), and responsibility (we have the obligation to help others who cannot help themselves, or others who are dependent upon us) (Raven, 1992).

Reward

Emerson (1976:347) defines reward as a positive reinforcement, but with the added

connotation of being socially administered. A reward is based on the belief that the actor has the ability to provide him or her with desired tangible or intangible benefits (Aguinis et al., 1996). Rewards (and costs) fit into the utilitarian perspective of social exchange, broadly defined as underlying relations between groups as well as between individuals (Blau, 1964; 1986:4). Utilitarianism generally looks forward: actors are viewed as acting in terms of anticipated rewards that benefit them and they tend to choose that alternative course of action that maximises benefit (and minimises cost) (Cook & Rice, 2003).

Reward power

Reward power is the ability to provide rewards to achieve the actor's aim. It signifies that an actor is rewarded in a material way, for example in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment to honorary member.

Hindering

Hindering implies that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by obstruction or by slowing it down.

Hindering power

Hindering power by authorities in river landscape planning may be revealed as an unwillingness to undertake action, withholding information and other tactics, such as not showing up at meetings, not reading project documents or reacting to email messages. Hindering power by local groups may be exerted through protest actions, presenting alternative plans or going to court.

Knowledge

Knowledge can be viewed as a societal asset (Etzioni, 1968:197,198). The distribution of this asset can significantly affect the position of actors in their interaction with others. When actors interact, the most knowledgeable unit – all other things being equal – will be the most effective. However, actors may overinvest in the production of knowledge, neglecting other functional needs and thus undermine their goals, the advancement of which depends on balancing the servicing of the various needs.

Knowledge power

Knowledge power can be broken down into various subtypes of power, such as scientific or technical knowledge (the domain of experts), political and administrative knowledge (the field of expertise of government decision-makers and government officials in particular) and public knowledge (particularly citizens' expertise), in the literature also referred to as local knowledge. The first focuses mainly on the technical/scientific field, the second concentrates on politics and public administration, and in the third the emphasis is on everyday knowledge of the local situation. Knowledge power can be built by using one or more of these types of power. It may also be manifested in a numerical superiority of experts or officials in meetings (which relays signals to other actors that things are serious)

and references to the experts' credibility (e.g. a report from a well-known consultancy may be considered more trustworthy than a report from an individual outsider).

Media exposure

The media exposure of actors is a relevant factor in their interactions with others. Events do not speak for themselves, but must be woven into some larger storyline. The media play an important part in social interaction by giving meaning to and interpreting the values held by actors. Media power is analysed in this study to get insight into the media involvement of actors.

Media power

Making a conflict more public offers an opportunity for actors to improve their power position relative to that of their antagonist, and mass media coverage is a vehicle for this (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). However, while local groups have free access to the media to influence the power balance in such a way that they achieve a more powerful position, this is usually not an option for government authorities due to strict media procedures surrounding decision-making processes. Here, a distinction can be made between the roles of the national government and lower-tier authorities in national decision-making processes. Whereas national government is strictly bound to specific rules regarding media exposure, lower-tier authorities have more leeway to profile themselves in public debate.

Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) identified three reasons why local groups may need to use the media: mobilisation, validation and scope enlargement. To reach their constituency most local groups have to mobilise some form of public discourse via various forums, including publications and meetings. The media validates the fact that the local group is an important player. Additionally, local groups need the media to broaden the scope of conflict. If this is narrow, the weaker party has much to gain and little to lose by broadening the scope.

Sociability

In the literature, credibility is mentioned as a likely important power basis (Nesler et al., 1993). Due to the various definitions, which often overlap with other power bases, such as indirect coercive power and knowledge power, a limited interpretation is used here, focusing only on sociability as one of five elements of credibility: competency, character, sociability, composure and extraversion (McCroskey & Jenson, 1975). Sociability is one of the most immanent goods that groups provide (Hechter, 1987:47). It can be seen as a source of power because it tends to call forth reciprocity – it is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, a good listener and so on – or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others.

3.2.4 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group

The ability of government authorities and the local group to act depends on their action

potential. How government authorities and the local group deal with each other depends, among other things, on their use of frames and buffering and bridging strategies, which are termed 'interaction strategies'.

Framing

Authorities and the local group use framing in their relationships. Like everyone, they frame their environment in a way they can live with. Framing involves shaping, focusing and organising the world around us. Framing and reframing is a continuous activity. Expectations about objects, people, settings, ways to interact and anything else in the world are continually checked against experiences and revised (Tannen & Wallat, 1987). Frames are viewed as dynamic rather than static, and they are multidimensional rather than one-dimensional (Aarts & van Woerkum, 2008).

This study uses four frames, drawing on Gray (2003), Benford and Snow (2000) and Pellow (1999), to analyse social interaction between authorities and the local group: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame, and a collaborative frame (see also 3.1).

When actors change their frame, they develop a new way of interpreting or understanding the issues in a dispute, or a new way of appraising one or other parties in a conflict. To reframe their understanding of a conflict or debate, actors have to change their perspective (Gray, 2003). Actors may change frames for example when engaged in a dialogue or collaborating with others, shifting from a collaborative to an identity frame. Techniques for reframing include shifting from specific interests to more general ones (in case of dispute or conflict), or the other way round (when engaged in a dialogue or collaboration), narrowing the issues or breaking them down into smaller parts, translating disputes about values into interests, identifying superordinate (or overarching) goals, and agreeing to disagree (the latter four may occur if disputes and conflicts are at issue). When actors remain stuck in their view of a specific situation, in the literature referred to as frozen frames (Gray, 2003), reframing will be difficult (Aarts & van Woerkum, 2008).

Buffering and bridging strategies

Another interaction strategy used by authorities and the local group in their social interaction is to buffer and bridge. Bridging and buffering strategies are developed in every relationships. Mesnar and Nigh (1995) argue that these strategies occur between members of an organisation and external relations when 'boundary spanning', which can be described as adjusting to constraints and contingencies not controlled by the organisation. Boundary spanning serves two purposes. First, it 'buffers' or protects the organisation from the external environment by resisting a change or trying to control it. Second, it acts as a 'bridge' to the external environment, promoting internal adaptation to changing external circumstances. As such, they may contribute to reframing.

Bridging and buffering activities are not exclusive. In their efforts to maintain legitimacy, some organisations may emphasise one type of activity over the other, other organisations may do little of either, and still others may try to do both (Mesnar & Nigh, 1995). With

respect to the local group and their social interaction with authorities, the hypothesis is that they use both strategies.

3.2.5 Interaction between authorities and local group

Social interaction between authorities and the local group can lead to the following outcomes.

Conflict

Conflict occurs when one or more parties hold incompatible goals and perceive interference from the other in their desire to obtain their goal (Kriesberg, 2007). Kriesberg (ibid.) identifies two kinds of matters that lead to contention: interests and values. Adversaries may quarrel about control of resources, such as land, money, oil and water, or prestige. Tensions arise when each side holds different values, which may become matters of contention when one side insists on manifesting particular values that another party finds objectionable, such as the right to abortion. Value differences can also be attributed to different knowledge or understanding. Groups may use different theories, models, assumptions and information (Mitchell, 2002). Conflicts may also have other causes, such as power inequalities, a lack of communication, a sense of collective identity (Coy & Woehrle, 2000) or historical mistrust (Gray, 2004).

Conflicts can be seen as the result of distorted social interaction and may be constructive or destructive. Constructive conflicts may lead to positive effects (e.g. openings to start conflict resolution); destructive conflicts may result in negative effects (e.g. a hardening of the conflict). However, negative effects do not have to endure. According to Tannen (1998) there are times when people need to disagree, criticise, oppose and attack, but this does not have to be forever.

In this study conflict is defined as a state of opposition between individuals or groups about values, interests or resources.

Debate

Debate can be defined as a disputation or dispute about negotiable interests. Tidwell (1998:9) views disputes as less intense over time and they have a greater degree of negotiability, whereas conflicts are more intense over time and are less negotiable. Conflicts usually arise from unsatisfied needs, whereas disputes do not possess the same level of dissatisfaction. A key aspect is that all parties recognise the existence of a dispute, and are able to agree upon the components or dimensions of the problem (Mitchell, 2002).

Instead of dispute Yankolovich (1999) uses the word debate. It assumes there is a right answer and you have it. Debate is combative: participants attempt to prove their point. Debate is about winning; it is listening to find flaws and make counterarguments, and it is defending assumptions as truth, critiquing the other side's position and defending one's own views

against those of others. The purpose of debate, which can be considered the opposite of dialogue, is to win an argument, to vanquish an opponent. The main characteristics of a debate are the occurrence of subtle coercive influences, overt or indirect, like arm-twisting, pulling of rank, and a hint of sanctions for holding politically incorrect attitudes, and approaching others without empathy, such as exchanging ideas and opinions without making assumptions known, which fosters unresolved tensions (Yankolovich, 1999).

In this study, debate is interpreted as a dispute in which actors have the idea that they can win based on argument.

Negotiation

Negotiation, in its broadest sense, is seen as an alternative to conflict. Negotiation is involved when two or more parties are communicating to influence the others. The successful negotiation is one that achieves the best agreement – not just any agreement, but an agreement that ensures both parties meet their objectives and will live up to their commitments. Negotiation is thus a problem-solving vehicle (Asherman & Asherman, 2001). Although in the literature negotiation refers to an approach normally considered to comprise alternative dispute resolution (Mitchell, 2002), in this study it is a collective term for solving disputes.

The negotiation literature describes many approaches to negotiation. The ‘principled approach’ and the ‘positional approach’ deserve attention here. The ‘principled approach’, developed by Fisher and Ury (1981, 1991), stresses working with other parties to develop a creative solution that will meet most people’s needs. The main characteristics are (1) separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on interests, not positions; (3) invent options for mutual gain; and (4) insist on explicit, ‘objective’ criteria to guide decisions. In the ‘positional approach’ parties arrive for negotiations having already decided on a desirable solution, and attempt to persuade or coerce the others to accept their terms and solution. They arrive with a ‘position’, and their goal is to achieve it. Such an approach tends to constrain flexibility and a willingness to be open-minded about alternative solutions (Mitchell, 2002). The negotiation process relies upon the intellectual and communicative skills of all parties, the willingness of those involved to resolve the conflict, and the general congruence of events which may influence the course of the resolution (Tidwell, 1998).

Negotiation is defined here as coming to terms, communicating to achieve the best agreement for both parties.

Dialogue

Dialogue is an outcome of social interaction in which actors converse with each other without entering into collaboration. It can promote understanding, mutual trust and respect between parties, beginning the work of building relationships (Forester, 2006). The word dialogue derives from two Greek words: dia, meaning ‘through’, and logos, signifying ‘word’ or ‘meaning’. Emphatically, dialogue is not confined to conversations between two

people; it can also be carried out in groups ranging from about a dozen to two dozen people. In contrast to debate, it would be inconceivable to say that someone 'wins' or 'loses' a dialogue. In a dialogue, all participants win or lose together. The process excludes winning at the expense of others in favour of reaching mutual understanding. Three distinctive features of dialogue differentiate it from debate. When all three are present, conversation is transformed into dialogue. If one or more of the three features are absent, it is a debate or some other form of talk, but it is not dialogue. The first feature of dialogue is equality and the absence of coercive influences. All participants must be treated as equals. Outside the context of the dialogue, they may have widely differing status, but in the dialogue itself they are considered equal. In genuine dialogue, there is no arm-twisting, no pulling of rank, no hint of sanctions for holding politically incorrect attitudes, no coercive influences of any sort, whether overt or direct. Dialogue becomes possible only after trust has been built and higher-ranking people participate as true equals. The second feature is that actors need to have empathy towards others and approach them with an open mind. It is considered essential that participants have the ability to respond with unreserved empathy to the views of others. The third feature of dialogue is that participants are encouraged to examine their own assumptions and those of other participants. And once these assumptions are in the open, they are not to be dismissed out of hand, but considered with respect, even when participants disagree with them (Yankolovich, 1999).

Although the government–citizen relationship in this study is in essence not an equal relationship, the definition of dialogue by Yankolovich seems useful. The essential aspect of dialogue in this study is the intention of the partners to respect each other, and that both are willing to converse with each other without conditions. Dialogue is considered to occur when two or more people are in a conversation based on equality, empathy and respect of the other's opinion.

Collaboration

Collaboration can be defined as a 'process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible' (Gray, 1989:5). Through interacting with each other they search for consensus. The focus of their interaction is directed at the long-term gain rather than short-term benefit.¹⁹ Both parties then have a more tightly organised relationship characterised by concerted decision-making. One of the most important dynamics in collaboration is the process by which reciprocity is developed informally in the absence of rules (ibid.). Byrum-Robinson (2001) states that the collaborative ethic assumes that both parties have good will and desire to achieve the best possible outcome. However, even the most honourable intentions may be derailed as parties examine their differences. In other words, collaboration does not mean that dispute is absent. As Tannen (1998) puts it, 'collaboration is more the management of conflict than the absence of conflict'. In this study, collaboration can be distinguished within the local group and between the authorities and the local group.

Here, two issues are relevant. The first is boundary definitions that are crucial for local group's interaction with authorities. The basic functions of boundary maintenance are keeping insiders in and outsiders out (Sommerville, 2000). The second refers to the conditions that have to be achieved for collaboration: (a) an 'authentic' dialogue has to take place (including a shared perception of interdependence between the actors involved and rules for discussion); (b) all interests need to be engaged in the discourse; and (c) only recognised representatives of an interest group participate (Innes & Booher, 2003). Partners involved in collaboration, referred to as alliances or partnerships, have well-developed interactions among themselves as well as links to outside groups. They share both understandings of problems and recognition of their shared or reciprocal interests. Effective alliances engage diverse interests and allow their decisions to be informed by the knowledge of these differing stakeholders. As a result, they produce more robust and legitimate strategies. They have both depth and breadth in their leadership, with diverse participants willing to take responsibility and initiative as needed. They have roots in their communities and can mobilise players to get results. They produce innovative solutions to problems that have seemed intractable. They can respond in a timely way to new challenges, whether they are threats or opportunities. The most effective alliances build their own capacity by tracking outcomes they are producing and by providing this information back to participants to enhance their learning process. They continually reassess their directions and strategies (ibid.).

Collaboration is defined here as the act of working jointly, based on an authentic dialogue between all parties to bring the goal closer.

The concepts described here together form the analytical frame for studying social interaction between authorities and the local group in river landscape planning. The three case studies will be analysed using this frame.

3.3 Embeddedness of the CSI framework

This section focuses on the relation between the CSI framework and current theories.

Basically, the CSI framework is consonant with the work of social theorists like Habermas (1984) who emphasise the process of social interaction. Taking the interaction outcomes into consideration, the framework partially matches Habermas' communicative action theory, which pays attention to the middle range of interaction outcomes: debate, negotiation and dialogue. The framework thus includes Habermas' criteria for an 'ideal speech situation' (comprehensibility, sincerity, legitimacy and truth), providing a vocabulary to critique dialogical practices and to highlight communicative 'distortions' of one-sided conversations in which the exchange of knowledge and understanding and of claims for attention does not take place. With these ideas, he aims to reconstitute the public realm through open, public debate (Healey, 1997:49,265). As result of the inclusion of both

extremes of the interaction outcomes – conflict and collaboration – the framework is broader than Habermas' communicative action theory with regard to interaction outcomes.

The CSI framework also fits into Giddens' (1984) structuration theory. This theory includes that we make history not just by acts of conscious resistance, but in our day-to-day decisions, as we work out how to share a house, how to get on in an office, how to make a production line work, how to make a recommendation on a planning issue, how to organise a protest. This implies that we live through culturally-bound structures of rules and resource flows, but our continually inventive human nature remakes them in each instance, and in remaking the systems of structuring forces, we also change ourselves and our cultures. Structures are 'shaped' by agency, just as they in turn 'shape' agency (Healey, 1997:47). With regard to the framework, Giddens recognises the relevance of actors' potential to act and the role of power in social interaction. Giddens views power as an elementary concept, but it is not more essential than any other: 'Power is one of several primary concepts of social science, all clustered around the relations of action and structure. Power is the means to get things done and, as such, directly implied in human action' (Giddens, 1984:281-283). In the framework, the actors' power building is situated between their potential to act and their execution of frames. Its location in the causal chain from potential to act via building social power and interaction strategies to interaction outcomes shows that power is central.

Of the three dimensions of power relations derived from Lukes (1974), two are present in the CSI framework: the 'visible power' or formal level of decision-making (first dimensional view) and the 'hidden power' or behind the scenes level (second dimensional view) in which agendas are set. What is lacking in the framework is the 'invisible power' or embedded dimension of power, Lukes' third dimension of power that shapes and modifies people's desires and beliefs (Lukes, 1986:10) and is found in the fine grain of people's daily routines, policy discourses and governance practices (Healey, 2003:85). In this study the one dimensional view has been made manifest through the actors' use of social power in social interaction. The second dimensional view is shown by the way actors' determine which are the 'key' issues and which issues come up for decision, and exclude those which threaten the interests of the powerful.

The CSI framework is largely consonant with Geertz' (1973) view of the cultural embeddedness of social life. The framework incorporates a more limited understanding of culture, namely culture as an attribute of a social group, the 'organisational culture and traditions' of authorities and the 'culture and traditions' of local groups. Both are located on the most basic level of the framework, which allows the analysis to identify culture as an influence on all other more emergent levels. The CSI framework reflects Geertz' idea of local knowledge as a mixture of systematised, formulised and calculated knowledge that is acquired through social interchange and experience, a 'common sense' and a 'practical reason', a store of proverbs and metaphors, and of practical skills and routines (Geertz, 1983:12). In Dutch river landscape planning local knowledge does not play a significant

role except for cases in which authorities and local groups are involved in collaborative spatial design.

The CSI framework is basically consistent with Healey's (1997) concept of collaborative planning. Collaborative interactive planning processes are, through their focus on process and what she calls 'substance', the specific content of issues, offering the possibility of both mediating between the concerns of multiple and diverse stakeholders and building place-based institutional capacity. Collaborative planning is a social process built up from the particular social relations of a place. Those involved identify matters of collective concern, define problems, draw on knowledge resources, articulate solutions and develop ideas about how to put the solutions into practice. It is a dynamic process. The activity of thinking about what the issues are and what to do about them itself changes the situation, as people learn about what is at stake and what their own values and interests are (Healey, 1997:85-87). Although the framework focuses on process, substance is also present, particularly in the concept of social power and the case studies. Further, the framework gives insight into the various aspects of the social and dynamic process of the case studies.

The CSI framework fits into Putnam's (1996, 2000) concept of social capital. By social capital Putnam means 'features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives' (Putnam, 1996:34). These features of social life, network, norms and trust, are included in the local group's potential to act. Network, norms and trust are also included in the local group's capacity to act. Resources are operationalised through bonding force and bridging force, norms are included in social identity, and trust is differentiated into personal trust and process trust. What differs is the aim of the study. Putnam's study of social capital includes analyses of people's attitudes and behaviour, ranging from drinking coffee with neighbours to active political participation – which are viewed not just as recreational channels but as sustainers of the wider 'social fabric' (Schuller et al., 2000). Putnam sought to reveal America's changing behaviour and the disintegration of social structures. This study tries to find keys to civic participation in river landscape planning.

Like Habermas, the CSI framework partially reflects Forester's (2006) view of interaction outcomes. As Habermas is a source of inspiration for Forester, he also focuses on the mid range of interaction outcomes: debate, negotiation and dialogue. The CSI framework, however, also includes both extremes of the continuum: conflict and collaboration. Another point of interest in Forester's work is the relevance of a third party, such as facilitators (who help debate), mediators (who arbitrate in disputes) and moderators (who stimulate dialogue) in planning processes. As the framework is based on a rather strict dichotomy of authorities versus local groups, it does not easily accommodate Forester's view on this point.

Chapter 4 Methodology

The basic methodological steps followed in this research were the following: deciding on the research question and research design; choosing the best methods to obtain the required data; and data analysis and interpretation. The research question and design will be described first, followed by the research methods and process.

4.1 Research question and design

Based on the theoretical approach laid down in Chapter 3, which focused on a process view of cross-scale interaction, the following research question was formulated:

What factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning?

As mentioned earlier, this study was framework-led and based on data from three case studies. The research framework evolved during the research process in a continual intertrade between concepts and data. The movement 'from the data up' was inductive, while the improved concepts were in turn used deductively to shape the next round of analysis (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

4.2 Research methods and process

Case study approach – a justification

The case study approach (Yin, 1984) is a commonly used research strategy to allow complex issues to be explored in depth from a holistic perspective. It attempts to examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1981). The case study approach allows the researcher to answer 'how' and 'why' questions, that is, to understand the nature and complexity of the processes taking place. This study first addresses the 'how' questions, such as how the main actors interacted and how the social interaction between these actors proceeded to a certain outcome. 'Why' questions are addressed in the conclusions. The analysis of the case studies provides the answers to these questions, such as why a certain social interaction leads to a certain outcome, and

why sometimes a certain social interaction will lead to a specific outcome, while in another occasion this will not be the case. An important advantage of the case study approach is that it can uncover insightful information about how these projects proceed. The type of case study used here was explorative and descriptive rather than explanatory. In an exploratory case study data collection is undertaken prior to the final definition of the research question, allowing the research to pursue intuitive paths. The goal may justifiably be to develop the analytical framework by directly observing the research subject (Yin, 2003). Descriptive research describes data on and characteristics of a phenomenon being studied. Descriptive research answers the questions who, what, where, when and how. Although the data description is factual, accurate and systematic, the research cannot describe what caused a situation. Thus, descriptive research cannot be used to create a causal relationship, in which one variable affects another. An explanatory study is research conducted in order to explain any behaviour.

As this study was framework-led, it was desirable to include several case studies in the research design. A variety of cases was needed to be able to deduce answers to the research question and sub-questions (Yin, 2003). This multiple-case design raised issues about the selection process and the variety of data that would come out of the case studies. The case studies in this study were selected according to specific criteria. First, the expected outcomes of the social interaction between government authorities and citizens in river projects should represent outcomes at both extremes of the continuum. This implies selecting a river project in which actors tended to collaborate with one another, and a project in which actors stood diametrically opposed one another. Second, the way citizens organised themselves in local groups to achieve their objective must be incorporated, which meant that a variety of local groups was needed, including a homogeneous group of citizens, a group of citizens with a heterogeneous constitution and various local groups pursuing their own interests. Third, the case studies should include diverse government agencies. Based on these criteria, the following case studies were selected: the Dike Relocation in Lent (various local groups, the involvement of national and local government, and government authorities and citizens in opposition to one another); the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder (heterogeneous group of citizens, inclusion of national, provincial and local governments, interaction based on conflict); and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder (homogeneous group of citizens, national and provincial governments were involved, and government authorities and citizens intended to collaborate).

All types of case studies, whether they are exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory, face the problem of the context being part of the study, which means there will always be too many 'variables' for the number of observations to be made (Yin, 1981). This therefore required a strong focus on the key issues during the research process.

Data collection methods

The case studies relied solely on qualitative data, for which interviews and a desk study

were the main research methods. The data gathered from these methods were consolidated to provide evidence that can be used to answer the research question.

Interviews

The interviews were in depth, semi-structured and open-ended. The interview guide was designed to elicit naturally occurring speech on a range of topics. The design of the interview guide began with some preliminary thoughts about the research. Although at first glance the questionnaire appeared to be somewhat rough and ready, it went through a continuous process of redesign and fine-tuning in the light of new findings. Questions were modified to test emerging ideas. The main issues raised in the interviews included personal and organisational background information, personal views on specific events that occurred in the planning process, the interviewee's interactions with other stakeholders, particularly government authorities, and the outcomes of these interactions. This approach ensured that when the data gathering exercise came to an end, sufficient material was available to answer the research question.

Given the nature of the actors, two interview guides were prepared: one for the government authorities and another for the citizens. The questions in the interview guide for representatives of the government authorities covered their political involvement, organisational perspective, their personal view on specific subjects like public criticism, how they deal with comments by citizens, the history and implementation of the planning process, and their motivation to collaborate with other government authorities or their reasons for not doing so. The questions for the citizens included whether they have a history of protest, whether they were involved in previous government plans, how they got involved this time, how they organised themselves, what their strategy was, and how they managed to get their message across.

Sampling

For the case studies nonprobability samples were used (Russell Bernard, 2006). This type of sampling is appropriate for labour-intensive, in depth studies of a few cases, as in this study. Snowball sampling was used in one of the three case studies, the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study. In the snowball technique, key informants are used to locate one or two people in the population. During the interview the interviewer asks those people to list others in the population and recommend someone from the list to interview. The sampling frame therefore grows with each interview. A list of criteria was made to identify suitable interviewees from the people suggested by the respondents. The main criteria for the government authorities included the position of the participants in the planning process and their affiliation with a government agency or other organisation. This required a multilevel approach as the key people worked at different levels across various government authorities and related organisations. The criteria for the citizens consisted of their position in the residents' group, their position in a specific local organisation (farmer or political organisation), their social position in the polder, and simply being resident in an area

where the government has plans for a specific measure. Although the gender and age of the interviewees were also taken into account, it proved hard to get a well-balanced distribution of respondents, because women and young people were underrepresented. The majority of the respondents turned out to be white middle-aged men.

The total number of interviewees from government authorities and citizens in the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study was 47. Of these, 24 interviewees worked for government authorities (including the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate-General for Water Affairs, Rijkswaterstaat,²⁰ Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office, Gelderland provincial government, the municipality of Ubbergen, experts from a technical department of Rijkswaterstaat (*RIZA*), and the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (*Technische Adviescommissie voor de Waterkering*, TAW). Six interviewees, with two MPs, a representative of an environmental organisation and three consultants, were related to the government plan. Seventeen interviewees were held with residents. The chair of the residents' organisation High Water Platform (*Hoogwaterplatform*) was interviewed three times, including one which involved reflecting on key issues of the planning process with a member of the residents' organisation. Conversations with the Room for the River project manager at Gelderland provincial government and two members of a historical association were not included in the list of respondents. All but one of the interviews were held in the period from 2005 to 2009.

Due to the limited number of participants involved in the other two case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder, a sampling method did not prove necessary. Furthermore, access to information on the case studies was highly dependent on one or a few people. Data gathering for the Dike Relocation in Lent case study was contingent upon the approval of the project manager, while research material for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study had to be obtained from a farmer representative and the project manager.

For the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the interviewees and the time period in which the interviews could be held were selected beforehand. Sixty interviews were held. The primary data collection occurred in the period from January to March 2005, when 18 interviews were held with members of the project organisation, which was established for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure. Additionally, 32 'street' interviews with citizens were carried out. Later, 10 interviews were held with key people who were not included in the list of interviewees at the project organisation. The interviewees at the project organisation included members of the steering group (government decision-makers), the project group (staff members) and the advisory group (citizens and other societal groups) were interviewed. The list of interviewees was compiled in cooperation with the project manager and included three members of the steering group, the executive councillor concerned with spatial planning at the municipality of Nijmegen, the director for water management at Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office and the dike reeve (chair) of Rivierenland water board. Six

members of the project group were interviewed: a staff member of the planning department of the municipality of Nijmegen, three Rijkswaterstaat officials, one official from Rivierenland water board, and one from Gelderland provincial government. Nine members of the advisory group were selected for an interview, including a representative from a historical association, two members of the association of entrepreneurs, representatives of three local groups, a representative from an environmental organisation, a member of a residents' association from the new Waalsprong housing development, and the chair. In addition, during the research period, 2004 to 2009, ten supplementary interviews were held, three of which were with a staff member of the municipality of Nijmegen, a chair of a residents' group, who was interviewed twice, and a water expert who supported the residents. Five interviews were held with representatives from Rijkswaterstaat. Among the interviewees was the project manager, the director, a legal affairs officer, and the former director for water management, all from the East Netherlands regional office, and the head of water infrastructure at the head office. Two interviews were held with a consultant and a resident to reflect on specific issues of the planning process. In addition, several conversations with the project manager, which were not included in the list of interviews, provided useful insights into the actions of national government.

The street interviews were held to get the opinions of the residents of the village of Lent about the government plan for a dike relocation. These interviews were held to determine whether the common-sense feeling of Rijkswaterstaat officials were borne out by the facts. They presumed that a minority of the population of the village of Lent would be against the government plan, particularly those who supported the residents' groups, while a majority would be in favour but did not voice their opinion – the 'silent majority'. As too few street interviewees were held to make up a representative sample of the residents of the village of Lent, the results are only indicative. The interviewees were chosen at random by stopping people on the street, including local businesspeople (a hairdresser, a garage owner, a market gardener), pedestrians and citizens who were at home. Most of the interviewees were anonymous and the form of the interview was different from the in depth semi-structured questionnaire prepared for the selected interviewees of the project organisation. The street interviews were based on a short semi-structured questionnaire with a few topics about the government plan for a dike relocation.

The data collection for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study was different from the other case studies. On the side of the government authorities, only a few staff members and government decision-makers were involved, and the population of the polder was a homogenous group of 17 farming families and the owner of a marina. Fifteen interviews were held, 13 with representatives of the government authorities and one each with the chair and vice-chair of the residents' organisation, the Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder*). These interviews proved sufficient to collect the required data. The 13 interviews with representatives

from the government authorities included six from national government and four from provincial government. At the national level, the Room for the River programme manager (*Project Directie Ruimte voor de Rivier, PDR*) was interviewed once and the river branch manager (*riviertak manager*) for the downstream stretch was interviewed twice. Four representatives from Rijkswaterstaat were also interviewed, one of whom was the chair of the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence, another was head of water infrastructure at the national office, and two were working at the East Netherlands regional office. The interviewees from provincial government were two provincial delegates (members of Noord-Brabant provincial executive, one of whom had just become a member of parliament when the interview was held, and two project managers, the first was interviewed once and his successor was interviewed three times. The vice-chair was interviewed regularly, two or three times a year. In addition, interviews were held with a representative from the Government Service for Land and Water Management (*Dienst Landelijk Gebied, DLG*), a water expert, and the deputy director of Habiforum, a non-governmental organisation for multifunctional land use. Two conversations with provincial government officials were not included in the list of interviewees. The interviews with both the government authorities and the two farmers took place in the period from 2005 to 2009.

A number of respondents were in a position to reflect on two or three case studies, or their statements could be used in different case studies. The interviews with these respondents were therefore included in the analysis of all the relevant cases. The respondents appear two or three times in the list of interviewees (see Appendix).

Recording

Some of the interviews were recorded and some were not. Interviews for the Dike Relocation in Lent case study were recorded, while notes were taken during interviews about the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study. The interviews that were carried out jointly were not recorded as there was always one interviewer who could take notes while the other asked questions. The tape recorded interviews were transcribed. The notes made during the other interviews were written out in full. The second interviewer then carefully reviewed the interview report and sometimes added additional information from memory or his own notes.

Desk study

A documentation search was conducted to find out whether this research topic had already been reported in the scientific literature, and then to search for specific concepts and important themes for inclusion in the analytical framework. Secondary sources were also used for the analysis of the case studies, including project documentation, government reports, policy documents and print media like articles in newspapers, magazines and on the internet. The printed media turned out to be a significant source of information on the three case studies. The amount of media coverage varied per case. While the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder project provided a continuous

flow of articles, particularly in the regional newspaper, the Dike Relocation in Lent project generated much smaller media attention, and the Terps Plan in Overdiep polder project even less. This proved to be part of the media power built by the local groups, as explained in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.

Process

The roots of this research lie in the European Freude am Fluss project (Enjoying the River) which ran from 2004 to 2009. The focus of the project was river landscape planning: making room for the river by bringing various interests together, such as housing development, nature conservation, recreation and economy. The idea behind combining land uses was to put together a total package people would embrace and assume a 'please in my backyard' (PIMBY) attitude instead of a NIMBY (not in my backyard) one. One of the research topics was 'communication', which covered a broad field from communicating the river and communication between experts and citizens as lay people, to communication between stakeholders in river projects. As the project planning of the Freude am Fluss project was consistent with the Dutch Room for the River policy, for which 39 projects will be realised by 2015, there was a broad range of practical cases available as data sources for all these topics. The choice for the government–citizen relationship was partly based on the experiences with Room for the River projects until then. As the first Room for the River projects started in 2000, the preliminary results of these projects became available when the choice for the research subject had to be made. The fact that some projects did not run at all, while others were considered successful triggered the choice for studying the government–citizen relationship, which is also close to my own knowledge and experience. The first questions to arise were why some projects lead to conflict while others to collaboration, and what conflict and collaboration mean. While formulating these questions the main theme of this study emerged naturally: the social interaction between government authorities and local groups.

At the beginning of the research all three river projects which were selected for the case study were at an advanced stage, which meant that data gathering began with a relatively meagre theoretical (e.g. framework) input. Nevertheless, the research was organised around specific key propositions, questions and activities. Some key propositions were, for instance, that history is an important factor in today's government–citizen relationship, that citizens who form several residents' groups are less influential than those who are organised in a single residents' group, and that a governmental top-down approach, once set in motion, can hardly be changed. Key questions included how the project proceeded, the history of the project, which position the actors had in the project, how the actors interacted, and what means they used to influence decision-making. The focus was on the various activities government authorities and citizens undertook to influence decision-making in their direction. This initial phase of the study was flexible enough to allow these topics to be modified as the analysis progressed (see Yin, 1981).

Getting access to information on the cases selected for this study demanded persuasive qualities, perseverance, dedication, and communicative abilities. It proved relatively easy to get the information needed for two case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent and the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder. The project manager of the first was involved in the Freude am Fluss project, under which this research was initiated, the second was part of a study²¹ for which two researchers at Wageningen University had already collected information. Access to information on the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study proved harder to come by. The reticence of the water expert who had a key position in the project and the guarded reaction of the project manager to a request for information, an attitude that in literature is referred to as 'gatekeepers' (Fleck et al., 2004), meant that it took more than a year to gain access. An opportunity finally arose to show a scale model of the terps plan during a Freude am Fluss conference in the municipality of Nijmegen in spring 2005. As the model had been made by children who lived in the Overdiep polder, it had to be taken back to its owners. This was my best chance to get directly in touch with the farmers of Overdiep polder. The farmer I returned the model to was highly surprised by the attitude of both the water expert and the project manager. In contrast to them, he viewed contacts with outsiders as his 'societal' task, a consequence of being involved in a plan that serves both a public aim, to reduce the risk of flooding, and the farmers' interests in an economically viable future.

Development of the analytical framework

The first data gathering from interviews, a literature review, and the conversations with practitioners, colleagues and supervisors allowed me to elaborate key conceptual topics of social interaction. The analytical framework was given initial shape by putting the actors in a logical position in relation to the outcomes of their social interaction. The authorities and citizens were located on one side of the analytical framework, and the outcomes of their interaction on the other. However, it took time to get a clear picture of the relevant concepts for analysing social interaction, the process from actors to outcome. Analytical induction provided these concepts, first the concept of framing and later the concept of social power. Empirical data from the three cases contributed inductively to modifications of the analytical framework, such as the addition of a type of social power and merging two types already included. Deductive analysis also led to alteration of the framework. Examples were the addition of the organisational culture of the authorities and the cultural background of the residents, and putting the bridging and buffering strategies on an equal footing. A major alteration was changing the interaction outcomes from 'conflict, evasion, reconciliation and collaboration' to 'conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration'. The analytical framework thus acquired its final shape and covers various concepts and properties of social interaction.

The analysis of the properties of social interaction would only be useful if they could be evaluated. But to estimate the properties meant that they have to be comparable, which they were not. Despite the fact that the properties are in essence incomparable,

it was decided that the evaluation would be based on the principle of taking the minimum evaluation as the norm. This meant that a \pm (plus minus or weak value) against a ++ (plus plus or strong value) will result in a \pm (plus minus or weak value). It will not be averaged to a + (plus or moderate value). This evaluation method meant that authorities may have a weak or moderate score while the local group has a strong score. These outcomes, however, are relative. Authorities may have a relatively weak action potential in comparison to the local group, which may turn out strong.

Analysis

The data were analysed in two steps. First, a within-case analysis of the three case studies was made based on a hybrid method of grounded theory and a responsive interviewing model (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The grounded theory method argues that coding, recognising key concepts and themes are part of one integrated process, and concepts and themes must emerge from the data without the literature. The working method is therefore to go through the transcripts of the interviews and identify potential analytic categories, which are coded. By contrast, in the responsive interviewing model the phases of work are more distinct and analysis is made more efficient by developing a separate list of concepts and themes derived from the literature and other sources, which is applied to the interviews. As the research progressed the interviews became more focused, for which an open coding process is best. Using this hybrid model, part way between the grounded theory model and the responsive interviewing model, it was not necessary to code every passage or term in the transcribed interviews, but to select only those concepts and themes that were most closely related to the research question, such as the actors' potential to act, their use of social power and framing, and bridging and buffering strategies, and the outcomes of interaction. The phrases of the interviews that covered these concepts were similarly coded. The coded phrases of the key concepts were then put together. Second, a search for cross-case patterns was made by analysing the emerging outcomes of the case studies. To complete the analysis, the research question was answered and broader implications were drawn.

The analysis of the case studies was based mainly on the quotes of interviewees. The main reasons for using statements by the interviewees was to reflect their perspectives, which not only clarified what they communicated (key issues which they considered important) but also how they communicated (their choice of words can reveal their attitude towards others, by their directness of speech, for example, or use of suggestive language, putting names to specific feelings). Apart from the fact that this method of analysis proved to be quite time-consuming, it became clear that the context of the quotations was often largely lost, which introduced an element of uncertainty into the interpretation of the remarks made by the interviewees. Nevertheless, the advantage of using quotes was considered important, and many of them have been retained in the final descriptions.

Case description

As a social anthropologist I used Geertz' (1973) 'thick' description as a source of inspiration for describing the case studies. As this type of case description is usually based on participant observation, which was not the case here, it was not directly applicable. The reason for choosing this type of case description was to unravel the multiple layers of meaning expressed by the actors to build a comprehensive and insightful picture of what was going on in river projects. Thick description, with its wealth of information, relates to the conceptual system of what is being investigated ('emic analysis') (Fleck et al., 2004). In the literature, 'emic' refers to culturally based perspectives, interpretations and categories used by members of a group under study to conceptualise and encode knowledge and to guide their behaviour. Emic terms, concepts and categories are therefore functionally relevant to the behaviour of the people being studied.

An analysis built on emic concepts incorporates the participants' perspectives and interpretations of behaviour, events and situations, and does so in the descriptive language they themselves use (Watson-Gegeo, 1988). Sometimes the etic view gave a different insight in the process than the emic view as was the case in Chapter 5. For that reason, it was included in the recommendations for further study (see also Chapter 8). An adapted version of 'thick' description was followed in which two steps can be distinguished. The first step of the case description was making a brief portrait of the key issues that occurred during the planning process according to the government authorities' and local group's point of view. This was based on the researcher's interpretation and a historical perspective on the government–citizen relationship. In the second step, a description was drawn up from the actor's point of view, one from the standpoint of the government authorities, and another from the local group's viewpoint. This yielded quite different interpretations of what occurred in the projects. It meant that texts and arguments at two levels of description (the viewpoints of the government authorities and of the local group) could be juxtaposed in such a way that they could be compared and contrasted with each other (see Fleck et al., 2004). Individual interpretations were not seen as right or wrong in themselves, but rather as different slants on what happened, slants that the researcher puts together to construct his or her understanding of what has occurred (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

Each case description, therefore, started with a summary, followed by a historical overview of the main events in the area, the relationship between place and neighbourhood, specific characteristics of the residents and their relationship with the government authorities. Next, a description was made of the case narrative from the viewpoint of the government authorities and the residents, which was organised around specific topics arising from what occurred in the case study. Evidence for most topics was obtained from different data sources, interviews and document analysis (see Yin, 1981). Each case study chapter begins with the narrative case description before the framework-led case analysis.

Chapter 5 Dike Relocation in Lent case study

The plan for a dike relocation in Lent was a state initiative to reduce flood risk by widening the bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent and the city of Nijmegen (see Figure 5.1). The Dike Relocation in Lent case study covers the period from the launch of the plan in February 2000 to the final decision in December 2006 to proceed with implementation.

This case description draws on 60 interviews, 18 of which were in-depth, semi-structured interviews held with members of the project organisation: the steering group (3), project group (7) and advisory group (8). In addition, 32 street interviews were held with people chosen at random by walking through the village. Among the interviewees were local businesspeople, such as a garage owner, hairdresser and market gardener, as well as a local fire brigade volunteer and an active member of the residents' group 'dikers', whose houses would be along the new dike. These residents lived in various parts of the village of Lent and the newly built Waalsprong urban extension. Ten further interviews with key people were held, three of which were carried out after the final decision-making and reflected on crucial moments in the process. Among the interviewees was the chair of a residents' group and a consultant who was responsible for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and initiated a mediation action. This case description also draws on various conversations with the project manager which are not included in the list of interviewees.

5.1 Case narrative


The case narrative for Dike Relocation in Lent includes a brief review, a historical perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the launch of the government plan, and the descriptions of the case from the government's point of view and the local groups' position.

Dike relocation in Lent in brief

On 28 February 2000 at Loevestein castle²² the Dutch state secretary for water management presented the White Paper on Room for the River and showed a sketch of the plan for a dike relocation. Contrary to former policy, which relied on raising the dikes, the new policy proposes a package of structural spatial (and infrastructure)

measures to increase protection against flooding, including dike relocations and excavating flood plains and side channels (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). It should prepare the Dutch rivers to withstand floods to a design discharge of 16,000 m³/s by 2015, and ultimately a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s.²³ A bottleneck that needed to be solved was in the river Waal near Lent. The state secretary showed a sketch of a dike relocation as an illustration of measures that could be taken (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Bottleneck in the river Waal near Lent and proposed dike relocation



The state secretary's speech was picked up by national television. Government officials were upset when they saw the eight o'clock national news. Local politicians had not been officially informed about the possibility of a dike relocation. The responsible executive councillor of Nijmegen²⁴ was taken aback by the national government decision to relocate a dike in the same area as the Waalsprong housing development which just been approved. For officials of Rijkswaterstaat²⁵ it was a different situation. Although they knew about the ideas for resolving the bottleneck in the river, they had not been told about the use of 'their' design for the dike relocation.

Shortly after the state secretary's presentation, the executive councillor decided that cooperation with the state was the most likely option. At the insistence of the municipality of Nijmegen, the state secretary commissioned a Quick Scan study to compare two by-pass alternatives (with routes through the northern and middle parts of Lent) and the proposed dike relocation. The outcomes showed that the measure for a dike relocation performed best on safety and cost, and it would have less impact on the Waalsprong housing development. This outcome allowed the municipality of Nijmegen to reconcile itself to the situation and negotiate with the state for compensation for the homes that now could not be built and a contribution to the 'accessibility of the city', a second bridge over the river Waal. With this information the executive councillor organised an information meeting for the residents of Lent, most of whom did not know of the government plan beforehand. The executive councillor's message 'the Waalsprong will go ahead' stirred the residents into action. They viewed

the government plan as a second government intervention after the annexation of their village by the municipality of Nijmegen in January 1998, which meant the development of a new suburb, the Waalsprong, for 30,000 inhabitants. Like the annexation, they considered the proposed dike relocation a threat. As they had not been able to prevent the annexation, they intended to organise strong resistance to the dike relocation, arguing that they may live at a bottleneck in the river, they never feel insecure. Their main strategy was to question the premises of the measure. They did not believe the government's assumptions behind the need to reduce the flood risk. 'Even during the last flood of 1926 the discharge capacity was limited to 12,600 m³/s, and if so, Germany will flood first,' they said.

With the help of a retired professor of water management, van Ellen, they launched an alternative plan, 'Lentse Warande', based on the legal design discharge of 16,000 m³/s. This plan provided for (1) excavating the flood plain, including a 'green' side channel separated from the main channel by a longitudinal dam with concrete block, and (2) a land reservation for a dike relocation in future (see Figure 5.2).

In the autumn of 2000, the state secretary decided to install an advisory commission chaired by former minister Gerrit Brokx (referred to as the Brokx Advisory Commission) to develop the government plan, which resulted in 'Plan Brokx' (see Figure 5.3). With the outcomes of the Quick Scan and the Commission's report, the state secretary reasoned that 'the dike relocation was the best possible solution for the bottleneck in the river Waal'. Acting on the Commission's advice she negotiated with the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen about damage compensation, including the construction of a second bridge over the Waal. These were laid down in two voluntary agreements, one concerning damage compensation for the dike relocation and the housing development, the other for a financial contribution to the second Waal bridge. In earlier negotiations, it had been agreed that as well as the government plan (Plan Brokx) the residents' alternative (Lentse Warande) would be studied in the environment impact assessment (EIA), an obligatory step in the planning of infrastructure and planning application procedure. A project organisation was set up comprising a steering group with government decision-makers from the authorities involved, a project group with government officers from the same organisations and an advisory group, which included residents of Lent.

By mid 2004 the planning process was delegated from the state to a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the EIA. The appointed project manager began discussions with key people, including professor van Ellen, whose previous attempts to open a dialogue with the authorities had been disregarded. Having gained a picture of the various stakeholders, the project manager set up a project organisation, which included an advisory group, for which he invited the residents' groups. Meanwhile, the state secretary provisionally adopted the government plan in the national planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River.

Although the role of the advisory group was to give advice during the execution of EIA studies, the meetings were characterised by discussions on the government requirements for river plans, the necessity of Plan Brokx and the lack of studies of alternatives, which did not lead to much agreement. The residents finally decided to put their efforts behind getting their alternative approved. With support of the local government and Rijkswaterstaat, it was developed into a full alternative to the government plan in the EIA. In the end, both plans scored roughly the same, but the residents' plan turned out to be the most environmentally favourable alternative. While the residents considered their plan to be the best alternative as it met the legal design discharge of 16,000 m³/s for the Rhine, the project group was convinced of the utility of the government plan because it was best able to satisfy the policy requirements by meeting the future forecast of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine. The steering group finally chose the government plan because of its 'robustness'; it would solve the bottleneck in one go and meet the safety requirements best. The residents reacted furiously. The state secretary decided on the government plan in December 2005 and it was adopted by Parliament in June and December 2006.

Figure 5.2 The residents' alternative 'Lentse Warande', which consists of a side channel in the flood plain (1), a dam with opening on the west side (2), a land reservation for a possible dike relocation in future (3), housing development Waalsprong (4) and the former fortress Knotsenburg (5)




Figure 5.3 The government plan, 'Plan Brokx', including a dike relocation (1) 350 m land inwards, a side channel (2), housing development Waalsprong (3), an island Veur-Lent (4) and the former fortress Knotsenburg (5)




Table 5.1 shows a process outline with the different stages that can be distinguished in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study.

Table 5.1 Process outline of Dike Relocation in Lent

Process stage	Date	Method	Participants
Preparatory stage (February 2000 – April 2002)			
Launch of government plan	28 February 2000	Presentation studies and White Paper on Room for the River	Ministry
Quick scan	March – August 2000	Inventory of alternatives	Ministry, municipality of Nijmegen, water board
Brokx Advisory Commission	November 2000 – February 2001	Studying consequences and feasibility of plan for a dike relocation (later called Plan Brokx)	Ministry, province, municipality of Nijmegen, water board
Voluntary agreements	April 2002	Signing of two agreements: one agreement on compensation for dike relocation, a second on contributing to the cost of the second bridge over the Waal river.	Ministry and municipality of Nijmegen
Development stage (May 2002 – February 2005)			
Environmental Impact Assessment	January 2003 – January 2005	Studying various consequences of two plans: dike relocation (Plan Brokx) and resident alternative (Lentse Warande).	Rijkswaterstaat, province, water board, citizens, non-governmental organisations and municipality of Nijmegen
Preparation of decision-making	October 2004 – February 2005	Advisory group, project group and steering group make preference public concerning dike relocation or residents' alternative Lentse Warande. Drawing up final document for decision-making.	Province, municipality of Nijmegen, water board, citizens and non-governmental organisations
Decision-making stage (March 2005 – December 2006)			
State secretary	October 2005	State secretary's decision	State secretary
Government	December 2005	Government decision	Cabinet
House of Representatives	July 2006	House of Representative's decision	Members of House of Representatives
Senate	December 2006	Senate's decision	Members of Senate

Historical perspective

This section sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the launch of the government plan.

Split village

The village of Lent²⁶ is situated on the north bank of the river Waal. Opposite the village on the southern bank of the river lies the municipality of Nijmegen.

Since the construction of the Grift canal the village of Lent has been split in a western and eastern part. In 1310 Reinald I, Duke of Gelre, prepared plans to build a canal through the Overbetuwe area for travel and shipping between the cities of Arnhem and Nijmegen. It was not until 1608 that the first sod for the canal was cut. The municipality of Nijmegen paid three-quarters, the city of Arnhem the rest. Several bridges over the canal linked the eastern and western parts of the village of Lent. To make the Grift suitable for transport a road was built along the canal. In 1610 the first boat, carrying cattle, fish and peat, sailed through the canal. Two horses on the canalside road pulled the boat. Travellers used the track boat service. In the 17th century each day forty foot passengers, ten horses and five cart horses went by track boat between the cities of Arnhem and Nijmegen. From Lent the travellers were ferried across the river Waal in rowing boats and scows (Jansen, 1986). Often this was not an easy passage because of the weather or the long wait, and in 1648 a bridge was seriously considered. This plan was dropped when Hendrik Heuck, a resident of Nijmegen, presented his plan for a chain ferry or 'flying bridge'. It was built and opened in 1657 (Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998). The bridge consisted of a deck resting on two barges which were yawed on a cable connected to quay via seven boats. The river current provided the force to get the chain ferry across (Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998). In the 18th century the road along the canal deteriorated, as did the Grift, which was not making a profit, especially after the construction of the Pannerdens Kanaal in 1709, which provided a faster connection between the cities of Nijmegen and Arnhem. In the winter of 1740–1741 the dike was breached near Elden, sand filled the Grift and the canal lost its function for shipping.

A new means of transport was introduced in 1873 when Parliament decided to build a railway between Arnhem and Nijmegen. In 1875 the construction of the railway bridge started and in 1879 the first train arrived in Nijmegen. A dike had been built through the western part of Lent to access the bridge, cutting off this area from the centre of the village. Since then Lent has been split into three parts: a western part to the west of the railway, a middle part between the railway and the Grift canal, and an eastern part to the east of the canal. In 1882 Lent got a railway halt and in 1914 a station was built. However, the residents of Lent did not take the train, unless the floating bridge was out of service because of drift ice or high water.

The rise of the car led to increasing traffic and the floating bridge became a constraint on crossing the river. The establishment of the *Stichting Nijmeegsche Burgerij-Commissie voor Waaloverbrugging* in 1906 brought the building of a bridge over the Waal a step closer, but the First World War thwarted this plan. The discussion about a bridge began again in 1927 when the national government presented a national highway scheme. In the same year the chain ferry was replaced by a motor ferry. Discussions arose about the location of the bridge, near the existing railway bridge or to the east, the Belvédère plan. The residents of Lent supported a bridge next to the railway bridge ('it provides a connection to the new industrial site near the Meuse-Waal canal', 'it prevents expensive expropriation' and 'there is a lot of space available for easy slantwise banks'), which had the most backers, it was the bourgeoisie in Nijmegen who proved to be an important voice in the final decision-making. The main proponent of the Waal bridge near the Belvédère was the well known photographer C.A.P. Ivens. He made a brochure entitled 'The missing link' in which influential persons like architect H.P. Berlage, painter Jan Toorop and former city architect J.J.H. Weve came out openly in favour of the Belvédère plan. Like the municipality of Nijmegen they preferred a road past the city centre because of future revenues. On 24 February 1928 the government adopted the Belvédère plan.

Two years later the Grift canal was filled in and turned into a major road between Arnhem and Nijmegen (Jansen, 1986; Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998), definitively dividing Lent into three parts. This was made complete when the Waal bridge was completed in 1936.

Theatre for warring parties

Through the centuries the village of Lent and its surroundings has regularly seen conflict. Among others, the Spanish, the French and the Germans have fought in or near Lent. Being situated just across from Nijmegen, Lent became a front line. The Overbetuwe region, of which the village of Lent is part, was often a disputed border zone, and defensive works from various centuries are reminders of the strategic value of the region. The river proves to be a difficult barrier and armies can be prevented from crossing.

In 1585, for example, the Spanish had ousted the States Army from Nijmegen, making the city a threat for the northern Netherlands. In response a new entrenchment was built in Lent. For the Spanish troops it proved easy to oust the States Army, but in 1590 Prince Maurits came to Lent and built fortress called Knodsenburg. The Spanish lost in 1591. The Duke of Parma wanted to expand his influence with a breakout over the river Waal, but this expedition failed and the fortifications remained standing. Later, in 1672, the French threatened the north of the Netherlands. Their plan was first to invade the Overbetuwe, and from there attack the city of Nijmegen. In June the water level in the Waal near Lobith was very low and the French could cross the river without problem. The States Army troops could not withstand the enemy and had to surrender.

The city of Nijmegen also capitulated. However, the French invasion was stopped at the Hollandse Waterlinie, a line of water defences and fortifications from Amsterdam to Gorinchem. From 1674 the States Army reinstated the rule in Lent and in Nijmegen. The French came back, inspired by the revolution in 1789, and in the summer of 1794 they captured the south of the Netherlands. In the autumn the Overbetuwe was mobilised for an offensive. Although the French seized the city of Nijmegen they did not manage to get across the Waal. This changed on 10 January 1795 when the French passed the frozen river and in a few days they captured Overbetuwe. They went on to rule the Netherlands until 1815.

In the mid 19th century, the fortress town of Nijmegen wanted to strengthen its position. As fort Knodsenburg in Lent could not fulfil any role of significance three new defensive works around the village of Lent were planned two of which were realised: fortress Boven-Lent, also called Sprokkelenburg, and fortress Beneden-Lent, or Nieuw-Knodsenburg. The first was built in 1862, the second a year after. Although most of the fortresses were dismantled after the abolition of fortress Nijmegen in 1874, both fortresses in Lent were preserved. During World War II in September 1944 the German used fortress Beneden-Lent to open fire on the Americans on both banks of the Waal. The Americans finally won, but lost 200 men (Schenkels, 1985-2005).

At the end of the 20th century a new battle arose. This time it was not an armed battle but one of words. The municipality of Nijmegen intended to annex Lent for housing development. The municipality to which the village of Lent belonged did not agree and tried to convince the government and the regional authorities. Lent finally became part of the municipality of Nijmegen in January 1998. Since then Lent has been transformed from a village of 3200 inhabitants (Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998) into a suburb of the municipality of Nijmegen including the Waalsprong housing development for 30,000 inhabitants, on which building started in the late 1990s.

Bottleneck in the river Waal

In the past the Waal was a broad, shallow meandering river with channels, many islands, sand shallows, and a low discharge capacity. This changed in the 13th century when main dikes (*bandijken*) and groynes were built to stabilise the river in the main channel. Since then the Waal has been flowing in the same channel between the city of Nijmegen and the village of Lent. At this place the river was forced to burrow deeper and deeper as it is constrained by the glacial ridge on which the city of Nijmegen is built on one side and on the other side the main dikes that were built to protect the Overbetuwe region. These narrowed the space for the river to 400 meters. Through the centuries this channel has narrowed to 90 metres by the building of embankments in the flood plain outside the dikes (Mulder et al., 2001).

The inhabitants of both places used to cross the river regularly. People from Nijmegen during a Sunday walk, the residents of Lent to sell their merchandise. During severe

winters when the river was frozen the latter could easily walk across the Waal to where people were gathered. For such occasions the bakeries in Lent baked a special biscuit, *Lentse pleske*, a treat for the villagers as well as the city dwellers.

The festive mood disappeared soon when the thaw set in. People knew very well that drifting ice or weak dike sections caused floods. Ice floes floated with the current, but the natural discharge of the melting ice was blocked by sand shallows, islands and curves in the river. The outside bend was particularly threatened by the drifting ice floes and mounting ice dams. These dams held up the water, causing levels to rise. Sometimes a dike was breached, but often the water and ice overtopped the dikes. For centuries Lent, like other places along the river, was threatened by dike collapses. It was not only the dike near Lent the residents were afraid of, but also dikes in the neighbourhood, because the result was the same: generally the whole area was flooded. For example, in 1634 high ice floes caused a breach in the main dike near Lent and washed away everything, including the solid sluice gates of the Grift canal. A dam was then built in front of the restored sluices, which blocked the direct connection with the river Waal (Jaarboek Stichting Batavorum, 2008).

Breaches in the dike were repaired as soon as possible, but the maintenance of dike parcels proved a severe problem. This was enforced on those who had a 'dike duty' (*dijkplichtigen*), owners of land that bordered the main dike. Also, the dike enforcements that had to be carried out periodically as a result of the increasing water level had to be paid by them. This was a source of recurring conflict between the dike chair (*dijkstoel*) and the owners (*dijkgeslaagden*), as the burden was divided among the land owners, which often resulted in bankruptcy (van de Ven, 1995).

In addition, seepage water was considered a problem. The water came up through many old river beds in lower layers containing rough sand and gravel. From the 15th century a system of seepage dikes were built to counter the pressure against the dikes, although this raised the seepage water a bit. A seepage dike consists of clay and is about 50 centimetres high. Seepage dikes do not have deep foundations and let seepage water through after a while. In the 18th and 19th century the seepage water system was developed and put under the supervision of the dike chair. Other measures to dam up the seepage water included the reservation of a parcel of land along the dikes around Lent, which can be seen today because houses were mostly built beyond this seepage water zone.

Until about 1825 dike overflows, dike breaches and ice floes were regular occurrences in Lent, for example in 1784, 1799, 1809 and 1820. Most occurred upstream (towards the east in the direction of Doornik and Bemmelen) or downstream (towards the west near Oosterhout). The main dike near Lent often held firm, for example during the high water of 1926 but also during the high water periods of 1993 and 1995. Because of this, and despite the evacuation of over 200,000 people in January 1995, many

residents of Lent did not see the need for the dike relocation that was launched in 2000.²⁷ However, a few had a different opinion, such as a member of the voluntary fire brigade²⁸ who inspected the dikes during the last high water periods and prevented a dike breach upstream near Bemmelen.

The high water periods in 1993 and 1995 led to various studies (Bestuurlijke Begeleidingsgroep Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivieren, 2000; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2000a) on how to reduce flood risk in the Netherlands. These studies made it clear that higher water discharges from the rivers during periods with high sea water levels have to be taken into account. It further showed that it might turn out to be very effective to solve the bottlenecks in the Dutch river system. At Lent the river is narrowed by a sheet piling on the south bank (city of Nijmegen) and a dike with a small flood plain on the north bank (village of Lent). This bottleneck in the river system may obstruct the water discharge and may lead to a higher flood risk. These studies did not go unnoticed in The Hague. The high water events had put water management high on the political agenda. Apart from the Major Rivers Delta Plan (*Deltaplan Grote Rivieren*) to speed up execution of the dike reinforcement before 2001, the Water Management department launched the Room for the River policy (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2000b). Discussions about climate change and a possible resulting increasing water discharge spurred the state secretary to act and broadened the legitimacy of widening the narrow part of the river Waal near Lent.

Small village against big city

For centuries the city of Nijmegen was dependent on the village of Lent for the transport of goods, first through the Grift canal, later via the N325 trunk road to Arnhem. Furthermore, as a horticultural centre, Lent turned out to be an important supplier of vegetables, fruit, tobacco, and later flowers for the citizenry of Nijmegen. For most residents of Lent the city of Nijmegen was for a long time their main source of income.

At the end of the 20th century the municipality of Nijmegen annexed Lent and moved to the north across the river Waal. After years of struggle between the authorities, the residents of Lent realised they could not defeat this threat – but would it be the last threat they had to accept?

Government perspective

In this part the dike relocation in Lent is described from the government's point of view.

Loevestein meeting: launch of plan for dike relocation in Lent

On 28 February 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries for Water Management officially

received the advisory reports on two studies²⁹ into dealing with flood risk. During the meeting she proclaimed that the Room for the River policy³⁰ was the spearhead of her policy. The key concept was 'sustainable water safety', which she explained by addressing three questions: What are we doing now to achieve the required safety level? How are we dealing with future developments, for example climate change and the related effects of higher water discharges? How are we administering residual risk, a situation that will occur if the design discharge is exceeded? In her attempt to present a decisive image she used a sketch of a dike relocation in Lent to illustrate the measures that could be taken.³¹ 'Near the city of Nijmegen', she explained, 'is a bottleneck. And this is precisely where a new urban extension will be built.' She questioned whether this was a shrewd plan, knowing that the water discharge of the river Waal may increase over the coming decades. She predicted tough negotiations with the municipality of Nijmegen.^{32,33} The meeting attracted the attention of the press; it was broadcast as a news item during the 20.00 o'clock news and the following current affairs programme NOVA.

The state secretary's performance had the desired effect: it caused a wave of publicity. She positioned herself in the middle of the political arena and put the water question high on the political agenda (Roth et al., 2006a). Officials and government decision-makers were shocked. Rijkswaterstaat officials did know, but they were not informed about the use of their preliminary maps.^{34,35} Paul Depla, executive councillor at the municipality of Nijmegen, did not officially know that the dike relocation was a possible measure. Although he had previously received signals about the preparation of a Room for the River programme that may affect 'his' Waalsprong, it suddenly became reality when broadcast to the nation.³⁶ The executive councillor was not surprised by the increasing problem of flood safety – the memories of the high water events in 1993 and 1995 were still alive. After the recent dike raising there was growing awareness of the national interest in river widening as a possible measure. But the location for the dike just near Nijmegen was difficult to accept as the executive councillor intended to build the Waalsprong urban extension. With the approval of national and provincial government, the municipality of Nijmegen had just started building the Waalsprong housing development³⁷ and the proposed dike relocation might affect the edges of this plan.

Not everyone in Lent watched television on that day. Most residents got the information during the first information meeting that the executive councillor organised in September 2000. After the annexation of their village by the municipality of Nijmegen for the development of a new suburb for 30,000 residents, the residents considered the proposed dike relocation as a second government intervention in a short time.

Safeguarding the Waalsprong housing development

Soon after his first reaction of disbelief and denial, executive councillor Paul Depla decided that cooperation with the national government would be the best option. 'Although many local governments would choose a different position,' he explained, 'it

is a government plan and complying with national policy is our legitimate role in Dutch governance'.³⁸ Apart from the loss of revenue from the houses that could not be built, an important argument for the councillor's position was the former financial position of the municipality of Nijmegen.³⁹ Collaboration would provide opportunities to negotiate for compensation, including a second bridge over the Waal.⁴⁰ A second bridge was needed, but the budget and financial situation of the municipality of Nijmegen would not allow this. The local government was banking on plans being made for a bridge in the region for which it would not have to pay.⁴¹

A condition demanded by the municipality of Nijmegen in negotiations with the state secretary was to stick to the original plan for 12,000 homes in the Waalsprong urban extension. In an attempt to influence the state secretary's opinion, the municipal executive of Nijmegen invited the state secretary to visit Lent before holding an official meeting. She looked at the dike and was not shocked: 'I am not saying that I find [the proposed dike relocation] awful, no. I find it less terrible than a noise barrier'.⁴² At the insistence of the municipality of Nijmegen the state secretary decided to carry out a Quick Scan study from March to August 2000⁴³ in close cooperation with Rijkswaterstaat, the municipality of Nijmegen and other authorities. The Quick Scan addressed alternative options for solving the bottleneck in the river Waal to safely meet a design river discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine near Lobith.⁴⁴ Based on the outcomes of the Quick Scan, the state secretary decided to develop the dike relocation as a preferred option as it performed best on safety (the main condition of the Room for the River policy) and cost. Furthermore, it could have less impact on the development of the Waalsprong housing development,⁴⁵ a condition of the municipality of Nijmegen.

Dealing with two loyalties

In the morning of 20 September 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries informed the Nijmegen municipal executive that 'the Waalsprong will go ahead'.⁴⁶ The municipality of Nijmegen accepted the state secretary's choice for a dike relocation under the following conditions: (1) the national government to cover all claims for damages; (2) implementation of the dike relocation; (3) settlement of the legal procedures; (4) securing the Waalsprong housing development; and (4) cooperation in all necessary activities to guarantee the accessibility and development of the Waalsprong urban extension. These were summarised in a press release in which the municipality of Nijmegen also invited residents to attend an information meeting on Saturday 23 September at 10.30 a.m. in a local hall.⁴⁷

The dike reeve was also present and found it to be a peculiar meeting. 'I was in time, but I saw that about 200 people had already come instead of the expected 150. The hall was too small, so we moved to the gym instead, which happened to be empty. There was a microphone, but no chairs. The crowd grew to several hundred people, who had to remain standing. Executive councillor Paul Depla had to stand on a table to get the

attention of the audience. His intention was to explain the situation from the beginning to the end, but the atmosphere was not congenial. Residents asked him about the selling of their houses, and some had just bought a new house and wanted to know what to do now.⁴⁸ The first information meeting did not meet the local government's or the residents' expectations. Paul Depla felt very uncomfortable. 'The municipality of Nijmegen has tried to communicate openly and directly with the people of Lent, explaining the policy intentions of the national government. As a result, not the state secretary but the municipality of Nijmegen was the bearer of bad news. The residents did not thank us for that. We are firmly of the opinion that we are serving the public interest.'⁴⁹ In the village of Lent the information meeting went down badly. The municipality of Nijmegen was accused of having the plans already made. From an urban development perspective the government plan would be an enormous facelift for the local government. Until then the Waalsprong had been planned with its back to the river. The dike relocation the municipality of Nijmegen would open a possibility to be connected with the river, which made it seem an opportunity for the municipality of Nijmegen.

The local government did not reject the dike relocation.⁵⁰ Instead, in a meeting with the state secretary on 13 October 2000, it emphasised the conditions for collaboration.⁵¹

Late in the afternoon of 21 December 2000 the Nijmegen municipal executive received a response from the state secretary to two letters. One included the City Council's concern about the lack of a thorough study of alternatives, such as professor van Ellen's side channel (*Van Ellen-geul*) which involves excavating the flood plain. The side channel would be separated from the main channel by a longitudinal dam of concrete blocks. The state secretary's reply stated that alternatives might be considered and compared in an environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure (*milieueffectrapportage*). During a closed doors meeting for the affected residents held the same day, Paul Depla explained the position of the municipality of Nijmegen and the relationship with the state secretary. He regretted the fact that the state secretary was not willing to take alternative plans into consideration, and said he intended to commission a study to compare variants of the Van Ellen side channel⁵² and the government plan.⁵³ The residents, however, blamed the city for working with a double agenda.⁵⁴

Institutionalising the government plan

As a follow-up to the Quick Scan, in November 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries established an administrative task force chaired by former minister Gerrit Brokx⁵⁵ (also referred to as the Brokx Advisory Commission) to study the consequences and the feasibility of a dike relocation in the area of the Waalsprong housing development.^{56, 57}

The establishment of the Commission prompted questions in the House of Representatives. According to one MP, the residents' alternative was rejected too easily.

In her response the state secretary recognised some aspects of value in the residents' alternative, including the decrease in the water level, but she did not feel like withdrawing the plan for a dike relocation. She promised that if the Commission advised in favour of the government plan, the residents' alternative would get a second chance during the EIA.^{58, 59} Meanwhile, the state secretary included the preferred option for a dike relocation in the Government's decision of 15 December 2000, which was prompted by the report of the Commission on Water Management for the 21st Century (*Commissie Tielrooij*), published in August 2000.⁶⁰

The publication of the Brokx Advisory Commission's report was delayed.⁶¹ It took time before the Commission got the ministry's approval of the findings. It appeared that the chair had a limited mandate. He did not have the authority to decide.⁶² On 20 February 2001 the Commission presented its report. The main conclusions were that a dike relocation might offer sufficient flexibility for accommodating a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine in future. Furthermore, the Commission proposed relocating the current river dike 350 meters land inward and digging a side channel. The loss of housing could be limited by building a quay with apartments instead of a dike. Realisation of the plan would mean the demolition of 55 houses in Lent. As he could count on regional support for this plan, Brokx proposed to make an agreement with the parties involved. From then on, the dike relocation was called 'Plan Brokx'. The Commission's report included an 'expert judgement', which was commissioned by the municipality of Nijmegen.⁶³ The outcome of this study endorsed the executive councillor's opinion that no more energy should be invested in developing alternatives.⁶⁴ The state secretary's reaction was that the dike relocation would be the most robust measure. The residents of Lent, however, were not amused.

State secretary Monique de Vries followed the advice of the Brokx Advisory Commission. Her main argument was that if the Waalsprong were built as planned, there would be less room for a dike relocation to resolve the bottleneck in the Waal.⁶⁵ 'A small widening of the bottleneck near Lent would have a relatively big result in terms of discharge capacity near the city of Nijmegen as well as upstream. Moreover, it would increase the effectiveness of measures taken downstream from Nijmegen.'⁶⁶ Negotiations then began between the national government (Department of Water Management) and the municipality of Nijmegen about compensation for losses resulting from realising the government plan.

Negotiating compensation measures

From mid May 2001 until April 2002 the authorities negotiated the compensation measures, with a breakthrough in November 2001 when the state agreed to provide compensation for the 'limited accessibility' of the city. The municipality of Nijmegen and the state secretary finally agreed to the proposed two voluntary agreements,⁶⁷ which were signed on 23 April 2002.⁶⁸ The first concerned the plan preparation, execution, financing and damage compensation, and the financial arrangements for

compensating the residents, the municipality of Nijmegen and private actors. The parties agreed to start planning procedures, including the EIA, and a project organisation consisting of a steering group, a project group and an advisory group with 'a wide ranged composition'. The name of the project was quite explicit: 'dike relocation Lent'. The second included a budget (M€ 90,756)⁶⁹ for the continuation of the access to the city during the construction of the dike relocation. According to an official it was 'the final offer'.⁷⁰ Next, the ministry delegated the planning to the regional office of Rijkswaterstaat situated in Arnhem near Lent.

Disputed aims and premises

After the voluntary agreements were signed a Rijkswaterstaat project manager began the Dike Relocation in Lent project. His assignment included taking the government plan through the EIA procedures and studying the residents' alternative, Lentse Warande, which included the Van Ellen side channel. At the beginning it was clear that a double track was followed: the dike relocation as the most promising solution and the residents' alternatives as second best.⁷¹

The project manager's first action was to meet key stakeholders, including Professor van Ellen, who proposed a side channel in the flood plain near Lent. He hoped these conversations would 'reinstate the relationship with the surroundings'.⁷² He admitted that during the start the government paid little attention to van Ellen's ideas. 'It was rejected with the wrong arguments which provided for residents' distrust against the government' (van der Graaf, 2007). In line with the voluntary agreement he established a project organisation consisting of a steering group of government decision-makers, including the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen, the dike reeve, the director for water management of the Rijkswaterstaat regional office and the provincial delegate, from the authorities involved, a project group consisting of officials from the same organisations, and an advisory group that represented all other stakeholders⁷³ and chaired by an independent chairman. Because of the difficulty of finding a chair, the advisory group only started work on 20 January 2003.⁷⁴

The initial work of the advisory group was dominated by discussions about the objective of the project, for example whether the problem at stake was a river management problem. Its view was that it was a river management problem for which a river management solution would have to be found. As a consequence, hydraulic engineering might have to be the leading consideration and not urban development. The residents feared the construction of a 'Manhattan on the Waal' under the pretext of the necessity of solving a river management problem. They wanted to keep the two separate,⁷⁵ but agreed on the project manager's formulation that 'spatial planning is more than a criterion; it will be considered during the planning process but it is not the main objective, it is following'.⁷⁶ Concerning the water security objective, the condition was that the plan had to meet the conditions of flood safety and time

(realisation before 2015). The budget⁷⁷ and the environment^{78,79} were also part of the assessment, but the advisory group were not informed of these.

Residents' plan as a full alternative

The EIA procedure included the writing of a Notification of Intent (*Startnotitie*), which describes the subjects for study, in this case a comparison of the government plan (Plan Brokx) and the residents' alternative, Lentse Warande. The consultation for the Notification of Intent resulted in 27 reactions,⁸⁰ most of which referred to the date of the final decision, whether they would have to move and disagreement with the government plan. All were dismissed (*niet ontvankelijk verklaard*)⁸¹ as the residents' reaction was limited to what might have to be studied. The Notification of Intent was approved in November 2003.⁸² The comparison of the two plans was based on a range of criteria, from flood safety to nature and social aspects,⁸³ and so various studies were carried out, for example in the field of hydraulic engineering, morphology and residents' perceptions of values in the area.⁸⁴

During the finalisation of the Notification of Intent a dispute emerged about the consultants contracted to carry out the EIA. The residents had reservations because they did not agree with the results of the firm's study at the beginning of 2001 commissioned by the municipality of Nijmegen. They demanded that they be given all the relevant documents on the tendering procedure, appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*), and threatened to resign from the advisory group if they did not receive them.⁸⁵ It took a lot of time and energy to resolve this question,⁸⁶ but the consultancy was awarded the contract.

Another dispute arose about the details of the residents' alternative. The advisory group was convinced that without a detailed alternative the state secretary would automatically choose the government plan. Although the municipality of Nijmegen had promised to cover the costs, the agreed designs were not included in the draft EIA. The residents resolved this by presenting preliminary designs for the land reservation⁸⁷ to allow a comparison of the alternative plans and speed up delivery of the final designs.⁸⁸ Finally, the details of the residents' alternative were drawn up with the support of Rijkswaterstaat (impact studies) and the municipality of Nijmegen (urban development plan).

Also disputed was the purpose of the land reservation that was part of the residents' alternative. Four possible development plans were drawn up: an option that maintains the status quo; a green-blue option with nature and water for recreation; an urban extension for temporary buildings (50–80 years), such as rented houses and student housing, and an urban extension with a permanent character, including buildings on terps.⁸⁹ Unlike these four options,⁹⁰ there were also stories in which three options emerged. The first option included a park, which was the residents' preference, but it was not the local government's favourite as it did not support the desire to connect the

housing development with the river. In the second option the emphasis was on temporarily facilities, such as parking, a camp site and fairs. The third option consisted of the construction of houses on terps, which means that the only works involved are to breach the dike.⁹¹ The municipality of Nijmegen appeared to be in favour of this last option.⁹²

The dike reeve, the chair of the water board, admitted that one of these variants with a 'green' side channel and a design for early completion came close to the government plan (Plan Brokx). Both needed a damming dike, an important condition according to him. But like the province, he had problems with the temporary uses of the land reservation. He proposed various legal constraints, including measures under the Spatial Planning Act, that might limit them to a maximum of 10 years, and moving the budget for the costs to the reserve.⁹³ The commotion surrounding the plans was finally settled by the promise that the final designs would be made after the state secretary's decision.⁹⁴

The conditional design discharge was also disputed as both plans were designed for different standards, which proved difficult for comparison. Soon after the approval of the Notification of Intent, the advisory group expressed its disappointment about this condition.⁹⁵ The government plan (Plan Brokx) was designed for 16,000 m³/s, but could also meet the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s, while the residents' alternative would withstand at most a design discharge of 16,700 m³/s.⁹⁶ This issue was solved by taking the land reservation into account, which meant that the residents' alternative also meets the discharge standard of 18,000 m³/s.

Time consuming activity

Reading the topic reports of the EIA was a time consuming activity for the residents and they asked for a postponement of their final judgement of four months.⁹⁷ The residents had considerable knowledge of the area and pointed out a number of mistakes in the reports.⁹⁸ The discussions were therefore mainly about the small details of each study, for example the correctness of the observation of the little owl. The project manager: 'The residents tended to favour all the details that might make their alternative more attractive, rather than details that favoured the government plan. It was difficult to get all this down on paper to the required level of detail'.⁹⁹ This view was supported by executive councillor Paul Depla: 'The outcome of the EIA does not make the dike relocation a fact, but a 'proposed fact' [it was not yet decided on]. The advisory group tried to do everything it could to get the principal question of 'dike relocation' off the table. At the same time, the residents knew that it might go ahead and that they could only influence the decision-making process. This ambiguous stance by the advisory group meant the participation process did not always go smoothly.¹⁰⁰

During the reporting, the authors changed the names of the two plans, from government plan into 'dike relocation' and the residents' alternative into 'dike maintenance'.¹⁰¹ The two plans turned out to be comparable on various points,¹⁰² but a

dispute then arose about the meaning of the word ‘comparable’. To executive councillor Paul Depla, comparable meant ‘equal’, but this was not the view of Rijkswaterstaat: ‘The alternatives are not equal, but they are elaborated equally. Both alternatives offer a solution’.¹⁰³ For an overview see Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Impact matrix of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) Dike Relocation in Lent (published without cost estimate)

Criteria	Short term		Long term		Total	
	DT	DH	DT	DH	DT	DH
River	+++	+	0	++	+++	+++
Spatial quality	+	+	0	0	+	+
Nature	+	0	0	-	+	-
Landscape, cultural heritage, archaeology	---	-	0	--	---	---
Destruction and permanent nuisance	--	-	0	--	--	--
Soil and water	0	+	0	0	0	+
Nuisance (building activities)	--	-	0	--	--	---
Accessibility surrounding	-	-	0	-	-	-

DT = dike relocation DH = dike maintenance + = positive - = negative 0 = neutral

Source: News Bulletin Room for the Waal, Room for Safety (*Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 4, December 2004

The advisory group did not agree with the outcome of the EIA and the estimated costs of both plans. From the residents’ point of view, the impacts of the dike relocation were underestimated and the impacts of the dike maintenance alternative on existing buildings were overestimated.¹⁰⁴ They found considerable defects, formulated in 13 points, from editorial to detailed comments.¹⁰⁵ One of the major points for discussion concerned seepage water, a sincere concern to them. According to the project manager this would be solved technically with sheet piling, but the residents doubted this solution.¹⁰⁶ Finally, it was decided to edit it without changing the content of the report.

On 22 October 2004 the advisory group made its preference for ‘dike maintenance’ public.

At the end of October the project group informed the steering group of its preference for ‘a dike relocation’ and added a memo to the advisory report of the advisory group. The advisory group was furious, calling this inappropriate.¹⁰⁷ For the second time the residents considered leaving the advisory group.¹⁰⁸

In the meeting of 23 November 2004 the steering group decided on the government plan, but the decision was not taken unanimously. Four participants (Rijkswaterstaat,

Rivierenland water board, province of Gelderland and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment) were proponents while the municipality of Nijmegen and the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (KAN) abstained.¹⁰⁹ The municipality of Nijmegen accepted both plans under the following conditions: a quick decision by the state secretary to give the residents certainty and clarity, rapid settling of the legal procedures and implementation of the selected plan, completion of the Waalsprong housing development, guaranteeing the accessibility of the city, and compensation for all costs and damages.¹¹⁰ Other members of the steering group had tried to convince executive councillor Paul Depla to agree to the other parties' decision by trying to discuss the arguments in the open, but that finally did not work.¹¹¹ Paul Depla: 'People had hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not interest me.'¹¹²

The dike reeve did not find the decision-making in the steering group to be hard going. 'In weighing the pros and cons we had a relatively easy task, because our aim was to put flood safety well and truly on the table.'¹¹³

Discordant views

During the planning process various disputes emerged between the government authorities, for example about the newsletter, the press release about the steering group's advisory report, and a letter to the residents of Lent.¹¹⁴ After going through many versions, the text for the fourth newsletter, the press release and the letter were accepted by the municipality of Nijmegen.¹¹⁵ In the end, the municipality of Nijmegen agreed to the wording of letter, but on condition that the underlying document be disclosed, referring to the principle of good governance requiring government to be accountable and transparent in its decisions.¹¹⁶ The draft EIA report therefore had to be disclosed.¹¹⁷ The next question was whether the draft version was legal.¹¹⁸ The project manager solved this by putting it on deposit for public inspection in a public venue in the village of Lent, but residents had to call the project manager first to obtain a key. Four residents called, only one of which had a look at the draft report.¹¹⁹

On 14 December 2004 the advisory group held its penultimate meeting, in which subjects like the reaction of the advisory group to the steering group's advice and the involvement of members in a follow-up were discussed. The residents' group Lentse Federatie gave notice of its leave after the last meeting of the advisory group on 25 January 2005, when the costs of the EIA would be discussed.¹²⁰ The project manager was not pleased by the reactions of the residents,¹²¹ who were disappointed with the steering group's decision.

Waiting for the final decision

It was generally expected that the state secretary would take a decision when she chaired the meeting of the Room for the River Steering Committee on 24 March 2005. Prior to the expected decision, the project manager planned a meeting with the residents of Lent in April 2005¹²² and allowed the project group to develop the government

plan.¹²³ At the same time, cost estimates of both plans were made for the finalisation of the EIA report. Despite the residents' disapproval of the proposed costs, the steering group agreed with them and with the revised version of the EIA (version 3.0), which was treated confidentially.¹²⁴ The project manager then sent the advisory reports on the dike relocation to the state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen.¹²⁵ As in the EIA report, in which the two plans were systematically relabelled 'dike relocation' (government plan) and 'dike maintenance' (residents' alternative), in the advisory report to the state secretary the two plans were labelled differently: 'dike relocation now' and 'dike relocation not yet'. The advisory reports included an overview of the short-term and long-term costs of both plans.¹²⁶ The long-term costs of the 'dike relocation now' option were 332 million euros, while the 'dike relocation not yet' option would cost 378 million euros (with park) and 448 million euros (built area). The question remained was what made the 'dike relocation now' option cheaper than the 'dike relocation not yet' option. Relating the costs to the reduction in the water level did not work because the latter option was not assessed in this way.¹²⁷ In addition, Rijkswaterstaat was unwilling to clarify how the costs of both plans had been calculated.¹²⁸

The residents felt disappointed about the way Rijkswaterstaat dealt with their alternative and asked for a meeting with state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen. This took place on 18 March 2005, just before the meeting of the Room for the River Steering Committee¹²⁹ in which the state secretary was expected to decide on 'Lent'.¹³⁰ However, she did not state her decision in the meeting, but kept open which plan would be the best option and called the residents' alternative 'very interesting'.¹³¹ As a result, both were included in the SPKD Room for the River part 1, published on 15 April 2005.¹³²

In a letter of 25 March 2005 the project manager informed the residents of Lent about the procedures, but the next steps were not clear yet, and promised to inform them when there was more clarity.¹³³ The state secretary's decision was expected at least before the consultation round on the SPKD Room for the River, which was to start on 1 June 2005.¹³⁴ In a letter to the House of Representatives, the state secretary stated her intention to take her decision before 1 May 2005.¹³⁵ In the meantime the project manager came back on his decision to elaborate the government plan. 'The decision-making by the state secretary has overtaken events.'¹³⁶ Next, on 21 June 2005 the state secretary postponed her decision on 'Lent' to wait for reactions from the consultation round of the SPKD. According to the project manager this would not be expected before 23 August 2005, the last day of the consultation period. Among ministry officials too the approach and the procedure were not clear, which indicated further postponement of the final decision.¹³⁷

Regional advice, dealing with residents and the state secretary's decision

Meanwhile, the province of Gelderland presented a regional advice which addressed the regional preference for measures in the framework of the SPKD. The provincial government took the lead while chairing the Upstream Rivers Steering Committee.¹³⁸

The region recommended looking beyond 2015, not excluding climate change, which could result in higher water discharges than the proposed design discharge of 18,000 m³/s, and looking into the 'spatial quality' of measures rather than technical solutions (Stuurgroep Bovenrivieren-Stuurgroep Benedenrivieren, 2005). The province of Gelderland proved to be an exponent of robust measures¹³⁹ and a proponent of the government plan.

After the last meeting of the advisory group in January 2005 the project manager was concerned about how to deal with the residents. He therefore sought independent advice. The consultant suggested disbanding the advisory group and taking a personal approach.¹⁴⁰ The project manager informed the residents by letter about the main topics, including the revised version of the EIA, the costs of both plans and the advice to the state secretary.¹⁴¹ The residents, however, had many questions and asked for a meeting to discuss these. At first the project manager refused,¹⁴² but finally agreed to a meeting on 22 June 2005, in which he explained, among other things, how both plans relate to the SPKD, and promised to include their comments in the next version of the EIA.¹⁴³

After the consultation period, in the first week of October 2005, the state secretary called the chairman of the residents' group Lentse Federatie in person to inform him about her decision to go ahead with the government plan.¹⁴⁴ This was incorporated into the SPKD part 3, published on 22 December 2005, in which Lent was made a front-runner project.¹⁴⁵

In his role as chair of the National Advisory Council on Water Management, Prince Willem Alexander visited Nijmegen and Lent. Based on the state secretary's decision, he delivered a presentation on the different aspects of the problem and the preferred solutions, and talked to some residents about their alternative.¹⁴⁶

Preparatory steps for final decision-making

On 3 March 2006 some members of the House of Representatives visited Lent prior to a debate on the SPKD Room for the River with the state secretary.¹⁴⁷ All MPs were in favour of the residents' alternative.¹⁴⁸ For the debate in the House the Room for the River project organisation drew up a report on the two plans (see Table 5.3).¹⁴⁹ In an accompanying letter, state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen said that 'the residents' alternative turned out to be less positive with regard to the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s and would result in a decrease in the water level of 12 cm, less than half as much as in the government plan (27 cm).¹⁵⁰ Additional upstream measures would have to be taken to meet the 18,000 m³/s discharge standard.'¹⁵¹ The state secretary stated that the costs of the plans did not differ much. 'The costs of the residents' alternative included the construction of the Van Ellen side channel (€212 million) and the purchase and planning of the land reservation (€103 million). For additional upstream measures an extra €103 million investment would be needed, which implied a total investment of

€270–373 million. The costs for a dike relocation in future were estimated at some hundreds of millions of euros, making a considerable part of the investment of €370 million ‘for nothing’, because upstream measures would then not be needed, while the costs for the government plan were estimated at €304 million in total.¹⁵² In the next paragraph she qualified this issue by stating that ‘the government plan would be much more cost effective than the residents’ alternative. For about the same amount of money the largest bottleneck in the river area would be solved in a ‘robust’ way and it immediately remove any further doubts’. She emphasised the regional support¹⁵³ and called attention to an agreement between the authorities on government finance for a second bridge over the river Waal when the dike relocation goes ahead.¹⁵⁴ The report entitled ‘Measure at the village of Lent’ to the Water Management Committee of the House of Representatives included an overview of the costs of both plans.

Table 5.3 Outcomes report by the Lent project team, Room for the River Upstream Rivers Office

	Government dike relocation plan (Plan Brokx)	Residents’ alternative Lentse Warande (urban option)
Room for the River - extra surface - depth	- now 30 ha (including island) - yes	- long term - yes
Reduction in water level	27 cm	12 cm
Final plan	Yes	No
Land reservation [in euros]	No	Yes (103 million; not included in total sum)
Number of houses [to be demolished]	50	15-20
Earth moving	3.7 million m ³	4.5 million m ³
Short-term costs [in euros]	304 million**	315 million (incl. 212 million Van Ellen channel)
Additional measures	well over 35 million	58 million (general measures) 35 million (for correcting river bends)
Total costs [in euros]	340 million	408 million
Nature*	0	-
Landscape, cultural history and archaeology*	---	--
Risks	Seepage water	Land reservation

0 = neutral - = negative

* Derived from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report Dike Relocation Lent, November 2004.

** The government contribution to a second bridge over the Waal river is not included.

Source: Measure at the village of Lent – an analysis as a result of public consultation round, explanation for the Commission Water Management of the House of Representatives, 16 March 2006.

In preparation for a debate on the SPKD Room for the River in the House of Representatives a hearing was organised about 'Lent' on 20 April 2006. Experts, government officials and residents were invited to give evidence. The parliamentary members of the Water Management Committee listened to the consultees, including a resident who commented on the government plan and a consultant involved in the EIA, who favoured the government plan.¹⁵⁵

After the hearing, the consultant tried to mediate between the residents and the project manager, who informed his superiors before confirming any decisions. He viewed this cooperative initiative by the residents' group as forced by political circumstances, but after several meetings the project manager stopped further consultation. He judged it too dangerous to continue: 'How could I work on a compromise while the state secretary had already determined her position?' Showing his commitment, he even authorised calculations for a minor dike relocation with flood plain excavation. 'Not the best option from the viewpoint of hydraulics', he commented.¹⁵⁶

Discussion backstage before the vote in Parliament

A report of the Investigation and Verification Office of the House of Representatives prompted some discussion in the media. On 14 June 2006 an MP asked the state secretary to provide additional cost estimations for some projects, including the Dike Relocation in Lent. 'In this project it does not seem to be easy to compare the government plan and the residents' alternative. The choice will probably automatically be the state secretary's preferred variant.'¹⁵⁷ However, the subject was not picked up by other members. In an email correspondence the residents asked the project manager whether there would be 'some movement' from the ministry, but he replied that the state secretary did not want to negotiate about the measure. She had already determined her position in favour of the dike relocation.¹⁵⁸

On 27 June 2006 the House of Representatives discussed the SPKD Room for the River, agreeing with the dike relocation, but proposed various motions.¹⁵⁹ The House adopted the SPKD on 7 July 2006.¹⁶⁰ The day after the residents of Lent received a letter from the municipality of Nijmegen in which the mayor explained the House's decision. She was sorry about the choice of the state secretary and supported the idea that the residents' alternative would also provide sufficient safety during high water, including the salvaging of 55 houses. She referred to Rijkswaterstaat, which would provide information about the process and the design plan.¹⁶¹ Three days later Rijkswaterstaat wrote a letter explaining the procedure and the planning.¹⁶² Attached was a package full of expert information about the dike relocation.¹⁶³

In August 2006 the state secretary decided to delegate the planning of the dike relocation to the municipality of Nijmegen.¹⁶⁴ In a letter to the residents the project manager said that 'the decision of the House of Representatives closes a period of political discussion and decision-making'.¹⁶⁵ On 17 November 2006, however, the Senate debated the SPKD

Room for the River. One senator was highly indignant about the project manager's statement about decision-making coming to a close, as if the Senate did not have a voice in decision-making. However, the dike relocation in Lent was not discussed and was passed by the Senate on 19 December 2006.¹⁶⁶

The arguments

State Secretary for Water Management

State secretary Monique de Vries declared that the bottleneck in the river Waal near Lent needed to be solved. 'Climate change, rising river discharges, accelerated sea level rise in combination with land subsidence; it is a slow but unavoidable process. The threat of the water is always present and in the long term it will even increase. We have to be alert and be unafraid of taking radical measures. Planning today implies taking into account the situation of tomorrow, let us say 2015, and further.... In our current river system there is not so much room between the river dikes, which means that you have to search for likely measures inside the dikes.... Studies have outlined a few possibilities, for example a dike relocation,¹⁶⁷ while the Quick Scan showed that the dike relocation is the preferable option with regard to flood safety for the village of Lent, the Waalsprong housing development and the municipality of Nijmegen.'¹⁶⁸ Her successor state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen threatened to refuse the promised contribution to a second bridge over the river Waal if the municipality of Nijmegen did not agree to the government plan. She stated that the alternative would meet the legal design discharge but not more, while the government plan would meet a higher design discharge.¹⁶⁹ An unresolved question was the land reservation. The state secretary repudiated the proposal to buy that very parcel but did not go into this subject.¹⁷⁰ Finally, she decided for the government plan.¹⁷¹

Rijkswaterstaat

'The government plan and the residents' alternative have both been included in the SPKD Room for the River. The residents' alternative will therefore be seriously considered', stated Bert Keijts, director-general of Rijkswaterstaat. 'The point of departure is relocating the dike in the short term, including a side channel inside the dikes. This would offer opportunities for recreation. But the residents' alternative with terps for housing development would provide money. We have to look seriously at this plan to see whether it deserves a chance.'¹⁷²

The director of the Rijkswaterstaat regional office felt uncomfortable with the government plan, as the housing development had just been approved by all authorities involved. According to him 'it was an extremely politically sensitive question'.¹⁷³

The director for water management of the same office was a proponent of relocating the dike. 'The conditions were time, budget, security and the environment. The

residents' alternative did not meet the first three conditions very well, and on the environment it did better than the government plan. This is logical: the measure is not very large, so it would be better for the environment. But what counts heavily is important, and I think flood safety counts very heavily, and for the long term a dike relocation will also meet these conditions. Who can say that we will achieve this [dike relocation] later?' She was clear about whose opinion might count heavily: 'Those who are responsible for flood safety, Rivierenland water board and province of Gelderland. The mayor [in his role as responsible for calamity management] has to take over in the event of a disaster, but before this is at issue, [flood safety] is the responsibility of the water managers [in other words, Rijkswaterstaat].'¹⁷⁴

Province of Gelderland

Provincial delegate Harry Keereweert of province of Gelderland explained his preference as follows. 'Broadening the river near Lent is necessary. A solution has to be found, not only for the short term, but also for sustainable measures that will be effective over the long term. The dike relocation provides a structural and sustainable solution that responds to the expected increase in the water discharge as a result of climate change. A dike relocation now will avoid a second period of construction, something to be prevented under the Government's decision of 2002. A dike relocation will solve the bottleneck in the river Waal in one go and increase the discharge capacity of the river system. The provincial government states that a dike relocation could lead to completion of the Waalsprong housing development and thus remove any uncertainty concerning future measures in the area.'¹⁷⁵

Rivierenland water board

The dike reeve of Rivierenland water board believes decision-making concerning the solving of the bottleneck in the river Waal has to be based on three conditions: time, flood safety and budget.¹⁷⁶ He argued: 'The first reason for choosing for a dike relocation is the time component. You have to decide for the long term and if you know that your decision has consequences for that time period then you must not resist it. Deciding now for a robust plan will resolve the situation for a long time. The second reason is the knowledge that the 16,000 m³/s safety standard will meet the condition, but probably not for the long term.'¹⁷⁷

Municipality of Nijmegen

According to executive councillor Paul Depla the question is whether the municipality of Nijmegen has to declare openly for or against one of the plans. 'From my point of view you should not do this. Since the start I have said that the dike relocation is a decision for the state secretary; we are collaborating under certain conditions. Neither the government plan nor the residents' alternative is my preference. If we declare our preference, we imply that the municipality of Nijmegen will determine the decision-making process. It is not our choice; we are not in charge of that.' His role in the steering group was clear: 'We are participating in the steering group to take stock of the process.'

Rijkswaterstaat remains responsible.¹⁷⁸ His reflection on the planning process: ‘Rijkswaterstaat was clearly in favour of the government plan, while the residents chose their alternative, arguing it would save homes. The two parties communicated fairly with each other, there was a lot of comprehension, but the principal differences of opinion remained.’¹⁷⁹

Residents’ perspective

The residents’ perspective of the plan for a dike relocation is described below.

Residents enter the scene

After the presentation of the state secretary in February 2000, Professor van Ellen, a retired professor of water management who lives near Nijmegen, worried about what was going on. He published various articles on this subject in the regional newspaper. In May 2000 he wrote a letter to the municipality of Nijmegen in which he presented his plan for a side channel as an alternative to the government plan, which proposed excavating the flood plain and digging a side channel, the so-called ‘Van Ellen side channel’ (*Van Ellen-geul*). When he did not receive a reply, he decided to call. A local government official informed him that a commission would be established in June 2000 for which he would be invited. When nothing happened van Ellen called the official, but now he was referred to Rijkswaterstaat, but the government authority referred him back to the municipality of Nijmegen.¹⁸⁰ Finally, in September 2000 a meeting was arranged between the authorities and Professor van Ellen. The municipality of Nijmegen was positive about van Ellen’s plan and wanted to investigate it, but the Rijkswaterstaat official first had to discuss it with his boss. Through his son, who worked for the consultancy firm that made the calculations, van Ellen heard that the results of his plan were available. Later Rijkswaterstaat phoned to say his alternative did not meet the conditions and had been shelved. Van Ellen had to repeatedly ask for a copy of the report, which he dismissed as not being fair.¹⁸¹ He commissioned a new calculation with another model at his own expense.¹⁸² At that point ‘a conflict was born.’¹⁸³

Preparing a residents’ alternative

The state secretary informed the municipality of Nijmegen about the outcomes of the Quick Scan by telephone on 20 September 2000. Executive councillor Paul Depla then planned a meeting behind closed doors for insiders. One of the invitees was the chairman of the Village Council. ‘The main message was: “the Waalsprong housing development will go ahead”’.¹⁸⁴ Later that week, on the morning of Saturday 23 September 2000, the municipality of Nijmegen organised a meeting for the residents, including some people who had recently bought a house in the new suburb. Paul Depla declared the same message and informed the audience that the municipality of Nijmegen agreed to the government plan and compensation measures, including a contribution to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal. This meeting became

turbulent. Residents felt enraged by the planned dike relocation and the proposed demolition of 55 houses.¹⁸⁵ It prompted the residents to organise.

A week later a special meeting was held for the residents of Lent. The chair of the Lent Village Council hoped that all residents would come together in one residents' group, but this turned out impossible.¹⁸⁶ Three residents' groups finally emerged: GeWaLent (residents affected by the cut-off the bend in the Waal), Flotust (acronym of three streets in Lent where the residents would have a view of the new dike) and Veur-Lent (residents living in the part of the village near the dike).¹⁸⁷ Of the three residents' groups, GeWaLent appeared to be the most active and also addressed the needs of the others. The three groups later came together in the Lentse Federatie,¹⁸⁸ which also included the Lent Village Council. Another active residents' group, Lent 800, was not part of the Lentse Federatie. Although the local groups that were part of the Lentse Federatie agreed that for specific objectives all groups would act jointly to prevent them becoming a 'plaything' of the municipality of Nijmegen,¹⁸⁹ the opposite often occurred. The Lentse Federatie, Lent Village Council and Lent 800 preferred to profile themselves as three separate organisations. Apart from the chairs of these residents' groups, only a few residents were involved. As the chair of the Lentse Federatie explained, 'Everybody was acquainted with me, but I knew nobody in the village, [which is the main reason why] there were not many people actively involved in the protest actions, so we had to manage with the few we had'.¹⁹⁰

In autumn of 2000 a few residents contacted Professor van Ellen. With his help they prepared an alternative for the dike relocation in which the Van Ellen side channel was included. They added a land reservation for a possible dike relocation in future which they called 'Lentse Warande'. The water expert was not amused about the name of the plan as his name was not included. 'I was officially advisor of GeWaLent. They would inform me but this went wrong. I did like the fact that they recognised it as my plan'.¹⁹¹ The residents started a lobby campaign to get their alternative accepted which included four or five times a journey to The Hague to meet Members of the House of Representatives.¹⁹² 'Our main message was: "We are not against measures, but there must be a good overview of the alternatives and one has to decide on the basis of arguments"'.¹⁹³ As a consequence, a MP (Socialist Party) asked the state secretary about the exclusion of the residents' alternative.¹⁹⁴ Later, the relationship between Professor van Ellen and GeWaLent deteriorated. The chair: 'We were involved heavily in politics and van Ellen wanted to discuss substantive details. This did not always go well together'.¹⁹⁵

Getting political attention

On 15 November 2000 the Nijmegen City Council asked for the establishment of a working group to conduct a comparative study of the Van Ellen plan and the plan for a dike relocation.¹⁹⁶ A letter from the municipality of Nijmegen to the state secretary demanding this remained unanswered. Instead, the state secretary established the Brokx

Advisory Commission, whose brief was limited to the government plan. In a press meeting the state secretary informed the audience that the residents' alternative did not play a role in the comparison of the available options to solve the bottleneck in the river Waal and she emphasised that might still be considered in the EIA.¹⁹⁷ In response to the state secretary's refusal to include the residents' alternative, executive councillor Paul Depla commissioned the study.¹⁹⁸

In a closed-door meeting for affected residents on 21 December 2000 Paul Depla explained the local government's position towards the state secretary. The audience criticised him firmly. 'The municipality of Nijmegen says it is supporting Lent, but in practice it ignores our interest.' But they had to admit that the municipality of Nijmegen did its utmost to make the state secretary aware of the residents' objections against the government plan. However, the residents were not convinced of the willingness of the local government to invest in an alternative. The study that was commissioned 'looks better than it is. The budget for the study was €25,000. Would this be comparable with the budget for the study by the Brokx Advisory Commission?' they asked the executive councillor.¹⁹⁹ He denied that it would be comparable with the quality of studies commissioned by the national government.²⁰⁰ Besides, he emphasised that when Van Ellen's side channel was recognised as a full alternative of the dike relocation, he would be willing to make a case out of it.²⁰¹

On 27 December 2000 Professor van Ellen wrote a letter to the project manager of the study commissioned by the municipality of Nijmegen in which he attached a new proposal for a side channel called 'Bottleneck of the municipality of Nijmegen, Van Ellen solution with minimal channel'²⁰² for possible inclusion in the study. However, a presentation of the study results on 12 February 2001 showed that Van Ellen's side channel (minimum variant) did not prove to be a full alternative to the dike relocation, which performs better for ecology and urban development. The residents felt disappointed. They found that too much emphasis had been laid on urban development aspects. Besides, they did not take the arguments seriously ('with the dike relocation a roe and a badger would still be able to swim to the island – except during high water') and asked why the study did not say anything about the families who had to move.²⁰³ Professor van Ellen reacted in an official letter to the consultants. He commented on the information about his proposal and the government plan.²⁰⁴ After a reaction from both the municipality of Nijmegen and the consultancy he sent a second letter to the consultancy in which he repeated his demand to correct the mistakes in the report.²⁰⁵ The issue was later resolved in a telephone call.²⁰⁶

The residents' groups hoped that the outcomes of the study would force the state secretary to look at the residents' alternative. A representative, however, admitted that 'in all fairness, we only have hope, no more than that.'²⁰⁷ Executive councillor Paul Depla accepted the outcomes and declared that he did not see the need to work on the development of a residents' alternative.²⁰⁸ As a result, municipal councillors asked him

critical questions. They asserted that he ignored the decision of the City Council to commission a thorough study of the alternatives to get a clear picture of the various options first before adopting a final position. This demand was laid down in a motion calling for an end to cooperation if the state secretary was not willing to consider other alternatives. For Paul Depla it was clear: 'the state decides'.²⁰⁹

Working on support

On 31 January 2001 the Brokx Advisory Commission published its report on the consequences of the dike relocation. Authorities like the municipality of Nijmegen and the province of Gelderland relied on the national government to inform the affected residents about procedures and compensation as quickly as possible. According to the municipality of Nijmegen the emotional pain could not be taken away, but the maximum financial compensation would be offered. Further, the local government worried about the fact that the Commission backed making a binding agreement, which was considered to be an agreement between the municipality of Nijmegen and the state secretary.²¹⁰ The chair of GeWaLent was clear about the outcomes: 'It was really a misapprehension because they did not listen to the residents' voice. Brokx came up with fancy pictures of facilities for the hotel and catering industry, including recreation. No, the Commission only viewed it from its own perspective.'²¹¹ The chair of Lent Village Council reacted: 'Actually, the decision had already been made when the Quick Scan was finalised. Brokx elaborated the plan a little bit more.'²¹² He wrote a letter to the municipal executive of the municipality of Nijmegen saying that the residents of Lent felt left in the cold.²¹³ Thanks to the lobby of the residents groups,²¹⁴ Nijmegen City Council voted unanimously in favour of the residents' alternative in its motion on 7 March 2001, which demanded certainty and clarity concerning the legal and financial consequences for the people of Lent, the municipality of Nijmegen and other parties involved. Additionally, it urged the state to study possible alternatives and insisted that the outcomes of the various alternatives may be a reason for withdrawing the government decision made in December 2000. Furthermore, it stated that if negotiations with the state failed, the local government must consider stopping cooperation with the government.²¹⁵ The residents also tried to convince the municipality of Nijmegen not to agree to the government contribution to the cost of the second bridge over the river Waal, but did not succeed.²¹⁶

After the municipality of Nijmegen signed the two voluntary agreements concerning the financial and legal arrangements, the project was delegated to a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat situated in Arnhem near Lent.

Co-opted by the government

The appointed project manager began by holding conversations, among others with Professor van Ellen. He also arranged several meetings with Professor van Ellen and experts of Rijkswaterstaat,²¹⁷ but they finally disagreed with the premises and the measures to resolve the bottleneck in the Waal. The project manager then set up a

project organisation. Three residents' groups became members of the advisory group.²¹⁸ Professor van Ellen was not asked to join, but this was not a problem for him: 'It is only waffle.... You must not commit yourself, never be a member of a Rijkswaterstaat advisory group. If you are against, show it!'²¹⁹ The residents, however, spent a lot of time in it. 'From its inception in January 2003 until January 2005 the advisory group met every Monday. We went through project documents and commented on texts.'²²⁰

The first task of the advisory group was to react to the draft of the Notification of Intent in which the guidelines for the EIA were formulated, including which options for solving the bottleneck in the river Waal near Lent would be compared. During the consultation period from 8 May until 5 June 2003 the public was invited to react to the document²²¹ and 27 representations were made, including several from the residents' groups and Professor van Ellen. A chair of a residents' group commented: 'First, the Government is of the opinion that the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s needs to be accommodated, while the legal design discharge is 16,000 m³/s. This turned out difficult to measure. Second, the objective of spatial quality has been mentioned, while the problem at stake is a hydraulic problem. The spatial design of the area will also have to be taken into account, but the hydraulic problem must not be used as an excuse for restructuring the area.'²²² Professor van Ellen suggested postponing decision-making until the results of the Dutch-German study of possible design discharges in the Rhine were available. He argued that the consequences of the bottleneck were previously included in the calculations for the dike heights and 'Lent' is not the only bottleneck in the Dutch river system.²²³ The study near Lent can thus not be viewed apart from other measures – whether they are necessary or not – to be taken upstream and downstream. In addition, the accuracy of the calculations is limited. Dike reinforcement would therefore be an adequate alternative. Among other criticisms was that the government plan has various hydraulic engineering disadvantages and the choice of the project area is limited. He further pointed that a number of Van Ellen side channels near Lent²²⁴ were in circulation which would be useful to study. This representation did not result in a modification of the study objective. The chair of the advisory group wrote a letter to the provincial executive of province of Gelderland to express his disappointment with the 18,000 m³/s discharge standard as point of departure for the EIA.²²⁵

At the final stage of the EIA the residents discussed the functioning of the advisory group. They listed their comments, including the planning (late and incomplete supply of documents and shortage of time for reading, communication with support group and formulating responses) and the incorporation of residents' comments into background reports (not only technical comments, but also political, strategic and other remarks have to be included).²²⁶ This resulted in postponing the finalisation of the EIA.

Until then, their plan was not treated as a full alternative as promised by the municipality of Nijmegen. As a result, a residents' group requested the local government not to include this alternative in the EIA, unless it was willing to provide supporting

information on the various planning variants in due time. In addition, the residents submitted proposals for various planning variants.²²⁷ In the end the municipality of Nijmegen developed the urban development plan and Rijkswaterstaat did the environmental impact studies.

Finally, the outcome of the EIA proved to be positive for the residents' alternative, which was the most environmentally favourable alternative (*meest milieuvriendelijke alternatief*). On 22 October 2004 the advisory group published its advice in which said that the bottleneck in the river Waal would only be solved by implementing the residents' alternative.²²⁸ The residents unsuccessfully tried to convince the steering group to choose for their alternative. On 19 November 2004 the steering group announced its advice favouring the dike relocation.²²⁹ Since the project group attached a memorandum to the advisory report of the advisory group and sent it to the steering group, the constructive collaboration including the openness between the project manager and the members of the advisory group was gone.²³⁰ The residents were thoroughly disappointed. Reflecting on the EIA process, a resident stated: 'I really have the idea that on certain points they [Rijkswaterstaat] listened to us. Differences of opinion remained, but these had been dealt with together. There were times when we talked a lot, but we did not come close to an agreement, for example on the seepage water problem, the 18,000 m³/s discharge standard, and the conditions for river projects.'²³¹ Another reacted: 'It is just like the Betuwelijn railway construction project: 'We want it, so we get it.'²³² During the penultimate meeting of the advisory group the project manager gave a present to the members to thank them for their effort and collaboration. Later, he was not pleased with their criticisms.²³³

A second lobby campaign

The next aim of the residents' groups was to convince Nijmegen City Council of their alternative through a lobby campaign, the media²³⁴ and a brochure for the residents of Lent.²³⁵ This succeeded on 2 February 2005 when Nijmegen City Council unanimously backed the residents' alternative as it proved to be a full alternative to the government plan. It demanded that the municipal executive of the municipality of Nijmegen adopt the residents' alternative and send a letter to the state secretary stating the council's reasoning.²³⁶ A chair of a residents' group: 'It would appear to be a breach of trust if the state secretary did not choose our alternative. It is practicable and much cheaper than the government plan, but then she has to decide against the advice of the officials'.²³⁷

The chair of the advisory group asked for an appointment with the state secretary to inform her about the residents' perspective.²³⁸ The meeting took place on 18 March 2005. The residents emphasised the advantages of their plan and their doubts about the government plan. One of the residents thought that 'it was a constructive meeting. We got the impression that the state secretary was not informed about the elaborated version of our plan'.²³⁹

On 25 March 2005 the project manager informed the residents of Lent about the latest situation and the next steps. 'Apart from the government plan for relocating the dike in Lent, the residents' alternative will also be part of the SPKD Room for the River. At this moment the question is which procedure will be followed.' He assumed that it would become clear before 1 June when the consultation period started.²⁴⁰ The fact that the state secretary viewed the residents' alternative valuable gave the residents some hope. A chair of a residents' group. 'Of course, one swallow does not make a summer, but I really thought that the chances for the residents' plan were improving. We provided the state secretary with relevant arguments. She liked that.'²⁴¹ The state secretary postponed her decision to wait for reactions of the consultation of the SPKD.

Many consultation reactions

The public consultation of the SPKD resulted in 2843²⁴² reactions, 532 of which concerned the proposed dike relocation in Lent. Of the 532 responses, 485 were similar.²⁴³ Most people were against the dike relocation. They found the consequences of a dike relocation too radical: too many houses, historic buildings and monumental trees have to be demolished and heritage features will be affected. Moreover, they expected seepage water inside the dike, which they consider unsolvable. Generally, the residents doubted the need and usefulness of the measure and commented on the terms of reference and the height of the dike. They also found the reasoning behind the government plan unconvincing, saying the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s had not been properly justified. Some residents pointed to the procedures, for example the reason for doing an EIA and the lack of alternatives. Furthermore, the reactions indicated that the residents' alternative is more cost effective. For the long term, a land reservation has to be made.²⁴⁴ The project manager informed the steering group that the reactions did not provide new information, so there was no reason for changing the preferred option for a dike relocation.²⁴⁵

Making a hidden reaction public

Professor van Ellen also sent a response just before he died in August 2005. His reaction, number 27, was given confidential status and was therefore inaccessible to others. Van Ellen's submission included a diagram that showed that 'near Lent nothing needs to be done. The dike in Lent is very high and the eventually desired decrease in the water level of 0.03 m is so small that extra measures downstream might compensate for this. If one is of the opinion that a side channel is needed, a side channel in the flood plain as proposed by me would be in all respects more than sufficient'.²⁴⁶ Appealing to the freedom of information legislation, a residents' group obtained the van Ellen's reaction, which was discussed during a visit to Lent by a delegation from the House of Representatives. A resident sent van Ellen's reaction as an attachment to an opinion article to a national daily newspaper, stating 'It is incomprehensible that these data have not been published and included in the EIA',²⁴⁷ but it was not picked up. The MPs, however, demanded that the state secretary responds to these reactions as soon as possible. One MP said: 'Some people did not receive an answer yet. Everybody has the

right to get a reasonable and correct reply, irrespective of the content. In fact, I do not want to continue before this has been arranged.²⁴⁸ On 25 April 2006 Mrs van Ellen received an official, twelve-page reply from the Room for the River programme manager.²⁴⁹ This response was at odds with the state secretary's promise to reply to all submissions personally before the end of March.²⁵⁰

State secretary's decision, distinguished guest and next lobby campaign

Just after the consultation period, in the first week of October 2005, the chair of the Lentse Federatie was called by the state secretary who informed him about her decision to reroute the dike relocation in Lent.²⁵¹ On 3 November 2005 the residents had an opportunity to present their views to Prince Willem-Alexander when he visited Nijmegen and Lent.²⁵²

The incorporation of the government plan in the SPKD and its front-runner status²⁵³ was the ultimate sign for the residents' groups to seize all opportunities to get their voice heard in The Hague. The planned vote on the SPKD in July 2006 in the House of Representatives and in December 2006 in the Senate made it imperative to make every effort to promote their alternative. They renewed their communication campaign in the village, for example through a banner along the flyover on the road that splits the village with the text 'Dike relocation No, Lentse Warande Yes', a hundred or so flags in gardens and posters in windows with the text: 'Dike relocation: is Lent being sacrificed?', and defiant signs in gardens saying 'We will remain here', 'I won't move', 'Dike relocation boo', 'We won't let this happen', 'Dike road, no', 'Melanie Schultz, will you marry me? I have a nice dike house', and at the entrance to the village, 'No Waal through Lent. Water over this land, 58 houses pulled down'.

On 3 March 2006 a delegation from the House of Representative visited Lent to get acquainted with the situation. They were not convinced of the need for the dike relocation and most did not intend to vote for the government plan.²⁵⁴ Even the Social Democrats (PvdA), who were previously critical of the residents' alternative, were now positive about the residents' plan on certain conditions.²⁵⁵ Later that week they asked the state secretary for an explanation of the government plan. She emphasised that the following questions were relevant: Is there room for the measure, does it deliver benefits for a wider area, and is support available? 'I do not want any "no regret" measures,' she said. She did not accept the idea of buying land for a reservation. 'Land can only be reserved for ten years. This is too short in an area under pressure for urban development.' Despite counter-arguments by some MPs, the state secretary remained firmly in favour of the dike relocation: 'First, there is no land reservation instrument available; second, it requires a measure upstream in the Gendtse polder; third, it gives greater chances to realise other government plans, such as emergency water storage; and fourth, the contribution to the second bridge over the river Waal will be recouped.'

²⁵⁶ This last statement met with an angry reaction from Nijmegen executive councillor Paul Depla ('I do not want to profile myself, only the content is at stake') and the

residents' groups ('We will have to continue our struggle in The Hague').²⁵⁷

In her letter of 23 March 2006 to the chair of the House of Representatives, the state secretary explained the decision for the government plan. 'Of the 55 houses that have to be demolished under the government plan, 17 have already been bought. While all the measures in the SPKD have to meet the design discharge of 16,000 m³/s, some exceptions were made, for example the dike relocation near Lent. Here, Rijkswaterstaat chose for a 'robust' measure to avoid the need for a "second" intervention if higher water discharges occur.' Apart from the costs, the Government's decision was also based on other considerations, including a robust design, water safety, spatial quality and regional support. The state secretary stated that the residents' alternative would have a disadvantageous effect on the division of water discharge upstream.²⁵⁸ On their website the residents commented on this argument by the state secretary.²⁵⁹

Getting their voice heard

The positive outcome of the MPs visit prompted the residents to ask the province of Gelderland to support their plan.²⁶⁰ A meeting of a provincial committee held on 29 March 2006 presented an opportunity to achieve this aim and a chair of a residents' group was given time during the meeting to promote the residents' alternative, with a packed public gallery looking on. In brief, the case was that 'the province ignored the residents' voice by excluding their alternative in the regional advice. The residents were never opponents of flood risk measures, but worked on an alternative based on a side channel in the flood plain, designed by Professor van Ellen. Despite obstruction by Rijkswaterstaat, van Ellen's side channel accommodated the design discharge of 16,000 m³/s. Provision for a land reservation and excavation of a flood plain upstream²⁶¹ were included to meet the 18,000 m³/s safety standard. The EIA showed the comparability of both plans. For the short term, the residents' alternative was the most environmentally favourable (*meest milieuvriendelijk alternatief*) one.²⁶² Relocating the dike would throw the residents into uncertainty about whether they will have to move or not. In addition, it would have considerable consequences for the rest of the village, including the demolition of about 50 houses. Furthermore, relocating the dike 350 metres inland would move the seepage water zone closer to the village. Rijkswaterstaat brushed aside residents' comments by replying that they would then compensate the residents.²⁶³ What particularly worried the residents was that the province of Gelderland did not accept the 18,000 m³/s safety standard for the proposed plan for emergency water storage, but when it came to the dike relocation they supported the government plan.²⁶⁴ The committee decided that a letter from the province of Gelderland might send a 'signal' to the state secretary.

In a meeting on 12 April 2006²⁶⁵ Harry Keerweer, a member of the provincial executive, made clear that he did not intend to sign the proposed letter. 'A year ago the region published an advice 'set in concrete'. It supported all measures designed to guarantee flood safety for all residents, except for the emergency water storage. We don't like to

come back on our position.²⁶⁶ The Provincial Council of Gelderland finally unanimously passed a motion²⁶⁷ in which the councillors declared their wish for a careful decision-making process on the SPKD and questioned the need for a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s. Besides, the residents' alternative needed to be studied in a comparable way, particularly the opportunities in the field of flood safety.²⁶⁸

Another platform for the residents' groups proved to be a hearing of the House of Representatives. On 20 April 2006 they presented seven arguments for their alternative. One of their main concerns was the seepage water problem, for which Rijkswaterstaat suggested a sheet piling and advised the state secretary to reply that 'experts say that this will be solved technically'. However, the residents doubted whether this could be solved. A few options were available, including the build of a seepage canal with sufficient capacity, but there was insufficient land available. Another option was a special construction with gravel for water storage, but again there was too little space, and the construction of terps turned out not to be feasible for the existing buildings. A last option was the construction of a so-called 'seepage barrier', a sheet piling resting on an impermeable layer in the subsoil. The residents questioned whether this would succeed because they claimed that there was no such impermeable layer, or at least only in part of the area. It is still unclear where and to what extent an impermeable layer is present. Furthermore, subsoil sounding and borings hit upon layers of coarse gravel, which will make the engineering work more difficult. The residents claimed that Rijkswaterstaat failed to explain how it would solve this problem. Even the consultants had doubts about securing adequate foundations for the sheet piling. They recommended a thorough geohydrological study of the dike foundations.²⁶⁹

A mediation action

The day after the hearing the consultant involved in the EIA studies contacted the person who presented the residents' case to the House of Representatives hearing,²⁷⁰ and asked for a meeting. During the meeting on 23 April 2006 both reflected on the EIA studies²⁷¹ and listed conditions for starting up a new planning process. A second meeting was planned on 9 May 2006, to which the same resident, his 'colleague' and the project manager were invited.²⁷² Meanwhile the mediation process was altered by members of the other residents' groups who were not involved.²⁷³ One of them wrote a letter to the board of directors of the consulting firm complaining of the activities of the consultant.²⁷⁴ The other posted negative reports about the consultant on the internet.²⁷⁵ The consultant was therefore annoyed for the first hour of the second meeting, but the residents at the meeting knew nothing about these actions.²⁷⁶ The consultancy firm wrote a reply²⁷⁷ and the residents involved gave feedback to the 'outsiders'.²⁷⁸ They continued communicating with the project manager by email.²⁷⁹ According to the residents, the mediation attempt generated various new points of view worth working on. The project manager, however, explained the state secretary's choice not to negotiate, but he thought there would be some room for dialogue after the debate in the House.²⁸⁰ The residents' current position and 'the developments of recent

months' were sent by email to the state secretary, with a copy to the project manager.²⁸¹ They suggested postponing the relocation of the dike to see first whether other measures along the river have the desired effect.²⁸² This email did not result in a direct response from the state secretary, but she did refer to it during the debate in the House of Representatives on 19 June 2006. She stated that she did not believe in such an approach.²⁸³ At that point, the project manager gave up. 'How could I work on a compromise while the state secretary had already determined her position?'²⁸⁴

The media as residents' platform

Once again the media provided the residents with a platform to comment on the government plan. A resident accused Rijkswaterstaat of 'flexing their muscles. It is a political solution, not a technical one. It appeared to be a matter of prestige.' The writer made a connection between the plan for calamity polders upstream and the dike relocation in Lent. He claimed the rejection of the plan for emergency water storage had a direct effect on the plan in Lent. 'The plan for an emergency water storage failed, so the dike relocation has to succeed.'²⁸⁵ Other articles in the media covered the apparent endorsement by the 'region'. 'Support is broader than a handful of politicians,' one resident stated. 'In Lent there is much public indignation over the inadequate arguments used to justify the choice of the government plan.'²⁸⁶ Another issue was the comparability of the two plans. 'The government plan is supported by the powerful Rijkswaterstaat. Which enterprise dares giving an advice that would be diametrically opposed to Rijkswaterstaat?'²⁸⁷ Executive councillor Paul Depla was accused of striking of a bargain. His reply: 'What would you do? Remain angry and refuse every dialogue with Rijkswaterstaat? As a government decision-maker I am not in a position to remain angry. We are not in charge of flood safety. Instead of sulking and being obstructive, we should deal professionally with the consequences of the decision and set our own conditions.'²⁸⁸ The residents' publications resulted in an intervention with a member of the provincial executive. He questioned the conditions for river projects, saying they formed an unsound basis for the forced movement of the house owners.²⁸⁹

Final attempt

The residents fought to get a majority in the House of Representatives. On 15 June 2006 the regional daily newspaper published the latest update: 'Dike plan Lent faltering' and 'Uncertainties in river plans to last years' in which it appeared that two political parties (Conservatives and Social Democrats) tended to favour the dike relocation and the party that backed the residents' plan (Christian Democrats) held all options open. No party openly supported the residents' alternative,²⁹⁰ but the residents continued hopefully.²⁹¹

In a final attempt to influence the decision-making a local party (*Stadspartij Nijmegen*) sent an email to the members of the House of Representatives stating that the Nijmegen City Council had voted unanimously for the residents' alternative.²⁹²

During a parliamentary committee meeting on 19 June 2006 twelve motions were

submitted.²⁹³ A member of the Christian Democrats (CDA), for example, tried to make a last attempt to promote the benefits of the residents' alternative and asked the Government for an overview of the costs of the dike relocation. Other motions included the implementation in phases of proposed river projects rather than all at once²⁹⁴ and the proposal to make a new connection between the rivers Meuse en Waal, which would serve as canal for superfluous water.²⁹⁵

While all the motions were withdrawn, a resident argued that the state secretary misrepresented essential points in the debate with the House. 'She responded to an old plan by Professor van Ellen in which he suggested a side channel and two additional measures in the Gendtse Waard and the Ooijpolder, but the water expert had revised this plan. By optimising the side channel, the new plan would withstand the highest water discharges, even the 18,000 m³/s safety standard. But the committee did not recognise this misinterpretation.'²⁹⁶

In the vote in the House of Representatives on 27 June 2006 the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party opposed the government plan. 'Christian Democrats surprisingly in opposition' was the headline in the regional daily newspaper the next day.²⁹⁷ The Christian Democrat who did not back the government plan was of the opinion that people living along the river need to be protected. 'But,' he argued, 'we do not have to rely on large-scale measures.'²⁹⁸ Finally, the House approved the SPKD, including the government plan, on 7 July 2006.²⁹⁹ According to a resident their lobby campaign had almost succeeded because the contact person at the nationalist party (LPF) was not available. 'If I had convinced him we would have had a majority in the House.'³⁰⁰

On 14 November 2006 the SPKD was debated in the Senate. The senators asked questions concerning possible conflicts between the SPKD and European legislation, the calculation methods and the difference between the application of the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s and 16,000 m³/s.³⁰¹ The debate was adjourned as a result of a yes-or-no impasse concerning the design discharge of the Rhine. The minister, replacing the state secretary as she was on maternity leave, promised 'crystal clear' explanations during the continuation of the debate in December.³⁰² The Senate approved the SPKD Room for the River in December 2006.³⁰³

The arguments

Residents' groups

Reviewing the planning process, a chair of a residents' group concluded: 'We went a long way with our alternative, but in fact we did not have the ghost of a chance. As residents you do not have a chance against the government, with consultants and advisors working at least 40 hours a week, while we have only our evening hours to spend....Rijkswaterstaat has forced its plan through and the politicians snapped like

matchsticks.’³⁰⁴ The residents felt like the butt of a joke. For those affected by the government plan it was clear the time had come to save their skins.³⁰⁵

The main arguments of the resident groups were: (1) No legal basis for a dike relocation in Lent; (2) Sense and nonsense about the bottleneck near Lent; (3) Water discharge capacity of the residents’ alternative; (4) (Limited) tenability of the land reservation; (5) Seepage water of Lent solvable?; (6) ‘Robust’ as the wonder oil of the SPKD; and (7) Costs suggest more than it is.

Concerning the legal basis for a dike relocation, the residents’ groups hired legal expertise to assess the chance of realising the government plan. They believed that as the government plan would have far-reaching consequences for the region, including exceeding the legal basis of the design discharge of 16,000 m³/s, with insufficient support from society and the availability of a residents’ alternative, it would be sure to fail if it went before the Council of State.³⁰⁶

Although there is no direct safety risk to people living near a bottleneck in the river Waal, the residents’ groups agreed that river widening would be sensible from a hydraulic engineering point of view. The side channel in the residents’ alternative appeared to be very effective in achieving a considerable decrease in the water level near the city of Nijmegen as well as upstream of the city. The government plan had the same aim, but the principal difference was the place. While the residents’ alternative created space where they wanted it, outside the dikes, the government plan involved the use of land inside the dikes, in the village of Lent. Moreover, the side channel in the residents’ alternative would accommodate the conditional design discharge of 16,000 m³/s. It was far from certain that a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s was realistic.

The residents’ groups opposed the state secretary’s argument that their alternative would reduce water levels by less and be less effective compared with the government plan, and would therefore require additional measures upstream.³⁰⁷ Their alternative was dimensioned to meet exactly the legal design discharge, they said. Now it appeared that this was a shortcoming in the design, although its capacity exceeded the legal design discharge of 16,000 m³/s by as much 17,500 m³/s. It would have almost the same effect as the government plan, it would make additional measures upstream redundant, and through the land reservation it would not exclude any measure in future.

Further, the residents’ groups doubted the state secretary’s assumption that a land reservation was uncertain, especially in an area under increasing development pressure from Nijmegen. This position was unjust, they argued, because the overview of the costs included a budget for buying land by Rijkswaterstaat. This suggested that the land issue had been accounted for, but if this was not the case, a land reservation could be a realistic option. Under the Spatial Planning Act (*Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening*) provisions could be included in the local land use plan (*bestemmingsplan*) to reserve this land.

Moreover, they argued that if this was not possible the government could designate the land for this purpose via an order in council (a governmental decree).

The main challenge of the government plan would be managing seepage water. During periods of high water, residents living in a zone from 300 to 400 metres behind the dike will be affected by groundwater seepage from under the dike. This is why this area has never been built on to any significant extent. In fact, the village building starts behind this seepage zone. Relocating the dike 300 to 400 metres will move the seepage zone towards the existing built-up area. This implies that during periods of high water a large part of the village will be affected by seepage water, unless Rijkswaterstaat is able to make the foundations of the new dike sufficiently impermeable.

The residents mistrusted the word ‘robust’ because it seemed to be the ‘wonder oil’ of the SPKD. Rijkswaterstaat proclaimed that if measures are sufficiently ‘robust’, extra measures would not be needed, but this appeared not to be based on hard evidence and cost efficiency considerations. The justification seemed to be simply calling the dike relocation a ‘robust’ measure.

The costs of both plans proved debatable. For example, the costs of the future dike relocation are not known because it would be unlikely that a future dike relocation would be identical to one planned now. A report by the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (*Centraal Plan Bureau*) expected engineering techniques would in future enable other measures than a dike relocation. The main objection of the residents’ was that estimates of the costs suggest an accuracy that does not exist. Rijkswaterstaat published different cost estimations for both plans (see Table 5.4) which casts suspicion on the government agency for favouring the government plan at the cost of the residents’ alternative.³⁰⁸

Table 5.4 Cost estimation in € millions for the government plan and the residents’ alternative

	Government plan (Dike relocation)	Residents’ alternative (Lentse Warande; land reservation partly built)
September 2004	259	307
January 2005	303	274 including 14 m for lowering groynes
February 2005*	304	329 including 90 m for measure in Gentsche Polder
April 2005**	304	315 including 58 m for measure upstream 103 of the 315 m budgeted for purchase and planning would be partly used as receipts***

* Published in Snip 2a document.

** In a publication of the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau), April 2005.

*** Of this 315 million, 103 million was budgeted for land acquisition and planning, but part of this would be used as receipts as part of the budget would come from revenues (e.g. from housing),

Source: *Lentse Federatie, Room for the River hearing, 20 April 2006.*

Water expert

Water expert Professor van Ellen commented on the state approach. In his view the ministry grabbed on to measures too quickly, without carrying out a comparative study. He got especially excited about the design discharges of 16,000 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine. 'A situation in which a design discharge of 16,000 m³/s occurs will result in an increase in the water level of 3–5 cm, while a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s may lead to a maximum of 20 cm....First, a better model for calculating water discharges has been available since 2005, while the one used by Rijkswaterstaat dates from 1996. Second, the river bed has been lowered by 15–20 cm since 1996. Then you have the raising of the river dikes. Since 1995 the dikes have been raised more than necessary. In fact, near Lent nothing needs to be done, not even my side channel. But if you do it, then you will be ready for the next century.'³⁰⁹

5.2 Case analysis of the dike relocation in Lent

The case analysis of the dike relocation in Lent follows the framework laid down in Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the authorities and the local groups. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship between these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, their power building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the government–citizen interaction. The authorities' organisational culture and the local groups' cultural background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. The case analysis ends with a summary and discussion.

In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the principal actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the local government (municipality of Nijmegen) and three active local groups of the village of Lent: Lentse Federatie,³¹⁰ Lent Village Council and Lent 800/Werkgroep BOOM (referred to as Lent 800). As different authorities, the national and local government, were involved, a distinction has been made between these authorities and the local groups and between the different authorities.

The dike relocation was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River, which meant that the plan would be decided at the national level. Because the project was initiated by the ministry in a top-down approach, the Dike Relocation in Lent case study has similarities with the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study (Chapter 6). The Lent case study differs from the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study because of its bottom-up approach (see Chapter 7). The implications of this for the interaction between the authorities and the local groups are described below.

5.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local groups

In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local groups³¹¹ is the object of analysis. A distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local groups on the one hand, and between the local government (municipality of Nijmegen) and the local groups on the other. As the interaction between the authorities is considered important for the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and the local groups, this has also been taken into account.

Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine the interaction between national government and local groups, between local government and local groups, and between national and local government. Second, how can these interactions be characterised according to the typology of conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration?

Interaction between national government and local groups: perpetuating conflict

Two types of interactions can be differentiated in the relationship between the national government and the local groups: direct and indirect interactions. Periods of direct interactions alternated with indirect contact, via members of the city council or via others, such as the media.

The first direct interaction occurred when a professor of water management, Professor van Ellen, who worried about the government plan, attempted various times to begin talks with Rijkswaterstaat about his ideas for an alternative. Finally, an appointment was made for a meeting. However, the Rijkswaterstaat official was not allowed to agree to a study by the water expert's alternative as he had to inform his superior first, who finally agreed. Meanwhile, the water expert heard from his son, who worked for the consultancy firm that was awarded the contract for the calculations, that the results were available. When Rijkswaterstaat informed him about the outcomes the message was clear: 'We studied your alternative but it did not meet the conditions, so the topic has been closed for discussion'. Professor van Ellen nagged the official to get the report and after a while he received it. After reading the results the water expert concluded that the government agency had not used the right model. 'It was not done fairly', he commented. Therefore, he commissioned new calculations at his own expense. He believed that this was a source of conflict.³¹²

Professor van Ellen's proposal aroused a local group's interest, who contacted him and subsequently incorporated the Van Ellen side channel into the residents' alternative. However, in the course of the planning process disagreements arose, resulting in a breakdown in communication between the local group Lentse Federatie and the professor.³¹³

Meanwhile, indirect contact between the national government and the local groups occurred via other actors, such as Members of Parliament. They asked the state secretary questions concerning the rejection of the residents' views. Various rounds of questions in Parliament finally resulted in a response from the state secretary: 'The residents' alternative may be included in the environmental impact assessment (EIA).'³¹⁴ Indirect interaction also took place via the media, which proved to be a useful platform for the residents to present their views.

Subsequently, direct contact between the national government and the local groups took place after the planning process was delegated to the regional level in May 2002. The first action of the newly appointed Rijkswaterstaat project manager was 'to repair the relationship with the stakeholders'.³¹⁵ He started consultations with many people, including Professor van Ellen 'who was pushed aside on false argumentation' (van der Graaf, 2007). Experts from a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat, Professor van Ellen and the project manager met several times.³¹⁶ The project manager had to deal with various local groups who opposed the government plan, some of which merged to form one organisation, but without giving up their own identity. The project manager invited the local groups to participate in the advisory group which was part of the project organisation for the execution of the EIA. The advisory group turned out to be a platform for the residents to question the tasks, conditions, research results and budget outcomes, which led to fierce disputes with Rijkswaterstaat. On a few occasions this resulted in a negotiated solution, for example when Rijkswaterstaat recognised mistakes in the study results and changed them accordingly,³¹⁷ and when the organisation accepted a change in formulations that proved to be acceptable for the residents.³¹⁸ Most disputes, however, remained unresolved. An example is the discussion about the government's safety standards for river projects. According to Rijkswaterstaat a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine at Lobith³¹⁹ had to be met, whereas the legal discharge was 16,000 m³/s.³²⁰ In the course of the planning process a Dutch-German study resulted in a maximum discharge capacity for the Rhine of 15,500 m³/s (Nederlandse-Duitse werkgroep Hoogwater, 2004) which the residents used to underpin their argument. The project manager responded that the advisory group was not the place to discuss this.³²¹ Nevertheless, it proved to be an important indicator for assessing the plans in the decision-making process. While the government plan was designed for the next 100 years (18,000 m³/s), the residents' alternative was designed for 50 years (16,500 m³/s)³²² which again led to conflict. Another source of conflict was the project manager's memorandum on the residents' advice, which was sent to the steering group. Since then the little trust the local groups had in the government evaporated.

Another direct interaction occurred after the project manager sent the result of the EIA to the ministry and the residents asked for an interview with the state secretary.³²³ She invited them for a meeting in The Hague. As a result, she included both plans in the SPKD Room for the River³²⁴ and postponed the decision-making until after the consultation period.³²⁵ She called a local group chairman to inform him of this, and

again to inform him about her decision in favour of the government plan, which he appreciated very much.³²⁶

The last direct interaction occurred during the mediation action by a consultant who was involved in the EIA studies. During the meetings in May 2006 both parties listened carefully to one another and were willing to come to a compromise. The project manager showed his commitment by commissioning calculations for a small-scale dike relocation with flood plain excavation, even though he did not believe this was the best option.³²⁷ However, the state secretary had already been decided and the initiative did not succeed.

To summarise, the main interaction between the national government and the local groups took place during the EIA studies, for which a project organisation was established including an advisory group with residents. This can be viewed as a limited form of public involvement. The outcome of this interaction can be characterised as debate and conflict. There was some negotiation, but only when minor subjects were at stake, making this form of interaction insignificant in comparison with the other interaction outcomes. Generally, debates escalated into conflicts which remained unresolved. A mediation action did not succeed because the state secretary had already decided in favour of the government plan.

Interaction between local government and local groups: recurring conflict

Like the interaction between the national government and the local groups, two types of interaction can be identified in the relationship between the local government and the local groups: direct and indirect interactions. Periods of direct interactions alternated with indirect contact via local councillors or via others, such as the media.

Although the municipality of Nijmegen was responsible for informing the residents about the government plan, it took more than six months to take action. The local government waited for state permission to continue with the part of the Waalsprong housing development that was planned for the same location as the dike relocation. In May 2000, prior to the first information meeting in September 2000, to which all residents of Lent were invited, there was a direct interaction between the municipality of Nijmegen and the retired water expert Professor van Ellen,³²⁸ who sent a letter to the local government in which he presented his ideas for an alternative. As he received no reply, he called the local government and an official told him that a commission would be established in June 2000 in which he would be invited to sit. When nothing happened, the water expert contacted the municipality of Nijmegen once again, but this time the responsible official referred him to Rijkswaterstaat. When he contacted Rijkswaterstaat the government authority referred him back to the municipality of Nijmegen. Finally, in September 2000 a meeting was arranged between the municipality of Nijmegen, Rijkswaterstaat and the water expert. While the Nijmegen official was quite positive about the water expert's alternative and asked whether it would be

possible to study it, the Rijkswaterstaat official was not forthcoming because he had to refer this back to his superior first. It then became a Rijkswaterstaat affair.

The information meeting between the local government and the residents was the first direct interaction between them. The reason for this meeting was the state secretary's decision to allow the Waalsprong housing development to go ahead, based on a positive outcome of the Quick Scan for the government plan. The meeting did not go very well. The residents were angry when the executive councillor's informed them that the Waalsprong will go ahead because of the planned dike relocation and the resulting demolition of 55 houses.³²⁹ The executive councillor's stance stirred the residents to organise themselves³³⁰ to oppose the government plan and save these 55 houses. The residents set up various groups and some existing groups shifted the focus of their activities to the dike relocation. Then, in a hastily organised follow-up meeting the residents presented their organisations.³³¹

In the period leading up to the next direct interaction between the local government and the residents in December 2000 there was indirect contact via the members of the city council who sided with the residents. The council asked Nijmegen municipal executive to send a letter to the state secretary demanding a comparative study of the government plan and the residents' alternative. In the meeting with the affected residents in December 2000 the executive councillor promised that if the reply was negative the municipality of Nijmegen would commission such a study.³³² The executive councillor faced fierce criticism from the residents: 'It appears that the municipality of Nijmegen supports the village of Lent but in practice it ignores our interest.'³³³ As the state secretary did not react to the local government's demand, the municipality of Nijmegen reserved 25,000 euros for the promised study. When the residents asked whether this study would be comparable with the study by the Brokx Advisory Commission [the study commissioned by the ministry],³³⁴ the executive councillor had to say no.

After the presentation of the study outcomes, direct and indirect interactions took place. During the study the water expert continued to promote his alternative, of which various versions were in circulation, in letters and telephone calls. The study came down in favour of the government plan. The residents were disappointed. According to them too much emphasis was being put on the urban development aspects. The water expert discovered that his alternative had not been studied properly. Professor van Ellen: 'The plans were compared on hydraulic aspects and not the morphological implications, which would have shown a totally different picture.'³³⁵ As a result, his alternative did not perform as well as the government plan. He justified his comments in an official letter to the consultancy that carried out the study. Both the municipality of Nijmegen and the head of the consultancy reacted. A second letter from the water expert followed. Finally, the question was resolved in a telephone call. The municipality of Nijmegen did not then feel the need to work on the development of an alternative.³³⁶ As a result,

the executive councillor ignored a resolution by the city council to commission a thorough study of the alternatives and to cease cooperation if the state secretary did not want to consider other alternatives.³³⁷ He took this standpoint because he was negotiating with the national government for a state contribution to the cost of the second bridge over the river Waal.

During the execution of the EIA studies in which the government plan and the residents' alternative were compared, contact between the local government and the residents was mainly indirect.³³⁸ The executive councillor was in the steering group while the residents took part in the advisory group. When the executive councillor had to decide between the government plan and the residents' alternative in a vote in the steering group he abstained. The residents were furious that he was not willing to choose their plan. They lobbied the city council, which adopted various resolutions supporting the residents' alternative. Other indirect interactions between the municipality of Nijmegen and the residents took place via the media, which provided a useful platform for opposing the government plan. However, when the municipality of Nijmegen was unwilling to develop the residents' alternative, the residents presented the executive councillor with preliminary designs for the land reservation³³⁹ to speed up the delivery of the final designs.³⁴⁰

To summarise, the interaction between the local government and the local groups can be characterised as debate and conflict. The local government did not invest much in consulting and involving the public. As a result, the interaction between the local government and the local groups often resulted in debate, most of which escalated into conflicts which were not resolved. As the municipality of Nijmegen accepted a contribution from national government to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal, it was obliged to cooperate with the national government, leaving no room for negotiation with the local groups. As a result, there was neither dialogue nor collaboration.

Interaction between government authorities: armed peace

When the national government launched proposals for the dike relocation, the first reaction from the local government was opposition, based on the premise that the plan might thwart the Waalsprong housing development. As soon as it became clear that this was a serious plan, the local government asked for a Quick Scan to study alternatives. When this came down in favour of the government plan, the local government started negotiations with the national government about damage compensation, including funding for a second bridge over the river Waal.³⁴¹ These negotiations took a lot of time, but a breakthrough came in November 2001 when the national government was disposed to compensate for the 'limited accessibility' of the municipality of Nijmegen. Nijmegen entered the negotiations with the aim of obtaining the full cost of a new bridge over the Waal, but the government limited its contribution to 90 million euros.³⁴² Meanwhile the state secretary had established the Brokx Advisory

Commission to investigate the consequences and feasibility of the government plan. The results of this study also turned out positive for the government plan. The Commission worked up the government plan in more detail, the resulting plan being called Plan Brokx, and recommended drawing up two voluntary agreements, one for compensation for the homes that could not be built and another for the state contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.

After the authorities signed the agreements the planning process was delegated to the regional office of Rijkswaterstaat, which was responsible for carrying out studies as part of the EIA to compare the government plan and the residents' alternative. During this period several disputes arose between the national and local government, most of which were about who was responsible for what and the interpretation of outcomes. Disputes about responsibility for example arose while preparing a common press release and newsletters, the latter being Rijkswaterstaat's responsibility. Because communication with the residents was a local government responsibility Rijkswaterstaat was not allowed to publish the newsletter without the local government's permission. As a result, it had to accept many editorial changes.³⁴³ An illustration of a dispute on interpretation was the results of the EIA studies which revealed that both plans were 'comparable'. According to the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen comparable meant 'equal'.³⁴⁴ But this proved not to be true from the viewpoint of Rijkswaterstaat: 'The alternatives are not equal, but they are elaborated equally. Both alternatives offer a solution.'³⁴⁵ Another dispute concerned the question of whether the draft version of the environmental impact statement (EIS) had a legal status. In contrast to the municipality of Nijmegen Rijkswaterstaat was of the opinion that the draft version, which had not yet been adopted, was not a formal document and therefore did not have to be made public.³⁴⁶ The project manager solved this by putting it on display in a community centre in Lent on the condition that interested residents first had to call to obtain the key.³⁴⁷

Although the EIA studies showed that the residents' plan proved to be the most environmentally favourable alternative, the steering group chose the government plan. However, this decision was not unanimous as the executive councillor, among others, abstained in the vote. His main argument was that 'otherwise the residents might think that the local government decides this issue'. Most others, like Rijkswaterstaat, emphasised the government plan's 'robustness' and said that it comprehensively tackled the safety problem. As some members considered it important to decide by common consent they attempted to convince the executive councillor, but were unsuccessful.³⁴⁸ Instead of openly backing the government plan, the executive councillor put his own interests first: 'People hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not interest me.'³⁴⁹

To summarise, the interaction between national and local government can be characterised as debate, mostly about responsibility. On only one occasion did a

negotiation lead to the local government's acceptance of the state plan.

The prevailing outcomes of the interaction between the national government and the local groups and between the local government and the local groups were debate and conflict. Most debates and conflicts remained unresolved. The interaction between national and local government was dominated by debate, particularly in the area of responsibility, and only once did negotiation lead to the local government accepting the government plan. For an overview, see Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Interaction between national government (Nat), local government (Loc) and local groups (Loc gr)

		conflict	debate	negotiation	dialogue	collaboration
Nat	Loc	o	+	+	o	o
Nat	Loc gr	+	+	o	o	o
Loc	Loc gr	+	+	o	o	o

o = not occurring + = occurring

5.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local groups

In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local groups.

The interaction strategies of both authorities and local groups can be divided into framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When people make a distinction between 'us' and 'them' they are using an identity frame. In this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to 'us' and 'them'. A conflict management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A

collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or to achieve a joint objective.

If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiwer, 2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one-dimensional: 'all or nothing'. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena to justify actions that may be accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. Sometimes this ends in 'frozen' frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the identity frame with a conflict management frame.

Again, in the analysis of the interaction between authorities and the local groups a distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local government (municipality of Nijmegen).

The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local groups addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction between the authorities and the local groups, and between the authorities? Here, a distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local groups and vice versa, the interaction strategies used by the local government when dealing with the local groups and vice versa, and the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local government and vice versa. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local groups explain the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local groups and between the authorities?

Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local groups

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local groups

The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies in its interaction with the local groups.

The national government used a power frame in its dealings with the local groups, of which there were many examples. The launch of the government plan for a dike relocation had all the characteristics of a state intervention. The residents had to learn of the initiative from the eight o'clock news and a current affairs programme on television.³⁵⁰ Communication with the residents was considered to be the responsibility of the local government.³⁵¹ Another indication of the power frame was the design of the planning process: only after the project was included in national policy was there room for the residents to make their views known within the framework of the EIA. Furthermore, the state secretary's approach and her communication style are illustrative of a power frame. Two rounds of parliamentary questions were needed before the state secretary admitted that within the framework of the EIA 'all serious alternatives will be taken into account. I presume that Professor van Ellen's variants might be considered as such'.³⁵² Besides, the Brokx Advisory Commission's brief was restricted to studying the government plan. The communication strategy of the regional office of Rijkswaterstaat was also based on a power frame: a double track would be followed, 'the dike relocation as the most promising solution and the assessment of alternatives as second best'.³⁵³ This view was also supported at the decision-making level, as evidenced by the director-general's remark that the 'point of departure is relocating the dike in the short term, including a side channel inside the dikes. This would offer opportunities for recreation. But the residents' alternative with terps for housing development [on the land reservation] would generate revenue. We have to look seriously at this plan to see whether it deserves a chance'.³⁵⁴ The official's advice attached to the residents' advice to the steering group regarding the EIA also demonstrated a power frame. The most explicit illustration of the power frame, however, is the name of the project for the EIA studies: 'Dike Relocation in Lent' which suggested that there was no room for other options. Only rarely did a conflict management frame emerge, for example when the project manager accepted minor changes in the reports and his participation in the mediation action, but that is insignificant in comparison to the national government's dominant use of the power frame.

The national government often combined the power frame with buffering strategies when dealing with the local groups. Indicative of this approach was Rijkswaterstaat's unwillingness to communicate with Professor van Ellen. Rijkswaterstaat first referred him back to the municipality of Nijmegen before agreeing to a meeting. Subsequently, they did not keep him informed about their actions. It was only from his son that he heard that calculations were made. He was later called by an official who told him that they had studied his alternative, but because it did not meet the requirements the topic was closed for further discussion.³⁵⁵ Another example of the use of a power frame with

buffering strategies is the state secretary's reaction to comments by members of the House of Representative that the residents' alternative had been rejected too easily: 'I did not feel like withdrawing the plan for a dike relocation.' At the same time she used a bridging strategy by promising that if the Commission advised in favour of the government plan, the residents' alternative would get a second chance in the studies for the EIA.³⁵⁶ The director for water management at Rijkswaterstaat regional office was involved in the steering group. She used buffering strategies when she acknowledged that the residents' alternative had some environmental benefits. 'The project criteria were time, budget, security and environment. Although the residents' alternative did not meet the first three very well it did meet the last better than the government plan. This was logical: the measure would not be very invasive so it would be better for the environment.'³⁵⁷ The project manager changed the name of the plans twice, first in the final EIA report and later in the advice to the state secretary, which can also be considered as a buffering strategy. The first time, the name of the government plan remained the same – 'dike relocation' – whereas the name of the residents' alternative was changed to 'dike maintenance' (*dijkhandhaving*).³⁵⁸ The second time, the name of the government plan was changed to 'dike relocation now' and the residents' alternative to 'dike relocation not yet'.³⁵⁹ Another buffering strategy used by the project manager was his approval to elaborate the government plan prior to the state secretary's final decision.³⁶⁰ The state secretary used a buffering strategy when she was unwilling to discuss the conclusions of a report by the Research and Verification Bureau of the House of Representatives stating that cost estimations for infrastructure projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, were not very transparent. In turn, the project manager felt obliged to inform the residents that 'the state secretary did not want to negotiate the measure [to relocate the dike]. She has decided in favour of the dike relocation.'³⁶¹ The national government used a buffering strategy to convince its opponents by describing its plan as 'robust' and 'a measure that comprehensively tackles the safety problem'.³⁶² At the same time it demonstrated that the residents' alternative lacked these qualities.

The national government used several bridging strategies when dealing with the local groups. A bridging strategy used by Rijkswaterstaat was its agreement to meet with Professor van Ellen and make calculations for his alternative plan. However, it also used a buffering strategy to close the discussion with him by saying 'we have studied your alternative, but it did not meet the conditions, so the subject is not open for further discussion'.³⁶³ Apart from the above-mentioned promise by the state secretary to include the residents' alternative in the EIA studies,³⁶⁴ the national government used other bridging strategies. The project manager's first action on taking office was 'to reinstate the relationship with the stakeholders', which included acknowledging that at first the government had given little thought to Professor van Ellen's ideas.³⁶⁵ As a result, he arranged several meetings with experts from a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat and Professor van Ellen.³⁶⁶ During the EIA studies the project manager frequently used bridging strategies to show his empathy with the residents by accepting changes in the study results proposed by the residents, whereas they tended to emphasise all the details

that might support their alternative.³⁶⁷ He also used bridging strategies when the residents came up with the issue of seepage water, which they claimed had not been sufficiently addressed in the EIA studies. The project manager proposed a 'seepage screen', a sheet piling supported by impermeable layer.³⁶⁸ Other examples of bridging strategies are the state secretary's visit to Lent and her offer to talk to the local groups, the decision to include the government plan and the residents' alternative in the national planning instrument SPKD Room for the River,³⁶⁹ and her two telephone calls to inform a local group's chair about the postponement of decision-making and her final decision.³⁷⁰ The last bridging strategy was the project manager's consent to mediation and his commitment to make calculations for a small-scale dike relocation.³⁷¹ However, the mediation ended because the project manager concluded that it was too dangerous to continue as the state secretary already decided on Lent.³⁷² The bridging strategies never resulted in reframing.

To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the national government used a power frame to show who is in charge. This frame was accompanied by many buffering strategies and several bridging strategies. The dominant strategy was buffering, while bridging strategies were used mainly to prevent escalation, but never resulted in reframing.

Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the local groups

The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the local groups.

During the planning process the local government's frame was not used unequivocally. The difference between the view held by the local government and the view held by the local groups in the planning process was reflected in the municipality itself: Nijmegen municipal executive favoured the government plan (although not openly) while the city council supported the residents' alternative. The point of departure for this analysis, however, is the Nijmegen municipal executive, also referred to as local government, and its use of interaction strategies.

Generally, the local government, adopted an identity frame when dealing with the local groups, emphasising its position in the administrative hierarchy ('it is our position as the local government in relation to the national government'; in other words, 'we' are obliged to follow 'them') and its limited role in decision-making ('it is the state secretary who decides'; in other words, 'we' are not in charge of decision-making).³⁷³ At first, the local government showed that it was not in favour of relocating the dike ('the housing development would then be further from the city centre').³⁷⁴ But during the planning process this changed into a latent preference for the government plan as the municipal executive was unwilling to execute all the city council's motions on the residents' alternative. Once the EIA studies were finalised, the executive councillor abstained in a vote of the steering group. The executive councillor: 'Otherwise the residents would

think that I am the one who decides'.³⁷⁵ The use of an identity frame was further confirmed by the executive councillor's view on the position of the local government in the planning process: 'From the beginning the municipality of Nijmegen tried to communicate openly and directly with the residents of Lent, explaining the policy intentions of the national government....Looking back over the past years we are firmly of the opinion that until now we have been serving the public interest'.³⁷⁶ Also the executive councillor's reaction to a remark by a representative of one of the local groups who accused him of striking of a bargain demonstrated an identity frame. 'What would you do? Continue to be angry and refuse every dialogue with Rijkswaterstaat? As an executive councillor I am not in the position to remain angry. We are not in charge of flood safety. Instead of sulking and being obstructive we should be dealing professionally with the consequences of the decision and setting our own conditions'.³⁷⁷

The local government's identity frame was accompanied by buffering strategies which were often used. The most striking illustrations of this type of strategy are the aversion to entering into discussion with Professor van Ellen ('Nijmegen did not want anything to do with my plan'),³⁷⁸ the executive councillor's message during the first information meeting for the residents in which he told the audience that 'the Waalsprong will go ahead'³⁷⁹ without taking the residents' views into account, and his reaction to the outcomes of the comparative study of the government plan and the residents' alternative: 'I did not feel the necessity to work on the development of an alternative, for example the Van Ellen plan'.³⁸⁰ The passive attitude of the municipality of Nijmegen towards elaborating the residents' plan as a full alternative in the EIA can also be considered a buffering strategy.³⁸¹

The local government used several bridging strategies when dealing with the local groups, such as the organisation of several information meetings, the executive councillor's expression of sympathy with the city council that the state secretary did not take alternatives to the dike relocation into consideration, and his intention to commission a study of the government plan and the Van Ellen side channel.³⁸² Additionally, the executive councillor used bridging strategies when he showed his willingness to develop the residents' plan as a full alternative in the EIA.³⁸³ Another bridging strategy was the mayor's telephone call to a local group chair in which she informed him about the state secretary's final decision.³⁸⁴

To summarise, the local government used an identity frame when dealing with the local groups, emphasising its position in the administrative hierarchy and its dependence on the national government with regard to decision-making on the government plan. Although its buffering strategies were prevalent, the local government sometimes used bridging strategies to meet its obligations to inform the public and to show its willingness to work on the residents' plan as a full alternative.

Interaction strategies of the local groups when dealing with authorities

Interaction strategies of the local groups when dealing with the national government

The local groups used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The local groups used an identity frame in their interaction with the national government. The residents felt threatened by the government plan, particularly by the proposed demolition of 55 houses and the creation of an urban waterfront (the construction of a 'Manhattan on the Waal').³⁸⁵ In fact, with the dike relocation they would lose 'their' village. This identity frame was clearly expressed in the residents' plan, which they presented as an alternative that would improve flood safety. It included a land reservation to accommodate a dike relocation should this be necessary in future and excavating the flood plain through which the 55 houses could be conserved. The identity frame of the local groups was deployed forcefully during the first direct contact between the local groups and the national government. In the first meeting of the advisory group the residents questioned the project objective, for example whether the problem at stake was a river management problem at all. Although the advisory group also contained members of other organisations, the residents proved to be influential in the meetings because three resident groups were represented. The advisory group can therefore be viewed as a platform for the residents' groups. On a few occasions the local groups used a conflict management frame, for example when they accepted the project manager's explanation of disputed issues and during the mediation action that took place at the end of the planning process. As this frame was used only rarely, it does not seem to be significant when compared to the local groups' use of the identity frame.

The local groups used buffering strategies to support their identity frame. They often used this type of strategy, especially in the media, to highlight their point of view without any qualification. They also used it during the execution of the EIA studies when they were focused on promoting their own alternative. The project manager: 'The members of the advisory group had the tendency to emphasise all details that might support their alternative.'³⁸⁶ But as the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen observed, buffering strategies alternated with bridging strategies: 'The advisory group tried to do everything to get the principal question of dike relocation off the agenda. At the same time the residents were aware that it could go ahead anyway and that they would only be able to influence the decision-making process. The advisory group had this two-faced character.'³⁸⁷

Bridging strategies were used only incidentally. The first bridging strategy used by the residents in their dealings with the national government began before the residents' groups were formed: Professor van Ellen's³⁸⁸ attempt to present his ideas to Rijkswaterstaat.³⁸⁹ Other bridging strategies used by the local groups included their willingness to become members of the advisory group despite the constraints on the impact they could have on the decision-making, their acceptance of proposals by the project manager, their willingness to give presentations and being present during visits by Prince Willem-

Alexander and others. On three occasions they were on the verge of leaving the advisory group, but eventually they changed their mind, which can also be considered a bridging strategy.³⁹⁰ Their participation in a mediation initiative just before the vote in the House of Representatives in June 2006 can be considered their last bridging activity, but the parties did not then reframe. The local group's bridging strategies during their membership of the advisory group were based on their experience of a constructive atmosphere. This changed when the EIA came down in favour of the government plan. After that, all openness vanished.³⁹¹ In other words, the buffering strategies then prevailed.

To summarise, the local groups used an identity frame in their dealings with the national government to promote their alternative plan to improve flood safety. They often used buffering and sometimes bridging strategies when dealing with the national government, depending on the situation, to do their utmost to get their alternative approved.

Interaction strategies of local groups when dealing with the local government

In their interaction with the local government the local groups used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies.

The local groups used an identity frame when dealing with the local government as they thought this was their last opportunity to profile themselves as a village community. Apart from the demolition of 55 houses, the residents felt threatened by the creation of an urban waterfront (the construction of a 'Manhattan on the Waal').³⁹² The local groups used the media and the city council as forums to demonstrate an identity frame.

The residents' use of an identity frame was accompanied by buffering strategies. The local groups frequently used this type of strategy, for example during the information meetings organised by the municipality of Nijmegen. In the first meeting the residents thought the dike relocation was already planned and were afraid it meant the construction of a 'Manhattan on the Waal'. This was not without reason because 'from an urban development perspective the dike relocation would be an enormous facelift for the municipality of Nijmegen. Before the dike relocation was on the cards the Waalsprong housing development was planned with its back to the river. With the dike relocation the city would get the opportunity to be connected to the river.'³⁹³ Other buffering strategies included giving preference to the study results that might support the residents' alternative, and emphasising questions which could not be resolved in the advisory group or in the city council, such as the safety standards for peak discharges of 16,000 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine in the river plans.

The local groups rarely used bridging strategies when dealing with the local government. Examples are the letter from the water expert Professor van Ellen to the municipality of Nijmegen in which he explained his ideas for an alternative and his participation during a meeting organised by a local government official, to which a Rijkswaterstaat staff member was invited.

To summarise, the local groups used an identity frame when dealing with the local government to emphasise their alternative to the state plan to improve flood safety. In their interaction with the local government, buffering strategies were prevalent, while bridging strategies were rarely used. The residents used these strategies mainly because in their experience the local government was not acting to defend their interests.

Interaction strategies between authorities

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local government

The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the local government.

During the planning process the national government used a power frame in its interaction with the local government to show that it was in charge of the planning process. An illustration of this frame is the launch of the government plan for a dike relocation in Lent, which was not discussed with the municipality of Nijmegen. The state secretary's remark during the Loevestein meeting, where the government plan was launched, that 'some hard nuts have to be cracked with the municipality of Nijmegen',³⁹⁴ referring to the Waalsprong housing development that had just been started on the same location where she planned a dike relocation, also demonstrated a power frame. The state secretary's main reason for using this frame was to present a decisive image.³⁹⁵ She used a sketch of the dike relocation in Lent to show her approach to dealing with flood risk management: daring to take action. However, even the director of the Rijkswaterstaat regional office felt uncomfortable with the situation because the housing development had just been approved by all the authorities involved: 'It was an extremely politically sensitive question'.³⁹⁶ The power frame of the national government was also revealed during the negotiations between the national and local government on compensation measures. The negotiation process took nearly a year (from mid-May 2001 to April 2002) with a breakthrough halfway through the negotiations when the government agreed in principle to provide compensation for the 'limited accessibility' of the city.³⁹⁷

The dike relocation case shows that buffering strategies followed naturally from the national government's power frame. This type of strategy was used occasionally. An illustration of this is the state secretary's visit to the municipality of Nijmegen that took place shortly after the Loevestein meeting. She looked at the existing dike and was not particularly shocked: 'I am not saying that I find it awful, no. I find [the proposed dike relocation] less terrible than a noise barrier'.³⁹⁸

Sometimes the national government attempted to bridge, particularly when something had to be done, to prevent a dispute between national and local government from escalating. Illustrations of bridging strategies are the state secretary's willingness to commission a Quick Scan and her consent to pay compensation and contribute to the

cost of the second bridge over the river Waal. Other examples include responses to questions from the local government, solutions to disputes about responsibilities and interpretation of outcomes, such as the editing rounds before the publication of press releases and newsletters,³⁹⁹ and the question of whether the draft version of the EIA had to be made public.⁴⁰⁰

To summarise, the national government used a power frame when dealing with the local government to make it clear who is in charge. Buffering strategies, which were employed occasionally, followed naturally from this frame. Sometimes the national government used bridging strategies to prevent a debate escalating into a fierce conflict.

Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the national government

The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The local government employed an identity frame in its interaction with the national government. The first reaction of the Nijmegen executive councillor after the Loevestein meeting, where the government plan was launched, was illustrative. He inclined towards disbelief and denial: 'I was not surprised that the problem of water safety was raised as the memory of the high water events in 1993 and 1995 was still alive. After the recent dike reinforcement there was a growing awareness that river widening was an optional measure. But the proposed location near Nijmegen was difficult to accept. With the approval of the national and regional governments, the municipality of Nijmegen had just begun the construction of the new Waalsprong urban extension.'⁴⁰¹ His statement revealed a division between two parties: the municipality of Nijmegen as 'us', who intended to implement the Waalsprong housing development, and the national government as 'them', who proposed a dike relocation despite knowing that a housing development was planned. Later the executive councillor explained the position of the local government, which also revealed an identity frame. 'It is a national government plan, and conforming to national planning decisions is our legitimate role in Dutch governance.'⁴⁰² The executive councillor placed the local government between the national government and the residents. 'In everything it did the national government expressed its preference for the dike relocation, while the local groups wanted their alternative in order to save their homes. These two positions were part of the process. There was much mutual understanding, but the principal differences of opinion remained.'⁴⁰³ In its position between the national government and the residents, the local government endeavoured to realise its own objectives.

The municipality of Nijmegen sometimes used buffering strategies in its dealings with the national government to make its position clear. This was illustrated by the position it adopted in the negotiations with the national government, which was to stick to the original plan for the new Waalsprong urban extension of 12,000 homes. Other examples of buffering strategies include the local government's abstaining in the vote of the steering

group ('People had hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not interest me.'⁴⁰⁴) and the executive councillor's view of the local government's relationship with the national government: 'I have always said that we are participating in the steering group to take stock of the process. Rijkswaterstaat remain responsible.'⁴⁰⁵ The local government also used buffering strategies during the EIA studies, an example being its comments on the Rijkswaterstaat newsletter on the dike relocation, which resulted in many editorial changes,⁴⁰⁶ and its interpretation of the results of the study, which led to disagreements with Rijkswaterstaat.⁴⁰⁷

Bridging strategies were used incidentally. The main bridging strategies employed by the local government in its dealings with the national government included the acceptance of the government plan on certain conditions, including the completion of the Quick Scan and an agreement on compensation and a contribution to the cost of the second bridge over the river Waal.

To summarise, the local government used an identity frame in its interaction with the national government, stressing that it sets its own conditions by claiming damages and a second Waal bridge, among other demands. The local government sometimes used buffering strategies as well as bridging strategies as part of the local government's strategy of completing the Waalsprong housing development.

An overview of the interaction strategies used by the government authorities and local groups is given in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Interaction strategies of national government (Nat), local government (Loc) and local groups (Loc gr)

		framing		buffering strategies		bridging strategies	
Nat	Loc	P	I	±	±	±	±
Nat	Loc gr	P	I	++	±	+	±
Loc	Loc gr	I	I	+	+	+	±

± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The analysis shows that the local government used its identity frame strategically. In its interaction with the national government it emphasised that conforming with the national interest, but under certain conditions, was its legitimate role, but when communicating with the residents it stressed that it was the state secretary who makes the decision to avoid being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness.

The analysis also shows that employing a power frame or an identity frame and the accompanying buffering strategies hampered the development of negotiation, dialogue

and collaboration. The occurrence of bridging strategies did not change this. The use of bridging strategies, however, implies that even in such situations there is always an opportunity to resolve the deadlock and move forward (see Tidwell, 1998; Kriesberg, 2007).

5.2.3 Power building by authorities and local groups

In this section we analyse the power building by the authorities and the local groups. The following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials (frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are used first to achieve the government's objective, such as the use of indirect coercive power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, through a honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of the media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of the actor concerned and expanding the field of influence of the actors concerned. The sociability of an actor is considered a separate power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also Chapter 3) because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others. Since respondents rarely said anything about the sociability of other people, I noted their opinions of other actors or quotes that can be interpreted as such.

In this analysis authorities are differentiated into national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and local government (municipality of Nijmegen). Two questions about power building by the authorities and the local groups are posited. First, which power types are built by the authorities and the local groups? Here, a distinction can be made

between the power exerted by the national government over the local groups and vice versa, the power exerted by the local government over the local groups and vice versa, and the exertion of power by the national government over the local government and vice versa. Second, what are the consequences of power building by the authorities and the local groups for their interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local groups and between the national and local authorities?

Power building by authorities with regard to the local groups

National government power building with regard to the local groups

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with the local groups.

The national government sometimes built indirect coercive power in its dealings with the local groups. An example of the national government's building of this power type is that it left the decision on whether the residents' alternative would be incorporated in the planning process to the state secretary. With regard to the power relations, the state secretary's decision to incorporate the residents' alternative in the EIA needs careful attention. As Hillier (2002:112) states, 'consensus-building processes are likely to lead to "co-option" into the discourses and practices of the already dominant participant'. This was confirmed during the execution of the EIA studies. The meetings of the advisory group demonstrated that the national government was in charge. Rijkswaterstaat determined the agenda and to a large extent the outcome of the discussions.⁴⁰⁸ Its influence was also striking after the advice by the steering group and the advisory group was sent to the ministry. The project manager continued to elaborate the government plan while the state secretary had not yet come to a decision.⁴⁰⁹ Another illustration of indirect coercive power is the state secretary's response to questions in Parliament, including a request for the state contribution to the cost of the second bridge over the river Waal to be reclaimed if the members voted for the residents' alternative.⁴¹⁰

In its interaction with the local groups the national government often built legitimate power, which was used to emphasise the state role in decision-making. An illustration of this is during the execution of the EIA studies when the project manager referred regularly to the state secretary's responsibility for the final decision.⁴¹¹ The way Rijkswaterstaat dealt with the conditions set for river projects, the statutory design discharge of 16,000 m³/s and the forecast of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine⁴¹² can also be considered as a form of legitimate power. Neither government officials nor government decision-makers, could explain these well and often referred to the national government.⁴¹³ For the local groups, however, it was incomprehensible that during the last flood of 1926 a discharge of 12,600 m³/s was measured, while the high water events

of 1993 and 1995 did not even reach this. Furthermore, they stressed that if these statutory design discharges would occur, Germany would be flooded first. Nevertheless, the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s turned out to be an important factor in the decision-making.⁴¹⁴ Another example of legitimate power is Rijkswaterstaat's reaction to the residents' proposal to reserve land. 'Our conclusion is that it would not be legally possible to realise this. The local land use plan is valid for ten years, after which the statutory process of preparing and approving a new plan is required to designate the land for a possible dike relocation in future. That would not be the solution. Alternatively, we could buy the land, but then the area would be unavailable for development and that would go against the executive councillor's wishes.'⁴¹⁵

The national government frequently built hindering power in its dealings with the local groups. A striking example is Rijkswaterstaat's unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with Professor van Ellen when he wanted to discuss his ideas for an alternative. Rijkswaterstaat first referred him to the municipality of Nijmegen before it agreed to a meeting with him, but later were unwilling to send him the report on the calculations for his ideas for an alternative or to commission a new round of calculations using another model, as van Ellen requested.⁴¹⁶ Rijkswaterstaat withdrew van Ellen's reaction during the consultation period for the SPKD Room for the River. The local groups had to appeal to the freedom of information legislation to get van Ellen's submissions released for consultation. However, questions in Parliament were needed to get Rijkswaterstaat to respond to Professor van Ellen's representations,⁴¹⁷ which was eventually sent to his wife after he had died.⁴¹⁸ In addition, the national government did not react to letters from the municipality of Nijmegen based on resolutions of the council, and it was unwilling to release detailed information on the different outcomes of the cost calculations for the government plan and the residents' alternative.⁴¹⁹

In its interaction with the local groups the national government often built knowledge power through its access to models for calculating the effects of measures that lower the water level of the river and the costs of river plans, its access to Rijkswaterstaat experts who were able to interpret the outcomes,⁴²⁰ and to outside experts appointed to prepare reports⁴²¹ and provide advice, for example on the seepage water problem.⁴²²

In its dealings with the local groups the national government sometimes used sociability. An illustration of its sociability is the project manager's present to all participants of the advisory group to show his appreciation of their local groups' input during the meetings.

To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the national government built indirect coercive power in an attempt to influence the decision-making, legitimate power to emphasise who has the authority to make decisions and set conditions, hindering power to avoid difficult discussions, knowledge power to get information about costs and effects of the government plan and the residents' alternative, and sociability to express its appreciation of the local groups' input during the advisory group meetings.

Local government power building with regard to the local groups

The local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, and knowledge power in its dealings with the local groups.

It sometimes built indirect coercive power when dealing with the local groups to withstand opposition, for example by not executing resolutions of the city council, or by executing these but formulating the wishes of the city council in such a way that Rijkswaterstaat could continue the planning process.⁴²³

The local government often built legitimate power in its interaction with the local groups. An example is the executive councillor's explanation of his position: 'It is a national government plan and conforming to national planning decisions is our legitimate role in Dutch governance.'⁴²⁴ In addition, the executive councillor brought legitimate power into action (he used it interactionally) by emphasising that the residents could not call the municipality to account for the final decision. In other words, he claimed legitimacy as a means for not being blamed for his actions. The executive councillor: 'The question is whether the municipality of Nijmegen has to declare openly for or against one of the alternatives. According to me, you should not do this. From the beginning I have said that the plan for a dike relocation is a decision for the state secretary.'⁴²⁵ Apart from positioning himself in the political arena, he downplayed his role to avoid being blamed: 'I only participated to take stock of the process;...it is the state secretary who decides.'⁴²⁶

The local government sometimes built hindering power to avoid discussions with the residents. An example is not responding to Professor van Ellen's alternative. Later he heard that a commission would be set up and that he might be invited to participate. When he contacted the local government to ask why he had not heard from them, the local government officer referred him to Rijkswaterstaat.⁴²⁷ Another illustration of hindering power is the local government's unwillingness to elaborate the residents' alternative despite its promise to do so.

The local government rarely built knowledge power in its interaction with the local groups. Examples of its use of knowledge power are the commissioning of a comparative study of the government plan and the residents' alternatives and the involvement of local government experts in the elaboration of the residents' alternative. To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the local government built indirect coercive power to resist opposition by the residents, legitimate power to emphasise its position in the decision-making, hindering power to avoid discussions with the residents, and knowledge power to get knowledge about the state plan and the residents' alternatives, and to comply with the residents' request to elaborate their alternative as a full alternative to the state plan.

Power building by local groups with regard to authorities

Local groups power building with regard to the national government

The local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability in their dealings with the national government.

In its interaction with the national government the local groups occasionally built legitimate power to stress that alternatives to the government plan also had to be taken into account. 'Our message was that we are not against taking measures, but that alternatives have to be taken into account when there are good arguments for doing so.'⁴²⁸ Strikingly, the residents did not express their legitimate rights, such as their right to have a say in decision-making, more clearly. Another illustration of legitimate power is the emphasis placed by the local groups' on elaborating their alternative in such a way that it would be comparable to the government plan, including the design of the land reservation. In fact, the project manager did not want to decide on the land use before the state secretary took a decision. The residents, however, replied that without various elaborated land-use options the assessment process would not be fair, so the project manager demanded that the local government elaborated various options.⁴²⁹

The local groups occasionally built hindering power when dealing with the national government. Examples are the establishment of various residents' organisations and their presentation of an alternative, the Lentse Warande, which was not that different from the government plan.⁴³⁰ The local groups demanded attention for their alternative and the national government had to respond to them and their alternative. Their questions and demands for answers hampered the planning process that was geared totally to pushing the government plan through. In fact, it introduced much insecurity into the planning process in the sense that it complicated the acceptance of the government plan. In other words, it added 'noise' and 'loose ends' to the process. A local group chair: 'We were particularly focused on the fact that our alternative would be comparable to the government plan and getting the state secretary's attention for our alternative. As a result, she postponed decision-making. When she finally decided for the government plan, only Parliament was left to influence decision-making.'⁴³¹

Knowledge power was often built since the local groups were informed of the government plan and they prepared an alternative. They called on Professor van Ellen for advice⁴³² and his ability to communicate with Rijkswaterstaat experts on the details of Dutch river science. Additionally, they obtained legal advice on whether the discharge norm of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine would be tenable if they went to the Council of State.⁴³³ The local groups were particularly active in building knowledge power during their membership of the advisory group. Thanks to their knowledge of the area they found many mistakes in the EIA reports.⁴³⁴

Media power was frequently built through articles in regional and local newspapers,

which highlighted the residents' view of the process while the national government was tied to strict communication rules.⁴³⁵ The media turned out to be an important platform for the residents to draw attention to their point of view and their alternative. It gave them the opportunity to inform the general public that there were alternatives to the government plan for widening the river. At the same time the residents pressured the national government to incorporate their alternative in the decision-making. However, media power was built randomly rather than strategically.

In their dealings with the national government the local groups built sociability several times. For example, despite their disputes with the national government, the local groups appreciated that their voice was heard in the advisory group and were grateful for Rijkswaterstaat's willingness to discuss subjects the local groups put forward.⁴³⁶ The local groups also showed their sociability towards the state secretary when she invited them for a conversation. They gave her a pair baby boots for her three-month-old daughter.⁴³⁷

To summarise, the local groups built legitimate power in their dealings with the national government to stress that alternatives to the government plan also have to be taken into account, hindering power to demonstrate that the residents are an actor in the process and have to be listened to, knowledge power to present an alternative plan that meets the safety standard and to comment on the reports of the EIA studies, media power to inform the public and to put pressure on the national government, and sociability to show their appreciation towards the national government.

Local groups power building with regard to the local government

The local groups built legitimate power, knowledge power, hindering power and media power in their dealings with the local government.

In their interaction with the local government the local groups sometimes built legitimate power to underline the fact that they were clearly the local government's second priority after the second bridge over the Waal.⁴³⁸ They wanted to be heard and threatened to take protest actions. A local group chair: 'If we are not heard then we will fight to the death.... We stumbled on the government plan at the meeting in September 2000 when [executive councillor Paul Depla] announced that the Waalsprong housing development would go ahead, while completely ignoring the people who are affected'.⁴³⁹ The opposition of the local groups can be considered as the use of hindering power towards the local government, among others. According to the local groups, opposition in today's political context has to be accompanied by an alternative plan. A resident: 'We could say we are against, but that is not what we want. That is not fair. I am of the opinion that you have to use substantive arguments. If you are against, the discussion soon comes to an end and there is nothing left for you to do. What we have done is to come up with an alternative that is not very different from the government plan and continuously counter arguments against our alternative'.⁴⁴⁰ The local group frequently built hindering power by tabling motions demanding that the municipal executive send

a letter to the state secretary asking for the residents' views to be heard in the planning process or to study residents' alternatives thoroughly. Both motions were adopted unanimously by Nijmegen City Council. The first motion could not be pushed to one side. A local group chair: 'Oh, Paul [Depla] was mad'.⁴⁴¹ The local groups also gave a presentation about their alternative to the city council. A local group chair: 'In three minutes I showed that we are affected and presented our alternative, the Lentse Warande. I was complimented on my clear presentation. As a result, once again I convinced some members of the city council. I liked that'.⁴⁴² The local groups attempted sideline the executive councillor's objective of realising the Waalsprong housing development and the second bridge over the Waal by increasing their influence in the city council to put pressure on the municipal executive to take the local residents' views into account in the decision-making process.

In their dealings with the local government the local groups occasionally built knowledge power by incorporating the ideas of Professor van Ellen into their alternative. Van Ellen also commented upon the outcomes of the comparative study that the local government commissioned, which included 'his' side channel.⁴⁴³ Knowledge power was also built after the presentation of the report that the local government commissioned. According to the local groups too much emphasis had been laid on urban development aspects and that the authors therefore did not take their arguments seriously because they were mainly concerned with ecological and landscape aspects rather than the human aspects.⁴⁴⁴

In their dealings with the local government the local groups often built media power by publishing articles in local and regional newspapers drawing attention to the residents' alternative. Apart from the free local paper *Lentse Lucht* that functioned as the local groups' mouthpiece, the local groups did not build media power strategically. As a result, they missed many opportunities to call attention to their views and their alternative.

To summarise, in their interaction with the local government the local groups built legitimate power to stress that the local government did not represent the residents' interests, hindering power to show their opposition by presenting an alternative that would also serve the public interest, knowledge power to present an alternative plan that meets the safety standard and to assess a report that was commissioned by the local government, and media power to draw attention to their alternative.

Power building between authorities

National government power building with regard to the local government

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power and hindering power in its dealings with the local government.

In its interaction with the local government the national government occasionally built indirect coercive power, for example when the national government launched the plan for a dike relocation and said that 'some hard nuts have to be cracked with the municipality of Nijmegen'.⁴⁴⁵ Here, the national government meant to say that at least a part of the plan for housing development cannot be realised because it is situated in the same place as the planned dike relocation.

In its argumentation when dealing with the local government the national government also often built legitimate power. The state secretary legitimised her plan by referring to factors such as climate change, increased water discharges, sea level rise and land subsidence, which required appropriate action and far-reaching measures. She therefore presented as a vision for the long term. State secretary Monique de Vries: 'We have to be alert and be prepared to take far-reaching measures. In my White Paper on Room for the River I sketched the relation between upstream and downstream measures and my vision for the long term.'⁴⁴⁶ Presenting the final package of measures to be implemented in the Room for the River programme, the state secretary's successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen revealed 'her preference for relocating the dike, which means demolishing some houses. It shows that she takes a long-term view.'⁴⁴⁷

On one occasion, the national government built reward power to convince the local government to agree to the government plan. While compensation was widely recognised as a standard means of dealing with the negative impacts of planning decisions, a state contribution to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal was not. An official: 'It was the final offer.'⁴⁴⁸

In its interaction with the local government the national government frequently built hindering power. An example of the national government's building of hindering power is the time-consuming negotiation process, which lasted from May 2001 to April 2002, before it reached agreement with the local government. In November 2001 the national government agreed in principle to provide compensation for the 'limited accessibility' of the municipality of Nijmegen.⁴⁴⁹ Another example is the project manager's apparent willingness to disclose the draft EIA, but in practice it was not publicly available because interested residents had to call the project manager to obtain the key.⁴⁵⁰ Furthermore, hindering power was built by insisting on many editorial changes to the press releases, newsletters and letters to residents. This proved to be very time consuming and resulted in dissent between the national government and the local government.⁴⁵¹

To summarise, in its interaction with the local government the national government built indirect coercive power in an attempt to influence decision-making, legitimate power to justify its role in far-reaching measures to ensure flood safety, reward power to finally convince the local government to agree with the state plan, and hindering power to show that it would not readily agree with the conditions set by the municipality of Nijmegen.

Local government power building with regard to the national government

The local government built legitimate power and hindering power in its dealings with the national government.

The local government sometimes built legitimate power to withstand attempts by the national government to influence decision-making. An example is the list of conditions drawn up by the executive councillor after the state secretary informed him about the outcomes of the Quick Scan.⁴⁵² Another example of the local government's position in decision-making is the executive councillor's reaction: 'It is a national government plan and conforming with national planning decisions is our legitimate role in Dutch governance.'⁴⁵³

Hindering power was occasionally built during the execution of the EIA studies. The national government and the local authority had to agree on the content of newsletters, press releases and letters, which was often disputed. The municipality of Nijmegen did not accept Rijkswaterstaat's edits and suggested detailed alterations.⁴⁵⁴ Another example of hindering power is the local government's unwillingness to elaborate the residents' alternative, for which the residents blamed Rijkswaterstaat.⁴⁵⁵

To summarise, the local government built legitimate power in its dealings with the national government to resist attempts by the national government to influence decision-making and to position itself in the decision-making, and hindering power to influence the planning process.

Table 5.7 contains an overview of the authorities and the local groups' power building.

Table 5.7 Power building by national government (Nat), local government (Loc) and local groups (Loc gr)

		direct coercive power	indirect coercive power	legitimate power	reward power	hindering power	knowledge power	media power	sociability
Nat	Loc	o	±	+	±	+	o	o	o
Nat	Loc gr	o	±	+	o	+	+	o	±
Loc	Loc gr	o	±	+	o	±	±	o	o

± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The analysis of power building by authorities and local groups shows that both built a similar number of power types. The national government and the local groups built five power types. The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability, while the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability.

Their aims were identical: both intended to favour their plan as much as possible. Both the local government and the local groups built four power types. The local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. As a result of their power building the local groups were quite powerful in their dealings with the authorities. Their use of knowledge power and media power in particular enabled them to put pressure on the authorities. However, the use of reward power by national government (its contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge) was decisive in gaining the local government's support for the state plan.

Although the residents felt threatened by the proposed demolition of 55 houses, they never raised it in discussions with the authorities. Rather than emphasising the loss of the village character, they attacked the assumptions underlying the government plan, which became apparent in their use of specific power types, particularly knowledge power and media power.

The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered development of the interaction into negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose to enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis thus demonstrates that a power frame and an identity frame is not conducive to dialogue and collaboration. For the latter, a common understanding is needed and a tolerant relationship that fosters trust. This will not occur as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests are the most important. By focusing strongly on their own interests and being unwilling to listen to others, they put dialogue and collaboration out of reach. The interaction between the authorities resulted in neither dialogue nor collaboration because of a conflict of interest and loyalties. While the national government's objective was flood safety, the local government's aim was realising the Waalsprong housing development and a second bridge over de river Waal. When the incompatibility of these interests was resolved by a state contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge, the conflict of loyalties between the interests of the residents of Lent and the wider public interest experienced by the local government was also resolved. The local government, however, cleverly used an identity frame interactionally (see section 6.2.2). In so doing it avoided being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness.

5.2.4 Authorities' and local groups' potential to act

In this section we analyse the authorities' and the local groups' potential to act. Both potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard to the authorities, a differentiation was made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local government (municipality of Nijmegen).

Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities' and the local groups' potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities' and the local groups' power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the interaction between the authorities and the local groups?

National government's potential to act

The national government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

National government's capacity to act

The national government's capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

The national government's mandate was to realise the Room for the River policy that was included in a national spatial planning instrument, the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD). This policy is to lower the water level of the rivers Rhine and Meuse in 2015 to accommodate peak discharges in future.

At the Loevestein meeting in February 2000 the state secretary for water management presented a sketch of the plan for a dike relocation to show which measures could be taken in the Room for the River programme. The dike relocation in Lent was the first river project in the programme that was steered by the ministry and devolved to a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the EIA studies. A new phenomenon was the involvement of the municipality of Nijmegen. Relocating the dike land inwards implied that Rijkswaterstaat had to deal with the municipality of Nijmegen authority for this area. It thus had to cede responsibility, which led to disputes in the area of responsibility. Disputed subjects included the content of newsletters and letters and the transparency of the national government's actions.⁴⁵⁶ The national government's mandate can thus be considered strong.

Resources

The resources of the national government included budget and people.

The national government provided a budget (2.2 billion euros) for implementing 39 river projects within the framework of the SPKD Room for the River, including the proposed dike relocation in Lent. The size of the budget for the dike relocation in Lent was not known until the final stage of the EIA studies. The latest cost estimation for the government plan was 304 million euros, including 25 million euros reserved for solving the seepage water problem,⁴⁵⁷ whereas the residents' alternative was calculated at 315

million euros, including 58 million euros for a measure upstream.⁴⁵⁸ As the ministry was also in charge of transport it was able to contribute 90 million euros to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal.

Regarding personnel resources, the national government had enough staff to work on the project, both at the ministry as well as at the Rijkswaterstaat regional office.

The national government therefore had many resources at its disposal. In other words, its resource base was strong.

Coordinating mechanisms

Apart from the top-down launch of the government plan, the national government used several instruments to embed the plan in current policy. First, a Quick Scan was carried out to compare various options for solving the bottleneck in the river Waal. Second, the state-established Brokx Advisory Commission studied the need for and value of the plan for a dike relocation. Third, two administrative agreements were drawn up between the national and local government. Finally, studies for the EIA were commissioned. In these studies the residents' plan was elaborated as a full alternative to the government plan. The advisory reports from the steering group and the advisory group were sent to the state secretary who decided on the measure 'Lent' after the consultation period of the SPKD Room for the River.

The national government's use of coordinating mechanisms can be considered to be strong.

Consistency

The construction of a narrative started after the publication of the Quick Scan, which came down in favour of the government plan as the preferred option for widening the river near Lent. The state secretary: 'The plan for a dike relocation proved to meet the conditions safety and costs best.'⁴⁵⁹ Later, the features 'cost effective', 'robust', 'a measure that would be implemented in one go' and 'supported by the region' were added. Furthermore, there was an agreement with the local government in which the national government promised to contribute 90 million euros to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal.⁴⁶⁰

The national government's consistency (the construction of a narrative) was therefore strong.

National government's motivation to act

The national government's motivation to act entails political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

The political priority of the national government was to reduce flood risk, as stated in the Room for the River policy. The state secretary's intention was to push water high up the political agenda to motivate politicians to support the policy programme that included measures to lower the water level. She presented a sketch of the plan for a dike relocation in Lent as an example of measures that could be taken.

The political priority of the national government can thus be described as high.

Organisational ambition

The overall organisational ambition of the national government supported the political priority to work on flood safety.⁴⁶¹ However, the plan for a dike relocation was not communicated properly within the organisation (particularly Rijkswaterstaat). The director of Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands office: 'The state secretary took the project into her own hands. I was really furious about that. There was an agreement about the Waalsprong housing development. I just had arranged that all authorities involved agreed with it; it was therefore an extremely politically sensitive question.'⁴⁶² A civil servant: 'The director's problem was that he had to consult the local authorities. [As a state secretary] you have the cheek to do that [the dike relocation]'.⁴⁶³ The national and local government achieved a negotiated solution. Both agreed with the state payment of compensation for houses that could not be built and a contribution to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal. By way of compensation the local government was loyal to the national government's intention to relocate the dike. The national government therefore had a strong organisational ambition.

Personal vision

Officials were strongly motivated to take action to achieve the flood safety objective; they had a feeling that this period was the right moment to act.⁴⁶⁴ Although at the regional level there were some dissonant views, after negotiations between the national and local government resulted in a positive outcome for both, they changed their mind.⁴⁶⁵ The project manager who was in charge of the execution of the EIA studies did his utmost to gain the support of the residents, but this proved to be impossible. According to him it was a close finish between the government plan and the residents' alternative.⁴⁶⁶

The personal vision of politicians and officials can thus be considered to be strong. To summarise, with a strong capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the national government's potential to act was strong (see also Table 5.8).

Table 5.8 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government

	capacity to act					motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency		political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	++	++	++	++		++	++	++	
National government	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Local government's potential to act

The local government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

Local government's capacity to act

The local government's capacity to act encompasses its mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

Whereas the local government does not have a mandate in the field of flood risk management, except in emergencies, it does for the local land use plan. This spatial planning instrument had to be revised to permit the dike relocation in Lent. This implied that the national government depended on the municipality of Nijmegen to incorporate the dike relocation in the local land use plan.

Just before the state secretary launched the White Paper on Room for the River and presented the sketch proposal for a dike relocation in Lent in February 2000, the municipality of Nijmegen received the approval to begin the Waalsprong housing development in Lent. It therefore had a mandate to build a new urban extension on the same location where the dike relocation was planned.

The local government's mandate can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Resources

The resources of the local government included budget and people. The Waalsprong housing development was a major financial commitment for the municipality of Nijmegen, so it was not willing to agree with the dike relocation beforehand. The city's budget to commission studies was not that high. It provided 25,000 euros for a comparative study of the government plan and various residents' alternatives. The local government had sufficient staff with the skills required to work on the dike relocation

in Lent project. The resources of the local government can thus be considered to be moderate.

Coordinating mechanisms

The local government has various coordinating mechanisms at its disposal, including the commissioning of studies. The municipality of Nijmegen used this instrument when the state secretary did not want to include the residents' alternative in the remit of the Brokx Advisory Commission.⁴⁶⁷ The study resulted in a positive outcome for the government plan, which motivated the executive councillor to abandon further research into the feasibility of the residents' alternative.⁴⁶⁸ The local government's use of coordinating mechanisms can thus be described as moderate.

Consistency

As the municipality of Nijmegen was not the initiator of the plan for a dike relocation it was not in a position to construct a narrative. However, during the planning process the local government adopted the national government's narrative, although this was not done explicitly. It did not therefore act consistently and presented two faces: loyalties towards the national government and towards the residents. Since the second bridge over the river Waal was a long cherished desire of the municipality of Nijmegen, the state plan for a dike relocation presented an opportunity to negotiate with the national government on funding to cover the full costs of this bridge. The local government's interest therefore weighed more heavily than the residents' interest in retaining the 55 houses that would be demolished under the government plan. This paradox was felt throughout the planning process. On the one hand, municipality of Nijmegen could not be explicitly in favour of the government plan as this would result in fierce protests by the residents; on the other hand, in its relations with national government it was 'not done' to be a supporter of the residents' alternative.

The local government's consistency (the adoption of a narrative) can therefore be considered moderate.

Local government's motivation to act

The local government's motivation to act entails political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

The political priority of the local government followed the political priority set by the national government as it fitted in perfectly with its own interest, the desire to realise a second bridge over the river Waal and a riverfront on the north bank. The political priority of the local government can thus be considered high.

Organisational ambition

The organisational ambition of the local government was to realise the Waalsprong

housing development and the second bridge over the Waal. However, after the national government launched proposals for a dike relocation, the municipality of Nijmegen recognised the importance of the river for the city. ‘When we started with the preparations for the Waalsprong housing development fifteen years ago, we viewed it as a suburb behind the dike. The sketch plans for the dike relocation prompted us to change our minds. We doubted whether we should oppose the government plan, but it turned out that the costs would be high. Then a Quick Scan was carried out, followed by the establishment of the Brokx Advisory Commission. Engineers from Rijkswaterstaat and local authority urban planners finally elaborated the ideas for a dike relocation into an embankment with buildings to minimise the number of houses that could not be constructed. An additional benefit was that it would be a facelift for the municipality of Nijmegen.... We negotiated hard for a second bridge. In the end we did not get a bridge, but a contribution towards it.’⁴⁶⁹ Evidently, this contribution met the local government’s expectations. The organisational ambition of the local government can thus be considered to be strong.

Personal vision

The local government officials were strongly motivated to support the key aims of the municipality of Nijmegen including the realisation of the Waalsprong housing development and the second bridge over the river Waal. An official: ‘At some point, you have to choose, that is one of the roles of the local government. However, a few people felt cheated. You can make a drama of it, and it is regrettable that your house will be demolished, but look at urban renovation projects elsewhere, where many more houses will be demolished. And we guarantee compensation. At the moment the municipal executive is playing it smart by running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.’⁴⁷⁰ However, the Nijmegen executive councillor felt very uncomfortable about his position. ‘Although I tried to communicate openly and directly with the residents of Lent, they considered us to be the bearers of bad news rather than the ministry.’⁴⁷¹

The personal vision of the local government officials can thus be considered to be strong.

To summarise, with a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the local government’s potential to act proved to be moderate. For an overview, see Table 5.9.

Table 5.9 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local government

Local government	capacity to act					motivation to act			potential to act	
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency	political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision			
	+	+	+	+	+	++	++	++	++	+

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Local groups' potential to act

The local groups' potential to act consists of their capacity to act and their motivation to act.

Local groups' capacity to act

The local groups' capacity to act includes resources, trust and social identity.

Resources

The local groups' resources include dispositional force, bonding force, bridging force and linking force.

The dispositional force of the local groups was weak because there were three local groups active: Lentse Federatie, Lent Village Council and Lent 800 which preferred to profile themselves as three separate organisations. Furthermore, the practical work was done by four active members, three of whom were chairpersons and can also be considered to be 'chiefs' (individual leaders). As a result, at crucial moments they did not present a unified front. This was illustrated by the variety of articles, opinion articles and letters which the groups published in the media, which gave a rather confused picture of the opposition against the government plan. A particular case in point was the response by two active local groups who were not involved in the mediation action. These groups published their comments in a blog⁴⁷² and sent a letter with comments to the consulting firm employing the consultant who initiated the mediation action.⁴⁷³

The bonding force of the local groups was weak because they were not able to enlist residents who would be willing to be active in the local group in some way or other, nor were they able to bring in residents with expertise in various fields who could contribute to protest actions. Moreover, they did not try to get Professor van Ellen on their side during the planning process. The chair of the local group Lentse Federatie explained this as follows: 'Everyone came to me to express their sympathy, so I was well known in the village. But I didn't know everyone... There were not so many people actively involved in the protest actions, which meant we had to manage with the few we had.'⁴⁷⁴ This statement shows that the chair was passive rather than active in motivating residents who could have made important contributions to the local group. This was also true for the chairs of the other local groups.

The bridging force of the local groups towards the local government and the national government was weak. They had neither a well-considered strategy for dealing with the national government and the local government nor a strategy for dealing with the provincial government, which proved to be crucial for the decision-making.⁴⁷⁵

The residents' linking force was weak, despite their ability to get attention from members of the city council, members of parliament and Prince Willem-Alexander. However, they

failed to persuade the government to drop its plans for relocating the dike. For example, during a visit by a delegation of MPs to Lent most said they were in favour of the residents' alternative, but when it came to the vote they changed their mind. According to them they could not get a majority in the House because 'the LPF (nationalist party) was the only party we could not reach.'⁴⁷⁶ With the support of this party we might have had a majority for a motion concerning the residents' alternative in the House of Representatives.'⁴⁷⁷

Trust

The local groups lacked faith in specific people and organisations. They had little trust in others even those who supported their alternative. A chair of a local group described their trust in Rijkswaterstaat as follows: 'There was little trust, but a constructive atmosphere....An expression often used in business reflects the relationship well: "We agree to disagree". We differed in crucial respects: seepage water and the cost of the plans. You discuss it, but you don't get any further.'⁴⁷⁸ With regard to the local groups' trust in MPs, they were totally disappointed when the parliamentary vote did not deliver the expected outcome: instead of coming down in favour of the residents' alternative, which they indicated during their visit, they voted for the government plan. 'The politicians caved in when it came to the crunch'. The residents felt as if they had been taken for a ride.'⁴⁷⁹ A proponent of their alternative was Professor van Ellen, but the local group's relationship with him proved to be difficult. 'While we were heavily involved in the politics of situation, Professor van Ellen just wanted to discuss the substantive issues. There was a mismatch.'⁴⁸⁰ Communication between the local groups did not go smoothly either. Although they said that they trusted each other,⁴⁸¹ in practice this was not the case. They had little trust in each other, not to say distrust. The mediation initiative in which one local group was represented and two others were not resulted in a dispute between these groups – an example of the 'free riders' problem of Olson (1965). The two local groups reckoned they could have little impact on the outcome of collective actions, which was a strong inducement to free ride.

The local groups also distrusted the government, as evidenced by the comments Rijkswaterstaat appended to their advice to the steering group. The chair of the local group: 'The constructive atmosphere then disappeared.'⁴⁸² This distrust of the government was part of a general feeling about the political system: 'This is a democracy in which everybody has the same rights. But in fact that is not true. We are not in the same position. The government spent a million euros on advice, but as an individual you are only allowed to make comments. That is not equitable, absolutely not....I do not trust democracy as such anymore.'⁴⁸³

The local groups' trust can therefore be described as weak.

Social identity

Although the village of Lent was annexed by the municipality of Nijmegen in 1998 for the

construction of the Waalsprong urban extension, the residents of Lent still identified strongly with their own village when the national government launched its plan for a dike relocation. This was expressed during the planning process because the residents saw this as a last ditch action by the original 'Lent community'. Almost all the residents backed their alternative, with the exception of just a few, such as a voluntary firefighter who was involved in the repairs to the dike during the high water episode of 1995.⁴⁸⁴ However, most residents did not turn their words into action and remained passive onlookers; only a few actively opposed the government plan. The four active people – of which one grew up in the village – were spread across three local groups. They failed to come together to form a single organisation not because of differences of opinion about strategy, but because of differences between their own interests and incompatible characters.

The social identity of the local groups therefore can be considered to be moderate.

Local groups' motivation to act

The local groups' motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity.

Common purpose

The common purpose of the local groups was strong. For centuries the village of Lent has been at the mercy of big plans by the municipality of Nijmegen and the national government (e.g. the Grift canal, the railway, the railway bridge over the Waal, the Waal bridge in the east of the city, and the N325 trunk road). The penultimate action was the annexation of the village of Lent by the municipality of Nijmegen in 1998 and the plan for a Waalsprong housing development. Shortly after the annexation the national government launched a plan for a dike relocation in Lent, including the demolition of 55 houses, which the residents did not accept either. As they were not able to resist annexation and the Waalsprong housing development, they intended to fiercely oppose the dike relocation. Over the years the residents of Lent have witnessed the demolition of many historic buildings in the village. As a consequence, the village atmosphere (or what was left of it) faded slowly but surely. The plans for the dike relocation included the demolition of 55 houses, which meant the destruction of the last vestiges of the village identity, which were close to the hearts of the residents. Their ideal was clear: to save as many historic buildings as possible. In addition, they had a strong belief in the value of their alternative and their strategy to convince the members of Nijmegen City Council and the House of Representatives. In fact, the residents' opposition had to do with a broader feeling of dissatisfaction with the current situation, particularly the annexation by the municipality of Nijmegen, which was the final blow for the village, and the loss of the village character. In this respect the protest action against the dike relocation was symbolic for the residents' dissatisfaction with the status of their village.

Solidarity

The residents were generally united in their support of the residents' alternative, but this was not reflected in active participation in local groups, as only four residents became

active. There was little solidarity among the residents as a result of the annexation of the village by the municipality of Nijmegen, the Waalsprong housing development and the loss of economic activities, which used to be the bedrock of community cohesion.

As the low level of active participation by the residents in the local group weighs most heavily, the solidarity of the local groups can be considered weak.

To summarise, with a weak capacity to act and a moderate motivation to act, the local groups' potential to act in the Dike Relocation in Lent case was weak. For an overview, see Table 5.10.

Table 5.10 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local groups

Local groups	capacity to act							motivation to act			potential to act
	resources				trust	social identity	common purpose		solidarity	±	
	d	bo	br	l	±	+	±	++	±		
	±	±	±	±							
± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high											

Table 5.11 summarises the potential to act of all the parties involved in the case. The national government's potential to act was strong, the local government's potential to act was moderate and the local groups' potential to act proved to be weak.

Table 5.11 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government(Nat), local government (Loc) and local groups (Loc gr)

	capacity to act	motivation to act	potential to act
National government	++	++	++
Local government	+	++	+
Local groups	±	±	±

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

A striking result of the analysis of the actors' potential to act is that despite the fact that the national government's potential to act proved to be strong and the local groups' potential to act proved to be weak, both parties felt that the outcome of the decision-making process was a close finish. The power performance of the actors thus appeared to be different. Rijkswaterstaat proved to be less powerful and the local groups turned out to have more influence than their potentials to act would suggest. The analysis shows that the national government's mode of action had several weak points, including its inability to adopt a conflict management frame, its difficulty in dealing with opposing views, the

lack of transparency of its actions and its excessive concern with presenting the government plan in a positive manner. Officials felt limited by the bureaucratic rules that required them not to interfere in the decision-making after they had delivered the results of the EIA to the state secretary, whereas the residents had the freedom to try to influencing the decision-making. Although the government plan 'won', there remained some ill feeling about the process.⁴⁸⁵ The local groups lacked 'in-house' experts and a broad network of active people and did not present a unified front, neither did they have a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities or the ability to adopt a conflict management frame due to their fixation on their own interests. The 'weak' potential to act of the national government and the 'strong' potential to act of the local groups, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, was mainly because the local groups built various power types, in particular knowledge power and media power. This indicates that the action potential of the actors reveals more about their position in the planning process than the process of interaction. Therefore, the power building and interaction strategies have to be taken into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the analysis need to be discussed with the actors involved in order to assess the influence of the power building and interaction strategies on the government–citizen interaction.

Whereas the literature often discusses residents organised in a single group, the residents in Lent did the opposite: there were many resident groups, three of which were actively involved in the debate on the dike relocation. Although they did not win, they were able to exercise pressure on the national government to such extent that it was felt to be a close finish.

5.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, the local groups' cultural background and the impact of these on their action

In this section I analyse the authorities' organisational culture and local groups' cultural background and the impact of these on their action. The object of the analysis is the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action, the organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on its action and the cultural background of the local groups and the impact of this on their action.

National government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the national government's organisational culture was primarily based on an authoritarian government style (Pröpper & Steenbeek, 1999) or as Wolsink (2006) describes it, 'the institutionalisation of technical perspectives in water management and the tendency to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial planning'. This implied a preference for 'deciding over' rather than 'deciding with' the residents (Cooper, 1984). Over the centuries Rijkswaterstaat built up a reputation with this style (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998; van der Ham, 1999). The paradigm shift in water management from dike reinforcement to river widening that took place at the end of the

20th century (Wiering & Arts, 2006) – which in fact requires institutional change at all levels, including new forms of governance (Howe & White, 2004; Wiering & Arts, 2006) – did not result in a change in government style. The question that arises is why the authoritarian government style proved to be appropriate.

When dealing with the problem of river widening Rijkswaterstaat faced complexity and uncertainty (Meijerink, 2004). Since 2001 the Department of Water Management had worked on the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River to accommodate the expected rise in the water level of the Dutch rivers as a result of climate change. The policy aim of the SPKD was to find spatial solutions to the flood safety problem instead of engineering solutions, such as dike reinforcements. According to Meijerink (2004), the complexity of the task was due to the involvement of three administrative levels of government (national, provincial and local) because river widening often meant that land inside the dikes would have to be used. This requires amendments to the regional plan (*streekplan*), a provincial government responsibility, as well as the local land use plan (*bestemmingsplan*), a local government responsibility. Additionally, the plurality and diversity of the organisations involved and the variety of interests that they represent also contribute to the complexity of the task, including the problem perception of these parties and their (sometimes strategic) behaviour. Apart from the uncertainty of the outcomes, there are also uncertainties concerning the substantive issues. Which climate change scenarios have to be taken into account, what does this mean for the water discharge, and to what extent will river widening measures contribute to a lowering of the water level?

The character of the Room for the River programme therefore implied that a management style of ‘command and control’ was always present in the background (van der Werff, 2004). According to Korthals Altes (2002) the national government introduced national projects and proposed a general framework that reinforced hierarchical tendencies. It was also concerned more with providing legal and procedural certainty, by facilitating planning processes on these issues, and less with quality, by investigating in the process design and public involvement. Furthermore, Rijkswaterstaat officials, most of whom were engineers, still believed in ‘the engineering of society’ and, normatively, prioritised flood safety above other river values and functions, such as landscape and biodiversity (Wiering & Arts, 2006). Whereas lower-tier government agencies were included in the process because of their role in realising the programme objectives, the inclusion of the residents was out of the question as this did not fit in with Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture and approach. However, Dutch legislation requires that an EIA is prepared in which alternatives have to be studied. In the Lent case, the residents rightly proclaimed that not only the government plan, but also other options had to be taken into account. Therefore, alternatives had to be included in the planning process somehow. The state secretary set about it cleverly by using the EIA to kill two birds with one stone: to include the residents’ alternative and to co-opt the residents.

The organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action can therefore be considered to be strong.

Local government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

The SPKD process was designed in such a way that parties could also explore opportunities to realise their own goals within the parameters of the wider policy objectives (Meijerink, 2004). This became true for the municipality of Nijmegen. After initial scepticism, the local government decided to alter its orientation from 'a city with its back to the river' to 'a city with its face to the river' and tried to make a virtue out of the necessity for the dike relocation.⁴⁸⁶ The national government's approval of the Waalsprong housing development on the same location where the dike relocation was planned offered the local government room for negotiation, but throughout the process it felt pressured by the national government. However, the side effects of the proposed dike relocation had to be compensated for, including the houses that could not be built and the 'limited accessibility' of the city. This was settled in two voluntary agreements signed in April 2002.

In its actions the local government was ahead of the National Administrative Agreement on Water (*Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water*) of 2003, in which national, provincial and local governments and water boards committed themselves to work jointly on water management problems expected as a result of climate change and soil subsidence. The aim of the agreement was to adapt the water system accordingly by 2015 (Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water, 2003). Van Leeuwe (2007) states that societal support for changes in the field of water management have never been as complicated as they are now. Many stakeholders in society, such as provincial and local governments, have competences in policy areas that are directly related to or overlap with water management. Leeuwe (2007) quotes Schultz van Haegen (2003) in stating that water management is supposed to be decided in a process of consultation between water managers, experts, government decision-makers, interest groups, societal groups and citizens. In practice, however, fundamental choices have to be made in which inevitably there are winners and losers, and when it is clear who will be the winners and losers, conflict seems to be unavoidable.

In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the local government was internally divided: the municipal executive was a low profile proponent of the government plan, while the city council was against it. This reflects the conflict of interests at the local level, which leaves the local government little room for manoeuvre: on the one hand it has to be loyal to the national government, on the other hand it has to deal with the residents, who will judge the politicians on their results at the next election. The responsible executive councillor turned out to be a tightrope walker with a preference for realising the local government's objective, the Waalsprong housing development and a second bridge over the river Waal, rather than committing to the residents' desire to conserve the village character by retaining the houses that would be demolished under the government plan. He cleverly tried to support both causes at the same time.⁴⁸⁷ At the start, he managed to meet the city council's wishes, including sending a letter to the state secretary – but this was written in such a way that Rijkswaterstaat could continue to work on the government plan⁴⁸⁸ – and commissioning a comparative study between the government plan and the residents'

alternatives. Later, he regularly dismissed the city council's resolutions, for example when it asked for a thorough study of the government plan and the various alternatives. With the compensation and the state contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge, the government plan fitted in perfectly with the local government's ambitions. The local government therefore gave a higher priority to its loyalty to the national government than its loyalty to the residents. The residents can thus be considered as 'the losers'.

The organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on its action can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Local groups' cultural background and the impact of this on their action

Until the 1990s the village of Lent was known as a horticultural centre for the cultivation of flowers, fruit, tobacco and vegetables. For a long time the municipality of Nijmegen, located opposite Lent on the south bank of the river, was an important customer. Most of these horticultural enterprises were restructured in recent decades and when the municipality of Nijmegen annexed Lent in 1998 for the development of an urban extension the village effectively became part of the city. As a consequence, Lent lost its village character. Although many residents of Lent did not grow up there, most of those who live in the older parts of the village know one another. The village residents could not resist the annexation, but they perceived the government plan for a dike relocation and the demolition of 55 houses this implied to be a threat to their village. The residents of Lent seized this opportunity to make their last stand as a separate community.

This willingness to take action to conserve the last part of 'their' village had its origins in Lent's position in the region and the changes it has gone through during the past few hundred years. Until the end of the Second World War the village residents have often felt they were living in a contested area, under threat from either the Spanish, the French or the Germans. During the 20th century, the Dutch government and the municipality of Nijmegen agreed on the construction of major infrastructure works that cut through and divided up the village. The annexation of Lent by Nijmegen and the construction of the Waalsprong housing development turned Lent into a suburb of Nijmegen. When shortly after the annexation the government launched the plan for a dike relocation, the residents felt unfairly treated.⁴⁸⁹

Only the residents of the 'old' parts of the village and adjacent housing developments felt a sense of community interest. Street interviews⁴⁹⁰ showed a distinction between the residents living in these parts of the village and those who just arrived to live in the new houses built around neighbouring village of Oosterhout. Among the former, everyone knew about the government plan to relocate the dike and, apart from the volunteer firefighter, they all supported the residents' alternative. Among the latter, some did not know that they were living close to the river, others did not know about the river plans, and if they did they supported the government plan based on their trust in the state.

The village community was not a closely knit social network, mainly because of the decline in economic activities and the large influx of new residents since the 1970s and the infrastructure that split the village into three parts (see section 5.1). Like the village, the community was also split, as evidenced by the formation of different residents' groups, including GeWaLent (the victims of the cut-off of the river bend, the 'movers'), the 'dikers' (those who could remain), the 'watchers' (those who will have a view of the new dike) and existing organisations such as the Lent Village Council and Lent 800, which had similar objectives: to oppose the government plan. After an attempt to merge these groups, only GeWaLent, the dikers and the watchers were willing to form a new group, the Lentse Federatie, but under the express condition of retaining their own identity.⁴⁹¹ Besides this range of local groups, only a few residents became active. This was probably partly because the three 'chiefs' of the active residents' groups did not attempt to mobilise the residents. This became problematic during the planning process, for example after a chair of a residents' group became ill in July 2006 and there was nobody available to take over. The local groups therefore missed the initiative to lobby the Senate.⁴⁹² This shows that there was not really a village culture in the sense that villagers could rely on one another.

The local groups' cultural background and the impact of this on their action can therefore be considered to be weak.

To summarise, the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action appeared to be rather strong. Its authoritarian management style based on Rijkswaterstaat's centuries-long command of river management did not change when a shift in policy was introduced, while in fact this requires the involvement of citizens and other parties (Wiering & Arts, 2006). Instead, the national government broadened its scope somewhat by including lower-tier authorities in the planning process because it depended to a large extent on their commitment to realise its objectives. Throughout the planning process the local government felt subjected to the national government's 'command and control' approach. The organisational culture of the local government was flexible in that it leant towards the national government's objective without denying its own interest; the local government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action can therefore be considered moderate. The local government's disregard of the residents' desire to save the historic part of their village can be seen as an indication that the residents were the 'losers' of this game. The loss of much of the village culture proved to be a weak point which had repercussions on their action potential. Nevertheless, the residents were able to seize the opportunity to present their alternative as a solution that met both the public interest and their own interest. In the end, their arguments and actions were not convincing enough for Parliament, which voted for the government plan. In view of the history of Lent, this outcome is not surprising. In the past the government had successfully planned and built various infrastructure works, the Grift canal, the railway, the N325 trunk road and the Waal bridge, that have had a considerable impact on the village. The community was not able to influence decision-making to prevent the implementation of these works and this has not changed. The cultural

background of the local groups and the impact of this on their action can therefore be considered to be weak.

5.2.6 Summary and discussion

The Dike Relocation in Lent case study can be summarised as follows. The interaction between the authorities and local groups can be broken down into the interaction between government authorities and local groups and between the different government authorities: the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local government (municipality of Nijmegen). In the village of Lent there were three active local groups.

The interaction between the national government and the local groups ended in debate and conflict. Although the national government attempted to acknowledge the residents' concerns to prevent escalation, this never ended in negotiation. Most issues, however, escalated into conflict, which remained unresolved. The interaction between the local government and the local groups evolved in a similar way: issues were disputed and then often escalated into conflicts which also remained unresolved. The interaction between the authorities resulted in debate and negotiation. Most debates were about the division of responsibilities. Negotiation took place once, when the national government decided to contribute to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal in order to get the support of the local government.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used a power frame throughout the planning process. The most striking examples are the launch of the government plan without first discussing it with its own officials and the local government, and the way it dealt with the residents' alternative, which was considered to be the 'second best' right from the start. The local government and the local groups employed an identity frame. The local government used its identity frame interactionally. In its dealings with the national government it emphasised that 'conforming to the national interest is our legitimate role, but under certain conditions', but to the residents its position was that 'it is the state secretary who decides' to avoid being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness. Neither the national government nor the local government changed their frame from an identity frame to a conflict management frame. In its interaction with the local groups the national government used buffering strategies very often, while the local groups employed this type of strategy regularly. Both used bridging strategies occasionally. The local government and the local groups both used buffering strategies moderately in the interaction with each other, and bridging strategies incidentally. The government authorities occasionally used buffering and bridging strategies when interacting with each other.

Both the national government and the local groups built five power types in their

interaction. The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability. The local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. The local government and the local groups both built four power types in their interaction. The local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. The national government built four power types in its dealings with the local government (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power and hindering power), whereas the local government built two power types (legitimate power and hindering power). The most important use of power was the national government's use of reward power when dealing with the local government, in the form of a contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.

The power building by the government authorities and local groups gives insight into both the use of interaction strategies and the interaction outcomes. The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered the development of the interaction outcomes negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose to enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis therefore demonstrates neither a power frame nor an identity frame are conducive to dialogue and collaboration. The latter requires a common understanding and an atmosphere of tolerance in which trust may grow. This will not happen as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests are the most important.

The national government's potential to act proved to be strong, whereas the local government's and the local groups' potential to act proved to be moderate and weak respectively. While the national government's potential to act was powerful and the local groups' potential to act appeared to be less influential, this was viewed differently by the actors involved. The national government's potential to act was weakened by its inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of its excessive concern with presenting the government plan in a positive manner, its difficulty in dealing with opposing views, and the lack of transparency of its actions. In addition, it did not have an answer to the local groups' building of knowledge power and media power. The local groups, however, turned out to be more influential than their potential to act would suggest, which indicates that their lack of 'in-house' experts, a broad network of active people, a united front, a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and their inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of their fixation on their own interests were not as significant or consequential as expected. The 'weak' potential to act of the national government and the 'strong' potential to act of the local groups, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, was mainly a result of the local groups building various power types, in particular knowledge power and media power. This implies that the action potential of the actors better explains their position in the planning process than the process of interaction. Therefore, the power building and interaction strategies have to be taken into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the analysis need to be discussed with the

actors involved in order to assess the influence of the power building and interaction strategies on the government–citizen interaction from their point of view. As this case study shows, the actors may have a different interpretation of the outcome than my analysis.

Concerning the authorities' organisational culture and the citizens' cultural background and the impact of these on their actions, the analysis shows that culture had a strong impact on the national government's actions, a moderate influence on the local government's actions and a weak influence on the local groups' actions. The organisational culture of Rijkswaterstaat was largely an authoritarian style of governance. In practice this meant that Rijkswaterstaat took a technical approach to water management and tended to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial planning. The Room for the River programme resulted in new forms of governance, including cooperation with lower-tier authorities, but the organisation did not change its style of operation. The Room for the River programme was set up in such a way that a command and control approach operated in the background. Examples are the presentation of national projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, the emphasis on procedures and the focus on flood safety which meant that other river values and functions, such as landscape and biodiversity, were given a lower priority. The municipality of Nijmegen pursued its own course independently of the public interest which the national government defended, and the residents' interest. In the past the local community in Lent had been unable to change the authorities' mind when infrastructure works were planned in their village and this has not changed.

Discussion

The Dike Relocation in Lent case study shows that relatively badly organised groups of residents were able to exercise pressure on the national government in such a way that it was felt to be touch and go whether the government plan or the residents' alternative would win. The question that arises is what would happen if the residents had formed a single group led by a chairperson with management qualities and strategic insight?

If the residents had had a strong leader every effort would have been made to establish a good relationship with the water expert Professor van Ellen and he would probably have stayed on as adviser to the local group. Other experts in different fields would also have been invited to advise the residents. Furthermore, more effort would have been given to establishing and maintaining closer contacts with the residents and inviting them to become active members of the local group. At the same time, the local group would have presented a more united front and adopted a well considered strategy for dealing with the authorities (national, provincial and local) in which the media would have been seen as an ally rather than a coincidental partner. Opposition would have been centred on the 'substance' – particularly the assumptions underlying current policy, such as the need for a dike relocation, and the effects of the proposed measure, such as the seepage water problem – and on the 'process', such as the 'closed' design of the planning process, the

residents legitimate right to have a say in decision-making, the disregard of public values and the little attention given to reasonable alternatives supported by the residents. Should the residents have allowed themselves to be co-opted by the government, for example by taking part in the advisory group? There are two possible views. One view is that it was a good idea, although the chair of the High Water Platform (see section 6.1) considered it disadvantageous⁴⁹³ because it meant the residents had fewer options and rights, for example to give advice. However, if they had attached conditions to their membership, for example by demanding a different planning process in which the public was involved, then the local group's membership of the advisory group might have been beneficial. They could have made their membership of the advisory group conditional upon withdrawal of the government plan from consideration. A second option for the local group was to remain outside the planning process, but this would only have been an option if the authorities were unwilling to include the residents in the planning process anyway. As the dike relocation had been included in the SPKD Room for the River policy programme, the residents' group would have been invited to participate in the planning process sooner or later, since the national government is bound by legislation that requires it to take reasonable account of the local community's wishes. It would therefore have been difficult to refuse an invitation as this would have shown an unwillingness to engage in the process, which could have had disadvantageous effects on the relationship with the national government and weaken the residents' position in any legal challenges. The government authorities seemed to be in a powerful position. The plan for a dike relocation was included in the SPKD Room for the River, there was no discord between the experts or between the authorities and money was no object. Getting the plan realised seemed to be a question of prestige. In other words, all the conditions were present to go ahead and implement the project.

The power frame of the national government is typical for enforcing large infrastructure works in the Netherlands when flood safety (e.g. the Delta Works) or the national economy (e.g. the Betuwe rail freight line from the port of Rotterdam to Germany; *Betuwelijn*) is at stake. For a bottleneck in the river Waal, however, this power frame seems to be a case of overkill, all the more because flood safety was not at risk. In fact, the power frame is not typical of the Dutch polder model, in which each stakeholder has a say. As Dutch society is geared towards consensus, conflict makes the authorities feel uneasy. Therefore, before launching a plan they generally play it safe by consulting with other government authorities and civil society organisations to avoid discord and attempt to come to a consensus. In Rijkswaterstaat's command and control approach there was, however, another scenario for the dike relocation because the plan was not undisputed and was based on many assumptions which were questioned during the course of the planning process, such as the safety standard of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine discharge and the disregard of transboundary aspects. In the course of the planning process the national government changed its command and control approach towards a more moderate one to avoid conflict. Given the insecurity of the political process the outcome of the decision-making is never certain. It finally became clear that politicians did not make an issue out

of the safety standard of 18,000 m³/s and the limited room for public involvement. In the end, Rijkswaterstaat 'won', but according to its officials it was a close finish. While the national government totally ignored the residents, the local government would not be expected to consider this to be an option. One would expect that a lower-tier authority is closer to the local population. But this was not the case. The municipality of Nijmegen used an identity frame when dealing with the national government and the residents and proved to be opportunistic in its approach. It focused entirely on meeting the public interest in such a way that also met the local government's interest and ignored the residents' interest. Furthermore, it sought to avoid any blame by legitimising its role. As a result, the residents of Lent lost their faith in democracy, as evidenced by the statement of a local group chair: 'I am not keen to be involved [in the implementation of the dike relocation] because I do not trust democracy as such.'⁴⁹⁴

For various reasons the provincial government, the province of Gelderland, was conspicuous by its absence. First, it supported the government plan to relocate the dike in Lent, so apart from being involved in the project organisation for the EIA studies it did not have any further part to play. Second, at the same time the provincial government was involved in a dispute with the national government about another government plan: the designation of an emergency water storage area in the Ooijpolder (see Chapter 6).

The analytical framework and ideas for further research

The analytical framework worked quite well, but did not cover the feelings of the actors. At first sight the national government's and local groups' potentials to act were clear: the national government had a strong potential to act while the local groups' potential to act was weak. However, both these actors had a different view of this. The national government felt less powerful, particularly because of the local groups' building of knowledge power and media power, and it had several weak points, including its inability to deal with the residents and their alternative, which it expressed as an ill-feeling about the process. The local groups managed to exert pressure on the national government through their use of knowledge power and media power despite their weaknesses, including their lack of 'in-house' experts, a broad network of active people, a united front, a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and their inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of their fixation on their own interests.

What the analytical framework missed was the ability to follow the policy discourse and the narrative of the actors. It would be of interest to analyse the development of the policy discourse and the development of the national government's narrative, including the local groups' inability to adopt the national government's narrative or inability to change the national government's narrative and adopt a joint narrative. This raises the question of why the local groups were not able to develop their own narrative and whether a joint narrative would have been within the bounds of possibility.

Another shortcoming of the analytical framework was that it only includes two types of

actors, government authorities and residents, whereas the water expert also played an important role. In the analysis this was dealt with by considering the water expert as 'one of the residents', but this was not the case. His role in the planning process deserves a specific place in the framework.

A subject for further research is the question of the leadership of the local groups. Relevant questions are: What was the reasoning behind the multileadership (which stories were told by the different chairs)? Is multileadership an inevitable consequence of the physical barriers and social divisions in Lent? How did the relations between the leaders develop during the planning process? Did they divide tasks and responsibilities between themselves and subsequently make (oral) agreements, for example on relations with the media and specific tasks? How were the local groups and their leaders viewed by the residents and the authorities? and Is multileadership a workable arrangement for achieving the objectives of a coalition of local groups?

Chapter 6 Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study

The plan to create emergency water storage facilities in areas bordering the main rivers, including Ooijpolder, was a state initiative to prevent the densely populated Randstad area in the west of the Netherlands from flooding. This case study covers the period running from the launch of the plan in February 2000 to the state secretary's decision in March 2005.

Between 2005 and 2008, 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with key persons, 30 of whom were from government authorities, consultancy firms and a non-governmental organisation, and 17 were residents, including various members of the residents' organisation High Water Platform (*Hoogwaterplatform*). The chair of this organisation was interviewed three times, once to reflect on specific moments in the planning process with another member. Conversations with the manager of the Room for the River project office at the province of Gelderland and two members of a historical association in which additional information was acquired are not included in the list of respondents. During the interview period a desk study was carried out, for which reports, letters, articles and newspaper clippings were used.

6.1 Case narrative

This case narrative of the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder includes a brief review, a historical perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the state initiative and the descriptions of the case from the government's point of view and the local group's position.

Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder in brief

While presenting the White Paper on Room for the River on 28 February 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries for water management emphasised the necessity of additional measures, including the plan for three emergency water storage polders, or 'calamity polders',^[496] one of which was Ooijpolder (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 The white areas are planned for emergency water storage (Luc Dinnissen)



That very evening it was an item on the eight o'clock national news on television. Government decision-makers in the region were not happy. Although most of them knew the direction water policy was developing, there had been no proper discussion about which measures would be taken. Rather than worrying about the technical aspects of the proposed solutions, they were afraid of the social consequences (Roth et al., 2006a). Their premonition was right: the state secretary's speech caused considerable unrest, particularly in Ooijpolder. Until then, government officials and residents thought they lived in a secure area, but the state secretary's emphasis on 'residual risk'^[497] and her plan for emergency water storage ('controlled flooding') to reduce this type of risk changed that overnight. The evacuation of 1995 was still fresh in their minds (Warner et al., 2008).

The state secretary's next step was to establish the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (*Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden*), also referred to as the Luteijn Commission after its chair, David Luteijn. The Commission's assignment was to study the need and purpose of the proposed measure and to generate support for it in the region. It therefore consulted selected lower-tier government authorities and societal organisations to try to win them over to the idea that emergency water storage actually functions like an airbag in a motor car. The commission published its report in May 2002. The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen, who wanted to deal firmly with the subject,⁴⁹⁵ chose emergency water storage from five options for reducing flood risk: international collaboration, emergency water storage, compartmentalising, raising safety standards and organisational measures (Roth et al., 2006a). From then on, all efforts were focused on emergency water storage.

In the meantime, the bank manager of a local branch of the Rabo cooperative bank in Ooijpolder, who felt responsible for his clients and their future, invited David Luteijn, who was a member of the supervisory board of the corporate Rabo group, to a meeting to discuss the matter after the bank's annual general meeting. Luteijn expected a hostile audience, but it was only during the meeting that the residents realised that the proposals were in earnest. The meeting became tumultuous and can be considered to be the start of a broadly supported protest action against the plan for emergency water storage. The first to take action to oppose the plan were some farmers who were members of the regional farmers' organisation GLTO. They expressed their rage by erecting straw figures with slogans in the landscape.

After the Luteijn discussion meeting the bank manager worked on setting up a residents' organisation. The chair of the organisation was assumed by a recently retired rector of a secondary school whose family came from the area. He proved to be a real manager and established a well run organisation called High Water Platform (*Hoogwaterplatform*), with several working groups. The main strategy was to call the state secretary 'the enemy' and try to undermine her position. To this end the residents commissioned a contra-expertise to attack the Government's assumptions, used various means of communication and tried to convince local and provincial elected officials and senior government officers to take their side against the plan. Lower-tier authorities also commissioned a contra-expertise to underpin their arguments against calamity polders.


During the course of their work the residents discovered an undisclosed report in which the measure was critically analysed. They tried to obtain a copy of the report by appealing to the freedom of information legislation (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*). Finally, they directed all their efforts at the members of the House of Representatives by visiting political parties in The Hague and priming them with a steady flow of bite-sized information on new insights, developments and research into emergency water storage, and by inviting MPs and local and provincial politicians for a guided tour in Ooijpolder, with running commentary from the technical advisor to the residents' organisation (Warner et al., 2008). The residents had a close relationship with the media, which played an important role through the publication of a constant stream of articles about the subject in the regional newspaper. This proved to be effective. The technical and economic arguments put forward by the residents' organisation persuaded the MPs of the validity of their case. While the state secretary was on maternity leave the residents' organisation managed to get a majority in the House of Representatives to oppose the plan. In November 2004 the House of Representatives adopted a parliamentary motion by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to reallocate the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to the Room for the River programme. On 24 March 2005 the state secretary conceded defeat, and the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was shelved (Warner et al., 2008).

Table 6.1 is a process outline listing the different planning and decision-making stages in the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case.

Table 6.1 Process outline for the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study

Process stage	Date	Method	Participants
Preparatory stage (February 2000 – May 2002)			
Launch of plan	28 February 2000	Presentation in Loevestein Castle	State secretary for water management
Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (Luteijn Commission)	Autumn 2001-15 May 2002	Studying the need and purpose of emergency water storage	D. Luteijn (chair), E.M. d'Hondt (vice chair; mayor of the municipality of Nijmegen), Prof. J.P. Bahlmann, G. Blom, J. van Dijk, J.C.M. Hovers, Prof. C. Veerman
Decision-making stage (November 2004 – May 2005)			
Acceptance motion to reallocate funds from emergency water storage to the Room for the River programme	November 2004	Parliamentary motion	Two members of the House of Representatives: Erik van Lith (Christian Democrats) and Jan Boelhouwer (Social Democrats)
Government's decision to reallocate funds from emergency water storage to the Room for the River programme	24 March 2005	Government's decision	Cabinet

Figure 6.2 Ooijpolder



Historical perspective

Ooijpolder and Duffelt lie in the flood plain of the river Waal to the north and the push moraine on which Nijmegen is situated to the southwest. Ooijpolder contains the villages Ooij, Persingen, Wercheren and Erlecom; the Dutch part of Duffelt⁴⁹⁶ contains the villages Leuth, Kekerdom and Millingen aan de Rijn (Figure 6.2).⁴⁹⁷ The two polders have a total population of about 13,000 inhabitants (van Eck, 2005).

A border area for government and water management

Until the 19th century Ooijpolder and Duffelt contained several different polders and straddled national and municipal boundaries. After French rule ended in 1813 it took a while before the Prussians and the Dutch agreed on the national border. In 1816 Leuth and Kekerdom became Dutch and the border was situated roughly where it now lies (see Figure 6.2). For a long time Millingen, Ubbergen and Ooij were autonomous municipalities. During the 19th century Ooijpolder and Duffelt consisted of a few separate polders, which often had opposing interests. In this territory of Gelderland and Kleve the national border was convoluted and so it took much longer to establish a settled water management regime than in other areas along the main rivers. The existence of upper and lower polders in the border area was a point of contention. The polder authorities upstream were keen to discharge excess water, but often this flowed more easily via the downstream polders rather than the river. This meant that the downstream polders not only had to contend with excess water from the river, but also the drainage water from the upstream polders. In 1726, 1740 and 1744 dike breaches occurred in Germany, leading to flooding in Ooijpolder. From the Middle Ages on, the inhabitants of Ooijpolder regularly had to contend with flooding, leading to crop failure and damage. Their livelihoods have therefore long been insecure and unstable. Living on the higher ground did not guarantee safety from flooding.

As early as 1300 the inhabitants of Ooijpolder started to construct dikes from Wercheren, Ooij and Tiengeboden to the outlet in the river Waal (see Figure 6.2). Two dikes were built in the east to keep out water flowing under pressure from the push moraine and water from the surrounding countryside, which together formed a circle called the *Circul van de Ooij*. The close network of dikes prevented the river from overflowing its banks and as a result the channel followed a fixed course. Little by little the river was contained and the inhabitants built houses and cultivated the land. Dike breaches then had enormous consequences, which made their maintenance crucially important. In the farming communities it was common practice to maintain only the dike that was situated on their own territory under the system of customary law.

A close network of dikes also had consequences for drainage water. The surplus water could not drain naturally and had to be drained artificially. During high water periods this proved to be a hard job, partly because the dikes themselves formed a barrier as there were no openings through which to discharge the water. Besides, the improved drainage led to soil compaction in the areas outside the dikes. Another problem was

groundwater seepage. Water infiltrated into the sandy soils on the higher ground outside the dikes and flowed through deeper layers of subsoil under the dikes. This seepage water usually emerged during high water periods, making it difficult to drain the water to the river. It also had a positive effect: it provided a counterweight to the river water when it rose to the crown of the dike during periods of high water. Spring water from the push moraine was also a source of great concern to the landowners. Therefore, the Schependom Nijmegen built a drainage sluice (*Meersluis*) at the mouth of the river Aa where it flowed into in the Waal.

Disputed territory

The border territory proved to be an important bone of contention. It changed hands from the Duchy of Gelre to the Duchy of Kleve (part of present-day Germany), then to the Republic of the United Netherlands, then to the Kingdom of Prussia (part of current Germany) and the French Empire for a short time. However, to which lord the village belonged seemed to be of less importance than the water management borders, as everyone needed 'to keep their feet dry' (van der Most & Wehrung, 2005).

At the time Duffelt got its dike letter (*dijkbrief*) from the Lord of Gelre on 13 June 1364, six villages belonged to the municipality: Düffelward, Keeken-Bimmen, Kekerdom, Leuth, Niel and Mehr. However, although neighbouring villages belonged to the Duchy of Kleve, like Rindern, Zyfflich and manorial Millingen, they were given permission to drain their water to the river Waal via Gelre's territory. This was conditional upon keeping to the rules of the 'dike chair' (*dijkstoel*), consisting of a dike reeve and the dike board (*heemraad*). The dike board were representatives elected by the landowners who carried out the inspection and contributed to the maintenance of the water infrastructure, such as dikes, ditches, canals and sluices. Because the Millingen dike continued along both sides of Duffelt, manorial Millingen got its own dike chair, although it was a relatively small polder consisting of ten farms. With the lapse of time Millingen was no longer able to pay for the costs of dike maintenance. Therefore, the Dutch state took it over in 1817, but the responsibility for water drainage was left to Millingen. Later, when the Millingen polder became part of Gelre, it was obliged to follow the Duchy's river polder regulations.

In 1794 French troops crossed the Rhine under the command of Charles Pichegru and Gelre and Kleve were placed under French rule until 1813. After the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna decided in 1815 to cede the villages Kekerdom and Leuth to the Republic of the United Netherlands. The water management consequences were arranged in 1819 – the two villages would get their own polder board – but before this could be put into effect the dike near Leuth was breached in 1820. The landowners in Duffelt were of the opinion that all landowners, also those living in Prussia, should contribute to the dike renovation. As the Vienna arrangement had not yet been effected, this resulted in a situation in which Prussia was in charge of the maintenance of a Dutch river dike. A new agreement was signed in June 1821. The Prussian villages of

Düffelward, Keeken, Bimmen, Niel and Mehr and the Dutch villages of Kekerdom and Leuth once again fell under the same water board, Zyfflich-Wyler, which corresponded with the old Prussian water board of Duffelt.

Water management as a source of conflict

Like Duffelt, Ooijpolder received its dike letter in the 14th century. Ooijpolder was divided into four jurisdictions: *Rijck of Nijmegen*, *Scheependom Nijmegen*, manorial Ooij and manorial Persingen. The greater part of Ooijpolder lays within manorial Ooij and manorial Persingen. The board of each of the jurisdictions was responsible for the maintenance of the river dikes and the dikes in the hinterland. However, instead of safeguarding the dike maintenance the dike letter proved to be a permit to omit it. The lords who ruled in Ooij and Persingen had different interests. The disagreement between the lords of Ooij and Persingen and the landowners was mainly about the dikes and their maintenance, each side claiming that the other was responsible for maintaining the dikes and the costs of this maintenance. The members of *Scheependom Nijmegen* faced the consequences of this overdue maintenance and took the side of the landowners in the conflict. They presented a petition to the Court of Gelre to alter the dike letter to rectify the failure of customary law. With the help of a commission, dike legislation was prepared. Next, the Court of Gelre enacted a *Landtbrief des Circuls van der Ooy*, a revised version of the previously published dike letter. This letter arranged several water management matters and their administration. The Circul van de Ooij became a regional water board and the river dike in Ooij became a main dike, which meant that a dike chair had to be established. The *Landtbrief* established a fixed draining regime in the *Circul van de Ooij* along with other matters, such as the repair of dikes and the construction of sluices.

The course of the river Waal underwent continuous minor changes, but in the 16th century the river changed shifted about 2 km to the north, which offered new opportunities. Erlecom was now situated on the left bank of the river, but for the time being this had no administrative consequences. At the end of the 16th century a low dike connection was made, the dike of Erlecom, creating Erlecom polder. At that time, water from the land of Erlecom was drained manually via the sluice in the west of the territory near Oortjeshekken. In 1747 a new sluice was built near the connection to the Erlecom dam to improve inundation, a practice used to fertilise the soil, especially in the higher parts of the territory. Despite high expectations, the sluice failed. Therefore, the main dike was raised and two spillways were constructed. Although the infrastructure was costly, it did not function well because of regular dike breaches. After the opening of the new sluice, however, the dike boards of Mehr and Niel observed that the water also inundated Duffelt and draining water proved to be more difficult. While in the first instance the damage was limited to Kranenburg and a small part of Duffelt, later the entire territory of Duffelt flooded now and then. The *Circul van de Ooij* was blamed for this, but Duffelt suffered the consequences, compaction of the surface soil.

In 1830 it was decided to lower the main dike and raise the spillways. Originally the aim of the spillway in Ooij was to drain water after a dike breach in the territory of Kleve. Later it was used to inundate the *Circul van de Ooij* to fertilise the land and to provide sufficient hydraulic head to reduce the chance of a dike breach. However, the Prussian part of Duffelt suffered disadvantageous effects of the annual flooding of the *Circul van de Ooij*. To rectify this, a crosswise dike, the Querdamm, was constructed in 1853 along the current Dutch-German border. This measure resolved the disagreement between Nijmegen and Kleve about drainage water.

A regional water management conflict emerged when the province of Gelderland considered turning the *Circul van de Ooij* polder district into a polder outside the dikes (*buitenpolder*) in response to the obstinate attitude of the dike chair during the building of the Querdamm. The province's intention was to establish a common polder board, but the city of Nijmegen was fiercely against and protested to the king. It had doubts about the proposed change in water management, in which the local landowners would be given an important voice. A good functioning water management board, in this case a regional water board, was also the city's concern because many charitable institutions in Nijmegen owned land in Ooijpolder. The city of Nijmegen was finally successful and the province conceded defeat.

Towards a joint transboundary water board

At the end of the 18th century the French rule had a noticeable effect on water management. A centralistic approach was established by the creation of Rijkswaterstaat in 1798. Whereas formerly the water boards were in conflict, French authorities imposed state control.⁴⁹⁸ However, a transboundary initiative for cooperation, including the establishment of a binational Duffelt water board in 1821, the construction of the Querdamm along the border of Gelre and Kleve, and the establishment of the joined polder Querdamm in 1853 failed. The differences between the two countries' legislations proved too great. It was therefore decided that Duffelt water board would be divided along the national border.

The period of Prussian rule also had an influence on the organisation of water management. In 1838 Gelderland province drew up a 'Regulation for the management of the river polders in province of Gelderland' (*Gelders rivierpolderreglement*). This document drew inspiration from the Kleve water board regulations on water management dating from 1767. At that time it was a revolutionary regulation which put an end to all historical rights. It legally established the equality of all people and made dike maintenance a common responsibility. Financing of the costs was based on a proportional relationship between interest and payment, a principle that underpins the funding of Dutch water boards to this day. The regulations included uniform orders for governance and administration, which meant that the decisions and budgets of the water boards had to be agreed upon by the province of Gelderland. The water boards were divided into polder districts, village polders and polders outside the main dikes

(*buitenpolders*). For the river district between Nijmegen and Kleve the new regulation meant that the *Circul van de Ooij* became a polder district and Erlecom became a polder outside the main dikes.

Flooding and inundation: a continuing story

The flood of 1926 can be viewed as the last river flood. From the historical record we know that autumn 1925 started with a cold spell and heavy precipitation. In many parts of Europe snow had banked up. In December the thaw set in and the rain came. The rivers had to discharge a lot of meltwater, supplemented with large quantities of rainwater. This combination of circumstances resulted in a Rhine discharge of about 12,600 m³/s on 3 January 1926. The discharge wave took about fifteen days to reach the Netherlands. The level of the Rhine rose to just below the crown of the dikes. River water began flowing through several spillways and overtopping the dikes, flooding large areas. These spillways were effective during the high water periods of 1883, 1920 and 1924. Their function was to prevent dike breaches downstream, but the spillway in Ooijpolder could not prevent this in 1926. Water flowing through the spillway in the Waal dike and a breach in a dike in Erlecom (upstream of the spillway) led to the flooding of Ooijpolder on 2 January 1926 (Ververs & Klijn, 2004). The flood made two breaches in the Querdamm, the dike on the German border designed to prevent floodwater flowing into Germany from the Netherlands. Duffelt was protected from flooding because the breaches were repaired immediately.

Priest Smulders of Ooy-Persingen wrote about the flood in his diary: '4 January 1926: I did not read Mass this morning. At eleven o'clock our mayor arrived in a barge with rescued inhabitants at the iron stairs near the kitchen. More rescued people arrived later. At around three o'clock some 35 people were in the presbytery and in the evening ten more arrived. The cattle belonging to Frans Arts and Bart Kroes were rescued from the flooded stable and swam to the dike. I opened the doors of the church and offered shelter.' On 4 March 1926 he wrote: 'On the day before yesterday the water receded from the houses of the sexton and the cobbler; they will return in about five days. The day before yesterday a meeting was held with the residents of Erlecom polder. I participated in my role as priest and helped to solve the problem of dike repair. The result was that the polder proposed to contribute 5,000 guilders (about 2,300 euros) and not a cent more for reinforcing the dike from Nijmegen to Erlecom. The total costs will be 45,000 guilders, and for the Erlecom polder the costs were expected to be 50,000 guilders. Will the plan be realised?' (Bullinga & Offermans, 1993; van Eck, 2005).

After the flood it was decided to establish a common drainage regime for the German and Dutch border territory. This meant that Ooijpolder had to give up its right to inundate the polder. In 1933 a Dutch-German pumping station was built at the lowest place in Ooijpolder and Duffelt, near the city of Nijmegen. At the end of World War II the polder flooded once again. The Germans had blown up the Erlecom dike to inundate Ooijpolder and Duffelt. They did the same near Till, upstream of Kleve, in an

attempt to stop the Allies. Shortly after the war the Dutch-German pumping was recommissioned and since then the river water has been kept out of the polder. However, the threat of inundation did not disappear.

In the 1950s Ooijpolder was incorporated into the IJssel defence works, a Dutch defence system to withstand a probable invasion from the Eastern bloc, a consequence of the Cold War. A weir was built near Groenlanden and a 'sliding dike' (*schuifdijk*) was constructed in the Ooijsebandijk. In the case of an invasion, Ooijpolder would be inundated. The advent of the army helicopter that can transport army vehicles made the IJssel defence works redundant. In the course of the 1960s these were finally dismantled.

Plans for annexation, dike reinforcement and the Waal river bend cut-off

Besides the danger of flooding, Ooijpolder faced another threat: annexation by the neighbouring city of Nijmegen. At the beginning of the 20th century the city of Nijmegen planned to annex Ooijpolder, which was part of the municipality of Ubbergen. This proposal was presented in a letter to Gelderland provincial executive dated 3 January 1900. The city wanted to expand eastwards because 'the residents of Ubbergen live too far away from schools and churches in the municipality'. The municipality of Ubbergen reacted in a report dated 30 January 1900 that the residents' interests 'will be covered by the village council. For example, although the number of residents is limited, infrastructure for electricity will be laid on to the border of the city of Nijmegen. Besides, there are a few hundred hectares of open sites in neighbouring villages to the west of the city.' Nevertheless, in a law passed in 1914 the municipality of Ubbergen did lose part of its territory. It received financial compensation and a parcel of land of Ooijpolder from the city of Nijmegen in part exchange.

Once again, in the 1960s the city of Nijmegen targeted Ooijpolder for housing development. In the province's regional plan Ooijpolder was identified as a site for housing development on the edge of the city of Nijmegen. This prompted fierce protests by the residents of Ooijpolder, initiated by students who moved to Ooijpolder in the mid 1960s after completing their studies. The protest movement in the polder was widely supported by a mix of 'old' and 'new' residents. On 9 February 1970 the housing minister sent a letter to the city of Nijmegen in which he rejected Ooijpolder as a site for housing development, referring to its diversity of landscapes, including the push moraine and the specific characteristics of the river landscape, which were considered important to conserve.

Less than eight months later, the residents of Ooijpolder were startled by another threat. They received messages that Rijkswaterstaat had reserved 10 million guilders (4.5 million euros) for plans to excavate a river bend cut-off along an old branch of the Waal near Groenlanden, an important area of natural wetland habitat. The proposals were to create a channel that could accommodate multiple barge convoy sets since the Waal was the most important European transport waterway. On 20 November 1970 residents

organised a meeting attended by around a hundred people. They decided to write an angry letter to the House of Representatives emphasising the irreplaceable ecological and landscape value of the area. Despite the residents' objections the minister decided to approve the plan. The House of Representatives agreed, but insisted on a consultation round in the planning process. The residents, however, did not sit by and watch. With the help of the Environmental Management group at the University of Nijmegen they carried out an environmental impact assessment (EIA). Students focused on the political aspects and encouraged the residents to protest and established a residents' organisation called Groenlanden to organise joint action. However, expectations were not that high. Later, an action committee was formed and through a clever combination of public actions, formal protests and use of the media and public opinion they forced the minister to concede defeat on 26 April 1978.

Meanwhile, large-scale dike reinforcements were implemented, which could not be prevented by citizen protests, for example in Brakel, the place where the first protest actions were initiated (see also section 2.2). In the early 1970s the disastrous effects of the dike reinforcements became visible, which led to the establishment of the Becht Commission (*Commissie Rivierdijken* – Commission on the river dikes, generally referred to by the name of its chair, Cees Becht) in 1975 (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1995). Among the Commission's recommendations were proposals for ameliorating the impacts, for example through more sophisticated dike designs. For Ooijpolder this meant that the dikes had to be raised by about 70 centimetres. The residents were not enamoured of the dike reinforcements, but at that time they were too busy opposing the plan for the river bend cut-off and the expected large-scale excavation of the flood plains to react immediately to the announcement of the first plan for dike reinforcement in their polder. The dike reinforcement only became an issue among the residents in 1986, when they decided to establish a new association, *De Ooijse Dijken*, to promote communal and individual interests concerning the dike reinforcement. The residents proposed alternatives for the dike heightening that did not affect their houses. However, the responsible government authorities, the province and the polder district (later merged into a water board), did not take their interests on board as an EIA was not obligatory for works on stretches of dike less than 5 km long. Assisted by their mayor, the residents arranged to have an input to the planning process. The chair of the residents' association took part in meetings with the relevant organisations in the capacity of adviser to the mayor.

The residents' strategy was to focus on achieving small successes, for example new sites for housing development for the affected residents. Cooperation with other residents' associations with similar objectives made the association in Ooijpolder widely known. It also gave the organisation a reputation for expertise. As a consequence, the residents were taken more seriously, which was also reflected in an increase in the number of members of their association and their successes. The association gained approval for a plan for a 3.8 km section of the dike, including the preservation of five houses, local

reductions in the standard increase in height from 70 cm to about 30 cm and concessions on some individual wishes. Assisted by students and experts, it succeeded in developing an alternative for a 4 km stretch near Groenlanden, which also won its support from nature conservation organisations. The association's image therefore changed from a club of dike residents opposing the dike reinforcement to a broad societal movement operating in various parts of the river landscape. The residents made use of research results, for example a study by J. Bervaes, who questioned the dike reinforcement, arguing that flooding was mainly caused by ice dams rather than rising water levels in the river and that the current dike standards were needlessly high (Bervaes et al., 1990). This study and the support of the media and artists who blamed the government for harming the river landscape aroused the interest of politicians, who no longer turned a deaf ear to the local population. For the last stretch of the dike the association managed to get Rijkswaterstaat to agree to reduce the proposed heightening of the dike by 60 cm and conserve an old river branch. However, for some residents it was too late: their houses were already demolished.

High water experiences in the 1990s

The high water periods in 1993 and 1995 made residents living along the rivers more aware of the implications of the location of their houses, which were situated between high dikes. Apart from a very wet season in 1988, which caused a considerable rise in the water levels in the Rhine and Meuse, many residents did not have any experience of the effects of high water. After the high water period in 1993 the authorities in the province of Gelderland became fully aware of the risk of a dike breach. They drafted an emergency plan for the region, which was adopted in December 1994 (Diepenbrock, 1998). When the safety standard was exceeded in 1995, the authorities implemented their local emergency plans and ordered the evacuation of 200,000 residents in areas of potential flooding along the Rhine. For many residents the high water was a surprise. Although a high water event shortly after an earlier one was statistically not unlikely, they did not believe that flooding was a serious possibility (Rijksplanologische en Rijksmilieuhygiënische Commissie, 2003).

The general view was that there was not much difference between the high water of 1993 and 1995. A resident: 'I experienced the high water periods of 1993 and 1995. In 1993 everybody walked on the dikes while the water was coming up everywhere. In 1995 the water level was a bit higher and there was complete panic. Everybody, down to the last chicken, had to be evacuated. Across the border in Germany the people did not understand what the fuss was about. Their cattle had to be evacuated, but not the people.... Later you heard that people were backed up in a traffic jam to get out the polder and looking around desperately, saying "Oh God, where's the water coming from?" That surprised me, that people know so little about their landscape and where they are living.... My wife and daughter evacuated; I intended to stay but after a few days the army ordered me to leave. Next time I will stay anyhow.'⁴⁹⁹

On 30 January the evacuation of Ooijpolder started. It caused a lot of frustration among the polder residents. Within two days Ooijpolder was totally empty. Almost all the residents moved with all their belongings, including furniture, to relatives, friends or colleagues and waited. Farmers moved their livestock to colleagues in neighbouring safe areas. The dikes near Ochten and Bemmelen were on the verge of being breached, but this was prevented in time (Benning et al., 1995). There were also some weak dike sections in Ooijpolder (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1995).⁵⁰⁰ In fact, evacuation turned out not to be necessary in the end, but was solely based on the municipality of Nijmegen's emergency plan in which evacuation was deemed to be necessary when the water level reached 16.50 metres above Amsterdam Ordnance Datum (NAP) (van Meurs, 2003:27-48). The director of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office⁵⁰¹: 'I was ill, but participated in a meeting of the crisis team. They [the mayor of Nijmegen and the dike reeve of the polder district] said: "We have to evacuate, it is no longer safe". If you do not have the facts, you cannot say that a dike will be breached. I could not do anything but cooperate. The emotional element in this type of decision-making is very important.'⁵⁰² This version of events was refuted by the government decision-makers involved (Diepenbrock, 1998:59) and contradicted by reports of sightings of officials assessing whether the dike had to be breached to relieve the pressure.⁵⁰³ This was part of the state emergency strategy to prevent a disaster or minimise its effects.

Does a fighting spirit pay off?

Over the centuries the inhabitants of Ooijpolder had grown used to fighting against the authorities. Whereas in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries landlords were locked in a struggle with the higher authorities about water management, in the 20th century Ooijpolder was confronted with various government plans, from housing development in 1900 and the mid 1960s, the dike reinforcements of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s and the river bend cut-off in 1985 to the proposal for a calamity polder in 2000. Would the residents succeed once again in their opposition to a government plan?

Government perspective

In this section the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder is described from the government's point of view.

Calamity polders: a new idea?

The idea of calamity polders was not new. They had been used in the past to increase the storage capacity of the river during periods of high water and to prevent other polders from flooding (WL Delft Hydraulics, 1998). The idea of 'calamity polders' was picked up again by Frans Klijn, at that time affiliated with the Centre of Environmental Science at Leiden University. He started with the idea of spillways and green rivers in a book on environmental ideas for sustainable development. Later, he gave students an

assignment to study this Dutch version of temporarily controlled flooding, the outcome of which was published at the beginning of the 1990s.⁵⁰⁴ Calamity polders were also put forward as an option for water retention in the study 'Rhine in the Long Run' (*Rijn op Termijn*) (WL Delft Hydraulics, 1998).⁵⁰⁵ Some months later the concept, this time called 'controlled inundation', was included in the Fourth National Policy Document on Water Management (*Vierde Nota Waterhuishouding*). However, the studies 'Room for the Rhine Branches' (*Ruimte voor Rijntakken*) and 'Integrated Study of the Downstream Rivers' (*Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivierengebied*) presented during the Loevestein meeting in February 2000 did not include emergency water retention areas (*overloopgebieden voor nood*). However, the proposed locations in the state secretary's presentation were similar to those included in a draft background study for the latter report, but were intended for shallow inundation during high water (Klijn & van der Most, 2000).

Past experiences had proved that emergency water storage is an effective measure against flooding and experts consider controlled flooding to offer flexibility in the river system (Silva, 2001).⁵⁰⁶ The technical functioning of emergency water storage areas depends on their location and the capacity and on the velocity and manageability of the inflow of the water. The river water has to be diverted into these areas at the right moment and in the right manner. Based on a study of the 1926 flood, experts concluded that emergency water storage is a useful method as it has considerable effect in reducing the water level in the river, resulting in fewer dike breaches downstream (Ververs & Klijn, 2004).

According to an official, it was a brave move to propose emergency water storage. 'At that time the regional offices of Rijkswaterstaat were dominant and there was a culture of all working together. The director of the regional office responsible for Ooijpolder had a very good network in The Hague, so for ideas like emergency water storage you didn't have a leg to stand on in the organisation. You needed cheek to put it on the table.'⁵⁰⁷

Searching for support for water policy

Searching for support for its long-term water policy, the Government established a Commission on Water Management in the 21st Century (*Commissie Waterbeleid 21^e eeuw*), also referred to by the name of its chair, Frans Tielrooij. 'He was a former provincial delegate, a spatial planning man. It was more about communication and publicity than about substance.'⁵⁰⁸ The Commission, in which the state, the provinces, water boards and municipalities worked jointly on recommendations for desirable changes in water management, focusing on the consequences of climate change, sea level rise and land subsidence, began work in 1999. Studies on the maximum design discharge for the rivers in the Netherlands resulted in figures between 17,500 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine, depending on the height of the dike along the Rhine in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (Klijn & van der Most, 2000). Instead of the

traditional approach of draining the water, the Commission advocated a three step strategy (retaining, storing and draining) for all government plans to ensure flood safety and reduce water-related problems. The new approach also included more room for the river; in addition to implementing technical measures and allocating more land for water storage when necessary (Van Stokkom et al., 2005).

The calls for extra measures besides the dike reinforcement became more urgent. Experience indicated that the longer a disaster or near disaster did not occur, support for radical measures would wane. This had led to the dike reinforcement works falling behind schedule in the 1980s. Water managers were now in a hurry. The Room for River policy prohibited building in the flood plains without sustainable compensation measures (Kuil, 2000), but plans that were already in the pipeline could not be stopped (Roth et al., 2006a). It appeared advisable to designate in advance areas that would be eligible for emergency water storage in the event of extreme events. As the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment was just about produce a white paper with 'green' (nature), 'red' (construction) and 'blue' (water) spatial contours, it was decided to conditionally include emergency water storage.⁵⁰⁹ As a result, when the Room for the River White Paper was presented to the general public, it included a map with 'search areas' showing which areas were provisionally designated for emergency water storage (Warner et al., 2008a).

'On 28 February 2000 we presented our study Room for the Rhine Branches (*Ruimte voor Rijntakken*), which included measures to provide more discharge capacity for the rivers, and the state secretary launched her own plan emphasising measures inside the dikes, such as emergency water storage and dike relocations. That was a silly moment. Although we prepared our proposals in cooperation with all the regional partners, the region was surprised.'⁵¹⁰ Two policy developments were set in motion: (1) a change in spatial policy towards no longer relying on raising dikes even higher, but creating space by widening the winter bed of the rivers; and (2) an administrative change in which the national government was no longer willing to take the lead, but negotiate solutions as a partner with lower-tier government authorities. This shift to a 'horizontal' form of decision-making did not come easily to Rijkswaterstaat. Being used to a patronising but indulgent paternal role, Rijkswaterstaat found it difficult to adjust to assertive bargaining as first among equals⁵¹¹ (Warner et al., 2008).

The political story

The Room for Rhine Branches study could be considered as an inventory of possible options for the Room for the River measures, but it did not lead to concrete decisions. Direction was needed and state secretary Monique de Vries was keen to make a name for herself on the issue of flood safety,⁵¹² and not without reason. Since she had taken office the state secretary for water management had worried about her image. She was the first of her kind, as previously her job was a relatively minor part of the policy portfolio of the minister for transport, public works and water management. Polls

showed that only 2 per cent of the public knew who she was.⁵¹³ This low public profile and press attention translated into little bargaining power in the government and parliament. A government official: 'We disagreed with the state secretary's personal communication adviser. She thought that the state secretary had a low public profile and that she needed to generate more media attention. We preferred to take a lower profile approach, but we did give her a few options. In fact, the Loevestein session was organised with her in mind, to profile the state secretary.'⁵¹⁴ The state secretary decided to boost the image of her policy area considerably by widely publicising her department's plans (Warner et al., 2008). A government official: 'She was in the position to set out a new course. The state secretary was on good terms with the housing minister, so she had some room for political manoeuvre.'⁵¹⁵

The Loevestein meeting, the day after and beyond

The state secretary's presentation was broadcasted on prime time national television. Neither the liberal politician nor her advisers had expected fierce protests (Warner et al., 2008). The state secretary made a mistake, particularly by talking about emergency water storage instead of calamity polders.⁵¹⁶ A government official: 'The session at Loevestein castle was about principles and policies for the downstream part of the Rhine and Meuse and the upstream part of the Rhine. During the session afterwards, the state secretary focused on the maps, and some incorrect statements were broadcast on national television. As a result, we lost our grip on the situation and all hell broke loose.'⁵¹⁷ Lower-tier authorities in the region were not amused. They claimed they had not been involved in the latest policy decisions, although insiders were convinced that the direction the policy was taking was generally known.⁵¹⁸ Rather than worrying about the technical aspects of the proposed solutions they were afraid of the societal consequences (Roth et al., 2006a).

A provincial delegate: 'The discussion had been about the change in the design discharge for the Rhine from 15,000 to 16,000 m³/s. The idea to raise the dikes had been abandoned, so there were two options left: dike relocation and emergency water storage in relatively isolated areas. The responsible official said to me: "The state secretary had to be in the news". Then the maps were produced on which some areas were tentatively indicated. These were arbitrary areas; nobody seemed to take a close look. First, they called them 'likely areas', but later changed them into 'search areas'. It was really a civil engineering logic: technical measures with little societal support. It was a rather cavalier approach to launch such an idea in such a way. And then rather than saying that these were just options and that there were other options as well, the state secretary took a firm approach and defended it hotly. Later, stories emerged about enormous dikes around villages with some openings to get in and out. It was no surprise that there was fierce resistance.'⁵¹⁹ A Rijkswaterstaat official had similar experiences, but recognised the opportunities. 'The presentation in Loevestein castle with the map was awful! Nevertheless, it accelerated the awareness-raising process.'⁵²⁰

The premonitions were right. A turbulent period began, with considerable commotion among the stakeholders. Until then, government decision-makers and the residents had assumed that the area was safe, but the state secretary's emphasis on 'residual risk'⁵²¹ and her proposal for emergency water storage ('controlled flooding') to diminish this type of risk changed all that. The evacuation of 1995 was still fresh in their minds (Warner et al., 2008). Although the residents of Ooijpolder were upset about the state secretary's move and despite the national media coverage of their grievances, resistance by the residents and the government decision-makers soon dissipated (Roth et al., 2006a).

Meanwhile, the state secretary had achieved her objective: flood safety and water management had become a public issue and it boosted her public recognition to 4 per cent.⁵²² She still focused on the idea that 'controlled flooding is better than uncontrolled flooding'.⁵²³ In advance of his report, the chair of the Tielrooij Commission made it clear that a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine would be possible (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2000b), which strengthened the state secretary's belief that emergency water storage was a necessity. She was determined to explain the plan to the stakeholders. Her communication expert, Martine Leewis, is a great supporter of Social Learning and intended to stage a one-on-one dialogue between politicians and citizens. However, the envisaged interaction with polder residents was soon thwarted by senior policy advisers representing the mainstream ministerial culture that discourages too much communication between government ministers and the public, or indeed between ministers and public servants (Warner, 2008).

The interior ministry was not pleased with the state secretary's unexpected move. It did not oppose controlled flooding as a way of dealing with residual risk, but saw the issue rapidly becoming unfit for discussion. Its minister, Tineke Netelenbos, demanded an explanation in a cabinet meeting (Warner, 2008). As a result, the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (*Commissie noodoverloopgebieden*, also referred to by the name of its chair, David Luteijn) was instated on 27 April 2001.⁵²⁴

On the institutionalisation track

The reason for establishing a commission was 'to put the idea of emergency water storage on the track of institutionalisation'.⁵²⁵ It was established for the political purpose of gaining support for the idea of emergency water storage.⁵²⁶ The chair was required to write a report within a short time. 'The assignment was not well prepared but the director-general wanted to continue, the Commission was independent, and the state secretary had to decide later. Luteijn looked for support in the region, although this was not part of his assignment.'⁵²⁷

Interviews with Commission members and advisers revealed that the chair treated the 18,000 m³/s design discharge and the need to do something as a given. He did not find the lack of a public debate and consideration of alternatives to be strange. To impress the urgency of the task at hand on his fellow commissioners, Luteijn had a video

animation prepared depicting a disastrous flood event. This video drove home to key members that something needed to be done: 'If you do nothing, you will have to evacuate half a million people'. The chair's move for closure led to a clash between 'converts' and 'doubters' (Warner, 2008). Research into uncertainties concerning dikes conducted since 1995 had shown that many more failure factors than overtopping dikes, such as piping, play a role in flooding (Klijn & van der Most, 2000; Stijnen, 2007). Doubters sought to put their views on issues of uncertainty to the Commission. A Rijkswaterstaat official recalled a furious row between those who accepted a degree of uncertainty and those who did not.⁵²⁸ Others, like a provincial delegate and a mayor, also complained.⁵²⁹ However, this debate threatened to be time-consuming and the chair felt he had no time for an extensive debate about rationales and information uncertainties (Warner, 2008). When the ruling government fell prematurely in early 2002, the Commission chose not to engage in discussions about the quantitative assumptions underlying design discharge, uncertainty and causes of failure (Roth & Warner, 2007) and decided to speed up the work in order to present its report in time to set the agenda for the new coalition government (Roth et al., 2006a).

As Ooijpolder became an indicative site for emergency water storage, the Commission first considered Ooijpolder and Duffelt for designating controlled flooding, which included an area in German. However, inundating German territory (Duffelt) would have international consequences and raise a foreign policy issue that would cause great political problems. Rijkswaterstaat could not or would not take measures that had transboundary effects. Nevertheless, it would not be easy to isolate German territory from the impacts of controlled flooding in Dutch territory: dikes with a height of 8 to 9 metres would be required to stop the water from crossing the border.⁵³⁰ In order to explain the policy and allay German fears, officials regularly visited municipalities across the border in Germany rather than talking to their Dutch counterparts in Ooijpolder.⁵³¹ The amount of water retained determines the amount of space needed to deal with high flood scenarios. By concentrating on the Dutch polder, the Commission lost a sizeable chunk of its inundation capacity (Warner, 2008). The three areas finally selected (Ooijpolder, Rijnstrangen and Beerse Overlaat, see Figure 6.1) could not accommodate the amount of storage originally intended (de Boer, 2003a).

The chair of the Commission overestimated the support for the proposed measure. In his perception it was a matter of taking firm decisions and formalising procedures. During the drafting of his report he held three consultative rounds of meetings with local government and civil society organisations, which resulted in negative reactions from municipalities.⁵³² But it did not change his objective. The form of participation was of a decidedly 'controlled' nature. The Commission actively avoided open dialogue with the local population likely to be affected (Roth & Warner, 2007). The chair simply judged safety to be too important to bring citizen stakeholders into the discussion,⁵³³ so the Commission searched for 'support' among a narrowly defined group of actors and civil society organisations (Roth et al., 2006a).

Communicating flood risk

In its report the Commission advised reserving land for three 'calamity polders' in Ooijpolder, Rijnstrangen and Beerse Overlaat because they are situated in the upstream stretch of the rivers, which would limit the number of measures needed in the rest of the country. Furthermore, the rationale was that the designated areas were quite thinly populated and contained fewer sites (such as chemical factories) that would pose a health risk during flooding. The Commission used the metaphor of an airbag in a car to explain the functionality of calamity polders (Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden, 2002). In order to safeguard the residents in Ooijpolder, the main villages would be surrounded by a dike.⁵³⁴ The Commission's report placed less emphasis on compensation for damages: 'the usual damage compensation procedure is adequate'.⁵³⁵

The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen decided on a rigorous approach (Roth et al., 2006a) and agreed with the Commission's advice. However, the officials directly involved took a different point of view. 'We preferred the option of further research while reserving land for emergency water storage for the time being. The Luteijn Commission came up with the idea of surrounding the villages in the areas with a dike and the construction of a special inlet, but this made the measure no longer financially attractive. We had our reservations, such as why the design could not be simpler. Actually, we did not bother about outcome as long as there was a political discussion and a political statement'.⁵³⁶

Demand for contra-expertise

It became clear that an exclusive focus on norms and peak discharges simplified complex processes characterised by uncertainty. The debate on emergency water storage was actually a confrontation between different views about flood protection, focused mainly on the degree to which uncertainty and failure factors could be included in analyses and decision-making (Roth & Warner, 2007). The region authorities also became involved in the debate and presented a contra-expertise (second opinion) study by WL Delft Hydraulics,⁵³⁷ commissioned by the Association of Provincial Authorities (*Interprovinciaal Overleg*, IPO) and carried out in close cooperation with some Chambers of Commerce, social partners of Gelderland provincial government, polder districts, the farmers' organisation GLTO and others (Rijksplanologische en Rijksmilieuhygiënische Commissie, 2003). The aim of the study was to map the consequences of the probable implementation of the plans (Klijn & van der Most, 2000). The authoritative civil engineering and hydraulic consultancy that was mainly responsible for the idea of reviving the historic Dutch practice of inundating calamity polders (Warner et al., 2008) did not consider the concept itself to be problematic, but did not support the application of the principle in the three selected calamity polders (Roth et al., 2006a). In 2002 Gelderland provincial government initiated a Dutch-German study into the possible discharge of the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands, which resulted in a discharge of between 12,000 and 15,000 m³/s for the Rhine river, but at these levels the German dikes would be topped and the excess water would not reach

the Netherlands. The maximum expected discharge was 15,500 m³/s and in a worst case scenario 16,500 m³/s (Nederlandse-Duitse werkgroep Hoogwater, 2004). The provincial government therefore declared the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s to be an exaggeration. Another technical research report was commissioned by eight Dutch and two German municipalities. It pointed to the same weaknesses in the calamity plans as earlier reports.⁵³⁸ Additional comments included the need for a mix of 'structural' and 'non-structural' measures instead of concentrating on emergency water storage and retention areas. These and other reports raised growing doubts about calamity polders (Roth & Warner, 2007).

Opposing voices from within

There were calls from within Rijkswaterstaat for the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (*Technische Adviescommissie voor de Waterkeringen*, TAW), which consisted of Rijkswaterstaat officials, consultants and scientists, to study the report of the Luteijn Commission. Formulating their main conclusions diplomatically, the members of the TAW mainly endorsed the principle of emergency water storage, but were critical of content of the report of the Luteijn Commission.⁵³⁹ They recommended first improving weak sections of the dikes sections, questioned the usefulness of the measure and fiercely criticised the cost-benefit analysis of the 200 million cubic metres of water that was neither covered by the measures nor included as a loss-making item in the budget. This omission occurred because the calculations used by the Commission were made prior to its decision to reduce the storage capacity from 400 to 200 cubic metres (de Boer, 2003b). Another standpoint was based on the 'Expansion Force' study (*Spankrachtstudie*) carried out by experts of a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat, which focused on the needed and available space for the river in the long term. This report came to similar findings as the contra-expertise commissioned by Gelderland provincial government. It confirmed a possible future design discharge of about 18,000 m³/s, but instead of emergency water storage, the researchers proposed retention areas. Whereas emergency water storage or 'controlled flooding' is meant to reduce the effects of a calamity elsewhere, a retention area aims to prevent flooding. The government officials were not sure which report the Government would endorse.⁵⁴⁰

How to get support from the region?

After two years of negotiation, the national government and the provinces, municipalities and water boards signed a National Administrative Agreement on Water (*Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water*) on 2 July 2002. The agreement outlined the water management policies for the coming years and the parties involved committed to bring national and regional water systems up to standard by 2015. This meant that they had to take sufficient measures to withstand the consequences of climate change, such as increased precipitation, long periods of drought and sea level rise, and other trends, such as urbanisation and soil compaction. A key aim of the agreement was to improve coordination and consistency between the national, regional and local approaches to water management.⁵⁴¹ However, this proved to be not so easy in the light of the

discussion about emergency water storage in which the national government and the region seemed diametrically opposed to one another. In this question, the region received support from MPs belonging to the Social Democrats (*PvdA*) and Christian Democrats (*CDA*).⁵⁴² At the end of 2002 the state secretary postponed decision-making and asked the region for alternatives, while stressing her preference for emergency water storage.⁵⁴³ In response, the provincial government came up with an alternative plan, including nine dike relocations, excavation of flood plains and the removal of groynes and embankments.⁵⁴⁴ Later that year it presented another plan with five proposals for lowering the water level, including dike relocations and bypasses.⁵⁴⁵ The Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (*Knooppunt Arnhem Nijmegen*, *KAN*) refused to cooperate and presented a High Water Memorandum. Like Gelderland provincial government, *KAN* rejected the designation of Ooijpolder for emergency water storage. Instead, it proposed a set of small emergency water storage areas from five to fifty hectares in size that would offer the best protection against extreme river discharges. Dike relocations and the construction of bypasses in the river would also be needed.⁵⁴⁶ The provincial delegate was bitterly disappointed: 'It is truly sad'.⁵⁴⁷ The ranks were finally closed with the preparation of the Regional Advice (*Regioadvies*), on which lower-tier authorities and civil society organisations cooperated. Based on earlier proposals from provincial delegates Johan de Bondt and his successor Harry Keereweer,⁵⁴⁸ the provincial government initiated a broadly supported alternative for controlled flooding,⁵⁴⁹ which was presented on 14 March 2005, just in time for the Government's decision on the package of Room for the River measures a month later.

Towards decision-making

In the meantime, the proposed 'calamity polders' were incorporated into various policy documents. Based on the Luteijn Commission's report, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (*Centraal Plan Bureau*) study of the cost-effectiveness of emergency water storage and an additional study in which emergency measures were considered necessary (Dijkman et al., 2003), the state secretary resolved to designate three emergency water storage areas in December 2003, which culminated in the national Disaster Management Strategy for Flooding along the Rhine and Meuse (*Rampenbeheersingsstrategie overstromingen Rijn en Maas*).⁵⁵⁰ In addition, she began preparing a special law on the administrative competences and procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency. In the Fifth National Policy Document on Spatial Planning (*Vijfde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening*), published in May 2004, the Government reserved land for emergency water storage (Ververs & Klijn, 2004). In November 2004, during the maternity leave of the state secretary, a political deal saw the two largest parliamentary parties (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) acting in tandem to move the money reserved for controlled flooding to supplement the budget for the Room for the River programme (Warner, 2008; Warner et al., 2008). An MP who was previously a member of Noord-Brabant provincial executive: '[State secretary] Schultz phoned me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency water storage was not needed for the time being. Then I knew that there was some room. For me it was a

signal that if it is not necessary, we don't have to do it'.⁵⁵¹ On 24 March 2005 the state secretary decided on the final package of measures to reduce the risk of flooding, which did not contain reservations of land for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder and Rijnstrangen.⁵⁵² In mid April 2005 the Government adopted the plan, conceding defeat on the plan for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder and Rijnstrangen. The third location, Beersche Overlaat, remained as a potential emergency water storage area if the Room for the River programme could not meet the required safety standard in 2015.⁵⁵³

Reasoning for abandoning the plan for emergency water storage

Why was the national government's plan for emergency water storage not successful? There are four reasons.

First, the government plan was launched for political reasons and was not internally coordinated, which meant that officials at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office as well as experts from a specialised department felt sidelined.

Second, the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas had a limited remit,⁵⁵⁴ which focused on the relevance of and need for calamity polders as well as giving advice on criteria for area selection, the consequences of selection, land reservation, decision-making on actual use and compensation. Furthermore, the Commission consisted of people with various political affiliations and social and professional backgrounds. However, water professionals who could speak with authority on flood protection were largely absent, so that the Commission was dependent on support and advice from the ministry. From its inception the Commission stressed the need to generate public support for calamity polders, and to bridge the gap between the 'rational logic' of controlled flooding and the weight of emotion among inhabitants and companies in the region following the actual designation of areas. This reveals the basic attitude of social actors to knowledge on this issue. While knowledge and 'rational logic' were ascribed to the expert world in favour of calamity polders, critics were supposed to be primarily guided by 'emotion'. Although formally neutral, in its communication the Commission gave the impression that it was primarily seeking to legitimise a decision that had already been taken. Apart from the fact that the Commission actively avoided open dialogue with the population likely to be affected, it chose not to engage in discussions about the assumptions underlying design river discharge, uncertainty and causes of dike failure. To avoid further debates, the possibility of an 18,000 m³/s safety standard was taken as a starting point. Knowledge and insights that were critical of this simplification made for the sake of smooth policy-making were marginalised in the decision-making process (Roth et al., 2006a).

Third, the result of this top-down approach was the absence of public support for emergency water storage, and an unwillingness to draw on citizen knowledge and

perspectives on flood safety (Warner et al., 2008). The outcomes of internal reports in which the costs and benefits (including the planned dikes around villages) and failure factors (e.g. the dimension of the areas) were studied, several contra-expertises commissioned by lower-tier authorities and fierce protest actions by residents of Ooijpolder prompted a public debate about the Commission's assumptions.

Fourth, the residents managed to persuade MPs to back their opposition to the plans on the basis of technical and economic arguments. While the state secretary was on maternity leave a House majority was against the plan and adopted a motion to assign the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to Room for the River measures (Warner et al., 2008). As a result, the state secretary did not lose face when she was forced to abandon the plan for emergency water storage.

Negotiating water safety

Two developments in the underlying approaches to flood safety took place during the planning for emergency water storage: first, a shift from flood probability (the chance of exceeding the water levels at dike sections) to a flood-risk approach (risk defined as probability times impact); second, the lifting of the absolute guarantee of flood safety (Dicke & Roovers, 2007).

Regarding the first development, while the government changed the design discharge for the Rhine from 15,000 m³/s to 16,000 m³/s as part of the flood probability approach in the Flood Defence Act 2001, the discussion among experts focused on the development of a flood risk approach (Roth & Warner, 2007). Rijkswaterstaat's Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (TAW) had already proposed a change of focus from the probability of flooding to flood risk in dike rings, including consideration of the likely damage as well as the probability of a flood (Klijn & van der Most, 2000). This was supported by the report 'Dutch dikes and risk hikes' (*Risico's in bedijkte termen*) that focused on the risks of flooding in the Netherlands (RIVM, 2004). The report concluded that the present spatial distribution of economic interests in 'dike rings' is no longer in accordance with the spatial variation of these economic security standards. Due to the rise in sea level, climate change and further economic and social development, a further increase in flood risks is expected. Technical solutions no longer form the sole answer to this increase. The focus had been on reducing the chances of dike breaches by technical means, such as emergency water storage, whereas efficient solutions, including strategies such as avoiding flood-prone areas and the construction of compartment dams to split up large flood-prone areas into smaller ones, had been overlooked. The results of the Flood Risks and Safety in the Netherlands project (*Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart, VNK*), which examined the flood risk of dike rings, confirmed that existing dike standards did not comply with the law. A flood risk of once in 10 years to once in 100 years was not uncommon.⁵⁵⁵ From the political point of view, however, this proved to be a sensitive question and a decision on how to deal with flood risk other than to carry out further research⁵⁵⁶ has not yet been made.

As to the second development, a shift can be seen from trusting the legal standards for flood safety towards a situation in which negotiation and harmonisation of policies and measures play an important role. The parties involved moved from a situation in which they followed fixed rules and legislation accompanied by clear criteria towards a situation in which they negotiate and coordinate measures and the necessary 'exchange' (compensation) in order to arrive at a lowering of the water level. Whereas in the past flood safety was conditional, it now seems to have become more of a public interest in the way that the economy, the environment and quality of life are. This meant that Rijkswaterstaat is more of an adviser in a preparatory stage of planning than an enforcer of the law in the sense of assessing proposals for measures against the rules and regulations (Dicke & Roovers, 2007). However, practice shows (see also Chapters 5 and 7) that Rijkswaterstaat still employs the latter role.

The arguments

The state secretary for water management

The main reason why state secretary Monique de Vries opted for emergency water storage was that controlled flooding is cheaper than uncontrolled flooding. The lesson she learned from the high water event in 1995 was: 'Absolute safety is impossible'.⁵⁵⁷ She emphasised that the Dutch measures are not isolated and that attempts were also being made to get more control over the Rhine at the international level. In February 2000 a huge dike relocation operation began in Nordrhein-Westfalen in Germany, which will give back 4,700 hectares to the river, resulting in a lowering of the water level by about 10 cm. The Dutch government contributed 10 million euros from its European funds for water management to this German programme.⁵⁵⁸

It was no accident that David Luteijn was appointed chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas. The state secretary knew him from the board of the liberal party (VVD). Luteijn: 'That played an important role. I am involved in many important networks and have many contacts with various political parties'.⁵⁵⁹ The chair was a charismatic heavyweight and a more senior member of the party than the state secretary. He knew that the state secretary was in a difficult position and it was his job to find a way to dissipate the commotion following the Loevestein meeting (Warner et al., 2008). He had to protect the state secretary and was a father figure to her. When he was absent she always felt under pressure and felt a need to say something.⁵⁶⁰ Luteijn: 'The task was to produce an advisory report that could be implemented and would not end up in the bottom drawer. In other words, the question was how to improve flood safety, especially through the implementation of structural measures, but acceptable to all interested parties. This question strongly influenced the Commission's method of proposing a structural approach to flood safety while ensuring political support for our recommendations. We decided to identify 'search areas' for the most likely candidates. There was broad support for the basic idea of emergency

water storage areas and the design of such areas. Regarding damages, we encountered considerable distrust among politicians and civil society organisations, and they were opposed to the limitations on development in these areas. The process was very opportunistic, which is not desirable, but an inevitable part of the process.’

Luteijn had a clear agreement with the state secretary about the way the outcomes would be presented. ‘At Loevestein castle the state secretary caused a lot of unrest because of the clumsy way she presented the issue. My task was to get broad public support. The political responsible person could present the outcomes only with my permission.’⁵⁶¹ In Luteijn’s opinion, the three principles of retention, storage and drainage applied primarily to the short term and provisions for emergency water storage should be included to cope with exceptional situations.

The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen wanted to have options. She chose far-reaching options also proposed by the Luteijn Commission and accepted the whole procedure for setting land aside for emergency water storage.⁵⁶²

Rijkswaterstaat head office and Directorate-General for Water Affairs⁵⁶³

The director of water management at Rijkswaterstaat head office: ‘In 1990 we had a storm, in 1994 extreme rainfall which caused flooding in some places in the province of Noord-Holland, in 1993 and 1995 high water periods and in 1998 a very rainy season in the summer. So it was an excellent decade to make policy under the motto “no disaster, no policy”. We held a brainstorming session and a colleague came up with the idea of establishing a commission. We had already had the Boertien I and II Commissions and later the Tielrooy Commission [Commission on Water Management in the 21st Century], so we were used to this approach.’

The report of the Luteijn Commission put emergency water storage back on the agenda. The water management director: ‘I would never have done it. It is based on the wrong premise. Who will manage these areas? They are meant for a once in a 1,250 year flood, let say once in a 1000 year flood, which takes us back to the time of Charlemagne. Such inlet areas will become historic monuments. You have to take a firm approach to the Room for the River programme to prevent the use of emergency water storage. But the state secretary put emergency water storage on top of the agenda! From my point of view, emergency water storage is a measure of last resort. There is a good chance that such a measure would be used either too early or too late. We do not know how the river will behave when a discharge peak of 15,000 m³/s enters the Netherlands. It would already have caused flooding in Germany at 14,500 m³/s. Now they have a plan to create a peak discharge capacity of 17,000 m³/s in 2020. The idea of emergency water storage was put forward by a colleague. He was not averse to bringing something up, seeing what happens and then making policy. But it led to so much resistance, for example in Ooijpolder. In 20 years time they will still remember the plan for emergency water storage. If you want to make plans for that area in future, no one will trust the

government. People could not understand why we were talking about measures for water discharges above the 16,000 m³/s safety standard. They do not even believe in such a peak discharge. I myself do not feel comfortable with emergency water storage. There are so many risks. You should not add extra risks like emergency water storage. First, you should solve the problem with measures in the river system itself, and only in specific cases, for example a calamity, you can make a breach in a dike and revert to emergency water storage.⁵⁶⁴ In other words, if a once in 1,250 years flood occurs, let the land be flooded.⁵⁶⁵

Obviously, the official⁵⁶⁶ who came up with the idea of emergency water storage was in favour of the measure. 'The plan for emergency water storage is a political question: you are for or against it. But this is difficult. While experts look at the economic optimum, politicians focus on the political optimum. The principle of emergency water storage appeals to me. Basically, I am in favour of it. We should study it (what is it about from a technical point of view; does it work?) and assess what it delivers. The most difficult question is a political and administrative one: if Florence V had made such a decision, would we now execute it in the event of an emergency? Perhaps it should be reconfirmed at regular intervals.' He did not agree with the opinion of the Rijkswaterstaat experts who stated that Luteijn used outdated information and knowledge about the measure. 'The question of the usefulness and necessity of emergency water storage is always relevant. But Luteijn ignored some other aspects, for example the area of land for emergency water storage area was too small. An important factor is the distribution of the discharge capacity between the different river branches during high water periods. The sums do not add up. Furthermore, he refrained from giving suggestions on when emergency water storage areas should be used. Another point is the transboundary effects, but that is not my business. Finally, while the Luteijn Commission focused on flood probability, it neglected the change from a probability-based to a risk-based approach⁵⁶⁷ which considers not only frequency of dike failure but also impact (damage incurred).'⁵⁶⁸

The secretary of the Commission, a Rijkswaterstaat official, also took a critical view of its work, but from another perspective. He was of the opinion that the critical note was lacking. 'Critical discussions about the content were rare. The question of whether it would be necessary was put aside too easily. Some members were strongly in favour of emergency water storage, although the chair was not a priori in favour. One member took the initiative and said "I do not want us to wittingly take no measures, while we could have done something, only for a situation to arise that results in many victims", and convinced two other members, including the chair. Another member was of the generation that considered the dikes to be safe. Next time I would do it differently. The remit should have been broader, covering not only emergency water storage but also the Room for the River programme. Moreover, the structure of the final report, in which the rational arguments of experts were contrasted with the emotions of the public was dubious, because it appeared that we were justifying a decision that had almost already

been taken. It reflected something of the 'old' Rijkswaterstaat. We had not entirely negated the argument that Germany would have more room for spatial measures like emergency water storage. The Germany effect became known later. The Commission did not want to include technical statements in the report about things we did not know. And we could not list all failure mechanisms. After the publication of the report, the discussion with government decision-makers and politicians proved to be difficult, but the discussion with residents was even more difficult. Finally, the government decision-makers were nervous. The plan for emergency water storage would cost a lot of money and there was a lot of social unrest.⁵⁶⁹

Discussions about risks were restricted entirely to experts and policy-makers. That was not without reason. Raising the issue of risk, especially in the Dutch water sector, is difficult because it is considered to be a politically sensitive question. According to a Rijkswaterstaat expert this closed attitude was motivated by the argument that they were working for the politicians in The Hague.⁵⁷⁰ A government official explained the background to this attitude: 'When the Delta Works in Zeeland, which were built after the 1953 flood, were completed, we proclaimed that the Netherlands was finally protected against flooding. That was at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. It proved to be the worst thing you could do, because we cannot guarantee safety. We suffered from that statement. We did not foresee this and it became a difficult issue. The Cleveringa lecture by state secretary Schultz van Haegen in 2003, in which she emphasised that 100% security does not exist, opened up the question to debate.'⁵⁷¹ Later, Rijkswaterstaat officials noted that Rijkswaterstaat declared that 'we have been safer than ever before, but not as safe as we think.'⁵⁷² This formulation took a lot of time and discussion within the organisation, as evidenced by the officials' statement that 'before one arrives at such a formulation'⁵⁷³

Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office

The director of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office strongly believed that a flood is inevitable at some time in the future. 'Today, society expects that everything can be managed. I believe that government policies can never guarantee absolute safety. I was hesitant about the plan for emergency water storage. First, I hesitated because of the content. I do not believe that if a flood occurs, for example after 600 years, people will think of what has been agreed centuries before. In addition, I am not happy with the numbers of residents and the housing development in those areas. Second, technically it is hard to realise. The complexity of the river system makes it difficult to determine exactly when the emergency water storage arrangements should be put into effect. But I am in favour of making reservations for water retention⁴⁷⁴ to stop housing development and the growth in the number of residents in these areas. Third, political will is important: what type of flood safety do we want? That is a political choice. The current flood standard is the once in 1,250 year flood along the rivers. The problem is that people today do not know how to deal with insecurity. In addition, we have to deal with our neighbours. The minister for water management of

the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen protested against the plan for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder. If the polder were used Germany could be flooded [by water flowing back through the Querdamm on the border]. This would be prevented if the dike on the border was raised.⁵⁷⁵

However, just before the Loevestein meeting⁵⁷⁶ in 2000 during the 2nd International High Water Conference in Rees he was strongly in favour of emergency water storage. 'Within ten or fifteen years we do need a few retention areas or calamity polders. If it is going to be tight, the water can be stored temporarily in lightly populated areas in order to keep the rest of the country dry.' He did not disguise the possible locations of these areas. 'A retention area nearby the river Waal and the German border would be most effective. Rijnstrangen and Ooijpolder seem to be the best options, although in Ooijpolder the villages need to be surrounded by dikes. A similar operation in Nordrhein-Westfalen demonstrated that there would be emotional and fierce protests. Of the eleven indicated retention areas, only three are in the implementation phase. There are fierce protests in almost every location' (Kuil, 2000).

A government official who was involved in the Commission's work explained why the Dutch did not launch an international discussion about the expected discharges of the Rhine. 'The idea was to raise it for discussion in the Rhine Commission, but this was not done for pragmatic reasons. An international discussion would take ten years or more and at the end you would still do not know anything, and it would make it impossible to meet the deadline of 15 May 2002 [the Commission's deadline for publication of its report]. With regard to the content: whatever the figures, the airbag concept will remain necessary. Apart from international cooperation, you need to take measures and not factor in what may happen in neighbouring countries.' She explained that in the beginning she was moderately in favour of emergency water storage, especially the technical aspects. 'The discussion about emergency water storage functioned well as far as an exchange of ideas about water and risk was concerned. The Commission members had an important point, but the question became increasingly sensitive.'⁵⁷⁷ Besides, the question of hierarchy in Germany and the political issue played a role. There is no formal contact person for Rijkswaterstaat in Germany. Barbara Höhn from the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen was in charge of water policy, but she was responsible for only the stretch of the Rhine in her state, and Berlin is too far away. Although state secretary De Vries got along with her very well, apart from the Dutch-German study and the regular High Water conferences there were no other direct contacts. 'The plan for emergency water storage affected the political image of Barbara Höhn. Germany has no flood defence legislation, so politicians have to find support for their plans to reduce flood risk. State secretary Monique de Vries set great store by a good relationship with Höhn and said "keep off Germany"....During the Commissions' work I regularly visited German municipalities with the mayor of the municipality of Nijmegen and we found the atmosphere to be tense, and felt that the officials were thinking "tell us what you really want".'⁵⁷⁸

The director of water management at Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office had sympathy for the plan for emergency water storage. The director: 'I was all for Ooijpolder as an emergency water storage area. Not for using it, but to plan for it in consultation with the residents. Look, a 18,000 m³/s design discharge, but also a lower design discharge, will lead to flooding in Ooijpolder from Germany. The polder is an emergency water storage area, whether the residents like it or not, but not controlled. Another issue in the discussion is the unreliability of the government. There were officials who said: "You have to create retention areas in those locations". I was dead set against retention areas. The risk with retention areas is that the government will not want to wait to use them, that they will be used frequently, even more often than necessary. That is the risk. Using emergency water storage areas increases safety levels elsewhere. I said, "Let's first see what happens with, say, a design discharge of 16,000 m³/s, but be prepared to use them if needed". My view was: no expensive measures, invest in ways of getting the water out of the polder, and instead of the inlet, arrange for machines, for example an excavator, make land reservations and buy the residents out, reconstruct their houses and provide damage compensation. I found that you have to arrange this through financial mechanisms, for example by exempting owners from property tax, but the mayors asked how they were going to get their money back; and then you get the nonsense stories that areas will be "locked up".'⁵⁷⁹ Another government official: 'The charm of emergency water storage is that you take a measure in one location. That was not a bad idea. [The Directorate-General for Water Affairs] was right to come up with the idea of emergency water storage; in about 20 years time the opportunity will be lost.'⁵⁸⁰

Concerning the relationship between the national government and the region, the director of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office knew perfectly what the political and administrative impact of his function was. 'In my position as director of a regional office you stand with one foot in The Hague and another in the region. You are the eyes and ears of the state secretary. I knew many mayors and three or four times a week I had dinner with them. I sent all the local information on a little piece of paper to the state secretary. The director can therefore be considered as the representative of the state secretary in the region. Sometimes the ministry in The Hague developed proposals without consulting with the region, for example the plan for emergency water storage. That is why I am not surprised about the tumultuous political and public reactions [after the Loevestein meeting].'⁵⁸¹

Although the director talked regularly with government decision-makers in the region, a dialogue with residents was not common. Nevertheless, he was pleased to meet them, such as Professor van Ellen who was involved in residents' organisation Hoogwater Platform in Ooijpolder: 'Let them come and discuss things openly. Van Ellen knows what we are talking about. It is Rijkswaterstaat's business to underpin the arguments. Van Ellen once said to our river expert: "You know more about the river than I do"; a sporting gesture.'⁵⁸² This opinion was not widespread among Rijkswaterstaat officials;

it mainly depended on the individual. External contacts outside the professional circuit were not encouraged and experts were not easily accessible, with the exception of insiders like Professor van Ellen, who contacted them unhesitatingly.⁵⁸³

Province of Gelderland

On the question of emergency water storage the province of Gelderland assumed an active attitude towards the national government. Soon after the state secretary's presentation provincial delegate Johan de Bondt criticised the plan for calamity polders. He was not convinced the measure was needed to accommodate higher water levels in future and was sensitive to the anger of the residents. 'Storing and retaining excess water in Germany is preferable to rapid drainage in the Netherlands. The aim of emergency water storage is to remove the residual risks associated with a Rhine discharge of more than 18,000 m³/s where it enters the Netherlands. From Germany we know that such a discharge will probably never reach our country. Various emergency scenarios have shown that most of the dikes upstream will have been breached and most of the lower part of Germany (roughly the area from Cologne/Düsseldorf to the Dutch border) will have flooded. The water will flow naturally via northern Limburg in the direction of the Meuse and via the Liemers into the IJssel and not between the river dikes. The question was whether it would be useful to make arrangements for emergency water storage or to invest in transboundary crisis management and emergency plans. The provincial government has been committed to paying for measures in Germany and it has been demonstrated that a Dutch euro invested in Germany is more effective than measures in the Netherlands. In cooperation with the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen the province is looking for possibilities to realise a large retention area of about 2,000 hectares, which would reduce the water level in Germany as well in Gelderland.'⁵⁸⁴

The province was not afraid to pursue a different policy to the national government. Besides the commissioning of contra-expertise,⁵⁸⁵ it initiated a Dutch-German study, in which Rijkswaterstaat also became involved, and various plans to convince the state secretary to abandon the plan for calamity polders. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt defended one of his plans in the provincial executive.⁵⁸⁶ The chair of the residents' organisation Hoogwaterplatform in Ooijpolder was present: 'The delegate was looking for some support and I had some time that day. I went to the province and asked for an opportunity to speak. I recommended his plan warmly.'⁵⁸⁷ His successor Harry Keereweer followed the same path in August 2003, although his first reaction to emergency water storage was positive.⁵⁸⁸ As other authorities were critical about the position taken by the province of Gelderland,⁵⁸⁹ the delegate organised a joint initiative, the Regional Advice (*Regioadvies*), which was prepared in close cooperation with other lower-tier authorities. He emphasised the need to work closely with Germany. 'If further measures are taken to store the water in Germany, a smaller area will be needed for temporary water storage in the Netherlands.'⁵⁹⁰

A water expert at the provincial government considered emergency water storage to be

unreliable. 'If you let water into these areas too early, it will go wrong.'⁵⁹¹...It is very precise work. If you flood an area too soon, it loses its function; it will be full of water before the flood wave arrives. And if you are just too late, the water will overtop the dikes. Moreover, there is no model available to test, so you cannot demonstrate that it will work. Therefore, it is a risky method.'⁵⁹²...Our river system has been tailored to accommodate a design discharge of 15,000 m³/s and because of climate change this will rise towards 16,000 m³/s in the Rhine. The Room for the River policy was developed to deal with higher river discharges – the middle scenario. But the state secretary wanted to make arrangements to cover the possibility of even higher discharges. In 1997 we began to study the river system in the province of Gelderland and the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. When we heard of the plans to accommodate a river discharge of 18,000 m³/s we did not believe the Rhine could discharge this amount of water. We knew that Germany would not be prepared for such a high river discharge and that flood water would flow from Kreis Kleef (district of Kleve) to Ooijpolder. It was a very unpleasant discussion with the national government, also with the Luteijn Commission. We found that Luteijn was convinced that the national government's proposal was a good plan. But it was not. The peak needs to be cut off in Germany, otherwise the dikes will be overtopped because the proposed emergency water storage capacity would be too small to accommodate such a flood wave. This meant that the plan for emergency water storage proved to be a measure for a problem that did not exist. You need to communicate better with the region and ask whether there is a problem and if so, how it can be solved. In cooperation with the region we developed mitigating measures. As a province we would like to have a robust water system without arrangements for emergency water storage, which would create new risks rather than reducing the current flood risk. If we need to accommodate a river discharge of 17,000 m³/s, then we have to make room for 17,000 m³/s. We chose to reserve more room than needed from a hydrological point of view. As a result of the energy we put in this relationship the national government is now grateful for what we did.'⁵⁹³

Municipalities

The plan for emergency water storage caused great indignation among the municipalities concerned. The first reactions came the day after the Loevestein meeting. The mayor of the municipality of Bommelerwaard, M. Peereboom, was surprised that his municipality was indicated as a 'search area' for emergency water storage. The mayor of Gorinchem, P. IJssels, reacted furiously: 'It is extremely inappropriate to announce this without consulting the municipalities and polder boards. The state secretary had to be aware of the effect this announcement would have on people who were evacuated a few years ago.' Even for those who knew about the plan beforehand it was a worrying situation. In his capacity as the representative of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities in the steering group for the Delta Plan for the Major Rivers, the mayor of Nijmegen, E. d'Hondt, received a map with preliminary designated areas for emergency water storage. 'That is national policy. I was not keen on the idea.' According to him, creating space for river water should not be limited to the Netherlands and

Germany should also make plans for more retention areas. 'The problem has been exported from Germany; let the Germans import the solution.'⁵⁹⁴ Mayor M. Schneeman of the affected municipality of Ubbergen, which contains Ooijpolder, knew that the polder would soon be on the radar. 'During the high water event in 1995 there was discussion in the crisis team about whether the polder would be sacrificed to prevent the Bommelerwaard from flooding, but how would we inform the residents in the polder if there was a decision to evacuate?' (Kuil, 2000). His successor, Paul Wilbers, was more explicit. 'Rijkswaterstaat just said: "It is a study". We are a civil service organisation, the state secretary decides. The state secretary said: "It is being investigated by Rijkswaterstaat; they are experts, I will wait for their report". But from the interim report I understood that it would go wrong with this area. This is typical for Rijkswaterstaat engineers: they come up with a solution while the people do not even know about the problem. That could have been done differently. A turkey will not be willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the Christmas dinner.'⁵⁹⁵ According to him, the Luteijn Commission was too quick to identify calamity polders because the possibility of increasing the height of the dikes again and the effect of measures taken in Germany had not been sufficiently studied.⁵⁹⁶ Although he did not approve of the government plan, he did not formally oppose it. 'I am not convinced of the necessity yet. I do not know the effects of such a measure.'⁵⁹⁷

After the publication of the Luteijn Commission's report, mayor Lukassen of the municipality of Millingen aan de Rijn thought that her municipality would not be affected as Luteijn had identified Ooijpolder as one of the areas for controlled flooding. However, Luteijn meant Ooijpolder and Duffelt, the area from Nijmegen to the German border. This may have put the mayor on the wrong track: 'I did not get the impression that our territory is a 'search area' for emergency water storage.'⁵⁹⁸ Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen, who was well aware of the 'search areas', took a more active approach and formed an alliance of 14 municipalities, German as well as Dutch, to commission a contra-expertise study. His argument: 'Otherwise you are simply accused of being a NIMBY (not in my backyard). Here we call it NIMFABY (not in my front and back yard)...Whereas in the past flooding was seen as an act of God, nowadays it evokes an aggressive attitude. You are the government, so you have to take measures to make sure my parquet floor will not be flooded; that's the NIMBY response. The attitude of the residents' organisation High Water Platform has helped us to deflect the accusation of taking a NIMBY response. In every war there are screamers and that was the role adopted by the High Water Platform, who attacked the government plan. I had to consult with the state secretary. The argument against emergency water storage was that it is unnecessary, useless and against the law (Flood Defence Act). The tactic was to get rid of the NIMBY label by cooperating with a number of municipalities.'⁵⁹⁹ The main purpose of the study was to provide evidence to refute the need for 'calamity polders'. Mayor Wilbers: 'The government is looking for a Dutch solution to a European problem and there is insufficient proof of the need to create emergency water storage areas.' The municipalities intended to use the contra-expertise to contest the premises

of the Luteijn Commission. The study was financed by the municipalities, but some were reluctant to contribute, including Beuningen. Executive councillor L. van Beuningen: 'We are not in the Commission's sights and we want to keep it that way. We do not see a reason to contribute to a study about the need for emergency water storage'.⁶⁰⁰

The topical subject provided an opportunity for the mayors to profile themselves. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen was not averse to media exposure and proved to be a capable operator, with statements such as 'Luteijn is acting rather like God', referring to the way people viewed flooding in the past, and 'Of course, nothing is more beautiful than a near calamity'. Wilbers: 'It was easy. The population expected it; the people wanted me to do the talking on their behalf. From my former job, I was headmaster at a secondary school, I knew an old pupil who worked for the national news. After a while I received so much exposure that they stopped.' The issue and the communal approach gave mayor Wilbers a feeling of pride. 'We were very pleased to defeat Rijkswaterstaat on its basic figures and not on the conclusions [of the Luteijn report]'.⁶⁰¹

Another mayor also profited from the media exposure. The mayor of Duiven, H. Zomerdijk, had some experience with high water in his former position as mayor of Ochten, where the dike almost failed in 1995. In his role as secretary of the association of riverine municipalities he assumed an active role, which put him in competition for media attention⁶⁰² with his colleague from the municipality of Ubbergen, mayor Wilbers, who became the informal spokesman. Mayor Wilbers changed his media strategy after he saw this was causing irritation among his colleagues. 'When others said "It is easy to score", I started to pass on questions from the media to the chair of the High Water Platform, Harry Sanders. He did a very good job'.⁶⁰³

Residents' perspective

The residents' perspective on the emergency water storage area in Ooijpolder is described below.

Preparing for the fight

After the high water periods of 1993 and 1995 the Groot Maas en Waal polder district⁶⁰⁴ did not stand still. After the residents were evacuated as a precautionary measure in 1995 the organisation wondered what action it could take during high water events and commissioned an explorative study of the possibilities for flood water retention in Ooijpolder – a natural reaction by an organisation that had been used to looking for answers to water management problems for centuries. Wim Arnts, a farmer in Ooijpolder and executive councillor of the municipality of Ubbergen, was a member of the board of the polder district. In this capacity, he was informed in an early stage about

possibilities to prevent flooding in the future. Zeger Stappershoef, a farmer in Ooijpolder and member of the farmers' organisation GLTO, was also involved in the study of the polder district. He did not find the study useful. 'The polder district felt it had a responsibility to carry out a study. If you do research and the results are positive you run the risk that they will be used. The polder district did not expect the conclusion of the report to be that water retention in the polder is technically possible. If this is not what you want to hear, the report will not be as useful as anticipated. I was therefore not happy with this outcome.'⁶⁰⁵ After the report was published the management board of the polder district was not willing to put it to one side. In a letter to the state secretary the dike reeve said that Ooijpolder was not suitable for designation as a retention area, but that the area could be reserved conditionally.⁶⁰⁶ Like Zeger Stappershoef, other residents of Ooijpolder were also not happy about the polder district's initiative. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen reacted emotionally in a letter to the organisation at the end of June 2001: 'After the evacuation of 1995, Ooijpolder should not be subjected to plans for water retention, however well the scheme is designed.'⁶⁰⁷ The regional newspaper concluded that emotion had gained the upper hand at the expense of common sense.⁶⁰⁸

The report of the polder district lost significance when the report of the Luteijn Commission was published in May 2002. This caused some confusion because Ooijpolder was one of the areas identified for emergency water storage between Nijmegen and the German border, which also included Duffelt. Kees Nuijten, a member of the residents' organisation High Water Platform: 'The identification of the area led to confusion. Ooijpolder was identified as a location for emergency water storage, which also included Duffelt.'⁶⁰⁹ Zeger Stappershoef, a farmer in Ooijpolder, remembered the protest actions of the residents against other government plans in the polder. 'We have a bit experience in this region of how to handle things, such as the cut-off of the bend in the Waal and the annexation plans of Nijmegen. The protest groups arranged for the housing minister to visit our polder. He proposed a ban on further building in Ooijpolder. We have saved the polder many times. And successfully!'⁶¹⁰

How to organise a residents' group?

The first people to resist the emergency water storage plan, before the meeting at the Rabo Bank, were farmers, who tried to draw attention to the government plan by erecting straw figures in strategic locations in the polder and placards with slogans such as 'deep-sea diving in your back yard'.⁶¹¹ When the farmers' organisation arranged a press conference about the plan, the local authorities backed them. A local political party which had close connections with the farmers' organisation organised an information meeting which attracted fifty people (Warner et al., 2008). In addition, some 'old' opponents of earlier government plans started to meet with people who wanted to play an active role in opposing the government plan for calamity polders. The initial meetings held to arrange opposition to the plan were not well organised. According to mayor Wilbers, who attended a meeting, it was bedlam. Riny Zeegers, the

director of the local branch of the Rabo Bank told the organisers to wait until after the bank's annual meeting, to which David Luteijn, the chair of the Commission on Water Emergency Storage, was invited, but they did not. Riny Zeegers: 'The next meeting with the 'old' opponents was informative as there was more clarity about the plans, but it was even stormier than the first one. Some of the key people asked me to take the lead and involve the Germans. I responded that I lacked time for the job but that I was willing to organise a meeting [in which a board would be chosen] and to initiate contact with the Germans. As a consequence, you have to offend people, particularly those who wanted to be chair, but lacked the capacity for such a function. Then, it proved difficult to get the farmers involved. At a given moment I visited Harry Sanders, a member of our board. He knew a lot about how to involve farmers. Harry was capable; he did not have a strong profile, but had many good qualities and no hidden agenda, as I discovered. Although there were some four or five candidates, I preferred Harry. It was a question of acting fast and I admit it was not very democratic. I knew that he would like to do the job and the others accepted. Sanders agreed, but under certain conditions, for example including Jan Smit, a former scientist who had a good network in Germany built up during his work as a researcher.'⁶¹² Harry Sanders was a retired rector of a high school. He was from a well known local family of gentleman farmers who used to hold various social functions (van Eck, 1999). The polder residents viewed the assumed chair as independent. He proved to be a strong leader who had time, authority, and managerial and communicative skills.

The residents formed an action group called High Water Platform. Shortly after its establishment on 7 November 2002, the residents' group drew up an organisational structure, which included three working groups (technical, legal and communication) that supported the board.⁶¹³ It proved to be efficient and effective. The organisation consisted of a healthy mix of locals and non-locals, as well as educated people with networks that had access to politicians, government decision-makers, government agencies and non-governmental organisations. It enjoyed broad support in the polder, with 400 members, 25 of whom were actively involved.⁶¹⁴ A retired professor of water management, Wybrand van Ellen, was an active member of the technical working group. He questioned the assumptions of Rijkswaterstaat and made calculations. He was of particular value because of his extensive network within the scientific and political community.⁶¹⁵

The solidarity in Ooijpolder was very strong, mainly because of its history of opposition to government plans, and was reflected in the 5,045 signatures that were handed to the state secretary during her visit to the polder.⁶¹⁶

Battle with 'the enemy'

Initially the residents' organisation hoped that studies would be carried out to look for alternative solutions, which the state secretary had promised. This hope evaporated when procedures for implementing the plan for calamity polders were announced. In

the meantime, further economic development in the area was in effect put on hold, which had a considerable adverse effect on the local entrepreneurs.⁶¹⁷ This prompted the chair of the High Water Platform to change his strategy. The prime target was now the new state secretary, Melanie Schultz van Haegen. She fully believed Luteijn and her policy advisers that the public mood was ripe for controlled flooding and opted to go ahead with the policy. When she came away from a visit to the region saying the plan was 'basically accepted' by the local population ('I heard "I do not like that" rather than "no"'), the platform realised she 'did not get it'.⁶¹⁸ From then on, the state secretary was the 'enemy' and the Platform started looking for allies⁶¹⁹ (Warner, 2008). The chair: 'At that point I decided not to expend any more energy into trying to convince that woman and that it would be better to lobby for a majority in Parliament to block the plan.'⁶²⁰ The strategy now centred on lobbying MPs, visiting political parties in The Hague, issuing a steady flow of bite-size information about new insights, developments and research into emergency water storage, and holding a guided tour of Ooijpolder for MPs and local and regional politicians, with a running commentary from the technical adviser of the High Water Platform (Warner et al., 2008).

On various occasions national government officials visited Ooijpolder and some MPs also showed their faces.⁶²¹ During these visits active members of the High Water Platform, including Professor van Ellen, the technical adviser, were present and provided the members with ammunition. It became clear that the Rijkswaterstaat officials were not all of the same opinion about the government plan for calamity polders. 'There were many opinions, but few were proponents of the government plan.'⁶²²

One of the members of the platform uncovered a technical report consulted by the Commission Luteijn that was critical of the use of emergency water storage.⁶²³ While carefully worded, the report basically claimed that controlled flooding was uneconomic and ineffective. In the first instance, the requested report was promised, but was apparently lost. Later the official admitted that he was not allowed to send it. After appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*) the report was made public. Based on the contents of this report, the Platform argued that Rijkswaterstaat had based its case on the wrong premises.⁶²⁴ Professor van Ellen: 'The position taken by Rijkswaterstaat and the state secretary then started to crumble.'⁶²⁵

Through its ability to use the members' networks and the media, the residents' organisation built a powerful political lobby towards the national government. It arranged for regular articles in the regional newspaper, which ensured that its voice was heard in the region and in The Hague. The residents' organisation attempted to avoid the charge of nimbyism by emphasising that 'we would basically be willing to make sacrifices in the interest of national security, if the arguments are based on solid grounds'.⁶²⁶

In November 2004, during the maternity leave of the state secretary, two MPs laid a motion to reallocate the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to the Room for the River programme, which received broad support. In May 2005 the state secretary conceded defeat and the proposals for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder were shelved (Warner et al., 2008).

Rejection of emergency water storage plan: temporary or permanent?

The issue, however, had not finally been laid to rest. On 5 October 2005, a prime time current-affairs programme on national television suggested that emergency water storage was not quite off the cards. The High Water Platform protested vehemently and in response the state secretary sent a courier to the polder who delivered a personal letter to the chairman's house at around 10.30 pm. In the letter she denied that the option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda.⁶²⁷ The Platform had once again proved to be a redoubtable political factor (Warner et al., 2008).

External and internal threats

On two occasions Zeger Stappershoef had doubts about the outcome of the process. 'First, during a meeting when I asked a Rijkswaterstaat official whether it would be possible to surround a village with dikes. The official answered: "Mister Stappershoef, building dikes is our area of expertise". In other words, he meant that they were bothered about it at all. Then I thought we still had quite a job on our hands; technically speaking we had nothing to win. Second, I had doubts when the plan for dike relocation near Groenlanden [a side channel in Ooij] emerged. The people involved in this protest action needed access to contacts in The Hague. I was worried that they would give up, because I heard some dissenting voices. It went well because of the report [by the Commission Luteijn]. Otherwise, the High Water Platform would have collapsed or would not have been able to present strong arguments.'⁶²⁸

The arguments

The chair of the High Water Platform

Before he became chair of the High Water Platform, Harry Sanders took little interest in the plan to designate Ooijpolder as an emergency water storage area. 'I knew about it, but I was too busy. I had no time to follow the issue.' Later on the full nature of the plans became clear to him: 'It was a hundred per cent top-down approach. Via the media we knew that the Commission Luteijn had advised the government to designate Ooijpolder for emergency water storage. Well, "they are always writing a lot" is your first reaction.'⁶²⁹

When the government intended to designate Ooijpolder for emergency water storage his reaction was that it was 'a catastrophic plan'. According to the residents' organisation,

the residents in Ooijpolder have the right to claim the same protection against flood risk as everyone else in the country.⁶³⁰ The chair: 'Personally, as a citizen, I found that shameful. The government did not want to protect us any longer, but started to threaten us with flooding. Should a government treat its citizens this way?'⁶³¹ Furthermore, the chair argued that no proven case had been made for the need for and effect of emergency water storage. The residents' organisation distrusted the government plan.⁶³² One of the main arguments of the organisation was that the concept behind the measure had never been debated and despite the pile of thick research reports, there was no substantive basis for the need for calamity polders. The same was true for a comparative assessment. German measures had not been taken into account. On the basis of residual risk of a high water discharge that would statistically occur once in 1,250 years, a whole area would be sacrificed.⁶³³

The residents' organisation tried to convince the state secretary to look seriously at the possibility of discharging the water into the IJsselmeer lake via the river IJssel. From the residents' point of view, the calamity polders were identified too soon in the process. The organisation also doubted the effectiveness of the measure in the area. About 300 to 400 million cubic metres of water had to be stored to lower the water level downstream by 0.5 metres. The Commission Luteijn was fully aware that space in the Netherlands was limited and decided to indicate three areas for storing 200 million cubic metres. This 'limited' capacity had been adopted by the government.⁶³⁴

The water expert

Professor van Ellen had a positive opinion of the residents' organisation. 'They are well organised, well-equipped and straightforward.' According to Professor van Ellen the relationship with Rijkswaterstaat was as follows: 'They make plans; we react. You have to keep the relationship pure.... Generally speaking, the government solved problems by presenting measures too early. Then they carry out a comparative study. Look at the Commission Luteijn: a very limited assignment to search for areas for controlled flooding.'⁶³⁵

According to Professor van Ellen, emergency water storage does not work. 'Of the five preliminary areas designated for controlled flooding, one would be sufficient. Concerning the dikes, there are many risk factors at stake. For example, the dikes near the location of the Rhine bifurcation are not dimensioned for a situation with a northwest wind and a water level 10 cm higher than average.'⁶³⁶

He raised the German question by putting his finger on the problem of transnational cooperation. 'There is no contact with Germany. Rijkswaterstaat felt superior towards the Germans and that feeling still remains. Contacts are now gradually being established between the province and Nordrhein-Westfalen. The Germans said that the Rijkswaterstaat officials did not know the first thing about it. That was right. Rijkswaterstaat did not send their best experts.'

Professor van Ellen commented on the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine. 'This safety standard lacks any firm basis. The Becht Commission set the standard of water topping the dike only once in 3,000 years, which is equivalent to a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s. Nowadays this dike standard is once in 1,250 years, which is equivalent to a lower design discharge, but that was kept quiet. Rijkswaterstaat wanted to keep it at 18,000 m³/s, but that is not necessary. The Dutch-German study is based on a design discharge of 16,500 m³/s, but states no frequency, which is peculiar. I asked the water expert at Gelderland provincial government and he said, "I think once in 3,000 years". It seems that you can extend the frequency of flood occurrence endlessly.' He thus pointed out that two different standards were being used: the once in 1,250 years flood occurrence and the design discharge for the rivers. Van Ellen also commented on the significance of the standard design discharge. When there are no high water events, the significance of the standard design discharge decreases. He explained this as follows: 'The design discharge near Lobith [where the river Rhine enters the Netherlands] before 1993 and 1995 was 15,000 m³/s; after 1993 and 1995 it was 16,000 m³/s. If you do not experience a high water event, the significance of 1993 and 1995 in water terms decreases. You can imagine that this will return to 15,000 m³/s, but after 1993 and 1995 it was set permanently at 16,000 m³/s. This means that emergency water storage areas are not needed because Room for the River measures have already been planned. We can allow ourselves to sit back and discuss this with the Germans. It is time to ban the computer for a while to stop the endless flow of calculations for the design discharge.'⁶³⁷

Farmers

When the Commission's report was published the reaction of one farmer, Mrs Kroes, was: 'It is terrible. They did not take into account the people who live here, let alone the animals.... In 1995 we suffered so much; you do not want to know. We took refuge in Friesland province with 150 cows. The cows were upset, the milk quality deteriorated and it took months before the situation was settled.' The Commission tried to ease the people's concern by assuring them that there would be a good evacuation plan and damage compensation. Fruit farmer Mrs Daamen: 'You cannot compensate for emotions financially.' She knew the people who left the polder in 1995: 'Crying people, trailers full of fridges and chicken wire, you wouldn't believe it.'⁶³⁸

In 1995 Zeger Stappershoef left the polder with his wife and two children. 'The sheep went to Groesbeek, the cows to Uden and the tractor to Beek.' His wife Marijtje: 'This should never happen'. His first reaction when he heard about the plans for emergency water storage: 'Are they crazy?' After a few days he changed his opinion. 'With controlled flooding you may avoid putting people downstream at risk. You can let the water into the polder for about 30 hours. Then the water level will be two metres, cutting off the first water wave.' Compensation for damage would be a sensitive issue: 'Now I have a robotic milking system, which was a rather expensive investment. Taking down and transporting it will take four or five days. I cannot leave it here; the insurance company

would not accept it.’⁶³⁹ It was easier in the past. ‘You released the cows and they walked over the dike towards Germany. Nowadays, cooperation with Germany is not that easy. We live in the outlying area between the river, the push moraine and the border. The border is open, but that does not mean that it is easy to cross from the business point of view. Like the river it is an obstacle. You can cross it easily but on the other side you have different legislation and rules.’⁶⁴⁰

Citizens

Jan Smit, member of the board of the residents’ organisation High Water Platform and also a member of the German sister organisation Überparteiliche Bürgerinitiative gegen die Überflutung der Düffel, saw the advantages of Dutch-German cooperation for strategic reasons. ‘If we could lobby in The Hague, with support from the Germans, that would be important for strategic reasons. That was also the idea of the Rabo Bank branch director. A citizens’ initiative in Germany was given a legal status. The proposal led to fierce debates, but finally it was established and it functioned quite well. They got a lot of support from the population. The chair and secretary were present at our meetings and I was present at their meetings, so there was a perfect collaboration....At the local level there was always cooperation between the Dutch and the Germans. One of the best results is the Dutch-German pumping station that was built in 1933.’⁶⁴¹

Johan Bekhuis is nature conservation manager for the Millingerwaard, a habitat development area in Ooijpolder. ‘The Netherlands,’ he said, ‘thinks that the river Rhine starts near Lobith, at the border. However, the river crosses borders and goes beyond national structures. Moreover, there are funds from the European Union available for water quality, but also for measures to reduce flood risk. In about 200 years time people will laugh at our simplistic, nationalist approach.’⁶⁴²

6.2 Case analysis of the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder

The case analysis of the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder follows the framework laid down in Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the authorities and the local group. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship between these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, their power building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the government–citizen interaction. The authorities’ organisational culture and the local group’s cultural background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. The case analysis ends with a summary and discussion.

In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study the principal actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of

Gelderland), the local government (municipality of Ubbergen) and the local group High Water Platform (*Hoogwaterplatform*).

The plan for emergency water storage aimed to reduce the residual risk in the event of flooding for a design discharge in the Rhine of up to 18,000 m³/s (Warner, 2008) where it enters the Netherlands. It was provisionally meant to follow the ‘security chain’ – it would be delivered in a plain brown envelope to the responsible lower-tier authorities and nobody would ever hear of it but instead it was launched as an emergency measure to augment the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD). Room for the River should measures taken under this programme prove to be insufficient to accommodate the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s. As such, it was not part of the SPKD, which is the main difference between this case and the two other case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder (Chapter 7). As a national plan, decisions on the plan for emergency water storage would be taken at the national level. The implications of not being part of the SPKD and the national decision-making process for the interaction between the authorities and the local group are described below.

6.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local group

In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local group⁶⁴³ is the object of analysis. A distinction has been made between the interactions between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local group, the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local group, and the local government (municipality of Ubbergen) and the local group. As the interaction between the authorities, including Rijkswaterstaat, province of Gelderland, municipality of Ubbergen, the province of Noord-Brabant and the municipalities bordering the Rhine, is considered important for the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and the local group, this has also been taken into account.

Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine the interaction between national government and the local group, between the provincial government and the local group, between the local government and the local group, and the interaction between national and provincial government, between national and local government, and between the provincial governments and the local governments. Second, how can these interactions be characterised according to the typology of conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration?

Interaction between national government and the local group: diametrically opposed

In the relationship between the national government and the local group, two types of interaction can be distinguished: direct and indirect interaction. Direct interaction

occurred irregularly, for example when the successive state secretaries visited Ooijpolder in May 2001 and November 2002, during meetings in which Rijkswaterstaat officials and the local group participated, in telephone calls between them, during visits by government officials to Ooijpolder, through the various letters the local group sent to the state secretary, and the delivery of a personal letter from the state secretary to the local group chair in October 2005.

The first direct interaction occurred when state secretary Monique de Vries, who launched the government plan, visited Ooijpolder. At the instigation of her communication expert, who was a great supporter of social learning, she was determined to explain the plan in a one-on-one dialogue between politicians and citizens. However, the envisaged interaction with citizens was soon thwarted by senior policy advisers representing the mainstream ministerial culture that discourages too much communication between state secretaries and the public, or indeed between the state secretary and public servants. As a result, a 'traditional' information meeting was organised. The state secretary did not feel comfortable under the residents' critical questions, causing her to blush with shame. Afterwards, she called the meeting with the residents 'a learning moment'.⁶⁴⁴ Her successor, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, received a petition signed by 5,045 polder residents during her visit to Ooijpolder, but she was not convinced of the residents' arguments.⁶⁴⁵ In both visits the state secretaries did not make any attempt at reconciliation. The last visit – just after the residents had organised themselves – stirred the local group to change its strategy, and from then the polder residents saw her as 'the enemy' and 'declared war' on the politician. The strategy now centred on MPs and included visits to political parties in The Hague,⁶⁴⁶ issuing a steady flow of bite-sized information with new insights, developments and research into controlled flood storage, and inviting MPs and local and regional politicians on a guided tour of Ooijpolder, with running commentary from the water expert of the High Water Platform⁶⁴⁷ (Warner et al., 2008), which implied direct and indirect interaction between the national government and the local group.

Direct interaction also included meetings with Rijkswaterstaat experts that finally resulted in an invitation to submit an alternative plan drawn up by the local group's water expert for inclusion in the SPKD Room for the River.⁶⁴⁸ In meetings with Rijkswaterstaat the residents' organisation attempted to avoid the charge of nimbyism by emphasising that 'we would basically be willing to make sacrifices in the interests of national security, if the arguments are based on solid grounds'.⁶⁴⁹ Other examples of direct interaction are when the local group organised a discussion meeting in 2003, to which a director-general of Rijkswaterstaat and a high ranking government official of the interior ministry were invited to discuss the plan for 'calamity polders',⁶⁵⁰ and phone calls and correspondence regarding a classified report with critical comments about the government plan for emergency water storage. When the local group came away empty-handed from these contacts with government officials it wrote a letter to the state secretary, but she did not react to the local group's demand for publication under the freedom of information

legislation. After a second demand, in which the local group threatened to take legal action against the ministry, it received the report.⁶⁵¹ In the last direct interaction, a letter from the state secretary to the local group after the issue of emergency water storage was discussed in a current affairs programme on television, the state secretary denied the option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda.⁶⁵²

In direct interaction between the national government and lower-tier authorities (see below) it became clear that various other parties, including MPs, the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen, the municipal executive of Ubbergen and Millingen a/d Rijn, consultants and scientists, were also critical of the state secretary's plan. The residents operated in the background by supplying information via their website, with the latest news, media clippings and reports, generating recurring attention in the regional, national and foreign media, lobbying MPs and government officials in The Hague and giving guided tours. An MP who was previously a provincial delegate for the province of Noord-Brabant: 'We prepared a motion and after we submitted it, Melanie Schultz van Haegen [the state secretary] called me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency water storage was not needed for the time being. Then I knew that there was some room for manoeuvre. For me, this was a signal that if it is not necessary it will not have to go ahead.'⁶⁵³

To summarise, the interaction between the national government and the local group can be characterised as debate and conflict. Debate started soon after the establishment of the local group, High Water Platform, and changed into conflict after state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's visit to Ooijpolder, where she received a residents' petition against the government plan. In view of her and her predecessor's unwillingness to negotiate, the local group saw her as 'the enemy' and 'declared war' on her, which can be considered an escalation towards conflict. This situation lasted until the vote in the House of Representatives, although between the 'declaration of war' and the vote in the House there were occasional periods of debate.

Interaction between regional government and the local group: mainly indirect support

Both the regional government and the local group were against the government plan. They became active in different periods. Gelderland provincial government took an opposing standpoint shortly after the launch of the government plan in February 2000 by commissioning a contra-expertise. The residents organised themselves six months after the publication of the report by the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (the Luteijn Commission) in May 2002. Apart from disagreeing with the design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m³/s, the province had serious difficulties with the nature of the proposed measure.⁶⁵⁴ Regarding the design discharge, the province commissioned a Dutch-German study into how much discharge the Rhine could accommodate. Regarding the measure itself, it proposed several alternatives, including the provincial high water plan with alternative measures, including dike relocations, flood plain excavation and bypasses.⁶⁵⁵ This finally resulted in a regional advice supported by

lower-tier authorities (Stuurgroep Bovenrivieren-Stuurgroep Benedenrivieren, 2005). Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt: 'Fortunately, I could offer the residents of Ooijpolder an alternative [the regional advice]. It was my job to look for structural and safe measures and to get support from The Hague.'⁶⁵⁶

Direct interaction between the provincial government and the local group occurred irregularly.⁶⁵⁷ On one occasion the provincial delegate called the local group chairman and asked for support during a debate in the provincial executive. As he welcomed everything that might help to oppose the government plan, the chair endorsed the delegate's plan.⁶⁵⁸ In turn, the local group was supported by the provincial government's position in the public debate,⁶⁵⁹ the outcomes of the Dutch-German study, the regional advice and the media attention it received.⁶⁶⁰ Other direct interaction occurred during meetings and telephone calls with provincial experts, for example when the chair called a provincial expert for verification of news items in the media.⁶⁶¹

From the research material it is not possible to determine whether there was indirect interaction between the provincial government and the local group, but in all probability it did occur, for example via the municipality of Ubbergen.

To summarise, the interaction between the regional government and the local group can be considered to be in the form of collaboration.

Interaction between local government and the local group: direct support

The interaction between the local government and the local group was direct rather than indirect. The first direct interaction was a letter by Wybrand van Ellen, a retired professor of water management, who later became the local group's water expert. He sent this letter to the former mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen shortly after the launch of the plan for emergency water storage in which 'search areas' for calamity polders were made public. The mayor's reaction was a formal one: 'We are only concerned that the proper procedures are followed.'⁶⁶² While at first sight his successor Wilbers was well aware of the fact that one of the 'search areas' for emergency water storage was located in Ooijpolder⁶⁶³ in his municipality, his colleague in the neighbouring municipality of Millingen a/d Rijn did not believe the government plan: 'I have not been given the impression that our territory is a search area for emergency water storage.'⁶⁶⁴ Later she became convinced that central government was serious. Although she supported the local group, she did not assume an active role. Again, just after the publication of Luteijn's report, Professor van Ellen sent a letter to mayor Wilbers, but like his predecessor he was not cooperative.⁶⁶⁵

Several months later, however, there was direct interaction between the local government and the residents, initiated by the combination of these roles in the person of executive councillor Wim Arts of the municipality of Ubbergen, who was also a local farmer. As a member of the Groot Maas en Waal polder district⁶⁶⁶ he knew about the consequences

of the government plan. His son was member of farmers' organisation GLTO and the initiator of the first actions against the government plan, including straw dolls placed in strategic locations in the polder and placards sporting slogans such as 'deep-sea diving in your back yard', and the organisation of information meetings for the polder residents.⁶⁶⁷ Besides the executive councillor, the mayor was now also willing to support the residents, despite his earlier refusal to cooperate. This led to direct interaction, for example through his agreement with the straw dolls protest action⁶⁶⁸ and his membership of the discussion panel during the annual meeting of the local branch of the Rabo cooperative bank, to which the chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas was invited. He also attended a meeting with the 'old' opponents of earlier government plans, who made contact with people who would be willing to play an active role in protest actions against the plan for emergency water storage.^{669, 670} After the establishment of the High Water Platform he was willing to add a visit to Ooijpolder to the state secretary's programme with Dutch and German mayors from the region, which proved to be a platform for the residents to offer her a petition against the government plan signed by 5,045 residents.⁶⁷¹ The mayor preferred to take a low profile: 'In every war there are screamers. That role was for the High Water Platform, which was able to attack the government plan. I had to consult with the state secretary.'⁶⁷²

In his function as spokesman of the riverine municipalities and his active role in commissioning contra-expertise, the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen supported the local group's objectives.⁶⁷³ However, the mayor set a limit to his support, for example he was not willing to give a financial contribution to the High Water Platform for placing advertisements in national newspapers.

A final direct interaction happened after state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen conceded defeat on the government plan. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen attended a meeting of the local group⁶⁷⁴ in which he and his colleague from Millingen a/d Rijn thanked the High Water Platform for its unyielding determination. 'Its opposition was not only fierce, but also based on expertise.'⁶⁷⁵

Apart from direct interaction with the municipal executive of the municipalities of Ubbergen and Millingen a/d Rijn, indirect interaction took place via both municipal councils.⁶⁷⁶

To summarise, the interaction between the local government and the local group can be characterised as collaboration.

Interaction between authorities

Interaction between national and provincial government: disputed conditions and solutions

The interaction between the national and regional government occurred directly and indirectly. Direct interaction took place through visits and meetings attended by the state secretary, government officials from Rijkswaterstaat head office and the East Netherlands regional office, the provincial delegate and provincial government staff, and through letters from the provincial government to the state secretary. Indirect interaction took place through the media, particularly regional newspapers, the Association of Provincial Authorities (*Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO*), the National Administrative Council on Water (*Landelijk Bestuurs Overleg Water, LBOW*) and MPs.

The national government was not happy with the regional government's position in the debate on emergency water storage. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt: 'I am not well known among politicians; I made things hard for the national government as I was opposed to the government plan for emergency water storage.'⁶⁷⁷ The province of Gelderland doubted Rijkswaterstaat's proposed design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine ('At that level the water will flow into Ooijpolder via Kreis Kleve in Germany and Wesel will also be flooded'⁶⁷⁸). Johan de Bondt was also not in favour of 'unstructured measures' like emergency water storage to accommodate high water discharges in the river. He remarked that this interaction was 'a very unpleasant discussion.'⁶⁷⁹ Furthermore, the national government did not appreciate the province's initiative for a Dutch-German study as it considered this to be central government business. The relationship improved when Rijkswaterstaat became involved during the execution of the study,⁶⁸⁰ as a result of which it accepted the need for scientific underpinning of the 18,000 m³/s safety standard. Nevertheless, the province of Gelderland's alternatives for the government plan were not received well by the national government because of its high cost.⁶⁸¹

In his campaign against the government plan, the provincial delegate discovered that officials at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office had a similar opinion. 'The head of the water department agreed with me, but he could not say that in public,'⁶⁸² whereas the director-general was not open to a discussion, saying that the government plan was a good solution.⁶⁸³

Indirect interaction worked well, according to the provincial delegate: 'A member of parliament [who was of the same party] was willing to talk to the state secretary and asked her if it would be wise to continue. That helped, and was more than I would do because I am closely involved because of my provincial interest.' He was actively involved in the Association of Provincial Authorities (*IPO*), through which he raised the matter with the national government, but government officials at the ministry exercised

restraint: 'It [the government plan] was a political statement and they could not reverse the matter anymore. Furthermore, everyone was of the opinion that it would be a cheap solution, but this was changed by Luteijn, who proposed measures for the design of the area and damage compensation.' The delegate had frequent contacts with the National Administrative Council on Water (*LBOW*), which meets regularly to decide on water issues.⁶⁸⁴

At the insistence of the provincial government and others, the national government made a gesture in the direction of the lower-tier authorities by requesting a regional advice. In its function as chair of the Upstream Rivers Committee, Gelderland provincial government assumed the coordinating role for this advice. After this, the national government and the regional government were on speaking terms. Finally, the national government approved the regional advice in part and gave up the plan for emergency water storage. 'Afterwards, the national government was grateful for the energy we put into the relationship.'⁶⁸⁵

To summarise, the interaction between the national and provincial government can be characterised as debate, negotiation and dialogue. The interaction started with debate, but changed into negotiation when the national government got involved in the Dutch-German study, which led it to accept the need for a scientific underpinning of the discharge standard of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine. The national government's demand for a regional advice finally shifted the interaction towards dialogue.

Interaction between national government and local government: focus on maintaining the relationship

The interaction between national and local government occurred directly and indirectly. Direct interaction took place through visits and meetings which the state secretary, officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office and mayors attended, and letters and email messages from the local government to the state secretary. Indirect interaction took place via the media, particularly the regional newspaper, the organisation of municipalities bordering the Rhine, and MPs.

While the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen had to exercise restraint in his contacts with the state secretary ('in a bureaucratic organisation the state secretary has authority'), in his role as spokesman of riverine municipalities he was able to oppose the government plan. In this latter role he commissioned a contra-expertise. In close cooperation with regional authorities he also arranged for a letter to be written to the national government requesting a study of the actual situation. In this way he sought to deflect the charge of nimbyism.⁶⁸⁶

Apart from his presence during consultation meetings organised by the national government, the mayor of Ubbergen used the organisation of riverine municipalities to lobby against the government plan⁶⁸⁷ and asked the councillors to lobby in The Hague via their political parties.⁶⁸⁸ In contrast, his colleague at Duiven employed all his political

contacts to argue for the abandonment of the government plan.⁶⁸⁹ But unlike the provincial government, which is responsible for regional water management, the local governments did not have a seat at the ministry's table when it comes to water management.

The Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office viewed it as its task to explain the report of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas to local officials in Germany, but it did not take similar action in the Netherlands. A government official who was involved in the Commission's reporting and communication: 'Various German mayors asked for a presentation to their municipal councils, but I have never been to Ubbergen Municipal Council.'⁶⁹⁰

To summarise, the interaction between the national government and local government can be characterised as debate.

Interaction between provincial government and local government: joint approach

The provincial and local government interacted both directly and indirectly. Direct interaction occurred through meetings in which both authorities participated. As a result, the province, the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (*Knooppunt Arnhem-Nijmegen*, KAN) and the riverine municipalities decided to send a letter to the state secretary requesting a study of the actual situation.⁶⁹¹

Both authorities interacted indirectly through the media, particularly the regional newspaper.⁶⁹² For example, the mayor of Duiven appealed to the province of Gelderland and others to prepare a joint reaction to the state secretary's invitation to discuss measures to reduce flood risk with the region.⁶⁹³ Another example is the criticism from the mayor of Duiven of the provincial high water policy: 'The region is unified about the national approach to accommodate a rise in the discharge of the main Dutch rivers, including dike relocations, excavation of flood plains and bypasses. Under this approach, retention areas have to be avoided as much as possible. However, this contradicts the regional high water plan, which identifies search areas for water retention. The province is therefore following the national government's approach [to use emergency water storage] that it criticised earlier.'⁶⁹⁴ In a reaction, the provincial delegate explained that the mayor had commented on the regional river basin vision, which differs from the province's high water plan by addressing various related problems, such as regulating excess precipitation. Those retention areas were for storing rainwater and not excess river water. He finally stuck to the inclusive approach and emphasised that municipalities have a free hand in taking measures, whether these would be retention areas or other options.⁶⁹⁵

The interaction between the regional government and local government can therefore be characterised as dialogue and collaboration.

Interaction between provincial governments: joint action

The interaction between the provincial governments turned out to be collaboration, although they had different opinions with regard to the government plan for emergency water storage. While the Gelderland provincial delegate was utterly opposed to it, his colleague from Noord-Brabant was a proponent. Both delegates, however, agreed to support each other in their contacts with the national government.⁶⁹⁶ Interaction was only manifested directly, for example during meetings of the Association of Provincial Authorities (*IPO*).

Interaction between local governments: common goals

The interaction between the local governments was mostly direct, through meetings, letters, emails and telephone calls. Many local governments agreed with the initiative of the mayor of Ubbergen to commission contra-expertise, in which German municipalities were also involved.⁶⁹⁷ The ones that refused to cooperate did not enter into the public debate.

There were some difficulties between the local governments, for example the irritation between the mayors of the municipalities of Ubbergen and Duiven, who assumed both an active role in the public debate. While the former was volunteered to be spokesman of the riverine municipalities, which was second nature to him, the latter was secretary of the organisation and had experienced the real danger of bike breach during the high water period in 1995.⁶⁹⁸ The disagreement was resolved when the mayor of Duiven made his intentions explicit. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen: 'When others [including the mayor of Duiven] said it is easy to score points, I passed on questions from the media to the chair of the High Water Platform. He did a very good job.'⁶⁹⁹

To summarise, the interaction between the local governments can be characterised as dialogue and collaboration.

The prevailing interaction outcome between the national government and the local group was debate and conflict, whereas the interaction between the provincial government and the local group and between the local government and the local group was collaboration. The interaction between the national government and the provincial government led to debate, negotiation and dialogue, and the interaction between the national government and the local government resulted in debate. The interaction between the provincial governments led to collaboration and the interaction between the local governments ended in dialogue and collaboration. For an overview see Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Interaction of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov), local government (Loc) and the local group (Loc gr)

		conflict	debate	negotiation	dialogue	collaboration
Nat	Loc	+	+	o	o	o
Prov	Loc gr	o	o	o	o	+
Loc	Loc gr	o	o	o	o	+
Nat	Prov	o	+	+	+	o
Nat	Loc	o	+	o	o	o
Prov	Loc	o	o	o	+	+
Prov	Prov	o	o	o	o	+
Loc	Loc	o	o	o	+	+

o = not occurring + = occurring

6.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group

In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local group.

The interaction strategies of the authorities and the local group can be divided into framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When people make a distinction between 'us' and 'them' they are using an identity frame. In this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to 'us' and 'them'. A conflict management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A

collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or to achieve a joint objective.

If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiver, 2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one-dimensional: 'all or nothing'. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena to justify actions that may be accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. Sometimes this ends in 'frozen' frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the identity frame with a conflict management frame.

Again, in the analysis of interaction between authorities and the local group a distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local government (municipality of Ubbergen). As the interaction strategies between the authorities, including Rijkswaterstaat, the province of Gelderland, municipality of Ubbergen, the province of Noord-Brabant and the municipalities bordering the Rhine, are considered important to analyse the interaction strategies between the authorities and the local group, these have also been taken into account.

The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction between the authorities and the local group, and between the authorities? Here, a distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, the interaction strategies used by the provincial government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, and the interaction strategies used by the local government when dealing with the local group and vice versa. Another distinction is the interaction strategies used by the

national government when dealing with the provincial government and vice versa, and the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local government and vice versa. In addition, the interaction strategies used by the provincial government when dealing with another provincial government, and the interaction strategies used by the local government when dealing with another local government are analysed. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group explain the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local group and between the authorities?

Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local group

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local group

In its interaction with the local group the national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies. Since these were mostly used implicitly, illustrations of the interaction strategies include either quotes of what others said about the national government or quotes of officials of the government agency itself.

In this case, a distinction can be made between two faces of the national government: the first served the purpose of 'showing who is ruling' and the second was used to make it clear that it served the public interest. The first used a power frame, while the second used an identity frame. The first was personified by the two state secretaries who held office in the period the project was running. An example of the power frame is state secretary Monique de Vries's decision to establish an Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas shortly after the launch of the government plan and her successor's commitment to its outcomes, although the Commission's report raised a great deal of controversy. An MP: 'That went completely wrong. The mistake was that conclusions were drawn up by trampling on the residents. People do not accept this nowadays. It comes down to communication. Government departments have an attitude of "we decide what will happen" and "we are the main actors".'⁷⁰⁰ Another example is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's visit to the polder. Neither her visit nor the petition signed by 5,045 residents changed her mind. Throughout the years she stuck to implementing the government plan despite opposition from residents in Ooijpolder and others.⁷⁰¹ An example of the state secretary's power frame is her decision to release a classified report only after the local group threatened to appeal to the freedom of information legislation.⁷⁰² A government official: 'Looking back, I admit that the Room for the River programme jumped the gun a bit. People were not ready for thinking in terms of flood safety. Instead, they were confronted with specific measures.'⁷⁰³

The other face presented by the national government was represented by Rijkswaterstaat officials who exercised an identity frame in which they cast their relationship to the residents as 'us' against 'them'. Government officials and experts employed an identity frame, although both used different arguments.⁷⁰⁴ Officials of Rijkswaterstaat East

Netherlands regional office were bound to the 'official' line, whereas experts in the specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat were able to give their own opinions, within reason. The officials' identity frame is revealed in the positioning of citizens as people who are hard to please with regard to the realisation of river plans, while being aware that their involvement is crucial and negotiation will be necessary. The experts were willing to consider another approach, expressed by one of them as follows: 'Let them come and meet us; that will generate comprehension on both sides'. Talking about two sides, each with its own identity, implies that this expert takes a similar position as the government officials who sees citizens as 'them'. Another expert: 'Rationally speaking, the plan for emergency water storage is a good idea; only, we have chosen the wrong route.... Sanders [the chair of the High Water Platform] as well as Luteijn [the chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas] are both talking nonsense.'⁷⁰⁵ The government officials' and experts' identity frame was to a certain extent understandable as their state secretary's power frame did not give them much room for a more conciliatory approach.

State secretary Monique de Vries, who launched the plan for emergency water storage, often used buffering strategies. Examples of this type of strategy are her visit to the polder. After she visited the polder she downplayed the confrontation with the critical residents by describing it as 'a learning moment'. Her attitude towards the residents was clear: 'We must inform people adequately when they have to deal with the new water policy.'⁷⁰⁶ Her successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen also downplayed the encounter with the polder residents after her visit to Ooijpolder, saying: 'I heard "I do not like that" rather than "no"'.⁷⁰⁷

The state secretary sometimes used bridging strategies towards the residents. An illustration of a bridging strategy is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's visit to Ooijpolder when she received a petition from polder residents. At that moment she 'bridged' by offering the local group an opportunity to come up with alternatives. Afterwards she used a buffering strategy by saying 'I not have heard anything that changed my mind'.⁷⁰⁸ Another example of a bridging strategy is her letter to the chair of the local group after the topic of calamity polders was raised in a current affairs programme on television, denying that the option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda.⁷⁰⁹ Officials incidentally used bridging strategies when they were asked by the residents to explain the national government plan for calamity polders. They admitted, for example, that the idea of constructing side channels put forward by the local group's water expert could also be a solution.⁷¹⁰

To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the national government used two frames. The head of Rijkswaterstaat, in the person of the successive state secretaries, used a power frame, while government officials employed an identity frame. The state secretary showed who is ruling; the government officials emphasised their position in the debate. The national government often used buffering strategies and sometimes bridging strategies.

Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the local group

The provincial government employed framing and bridging strategies when dealing with the local group.

The provincial government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the local group, which would appear to be the most successful strategy for building an alliance to oppose the government plan and to communicate its alternatives. The province needed broad support for its alternatives, which included 'structured' measures, such as dike relocations, flood plain excavation and bypasses, as opposed to the 'unstructured' measure of the government plan for calamity polders. The provincial alternatives were finally presented as a regional advice.⁷¹¹ Instead of following the national governments approach, the province's aim was to seek collaboration. As a government official explained: 'You have to contact the residents and win them over.'⁷¹² The provincial government's collaborative frame was particularly meant to convince others to act jointly, in this case a joint action with the local group.

As buffering strategies do not work with a collaborative frame, these were not used. The provincial government sometimes used bridging strategies in its interaction with the local group. An example is the provincial delegate's request for support when he defended an alternative plan in the provincial executive.⁷¹³ This showed his confidence in the local group, as he considered the residents to be supporters of his plan.

Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the local group

The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the local group.

The local government employed a collaborative frame in its interaction with the local group. It felt that the government plan for emergency water storage would have a considerable effect on the polder and the residents, and therefore backed the polder residents in their struggle against the national government. The local government's aim was to support the local group as much as possible, while keeping a low profile.

The local government rarely used buffering strategies in its dealings with the local group. An illustration of a buffering strategy by the local government is the mayor's characterisation of a residents' meeting which was held to find ways to organise opposition against the government plan, but ended in chaos, as 'a bedlam'. At the same time, his attendance at the meeting can be described as a bridging strategy because he showed his support for the residents. Another example of a buffering strategy is the communication of a negative reaction to the local group's demand for a contribution to a major advertising campaign in national newspapers. Mayor Wilbers: 'That action, however, is very costly. We said we would not support that type of actions.'⁷¹⁴ This was followed by a bridging strategy by saying that for incidental initiatives the local group could apply to the municipality for money.

The local government often employed bridging strategies in its interaction with the local group, such as the mayor's agreement with the straw dolls protest action, his offer to open up the programme of state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen when she attended a conference of the riverine municipalities, and his acknowledgement after she conceded defeat on the plan for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder.⁷¹⁵

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with authorities

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the national government

The local group used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The local group exercised an identity frame in its interaction with the national government. The local group chair was clear about the residents' support: 'I have not met anyone here in the polder who says they sympathise with the plan.' He also pointed to the 400 members of the local group: 'The 400 members are our legitimacy. But that is common practice since just a few per cent of the population are members of a political party. Furthermore, historically, revolutions are always initiated by a minority.'⁷¹⁶ The point of departure of the local group's strategy was the question: Who is our enemy? An illustration of this is the reaction of the local group chair when state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen did not change her mind after visiting Ooijpolder, where she received a petition signed by 5,045 polder residents: 'I will not expend any more energy in trying to convince that woman.'⁷¹⁷ The focus was now on the MPs who could cancel the government plan. The residents started a lobby campaign to get them on their side. The local group chair deflected the charge of nimbyism by saying that 'if there are reasonable arguments for realising calamity polders to prevent the rest of the country from flooding, the residents might agree with the plan; we would not like it, but we would understand'. However, he usually followed this up by saying: 'This does not apply when it concerns a bad measure that will probably not work.'⁷¹⁸

The local group's identity frame was often accompanied by buffering strategies. Examples of this type of strategy are the presentation by the local group chair during Melanie Schultz van Haegen's visit to Ooijpolder, the 'declaration of war' on the politician after she said that she heard "preferably not" rather than "no",⁷¹⁹ and the local group's communication with the media, including statements such as 'Luteijn [the chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas] is a disaster',⁷²⁰ 'No Berlin Wall in Ooijpolder',⁷²¹ and 'In The Hague they have to know that flooding Ooijpolder is not an option'.⁷²²

Bridging strategies were solely used in meetings and telephone calls with Rijkswaterstaat officials, but the aim was always the same: to convey the local group's point of view.⁷²³ To summarise, the local group employed an identity frame in dealing with the national

government to emphasise its position in the debate. This frame was often accompanied by buffering strategies and sometimes by bridging strategies. Both were part of the local group's strategy in which the state secretary was viewed as the 'enemy'.

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the provincial government

The local group used a collaborative frame in its interaction with the provincial government. This frame was particularly meant to maintain the support of the province in its fight against the government plan.

Buffering strategies did not fit into the collaborative frame that the local group employed. The local group sometimes used bridging strategies when dealing with the provincial delegate, for example when he asked for the local group's support during a debate in the provincial executive,⁷²⁴ and in its communication with provincial officials. The local group's 'bridging', however, was focused on bringing the citizens' voice to the notice of the provincial government.⁷²⁵

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the local government

The local group used a collaborative frame in its interaction with the local government. This type of frame was adopted to gain the support of the government agency in its protest against the government plan. The residents' choice for a collaborative frame implied that buffering strategies did not match well and were therefore not used.

As a collaborative frame is generally exercised by partners who have a mutually tolerant relationship, this has to be maintained somehow. It is to be expected that the local group sometimes used bridging strategies towards the local government, but this was hushed up.

Interaction strategies between authorities

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the provincial government

The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the provincial government.

The national government used two frames when dealing with the provincial government: a power frame by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, exercised in particular by the successive state secretaries, and a conflict management frame used by officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. An example of the power frame is the launch of the government plan. An official of the province of Gelderland: '[The plan for emergency water storage] was a surprise for us. Rijkswaterstaat⁷²⁶ is like Gyro Gearloose (Willie Wortel) who will solve everything. It costs half a billion [euros]. Rijkswaterstaat was far too convinced that it was a sublime solution.'⁷²⁷ The Gelderland provincial

delegate: 'It was engineering logic: typically technical solutions, but with little societal engagement. The idea [of emergency water storage] was launched all of a sudden...and then Monique [de Vries, the state secretary], instead of saying that it was only an idea and there are also other options, stuck to it and defended it with fervour. Later you got stories about enormous dikes around farm houses. It would be a complete fortress with possibly an opening to get in and out. It was no surprise that it caused such a tumult.'⁷²⁸ Despite comments from lower-tier authorities and critical (internal) reports, state secretary Monique de Vries and her successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen stuck to the power frame, although the latter made less use of this according to the Gelderland provincial delegate.⁷²⁹ This was confirmed by the provincial delegate of Noord-Brabant, who later became an MP: 'Melanie Schultz van Haegen changed her mind. She called me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency water storage was not needed for the time being.'⁷³⁰ Another illustration of the power frame was the attitude of the director-general of Rijkswaterstaat, who was not willing to enter into discussion as he was convinced that the government plan was 'a good idea',⁷³¹ whereas officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office employed a conflict management frame towards provincial officials. An official at the province of Gelderland: 'We had meetings with Rijkswaterstaat in which questions were discussed, like is it useful and are there risks. That was a really fair discussion.'⁷³² They found a common ground in their standpoint with regard to the problem at issue and how to deal with it. However, according to the provincial delegate, 'They exercised restraint, because the plan of the state secretary had to proceed.'⁷³³

Provincial officials' statements, such as 'that was a very unpleasant discussion' and 'at national level they are now grateful for what we did',⁷³⁴ makes it likely that the national government used buffering strategies during meetings, particularly at the beginning of the process. Also, the provincial delegate experienced buffering strategies at the ministry when he raised the question of emergency water storage and government officials responded by saying that 'they could not reverse the matter anymore'.⁷³⁵ Likewise, the government officials and the state secretary used a buffering strategy by saying that the provincial alternative was prohibitively expensive.⁷³⁶ It can be concluded that the national government sometimes used buffering strategies in its dealings with the provincials government, particularly at the beginning of the planning process. Later, state secretary Schultz van Haegen 'bridged' occasionally, for example by offering the opportunity to come up with alternatives.⁷³⁷

To summarise, the national government exercised two frames when dealing with the provincial government: a power frame which was used by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, exercised in particular by the state secretary, and a conflict management frame which was employed by officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office, among others. This meant that the successive state secretaries showed who is ruling, while the government officials were open to different views. Buffering and bridging strategies were used occasionally.

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local government

The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the local government.

The national government used a power frame and a conflict management frame in its interaction with the local government. While the former was employed by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries, the latter was used by government officials, such as those working at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. An example of the state secretary's use of the power frame is the way the plan for emergency water storage was launched from the top down, without consulting the region beforehand. At that time, mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen was not yet in charge. From the draft report of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas he already knew that 'it went wrong with Ooijpolder'.⁷³⁸ An illustration of the conflict management frame used by the director of Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office is his frequent dinners with mayors. He saw his function as being the representative of the state secretary in the region: 'You are the eyes and the ears of the state secretary'.⁷³⁹ In other words, it was his job to mediate between the national and the local level. However, it proved to be a hard job for him because he doubted the government plan. 'I was undecided about the plan for emergency water storage, its substance – I am not happy about the number of residents in Ooijpolder – the technical question – it is hard to determine when you need to put the emergency water storage function into effect – and the question of whether politicians will have the courage to make the decision – which safety level do we want?'⁷⁴⁰

The national government sometimes used buffering strategies. An example of this type of strategy is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's remark during a visit to the polder that damage could not be fully compensated, although this was stated in the Commission's report. A further example is its non-communication with the residents, whereas it was a state responsibility to communicate with the public. When asked who was responsible for the communication with the residents by the mayor of Ubbergen during a visit by the state secretary to Ooijpolder a government official said 'Just do it yourself', which can be considered an example of a buffering strategy.⁷⁴¹

Bridging strategies were used incidentally. An example of a bridging strategy is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's offer to the local government to come up with alternatives. At the same time she used a buffering strategy when she said that until then she had not heard anything to change her mind.⁷⁴²

To summarise, the national government employed a power frame, which was used by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries, and a conflict management frame, which was employed by government officials, including those at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. While the state secretaries

demonstrated who is ruling, the government officials showed that they were open to other views. These frames were occasionally accompanied by buffering and bridging strategies.

Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the national government

The provincial government used framing and bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The province of Gelderland simultaneously used an identity frame and a conflict management frame in its interaction with the national government. The provincial government was known for taking a firm, independent standpoint on other issues, such as the Betuwe rail freight line (*Betuwelijn*). Illustrations of the province's identity frame are the development of its own high water policy, which was presented as an alternative to the government plan for emergency water storage ('which offers only false security. It is typical product of the drawing board'⁷⁴³), the questioning of the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s of the Rhine and its initiative for a Dutch-German study to research this issue. A provincial official: 'Our feeling about Rijkswaterstaat's premise of the government plan was that 18,000 m³/s is not realistic. We know that floods in Germany are not prevented; for example in Kreis Kleve the water will flow backwards, via the hinterland to Ooijpolder. (...) We stick our neck out a bit further than the national government. If a flood occurs the risk that there will be people drowned is much higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium or Germany. It is not silly that we worried about it'.⁷⁴⁴ The identity frame was made clear by referring to 'us' (as a province) against 'them' (the national government). This illustration of an identity frame has power frame characteristics as the provincial government did not involve the national government in the Dutch-German study while it was in fact an international question rather than a transboundary collaborative initiative. A provincial official: 'We had the cheek to work internationally. Later, we raised it to a higher level and included the Department of Water Management'.⁷⁴⁵ At the same time, the province used a conflict management frame to explain its intentions. A provincial official: 'We had put a lot of energy into it [the relationship with the national government]. We explained that emergency water storage was a solution to a problem that did not exist. You have to discuss this with the region: do we have a problem, and if so, how do we deal with it?...It is about how you bring it up for discussion. Look, the capacity and expertise are largely present at the national level, there is less at the regional level and at the local level nobody has expertise in the field of water management. In cooperation with the municipalities and water boards we developed mitigating measures'.⁷⁴⁶ Overall, the conflict management frame was prevalent in the interaction with the national government. This frame was purely used to restore the relationship with the national government and for 'damage reduction'. Reframing, therefore, was not relevant.

Buffering strategies were not used while the province used an identity frame, nor when it employed a conflict management frame.

On many occasions the province took the initiative to bridge. The provincial delegate used bridging strategies particularly during meetings with other government agencies and MPs, and in his role as representative of the Association of Provincial Authorities (*IPO*) he had access to administrative meetings in The Hague. The provincial delegate: 'In order to influence decision-making you have to be in The Hague'.⁷⁴⁷

To summarise, the provincial government exercised an identity frame and a conflict management frame when dealing with the national government. While the identity frame was used to position the province in the debate, the conflict management frame was directed at finding a common ground for alternatives to the government plan. Bridging strategies were used very often to achieve this aim, while buffering strategies were not used at all.

Interaction strategies between provincial governments

The provincial governments of Gelderland and Noord-Brabant, in whose territories the proposed calamity polders were located, decided to take a joint stance in opposing the national government. They used a collaborative frame despite having different opinions about the plan. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt of Gelderland recalled that Jan Boelhauer, the Noord-Brabant delegate, had agreed to the Beersche Overlaat, one of the three areas designated for emergency water storage. 'I said to him that we do not agree, but that does not matter. But if he did not create problems...by saying that the state plan for emergency water storage is a good solution, I promised that I would not comment on his attitude towards the Beersche Overlaat'.⁷⁴⁸

Both provinces did not use buffering or bridging strategies.

Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the local government

In its interaction with the local government the provincial government used framing and bridging strategies.

The provincial government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the local government. This frame was particularly meant for building an alliance against the government plan and gaining support for its alternatives, which finally resulted in a regional advice to the national government. A provincial official commented on the province's effort to involve local governments in the development of a regional advice: 'It is the way you bring it up for discussion. Look, the capacity and expertise [in the field of water management] are largely present at the national level, there is less at the regional level and at the local level nobody has the expertise. We wrote a memorandum on our standpoint concerning emergency water storage, which was brought into the discussion in the provincial executive. That was in close cooperation with regional and local actors,

such as the municipalities. We invited the executive councillors to comment on this. That proved to be hard for them [due to their lack of expertise in the field of river science] but they were cooperative as they could not easily say no.⁷⁴⁹

The provincial government did not use buffering strategies as these did not fit in well with its collaborative frame.

The provincial government regularly used bridging strategies when dealing with the local government, for example during the meeting of executive councillors with the provincial executive and in meetings of the riverine municipalities.⁷⁵⁰ In close cooperation with other lower-tier authorities, the riverine municipalities agreed with the provincial initiative to send a joint letter to the Dutch Parliament to request further research on alternatives.⁷⁵¹

Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the national government

The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The local government used an identity frame in its interaction with the national government. The mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen made it appear as if his municipality was a victim of national government policy. 'It seems unlikely that a turkey will happily negotiate about the terms and conditions of the Christmas dinner. We are against because we think that calamity polders are not necessary. And if research proves the opposite, well, so be it.' His tactic was to communicate the position of his municipality to the state secretary by telling stories to create a visual impression, such as the story about a mudflow in an Italian village. 'The question is whether you open the door to let the mudflow through or to keep it closed. I would only open the door if the neighbours helped with the cleaning; in other words, if I would be compensated for the costs of cleaning. If I have no confidence in the compensation measure, I will keep the door closed.' He motivated the choice for an identification frame as follows: 'The aggression [of the residents] was provoked, since it is not an act of God, but an inlet in the dike that will be opened by someone. Instead of praying in the church, people will go to the town hall. I am a representative of the government; I have to protect them from flooding.' Here, the mayor emphasised the position of the local government in the administrative hierarchy. It is the national government that decides when the inlet will be opened, who is responsible for opening it and what compensation measures will be taken.

Buffering strategies were used incidentally. An illustration of a buffering strategy is mayor Wilbers' standpoint about which government agency is responsible for informing the citizens, which he brought into the open during a meeting between representatives of the riverine municipalities and a delegation from the national government. But before

using a buffering strategy towards the national government, the mayor made sure of the province's position in the debate ('the province also said: "it seems to be unnecessary, there are other options"').

The local government sometimes employed bridging strategies. Mayor Wilbers' intention was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. An illustration of the use of a bridging strategy is when, as chair of the riverine municipalities, he invited the state secretary to Ooijpolder to show her the area. Another illustration of this type of strategy when dealing with the national government is the mayor's suggestion of making a leaflet to inform the polder residents.⁷⁵²

To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local government employed an identity frame to mark its position in the debate. It used buffering strategies incidentally. Bridging strategies were employed now and then to remain on speaking terms with the national government.

Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the provincial government

The local government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the provincial government to show its willingness to support the provincial government's initiatives to resist the government plan for calamity polders.

Buffering strategies were not used as they did not match well with the local government's collaborative frame.

The local government sometimes used bridging strategies towards the provincial government, for example its agreement with a provincial initiative to send a letter to the Dutch Parliament requesting further research, and sending representatives to various provincial meetings.⁷⁵³

Interaction strategies between local governments

The municipality of Ubbergen used a collaborative frame towards other local governments, in particular the municipality of Duiven, to gather support to oppose the government plan.

Neither buffering nor bridging strategies were used in the relationship between the local governments.

An overview of the interaction strategies of the government authorities and the local group is presented in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Interaction strategies of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov), local government (Loc) and local group (Loc gr)

		framing		buffering strategies		bridging strategies	
Nat	Loc gr	P	I	+	+	±	±
Prov	Loc gr	C	C	o	o	±	±
Loc	Loc gr	C	C	±	o	+	±
Nat	Prov	P CM	I CM	±	o	±	++
Nat	Loc	P CM	I	±	±	±	±
Prov	Loc	C	C	o	o	+	±
Prov	Prov	C	C	o	o	o	o
Loc	Loc	C	C	o	o	o	o

C = collaborative frame CM = conflict management frame I = identity frame P = power frame
o = zero ± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The most striking outcomes of the analysis of the interaction strategies used by the government authorities and the local group are the national government's 'double face' when dealing with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It employed a power frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The former was exercised by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries; the latter was generally employed by government officials. Due to the state secretaries' use of a power frame the government officials had little scope for adopting another frame, such as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by government officials, such as those working at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office, was understandable: they had to deal with the residents and the provincial and local governments. The provincial government's conflict management frame and bridging strategies changed the interaction between the national and provincial government from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. The interaction between the national and local government remained one of debate as a result of the national government's use of a power frame and an identity frame and the local government's use of an identity frame.

The analysis shows that using both a power frame and an identity frame is not conducive to achieving the 'collaborative' interaction outcomes of dialogue and collaboration. For the 'conflictive' outcomes of conflict and debate, towards the other end of the continuum, a conflict management frame is needed first. This frame is used if an actor is willing to accommodate and/or wants to get support from others. Actors who want to working together to achieve shared goals may adopt a collaborative frame.

In the interactions between the authorities the main opinions were formed in the interactions between the national and provincial government and between the national and local government. The interactions between these actors therefore had the greatest influence on forming the conclusions of this analysis and so the emphasis in the next section is on these relationships.

6.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group

In this section we analyse the power building by the authorities and the local group. The following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials (frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are used first to achieve the government's objective, such as the use of indirect coercive power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of the actor concerned and disseminating their message more widely. The sociability of an actor is considered a separate power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also Chapter 3) because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others. Since respondents rarely said anything about the sociability of other people, I noted their opinions of other actors or quotes that can be interpreted as such.

In this analysis authorities are differentiated into national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and local government

(municipality of Ubbergen). Two questions about power building by the authorities and the local group are posited. First, which power types are built by the authorities and the local group? Here, a distinction can be made between the power exerted by the national government over the local group and vice versa, the power exerted by the provincial government over the local group and vice versa, and the power exerted by the local government over the local group and vice versa. With regard to the authorities, a distinction can be made between the exertion of power by the national government over the provincial government and vice versa, and the exertion of power by the national government over the local government and vice versa. Second, what are the consequences of power building by the authorities and the local group for their interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local group, and between the national and lower-tier government authorities?

Power building by authorities with regard to the local group

National government power building with regard to the local group

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with the local group.

The national government occasionally built indirect coercive power in its dealings with the local group. While the publication of the report by the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas generated public debate about the need and purpose of the plan for controlled flooding, the local group did everything to oppose the government plan. At the same time the national government was on the 'institutionalisation track'. The Government decision of December 2003 designated three areas for possible emergency water storage.⁷⁵⁴ This decision showed that the state secretary was giving a signal that she was pursuing her own course, which can be interpreted as indirect coercive power.⁷⁵⁵

Legitimate power was frequently built. Examples of legitimate power include the legitimacy of the Government's decision to designate three locations for emergency water storage and the attitude of the chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas towards the local group. As to the first, the legitimacy of reserving land in the three designated areas for emergency storage was based on the idea that less populated areas needed to be flooded to protect the densely populated western part of the country against a catastrophe and considerable economic damage. In policy terms this concept is also known as 'norm differentiation', which means that various dike standards are used depending on the number of residents living in a specific area and the economic value of that area. It was, however, not undisputed as it would injure the principle of equality: it implies that the safety of some people is considered more important than that of others.⁷⁵⁶ This was politically a very sensitive issue, as shown in the following statement of the national government: 'These reserved areas may be

designated as emergency water storage areas, depending on the Government's decision in December 2006. We shall choose a solution that is realistic, affordable and effective, and one that makes the safety of the inhabitants a matter of importance.⁷⁵⁷ Regarding the attitude of the chair of the Advisory Commission, he did not feel the need to confer with the residents themselves, as evidenced by his statement that 'security is too important to leave to a public debate'.⁷⁵⁸

The national government seldom built hindering power in its interaction with the local group. An example is the withholding of a critical report on the government plan.⁷⁵⁹ It was finally released at the insistence of the local group.⁷⁶⁰

Knowledge power was built regularly, but in an indirect way. An expert told about his experiences with the Commission Luteijn: 'Experts from outside as well as from inside Rijkswaterstaat were not involved in the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas and could only give their opinion during the course of the process, but this was restricted due to the limited access to the Commission. Some institutions questioned the assumptions because these to a large extent determine the results. In the four or five times we met we had fierce debates about the assumptions (whether the design standard of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine would be realistic and whether the existence of residual risk requires taking measures, such as emergency water storage), the uncertainties of the river discharge under extreme conditions (one simply does not know how the river would react), failure factors (types of waves, dike strength, overtopping dikes and piping, and wind) and the effectiveness of the measure (it would be brought into action too early or too late as well as the dimensions of the designated areas in relation to the estimated water quantity would not be sufficient). In fact, everything depends on the assumptions. There are many uncertainties. We do not know exactly what happens in that extreme scenario.'⁷⁶¹ Knowledge power was also built by seasoned experts at Rijkswaterstaat (Warner et al., 2008) who supported the Commission, as it consisted of a carefully selected representation of national political parties, most of which had little or no substantive knowledge of water management.⁷⁶² Other illustrations of knowledge power include the critical reports which were commissioned by the Luteijn Commission⁷⁶³ and the stakeholder analysis of emergency water storage by the ministry's communication department, which was carried out after the publication of the Commission's report in May and June 2002 (Roth et al., 2006a).

The national government rarely built sociability. An example of this type of power building is the state secretary's letter to the local group six months after she conceded defeat on the government plan. In a prime time current-affairs programme on national television the suggestion was made that emergency water storage was not quite off the cards. When the local group cried foul, the state secretary sent a letter by courier to the chair, delivered at about 10.30 pm, denying the option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda (Warner et al., 2008). An MP: 'An absolutely unique fact'.⁷⁶⁴

To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the national government built indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to let the residents know that the government plan has a legitimate basis, hindering power to prevent difficult discussions, knowledge power to underpin the government plan and the designation of three locations for emergency water storage and sociability to show that the government plan is seriously off the table.

Provincial government power building with regard to the local group

The provincial government built knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with the local group.

The provincial government sometimes built knowledge power in its interaction with the local group. An example of the province's building knowledge power is the development of own plans to accommodate high water discharges in the Rhine in response to the government plan for emergency water storage. The provincial plans sought to prevent the designation of areas for emergency water storage in its territory. The provincial delegate: 'First, our experts worked out the expected consequences of high water discharges. Then we brainstormed about solutions for the safe storage of the excess river water without the option of dike reinforcement.... Fortunately, I could offer the people in Ooijpolder an alternative. For me it is clear: the search for a structural and safe solution for the Netherlands.'⁷⁶⁵ His motivation: 'All citizens have the same right concerning safety and protection against floods. It is pertinent injustice that people who live in a lightly populated area face higher risks.'⁷⁶⁶ The provincial alternatives included small-scale dike relocations, flood plain excavation, lowering of groynes,⁷⁶⁷ bypasses, and removing obstacles in the river, such as industrial sites,⁷⁶⁸ which according to provincial delegate were 'better, faster to implement, and cheaper than water storage in calamity polders.'⁷⁶⁹ Another example of the use of knowledge power is the provincial experts' availability for questions from the local group.⁷⁷⁰

The provincial government built sociability in its dealings with the local group now and then. Sociability was shown when the provincial delegate asked the local group for support for his alternative in a meeting of the provincial executive.⁷⁷¹ This was evidence of his appreciation of the local group's work.

To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the provincial government built knowledge power to present an alternative to the designation of areas for controlled flooding in its territory, and sociability to show its appreciation of the local group's work.

Local government power building with regard to the local group

The local government built legitimate power and sociability in its dealings with the local group.

The local government sometimes built legitimate power in its interaction with the local group, an example being the remark by the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen that in a bureaucratic organisation a state secretary has authority.⁷⁷² In other words, she has the right to launch plans to increase flood safety and in the government hierarchy the local government's role is to follow the line set by the higher authorities.

Sociability was used occasionally. An example of this type of power is the mayor's practice of passing questions from the media on to the local group. However, this was not only a friendly gesture ('they did a very good job'), but it was also in his own interest. It suited him well for two reasons. First, as the mayor put it: 'In every war there are screamers. That role was for the High Water Platform, which was able to oppose the government plan. I had to be cooperative with her' (state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen). Second, during the course of the process his colleague, the mayor of Duiven, assumed a more active position in the public debate. From then on, the mayor always referred to the local group when he was asked to give his opinion.⁷⁷³ Another example of sociability is the mayor's acknowledgement of the local group's work after the state secretary conceded defeat on the government plan. The mayor participated in a meeting of the local group⁷⁷⁴ in which he and his colleague, the mayor of Millingen a/d Rijn, thanked the local group for its unyielding determination. 'Its opposition was not only fierce, but also based on expertise.'⁷⁷⁵

To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the local government built legitimate power and sociability. Legitimate power was used to show the local government's position in decision-making, and sociability to let the residents know that it appreciated their efforts.

Power building by the local group with regard to authorities

Local group power building with regard to the national government

The local group built legitimate power, knowledge power, and media power in its dealings with the national government.

The local group frequently built legitimate power in its interaction with the national government, for example by emphasising the principle of equality. The government plan for controlled flooding implied that not all citizens would be equally protected against the risk of flooding; some areas (in the centre of the country) would be safer than others (in the areas designated for flood storage, including Ooijpolder).⁷⁷⁶ While this 'norm differentiation' was common practice in the sense that higher safety standards were applied for highly densely populated areas than for less densely populated regions and some dike rings were better protected than others (Roth et al., 2006a), from a political point of view it proved to be a very sensitive question.

Knowledge power was built very often throughout the planning process, particularly through the involvement of water management experts and legal experts. Water expert Professor van Ellen provided the local group with detailed technical information, which enabled it to show that there were many uncertainties in the national water policy. Additionally, the water expert had a good network of scientists and officials at the specialised agencies of Rijkswaterstaat. Legal experts advised the local group on how to deal with a classified report.⁷⁷⁷

In its dealings with the national government the local group employed media power very often. From the local group's establishment in November 2002 until March 2005, when the state secretary conceded defeat on the plan for emergency water storage, the issue was covered by the local and regional media (every two weeks), by the national media (irregularly) and by foreign media (incidentally). The media coverage proved to be an important factor in keeping the issue high on the political agenda. In addition, through its media exposure the local group was considered to be a relevant political actor.

To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local group built legitimate power to show that the government plan lacks a legitimate basis, knowledge power to underpin its arguments and media power to get support for its views and to put the issue high on the political agenda.

Local group power building with regard to the provincial government

The local group sometimes built sociability in its dealings with the provincial government. An illustration of the local group's building of sociability is the support given by the local group chair to the provincial delegate's plan in the provincial executive. The chair: 'I wanted to do him a favour'.⁷⁷⁸

Local group power building with regard to the local government

The local group occasionally built sociability in its dealings with the local government. An example of sociability is the local group's statement that the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen had been a valuable asset,⁷⁷⁹ referring to the mayor's help in facilitating the local group's actions, such as handing over of a petition signed by polder residents to the state secretary when she visited the polder.

Power building by authorities

National government power building with regard to the provincial government

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power in its dealings with the provincial government.

The national government sometimes built indirect coercive power in its interaction

with the provincial government. An illustration of this type of power building is the state secretary's progress with institutionalising the government plan. The identified areas for emergency water storage were provisionally designated by the Government's decision of December 2003,⁷⁸⁰ despite the provincial government's attempts to pursue a different course supported by the lower-tier authorities.

In its dealings with the provincial government the national government regularly used legitimate power through its flood risk management policy, which was based on two strands. The first concerned the Room for the River programme to reduce flood risk at a design discharge of 16,000 m³/s for the Rhine, and 18,000 m³/s for some locations conditional on certain river widening measures. The second emphasised the possibility of a 'residual risk' of a one in 1,250 year event involving a breach in the dike, which could be reduced by storing excess discharges in calamity polders (Warner, 2008). While the lower-tier authorities were involved in the preparation of the Room for the River programme, this was not related to the question of residual risk. Apart from the historical tradition of seeking a joint approach to water management,⁷⁸¹ which can be considered to be an unwritten rule in the water sector – at least between authorities, the water management principles themselves became the subject of discussion (the assumption of the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine and the existence of 'residual' risk) and by extension the legitimacy of the government plan for emergency water storage.

Knowledge power was often built, particularly by the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas. During their deliberations, seven technical studies were carried out, for which a large budget was made available, the outlay eventually amounting to 1 million euros (Warner, 2008). Another example of knowledge power are the opinions about uncertainty and how to deal with it held by some experts from inside and outside Rijkswaterstaat, which differed from the mainstream view in the organisation. These experts based their opinions on studies which indicated the causes of flooding involve many more 'failure factors' than overtopping dikes, such as piping (Silva, 2001), and accepted a degree of uncertainty. Others, though, such as some Rijkswaterstaat officials and Commission members, were not convinced. One official from the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office recalls a furious row between these parties during a hearing on uncertainty issues within the Commission.⁷⁸² It came down to a clash between different approaches to uncertainty. While the experts were supporters of a flood risk approach (in which risk is defined as probability of occurrence multiplied by impact), many Rijkswaterstaat officials believed in the existing approach of flood probability (the chance of exceeding the design water level at dike sections). The flood risk approach proved to be a sensitive issue and getting support for it among Rijkswaterstaat officials would require considerable time and effort. The Commission's chair felt he had no time for extensive debate about rationale and information uncertainties, particularly when the government fell prematurely in early 2002 and he decided to speed up the work in order to present the Commission's report in time to

set the agenda for the new coalition (Warner, 2008). Provincial government officials who also used the uncertainty argument in discussions with Commission members faced the same unwillingness to take other opinions into account.⁷⁸³ Another example of knowledge power is a report by the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (TAW) of external experts and Rijkswaterstaat experts, which was quite critical of the government plan. A provincial delegate who supported the conclusions in the report: 'It is wonderful to get support from unimpeachable authority.'⁷⁸⁴

To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national government built indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to demonstrate that the plan for calamity polders has a legitimate basis, and knowledge power to underpin the usefulness of the government plan.

National government power building with regard to the local government

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power in its dealings with the local government.

In its interaction with the local government the national government sometimes built indirect coercive power by continuing its attempts to institutionalise the plan for emergency water storage. The national government provisionally designated areas for emergency water storage in the Government decision of December 2003,⁷⁸⁵ despite the local government's efforts to change the government's position by pointing out the consequences and the demand for alternatives.⁷⁸⁶

The national government built legitimate power many times. An example is the state secretary's justification of the Government's decision by arguing that it takes account of 'a small chance of an excess discharge, for which we prefer to take measures to enable controlled flooding beforehand rather than doing nothing, which would result in flooding of highly densely populated areas'.⁷⁸⁷ Here, she touched on the policy of 'norm differentiation'. Although this is not considered official policy, it is common practice that some areas are better protected than others and some dikes are better maintained than others. The project Flood Risk and Safety in the Netherlands (*Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart*, VNK) addressed this theme, but the outcome was not put before Parliament. The issue proved to be politically sensitive as questions emerged about whether it was acceptable to vary the safety standards for people in different regions.

The national government often built knowledge power in its dealings with the local government. An illustration of this power type is the advice given by experts at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) on the economic costs of the spatial claims resulting from the plan for controlled flooding. The advice was positive as the costs for land were not included. Later, consultants who were asked to assess the costs and revenues found the plan for emergency water storage to be too costly due to the high costs of the recommendations for designating the area for controlled flooding,

which included dikes around villages.⁷⁸⁸ Another illustration of the use of knowledge power is the advice of the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (TAW),⁷⁸⁹ which focused on damage compensation and spatial planning procedures. The experts involved were not in favour of the government plan.

To summarise, in its interaction with the local government the national government built indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to demonstrate that the plan for calamity polders has a legitimate basis, and knowledge power to underpin the government plan.

Provincial government building power with regard to the national government

The provincial government built legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and sociability in its dealings with the national government.

The provincial government often built legitimate power in its interaction with the national government. An example of its use of legitimate power is its questioning of the legitimacy of the government plan, which was based on an assumed design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands.⁷⁹⁰ In fact, the provincial government doubted the very concept of 'residual risk' ('emergency water storage was a solution for a problem that does not exist'⁷⁹¹). In addition, it argued that the government plan was not compatible with the principle of a 'robust river system' based on taking 'structural' measures as proposed in the Room for the River programme. The idea of a 'robust' water system is based on a river basin approach that considers the river system as a whole, including the German federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen.⁷⁹²

The provincial government built knowledge power very often when dealing with the national government. An example is the reaction of the provincial government immediately after the 2000 plans were launched. The provincial government and social partners commissioned a contra-expertise, a report from the well-respected engineering consultancy Delft Hydraulics. The consultants predictably reported that controlled flooding in itself is a sound idea, but not in the locations and modalities it was then proposed (Warner, 2008). Another illustration of its use of knowledge power is the initiative for a Dutch-German study into the maximum discharge capacity of the Rhine. Although this initiative started without the involvement of Rijkswaterstaat, during the course of the study their involvement proved to be necessary for political reasons.⁷⁹³

The provincial government sometimes built media power, including the presence of alternatives and opinions on actual political issues.

Sociability was used occasionally. An example is the provincial delegate's statement that ministry officials were clever at keeping the government plan alive.⁷⁹⁴

To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the provincial

government built legitimate power to show that there are alternatives that could meet national government objectives, knowledge power to underpin their arguments against the government plan, media power to explicate its position, and sociability to keep the other parties amenable.

Local government power building with regard to the national government

The local government built legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and sociability in its dealings with the national government.

The local government frequently used legitimate power in its interaction with the national government. An illustration of the local government's building of legitimate power is when it pointed out that the government plan contravenes the Flood Defence Act. With the support of the riverine municipalities along the Rhine it argued that the government plan would provide a greater degree of safety than required by the legislation, that the stated design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine was not realistic as this amount of water cannot enter the Netherlands via the Rhine (later confirmed by the Dutch-German report by the province of Gelderland and the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen), that the dimensions of the designated areas were too small for storing the expected quantity of water (i.e. the plan is not effective), and that the plan was not efficient because the costs are higher than the benefits (de Boer, 2003b). The municipalities made it appear that they were victims of national policy, which gave greater priority to protecting the densely populated and economically more valuable western part of the country at the expense of less densely populated areas.⁷⁹⁵ In other words, the national government injured the principle of equality.

Knowledge power was sometimes exerted by commissioning contra-expertise by a number of Dutch and German municipalities that declared the 18,000 m³/s scenario to be an exaggeration. They also questioned the dimensions of the designated areas, arguing that they were too small to accommodate the expected river discharge (de Boer, 2003a).

When dealing with the national government the local government employed media power on occasions. An example is the mayor's drive to profile himself in the public debate. As he had access to the national broadcasting company this proved to be easy. 'I used to be the head of a secondary school. I discovered that a pupil of mine now worked for the national news on TV. But when I appeared too often she stopped asking me.'⁷⁹⁶

The local government rarely built sociability. It only showed a 'sociable face' during meetings with the national government to remain on speaking terms.⁷⁹⁷

To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local government built legitimate power to show that the government plan lacks a legitimate basis,

knowledge power to underpin its arguments that the government plan would not be effective, media power to get support for its standpoint, and sociability to remain on speaking terms with the national government.

Table 6.4 summarises the authorities' and the local group's power building.

Table 6.4 Building power by national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov), local government (Loc) and local group (Loc gr)

		direct coercive power	indirect coercive power	legitimate power	reward power	hindering power	knowledge power	media power	sociability
Nat	Loc gr	o	±	+ +	o o	± o	+ ++	o ++	± o
Prov	Loc gr	o	o	o o	o o	o o	± o	o o	± ±
Loc	Loc gr	o	o	± o	o o	o o	o o	o o	± ±
Nat	Prov	o o	± o	+ +	o o	o o	+ ++	o ±	o ±
Nat	Loc	o o	± o	+ +	o o	o o	+ ±	o ±	o ±

o = zero ± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The analysis of the power building by the authorities and the local group shows that the balance of power between the national government and the local group proved to be negative for the local group, because the national government built five types of power (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability) while the local group built three (legitimate power, knowledge power and media power). However, the local group proved to be quite influential, particularly through its use of knowledge power and media power. Another important factor was that the regional and local government proved to be supporters of the local group. Right from the start, the provincial government took the lead in a dispute with the national government on flood risk policy, particularly on uncertainties, interpretations and values.

The national government built three types of power in its dealings with the lower-tier authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power), while the lower-tier authorities built four types of power (legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and sociability). In particular, the lower-tier authorities' use of knowledge power made a difference. They commissioned a contra-expertise to gather arguments to back their opposition to the national government. In addition, the provincial government commissioned a Dutch-German research project to determine the maximum discharge capacity of the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands. Unusually for a project of national interest, the national government was not involved from the start of the project, but did become involved later on. The lower-tier authorities also

built media power towards the national government, which is not very common for government authorities. Both authorities used it occasionally.

The power building in the interaction between the national government and the local group had considerable effect on the interaction outcomes, which were debate and conflict. The use of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national government proved to be influential, while the local group's building of knowledge power and media power had an important impact. The same was true for the power building in the interaction between the national and provincial government. The provincial government's use of knowledge power, media power and sociability had a substantial influence on the interaction outcomes, which were debate, negotiation and dialogue. Its interaction strategies (a conflict management frame and bridging strategies) also contributed to these outcomes. The interaction between the national and local government, which never reached a negotiated solution and remained stuck in debate, could not be explained by their power building alone. The actors' interaction strategies (the national government used a power frame and an identity frame; the local government used an identity frame) and potential to act (see below) therefore also need to be taken into account.

6.2.4 Authorities' and local group's potential to act

In this section we analyse the authorities' and the local group's potential to act. Both potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard to the authorities, a differentiation was made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local government (municipality of Ubbergen).

Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities' and the local group's potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities' and the local group's power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the interaction between the authorities and the local group?

National government's potential to act

The national government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

National government's capacity to act

The national government's capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources,

coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

State secretary for water management Monique de Vries had the mandate to act due to the high water periods of 1993 and 1995 and the predictions of more frequent and intense climate change-induced extreme events (Warner, 2008b). The plan for emergency water storage was included in a package of measures for finding space for the rivers instead of dike reinforcement, which had been the focus until then. The measure was presented as an option in the event of an extreme Rhine discharge of 18,000 m³/s. Of the three locations provisionally designated as 'calamity polders', Ooijpolder is the first polder on the south bank of the Rhine after it enters the Netherlands from Germany.

While the elaboration of the Room for the River policy was a joint effort by national and lower-tier authorities, this was not the case with the government plan for emergency water storage. This plan was originally classified as a security issue, which meant it followed a 'security chain' directly from the ministry to the responsible government officers.⁷⁹⁸

The mandate of the national government can thus be considered moderate.

Resources

The resources of the national government included budget and people.

As the plan for emergency water storage was considered additional to measures to be taken in the Room for the River programme, it had a separate budget of 300 million euros for implementation. The national government had sufficient government officials at its disposal, both at the government department and the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. The resource base of the national government can therefore be considered strong.

Coordinating mechanisms

Apart from the top-down launch of the government plan, the national government established the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (also called the Luteijn Commission after the name of its chair) to embed the plan in current policy. This Commission addressed the question of whether there was a need for calamity polders. In addition, it advised on criteria for area selection, the consequences of selection, land reservation, decision-making on actual use and compensation. In its report the Commission made a positive recommendation on the use of calamity polders and selected three areas: Rijnstrangen and Ooijpolder for the Rhine and Beersche Overlaat for the Meuse. State secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen acted on the report (Roth & Warner, 2007) and reserved land in the designated areas for controlled water storage. However, the publication of the Commission's report led to a public debate about the assumptions of the plan (design discharges of 16,000 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s for

the Rhine), the costs and benefits (the planned dikes around villages) and failure factors (for example the dimension of the areas). These and other issues were also included in several contra-expertises commissioned by lower-tier authorities.

The coordinating mechanisms of the national government can thus be considered moderate.

Consistency

State secretary Monique de Vries started to build a narrative by presenting the government plan for emergency water storage in Loevestein castle. The narrative was followed up with the establishment of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas. Once the report was finalised the chair was keen to 'sell' it in the region. He felt he had a strong hand, being able to give the region far-reaching guarantees for compensation for damages resulting from emergency storage (Warner, 2008). He made striking use of the metaphor of an airbag in a car to explain the functionality of calamity polders (Roth & Warner, 2007). Although the chair claimed that the region was basically 'won over' (Warner, 2008), in practice this proved to be far from the case. The narrative was ended by a parliamentary motion transferring the money reserved for controlled flooding to the budget for the Room for the River programme. Back from her maternity leave, state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen presented the Government's decision to shelve the plans for emergency water storage in view of its cost and the lack of sufficient public support (Warner, 2008).

The national government's consistency (the construction of a narrative) can therefore be viewed as weak.

National government's motivation to act

The national government's motivation to act entails political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

State secretary for water management, Monique de Vries, was the first of her kind when she took office in 1998. Polls showed that the politician's name recognition in the Netherlands was worryingly low: 2.5 per cent. The lack of public profile and press attention translated into little bargaining power for a politician in government and little chance of keeping her job in the next government. The state secretary decided to boost the image of her policy area considerably by widely publicising her department's plan for emergency water storage as the miracle cure for the country's water problems (Warner et al., 2008). Her successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen also tried to keep water high on the political agenda.

The political priority of the national government can therefore be considered to be high.

Organisational ambition

Senior policy officers of the ministry did not resist state secretary Monique de Vries' intention to work on her image by presenting the plan for emergency water storage. As the deadline for the public presentation of the plans neared in early 2000, two key worries emerged inside the ministry. First, at the close of the 1990s, flood experts started to worry about bigger floods. The 1994 Mississippi flood and worrying climate change scenarios raised the question of what to do if an unusual flood peak hit the Netherlands. It was clear that even if all the Room for the River measures were in place, they would not be able to cushion such an event. Some experts started to project an 18,000 m³/s peak scenario as a result of climate change and the effect of upstream (German) flood protection works. Second, the Room for the River projects would generate an enormous amount of excavated material (sand and clay), which the market might not be able to absorb.^{799, 800} Would it not be more sensible to concentrate intervention in a few rather than many locations?

Such considerations put the issue of planning for a 'residual risk' of a one in 1,250 year crisis event on the agenda. Thoughts turned to controlled drainage to store excessive flood water discharges in 'calamity polders'. The officials, however, did not count on the state secretary's political aspirations, which led her to make the measure an issue for public debate instead of 'securitising' it by restricting publication of the idea to a circular to the responsible civil servants (Warner, 2008). As a consequence, the government plan was not discussed internally and various officials and experts opposed the use of this measure.

The organisational ambition of the national government was therefore low.

Personal vision

Not all officials of the ministry, Rijkswaterstaat, the East Netherlands regional office and the specialised offices of Rijkswaterstaat were convinced of the effectiveness of controlled flooding. For example, there were differences of opinion among experts on various aspects of flood protection policy, with discussions focusing mainly on the way uncertainty and failure factors with regard to dike breakthroughs could be incorporated into analysis and decision-making. While a growing number of experts were ready to replace the existing standards based on flood probability with a flood risk approach that takes not only flood frequency but also damage into account (Warner et al., 2008a), the state secretary and the head of the department were not.⁸⁰¹ The Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas chose to start from the existing standards, including the seeming certainties of the discharge-based approach (Warner, 2008b). This led to a dispute between officials in favour of a flood risk approach and those who stuck to the government plan and the 'old' standards. As most of the latter were employed in the upper echelons of the department where there was little exchange with 'the outside world', it was difficult to convince them.

The personal vision of national government officials can therefore be described as weak.

To summarise, the national government's capacity and motivation to act proved to be weak, which resulted in a weak potential to act (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government

	capacity to act					motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency		political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	++	++	±	±		++	±	±	
National government					±				±

± = weak/low ++ = moderate +++ = strong/high

Provincial government's potential to act

The provincial government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

Provincial government's capacity to act

The provincial government's capacity to act encompasses mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

Until the early 1990s the province of Gelderland concentrated mainly on the regional river systems. After the high water event of 1995 it assumed an active role in large river systems.^{802, 803} This matched the joint approach favoured by the national government, because it believed it would not survive a second 'Brakel' (see section 2.2).⁸⁰⁴ The province's role was legitimatised by chairing the Upstream Rivers Committee, which was established to develop options for widening the river.

From 2000 the province worked on the development of a provincial water policy for a 'robust' river system based on a river basin approach in which the whole river system is taken into account. This policy was adopted in 2003.⁸⁰⁵

The provincial government's mandate can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Resources

The resources of the provincial government included budget and people.

The budget was sufficient to commission studies, hire contra-expertise and work on water policy, but there was no money to implement major works, such as bypasses and dike relocations.

The province of Gelderland had a team of water experts at its disposal who had the right qualifications and were willing to cooperate with other authorities and listen to the local population.

The resource base of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Coordinating mechanisms

Immediately after the 2000 plans, the province and its social partners commissioned a contra-expertise report from a well-respected engineering consultancy, Delft Hydraulics. The consultants predictably reported that controlled flooding in itself is a sound idea, but not in the locations and modalities that were then proposed (Warner, 2008).

The province was the first to publicly question the underlying assumptions for emergency water storage, notably the need to prepare for a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine, rather than 16,000 m³/s. To back this up, the province initiated a study in close cooperation with the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and, in due course, with support from the Department of Water Management. The report found that a water discharge of 15,500 m³/s could flow into Dutch territory; a highly theoretical superwave would amount to a discharge of 16,500 m³/s. The maximum scenario was a 18,700 m³/s discharge, on the condition that there was no flooding at all in Germany, which would require extremely high dikes in Germany (Warner, 2008).

The province of Gelderland touched the right cord by looking across the German border. The German flood risk policy was not addressed in the report of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas as it was the state secretary's wish not to include Germany in the Commission's remit. The German flood risk policy was not addressed in the Commission's report because inundating German territory (Duffelt) would have international consequences and would raise a foreign policy issue that would cause the government great problems. Moreover, the Germans did not want the Commission to examine the situation in Germany (Warner, 2008).

In the meantime, Gelderland provincial government developed its own high water policy. This differed from the government plan by emphasising the creation of a robust river system based on the river basin approach, which included not only the Dutch part of the Rhine but also the stretch of the river in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. It also included various options for reducing flood risks using 'structural measures', such as dike relocations, bypasses and green rivers. This was the basis for a regional advice.

The provincial lobby for its own policy, including alternatives to the government plan for 'calamity polders', proved to be effective. The province got support from Rijkswaterstaat officials, though not openly, and eventually the state secretary and the

head of Rijkswaterstaat were convinced that the government plan had to be abandoned.⁸⁰⁶

The provincial government's use of coordinating mechanisms can be considered to be moderate.

Consistency

Although the province of Gelderland had recently shifted its policy focus from the regional water system to the large river systems, it presented a clear case.⁸⁰⁷ By developing its own high water policy and commissioning contra-expertise and the Dutch-German study it was able to start its own narrative. Thanks to an intensive lobby campaign that was supported by the local governments and the local group the provincial government got support from Rijkswaterstaat officials and consultants. The provincial narrative was partly adopted by the national government when it accepted the outcomes of the Dutch-German study, and later when the state plan was withdrawn, it was fully adopted.

The consistency of the provincial government (the construction or adoption of a narrative) can therefore be considered to be strong.

Provincial government's motivation to act

The provincial government's motivation to act encompasses political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

For many years water management was not a prominent issue in provincial politics. This changed after the evacuations in 1995 when provincial delegate Johan de Bondt was given the water portfolio. 'I then appreciated the importance of water management....When the government plan for emergency water storage was launched we had just had the debate on raising the design discharge for the Rhine from 15,000 m³/s to 16,000 m³/s. I said that the government plan was impossible. This is a subject for discussion with Rijkswaterstaat and the ministry. These are sensitive issues; you ought to have discussions at the administrative level first.' Johan de Bondt found that rather than talking about solutions the state secretary and civil servants vigorously defended the government plan. In response, he decided to come up with alternatives and to work on a regional high water plan. Johan de Bondt: 'Instead of solving it at the micro level you ought to solve it at the macro level, to take the whole river basin into account, also in Germany. The Germans were actually in favour of this, but we in the Netherlands were so intent on emergency water storage areas that cooperation with Germany was put on the back burner. Relations were restored again later, though.'⁸⁰⁸ Like his predecessor, provincial delegate Harry Keereweer proved to be a proponent of a 'robust' river system and supported it with fervour.

The provincial government's political priority can therefore be described as high.

Organisational ambition

The provincial government water department was in agreement with the political priority: a 'robust' river system in which there is no place for unreliable measures. An official: 'We rejected the idea of retention [outside the dikes] and inlets that have to be opened at the right moment, because this creates new uncertainties which will not help to reduce flood risk. Instead, we chose for more room for the river coupled with housing or nature development; in other words, high water policy in combination with functions that can be realised outside the dikes'.⁸⁰⁹

The provincial government's organisational ambition therefore proved to be high.

Personal vision

Provincial government officials were set on reducing flood risk while at the same time striking a different note. 'Sometimes we opted for an engineering solution with a riverside boulevard [in urban areas]. If you dare to do that; you need to be willing to make it attractive. In the Netherlands we tend to think small'.⁸¹⁰

The personal vision of the provincial government officials can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, the provincial government combined a moderate capacity to act with a strong motivation to act, which resulted in a moderate potential to act. For an overview, see Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of provincial government

	capacity to act				motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency	political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	+	+	++	++	++	++	++	
Provincial government	+	+	++	++	++	++	++	+

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Local government's potential to act

The local government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and its motivation to act.

Local government's capacity to act

The local government's capacity to act is based on mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

The local government does not have a mandate in the field of flood risk management, except in emergencies (COT, 1999), but it does for the local land use plan (*bestemmingsplan*). This planning instrument would have to be revised to permit the implementation of the plan for emergency water storage. This implied that the national government depended on the municipality of Ubbergen to incorporate the emergency water storage plans into the local land use plan.

The local government does not have responsibilities for water management, except in extreme cases, such as a breach in the dike, when the mayor has the responsibility to take action. The local government thus had a weak mandate to act.

Resources

The local government has a budget and people to carry out their tasks and responsibilities.

Part of the budget of the municipality of Ubbergen was spent on a contra-expertise commissioned with several Dutch and German municipalities, in which the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen played a central role.

The local government did not have officials with expertise in water management at its disposal. The mayor assumed the role of spokesman for the residents in Ooijpolder. He attended meetings and arranged a visit by the state secretary to Ooijpolder during which the newly formed High Water Platform could hand over a petition signed by 5,045 residents. While representing the interests of the local population, the mayor remained on speaking terms with the state secretary.

The local government's resource base therefore can be described as weak.

Coordinating mechanisms

The local government had a few coordinating mechanisms at its disposal within its field of competence. While the provincial government took the lead in public debate and also behind the scenes, as a result of an extensive lobby campaign, the local government made use of a much smaller network of relevant organisations. However, the mayor did everything to get his viewpoint across, including commissioning a contra-expertise on the government plan and giving the residents every opportunity to protest.

The local government's coordinating mechanisms can thus be considered to be moderate.

Consistency

As the local government did not play a central role in contesting the government plan, it was not able to construct a narrative. Therefore, soon after the 'Rabo meeting' it

adopted the province's narrative. Although the mayor made it appear that 'the province has its own responsibility', in practice the province's position on this issue proved to be important. However, the mayor considered his position to be pivotal: 'We managed to convince them all, the province, the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority and others.'⁸¹¹ The mayor contributed to public debate by commissioning a contra-expertise that focused on the fact that the design discharge of 18,000 m³/s was disproportional and that the designated areas were too small to store the originally calculated amount of water.

The local government's consistency (the adoption of a narrative) therefore proved to be moderate.

Local government's motivation to act

The local government's motivation to act entails political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

According to the mayor the discussion about emergency water storage had a financial dimension, particularly compensation for damage to residents' homes in the event the polder is used for water storage and for economic losses. As the residents viewed the local government as the first-line responsible authority to which they could complain about flood issues, the mayor foresaw new problems that he could not address properly. In the past, flooding was considered to be an act of God, but now it would be the result of someone opening an inlet in a dike. Instead of prayed to God to lowering the water level, residents now marched to the town hall. From the mayor's point of view the government plan was 'unnecessary, useless and contravened the Flood Defence Act (*Wet op de waterkering*)'.⁸¹²

The local government's political priority was therefore high.

Organisational ambition

The municipality of Ubbergen had no plans for housing development or business sites and it did not intend to take responsibility for anything other than local water management. The local government did not have an organisational ambition in these fields.

Personal vision

The mayor viewed the opposition to calamity polders as a defeat of Rijkswaterstaat. 'For us it was quite nice to attack Rijkswaterstaat on their assumptions instead of [the Commission's] conclusions.'⁸¹³

The local government's personal vision can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, the local government's capacity to act was weak and its motivation to act

was moderate, resulting in a weak potential to act (see Table 6.7).

Table 6.7 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local government

	capacity to act					motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency		political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	±	±	+	+		++	o	++	
Local government	±	±	+	+	±	++	o	++	+

o = none ± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Local group's potential to act

The local group's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and its motivation to act.

Local group's capability to act

The local group's capacity to act consists of resources, trust and social identity.

Resources

The dispositional force (skills, people, resources, available time) of the local group was strong.

The chair proved to be a strong leader who had time, authority and managerial and communicative skills. The local group was efficiently and effectively organised, with three working groups (technical, legal and communication) and experts to support the board. It also had a budget at its disposal.

The bonding force of the local group was high. The group consisted of a healthy mix of locals and non-locals, and a group of highly-educated former city residents with access to networks of politicians, government decision-makers, government agencies and the media. The local group had broad support in the polder and a steady membership of 400. Following its establishment it managed to convince 5,045 residents to sign a petition to the state secretary.

The bridging force was very high as the local group established contacts with neighbouring German organisations (Ooijpolder directly borders Germany and the use of Ooijpolder as a calamity polder would also flood the German Duffelt area) (Roth & Warner, 2007). In addition, it got support from politicians and the region. Although water was not high on the political agenda, the High Water Platform succeeded in holding the attention of politicians by keeping their website up to date, regularly sending leaflets on specific subjects to them and organising tours of Ooijpolder.

The linking force was very high, especially through their ability to use the media to ensure a regular series of articles in the regional newspaper. As a consequence, their voice was heard in the region and in The Hague. Through their network the residents heard about one of the technical reports underlying the Commission's report (Warner, 2008). After appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur*) the conclusions were made public (Roth & Warner, 2007).

Trust

The local group had a strong belief in its own capability rather than trust in specific people. In its dealings with others the members demanded that key people, particularly politicians, take responsibility. If they proved not to be exponents or fervent proponents of their ideas, the residents distrusted them. The local group had a certain belief in process trust, as evidenced by their objective of gaining a majority in Parliament on their side and the structural approach to achieve this aim. The local group's trust in individuals that supported their opposition and their trust in the process can therefore be considered to be strong.

Social identity

The social identity of the residents of Ooijpolder proved to be strong. Despite the major economic and demographic changes in the polder in recent decades – from a largely agricultural area towards a greater emphasis on nature conservation and recreation and the influx of many highly-educated people from the city to the polder – the residents were a relatively close community. This was largely a legacy of earlier protests against the development of Ooijpolder as a de facto urban extension of Nijmegen in the 1970s, the relocation of a bend in the Waal in the late 1980s (Warner et al., 2008a) and the dike reinforcement from the mid-1980s into the 1990s. The groups' feeling is encapsulated well in this statement by one polder resident: 'We have saved the polder many times. And successfully'.

Local group's motivation to act

The local groups' motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity.

Common purpose

The residents viewed the plan for emergency water storage as a threat to their polder. This brought about an increase in uncertainty as their houses and land might be flooded at any time and the economic prospects for the polder would be limited. Moreover, the landscape would be adversely affected by the construction of six-metre dikes around the largest villages. After state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen's visit to the polder when she displayed no empathy for the residents' interests, the local group labelled her 'the enemy' and set out to defeat the government plan. The common purpose of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.

Solidarity

The solidarity among the residents in Ooijpolder was strong, mainly because of their past experiences of opposing government plans. During the 20th century the residents had succeeded in changing government plans on several occasions. Their solidarity in opposing the latest plan was reflected in the petition signed by 5,045 residents, which was handed over to the state secretary during her visit to the polder, and the steady 400 strong membership of the local group.

To summarise, the local groups' potential to act was strong, based on a strong capacity to act and motivation to act. For an overview, see Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of the local group

Local group	capacity to act							motivation to act			potential to act	
	resources				trust	social identity		common purpose		solidarity		
	d	bo	br	l								
	++	++	+++	+++								
					++		++			++		++

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high +++ = very strong/very high
d = dispositional force bo = bonding force br = bridging force l = linking force

The analysis of the authorities' and the local group's potentials to act shows that the national government's potential to act proved to be weak, the provincial government's potential to act proved to be moderate and the local government's potential to act was weak, while the local group's potential to act can be considered to be strong (see Table 6.9).

Table 6.9 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government, provincial government, local government and local group

	capacity to act	motivation to act	potential to act
National government	±	±	±
Provincial government	+	++	+
Local government	±	+	±
Local groups	++	++	++

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

A striking outcome of the analysis of the authorities' and the local group's potential to act is that the national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction of an own narrative, although in the course of the

planning process it partly adopted the provincial's narrative), which resulted in a weak capacity to act. In addition, the national government apparatus had a weak organisational and personal motivation. The provincial government scored highly on coordinating mechanisms and consistency. It was able to use all possible coordinating mechanisms and to construct a narrative (for example, a Rhine discharge of 18,000 m³/s cannot enter the Netherlands smoothly) that was partly adopted by the national government, which meant that its justification for the plan (to accommodate a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s we have to implement emergency water storage) no longer held. The provincial government's moderate potential to act and the local government's weak potential to act did not explain their position in the public debate. Their interaction strategies and power building therefore have to be taken into consideration.

6.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action

In this section we analyse the authorities' organisational culture and the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action. The object of the analysis is the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action, the organisational culture of the provincial government and the impact of this on its action, the organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on its action and the cultural background of the local group and the impact of this on its action.

National government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

The natural landscape of the Dutch delta has been formed by the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt. Since the ninth century people have been increasingly making their mark on the landscape. The peat fens were reclaimed by digging innumerable field drains and drainage ditches, leading to an irreversible fall in the ground level, a process which continues to this day (TeBrake, 2002). In addition, there is a natural lowering of the land in relation to the sea level. The first dikes to protect the land from flooding were built in the 11th century. A large part of the Netherlands can therefore be considered to be a man-made environment (van de Ven, 2004; Saeijs, 2008).

This man-made environment was synonymous with a struggle against the water, which in fact was a struggle to survive. Keeping the water out meant that people could continue working on their land. Whereas in the past this fight was waged primarily by individual farmers or mutual associations, later managed by water boards, with the establishment of Rijkswaterstaat in 1798 it became a state affair (Disco, 2002). The establishment of a national institute put an end to the phenomenon of 'overdiking', a competition between water boards to raise dikes higher than their neighbours.⁸¹⁴ Rijkswaterstaat is to a large

extent responsible for the transformation of the Netherlands from a country affected by floods into a country that offers considerable protection from flooding. Whereas elsewhere the history of containing and managing water is often a story of conflict and struggle between the forces of self-interest and opportunities associated with 'progress' and community-based values (Donahue & Johnston, 1997), in the Netherlands it has been a chronicle of cooperation that has had a major influence on shaping the national democratic model. A government official: 'The country boasts a long tradition of independent water boards, an effective administrative culture with consultation, supervision, supreme control and implementation. Here, everything is related to water. Today there is a tendency to downplay our polder model of democracy, in which every stakeholder has to be heard, but it is really useful: you rely on others, otherwise you will drown.'⁸¹⁵ The keystone of Dutch water culture was the conviction that conflict, left unresolved, would ultimately undermine everyone's safety (Disco, 2006).

In assuming a leading role in water management, Rijkswaterstaat internalised the fight against water in its organisational culture. Nature, especially water, was an antagonist (the 'hereditary enemy') that took lives and property whenever and wherever it could. The classic hydraulic engineering tradition aimed to destroy this predatory 'nature' and replace it with a hydraulic culture. Since the 19th century this culture was 'fed' by graduates from the Civil Engineering Department of Delft University of Technology, which succeeded in establishing a monopoly on engineering posts in the organisation (Disco, 2002). In addition, Rijkswaterstaat's organisational culture was based on a historical consciousness that can be described best as 'it is our job'; in other words, the common good is our responsibility, we stand above competing interests.

Since the mid-1960s environmental groups and ecologists, who were employed by Rijkswaterstaat from the 1970s, also called 'green engineers', asked for policy changes. The critical social climate in reaction to pollution and damage to the natural environment as a result of the dominance of technocratic approaches prompted the government agency to replace the anthropocentric policy line with a more ecosystem-based approach (van Heezik, 2007). The organisation gradually became aware that it had to work 'with nature' rather than 'against nature' (for example, using sand as a natural buffer instead of asphalt dikes), and 'with society' rather than 'against society'. However, the extent to which this new approach will be integrated in its policy and its attitude is still unclear. While Rijkswaterstaat successfully integrated the 'back to nature' development into its official policy, it adopted a social engineering approach to achieving the objective of working 'with society', without devolving responsibilities.

During the change in policy towards building with nature, the organisation had to deal with its centuries-long 'resistance strategy' of building dams and dikes. The probability of flooding from the rivers or from the sea in the Netherlands has substantially declined since the last flood in the southwestern part of the country in 1953, but the risk of casualties and economic damage from flooding have become much greater since then

(ten Brinke et al., 2008a). In the Netherlands the minister of the interior is responsible for disaster policy, while Rijkswaterstaat and water boards are responsible for flood policy. The high water of 1993 prompted the national government to take action, including devolving responsibilities for flood preparedness and response to local authorities (ten Brinke et al., 2008b; Warner, 2008). The emergency plans hastily prepared by the local authorities were put into practice during the high water period in 1995 when 200,000 people were evacuated. The evacuation showed that flood preparedness and the response and recovery measures for extreme flood events are limited (ten Brinke et al., 2008b). Government authorities and the public are no longer used to dealing with the consequences of floods. The Dutch public's perception of the high risk of flooding had gradually ebbed away, along with its ability to cope with floods. The time when a rowing boat was standard equipment for those living in flood prone areas has long gone, along with hooks in the walls and ceilings to lift up furniture, and tiled floors. A recent study by Terpstra and Gutteling (2008) shows that the Dutch now have a low risk perception. A survey among Dutch households demonstrated that 73 per cent regarded the government as primarily responsible for protecting them against flood damage, and about 50 per cent viewed disaster preparedness as an equal responsibility between themselves and the government. Living behind dikes is not considered to be a problem as residents rely on the government and its expertise to prevent dike failures.

Government officials referred to this desire for absolute safety a 'struggle',⁸¹⁶ by which they referred to the paradox that Rijkswaterstaat's flood safety remit includes ensuring that everyone has 'dry feet' and 'protection against flooding'⁸¹⁷ while not acknowledging that 100 per cent safety cannot be guaranteed.⁸¹⁸ After finishing the Delta Works in the southwestern part of the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat even proclaimed that the country was 'finished with regard to flood safety'. A government official: 'The worst thing you can do'.⁸¹⁹ After finishing the dike reinforcement programme in the 1990s, Rijkswaterstaat's motto was 'we have never been safer, but we are still not as safe as we want',⁸²⁰ which paved the way for the announcement of a new set of measures based on a policy of river widening. In 1996 Rijkswaterstaat came up with the Room for the River policy for lowering the water levels by giving more room to the rivers. As government officials were not sure whether this river widening programme would be sufficient to accommodate a peak discharge (such as a Rhine discharge of 18,000 m³/s), the plan for emergency water storage was conceived to prevent the densely populated western part of the Netherlands from flooding. Social protest in tandem with objections by lower-tier authorities thwarted the central government proposals for designating calamity polders. In fact, Rijkswaterstaat did not have an adequate answer to the emerging disagreement about the need for the measure and its claim on land behind the dikes, which affected its sense of self-worth. Although it was well aware of the consequences – as one government official said, 'the problem has not been solved yet'⁸²¹ – it took a very cautious approach to public involvement in the safety chain (Warner, 2008).

Rijkswaterstaat can learn from British flood risk policy, which highlights the responsibility of the people to protect themselves and their properties by focusing more on risk

communication and options for citizens to insure their property (ten Brinke et al., 2008b). Apart from the fact that flood insurance does not exist in the Netherlands, such an approach would require a shift in Rijkswaterstaat's organisational culture from a paternalistic 'flood safety is government business'⁸²² towards an inclusive approach.

The impact of the national government's organisational culture on its action can therefore be considered strong.

Provincial government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

Over the centuries the relationship between national and provincial government has been fraught with tension. An illustration of this is the relation between the duchy of Gelre and the Habsburg Emperor Charles V in the 16th century. The duchy withstood the emperor twice by forming a large state along the borders of Charles's Habsburg territory, first on its own by expanding its territory, and later, when this failed, by seeking an alliance with the small neighbouring states of Kleve, Gulik and Mark. In 1579 when the northern provinces of the Netherlands united in the Union of Utrecht, the duchy of Gelre surrendered on specific conditions laid down in the Tractaat van Venlo. The aim of this agreement was to prevent Charles from incorporating the duchy into his empire and using it at his own discretion. Although Gelre was constitutionally and administratively bound to the central authority, it pushed the agreement to its limit, resulting in the duchy being split in 1581 (van de Pas, 2004:25-29) as laid down in the Plakkaat van de Verlatinghe (van Deursen, 2004:105). The larger part of the duchy broke with the Habsburg ruler while the rest continued to be part of the empire.

Gelre's opposition, however, proved to be a passing thing. After an attempt to seek an alliance with a German ruler it came to recognise that the Republic of the Seven United Provinces was the least worst option for retaining sovereignty. In this constitution, Holland was most powerful province. Six of the seven provinces were dependent on the union of the united seven and had to relinquish their sovereign status to the general authority, the States General. Unanimity was required as long as the republic was fighting for its survival and the protection and each province's rights and privileges were laid down in a treaty, which asserted their autonomy. This unity, therefore, served to maintaining the diversity. If any objective were to be given absolute priority over the means, the union would collapse. Conversely, if the means were to overshadow the objective, provincial independence would be put at risk. Therefore, it was important to adopt a middle course between these two essentially incompatible ideals. The use of coercion or violence would not prove helpful because the provinces retained their autonomy. This meant that decision-making on difficult issues involved consultation, compromise, reciprocal deals and give and take. The constitution prevented the concentration of power at all levels, not only at the level of the provinces, but also at the level of the nobles, the cities, and quarter meetings in each province (van Deursen, 2004:139-140).

Similar to its behaviour with regard to other states and provinces, Gelre followed its own

course in its relation to the local authorities, for example in the field of water management. It had a strong hand in a – for that time – revolutionary regulation for polders situated along the rivers in its territory. Following a Prussian model, Gelre drew up a ‘Regulation for the management of the river polders in Gelderland Province’ (*Gelders rivierpolderreglement*) in 1838. This document was based on the water board regulations of Kleve from 1767 and put an end to all historical rights. This legislation enshrined the equal rights of all citizens and made dike maintenance a common responsibility. Financing of the costs was based on a proportional relationship between interest and payment, a principle that still underpins the funding of Dutch water boards today. The regulations included uniform orders for governance and administration, which meant that the decisions and budgets of the water boards had to be agreed upon by Gelre. Water boards were divided into polder districts, village polders and polders outside the main dikes (*buitenpolders*). For the river district between Nijmegen and Kleve the new regulation meant that the *Circul van de Ooij*, which was situated in a part of the present-day Ooijpolder, became a polder district and Erlecom, actually part of Ooijpolder, became a polder outside the main dikes (van Eck, 2005).

Another example of the province’s influence in water management was the construction of the Panterdijns Kanaal, which was originally intended to be part of the defence line. The Dutch States commissioned fortress specialist Baron Menno van Coehoorn to reorganise the defence line. He started with a plan dating from 1681 for a canal between Panterden and Candia drawn up by the water expert Passavent. In 1701 the construction of the canal started under the express condition stipulated by the cities on the river Waal that the canal would be closed for shipping for commercial reasons. Therefore, the ends of the canal were closed and the water was regulated by sluices, and a dike on the east bank was not raised. The provinces of Gelre, Utrecht and Overijssel, however, were resolved to make a canal for shipping. Finally, in 1706 after receiving financial compensation, the cities of Dordrecht, Tiel and Nijmegen agreed. The dams at the ends of the canal were opened and the dike along the east side was raised. The canal was officially opened for shipping in 1708 (Janssen, 2003).

Today, the province of Gelderland is not known for its acceptance of state plans and procedures, such as the Betuwe rail freight line from Rotterdam to Germany (*Betuwelijn*), the Room for the River programme, the use of specific procedures for river plans and the plan for calamity polders,⁸²³ two of which were situated in its territory. As in the past, the organisational culture of the province of Gelderland is in many ways one of defending its own ideas. Not surprisingly, it made things hard for the national government, as Rijkswaterstaat found out, but the government agency framed it differently: ‘The province likes to obtain the money to do its own things.’⁸²⁴ Gelderland was one of the first provinces with an ambitious team of water experts who worked on a policy for a ‘robust’ water system that includes the three branches of the Rhine in its territory, the Waal, Nederrijn and IJssel, and is based on the river basin approach, which takes the whole river system into account. This was demonstrated by

its close contacts with the German federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and its contribution to the EU Floods Directive through one of its experts, who represented the Dutch provinces.⁸²⁵ The provincial water department was highly professional. Provincial officials were particularly focused on the challenges that national water policy presented to their province and sought to adjust the policy where it did not fit in with their own ideas.

As the province held the chair of the Upstream River Committee, its officials put forward their own view. In fact, the national government and provincial government officials had the same aim – a safe country – but with a slightly different accent. While the Rijkswaterstaat officials had to defend the public interest and comply with state policy and plans, the representatives from Gelderland made optimal use of the bargaining leeway afforded them by the provincial delegates to pursue their own course. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt: ‘The search for structural and safe solutions for the Netherlands was a message that I had to get across. In that process relevant contacts proved to be MPs, the National Administrative Council on Water (*Landelijk Bestuurlijk Overleg Water, LBOW*), and also the meetings of the Luteijn Advisory Commission, which I attended to prevent matters from going from bad to worse.’⁸²⁶ Soon after the launch of the plan for calamity polders it became clear that this plan would result in damage to the province of Gelderland, as it was not clear that it would meet the central government aim of accommodating a design discharge of 18,000 m³/s. Furthermore, it was not an optimal solution for the country. The provincial delegate: ‘I am not a person that covers his back by asking critical questions and then saying that I cannot do anything because it is up to the national government to decide. I consider it my duty to ensure that central government decides to adopt the optimal solution. If there is a decision, I am obliged to comply with it, but only after I have lobbied and exhausted all possibilities of appeal.’⁸²⁷

The impact of the provincial government’s organisational culture on its action can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Local government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

Ooijpolder and Duffelt belong to two municipalities, the municipality of Millingen a/d Rijn (about 6,000 inhabitants) and the municipality of Ubbergen (about 15,000 residents).⁸²⁸ The analysis focuses on Ubbergen because this municipality took a higher profile in the public debate on calamity polders.

Long before the establishment of the municipality of Ubbergen in 1818, when the villages of Beek, Ubbergen, Ooij, Persingen and Erlecom merged into one municipality, the presence of the city of Nijmegen was felt in Ooijpolder and other areas surrounding the city. In the second half of the 16th century, for example, the city assumed an active role in conflicts about water management, particularly concerning dike maintenance. It defended the interests of its residents who owned land or houses in Ooijpolder by taking on the local landlords, who were generally not concerned with maintaining the dikes to

prevent flooding or with repairing dikes after floods and preferred to leave the maintenance of the dikes, and the costs, to others. However, the city's access to Gelre brought this conflict to the attention of higher authorities. As the members of Schependom Nijmegen were faced the problem of overdue maintenance they assisted the landowners who lived in the city in the conflict and presented a petition to the Court of Gelre asking for the dike letter to be amended to rectify the failure of customary law. With the help of a commission new legislation on the dikes was prepared. In 1580 the Court of Gelre enacted a *Landtbrief des Circuls van der Ooy*, a revised version of the dike letter, which legislated for a range of water management and administrative arrangements. The *Circul van de Ooij* became a regional water board and the river dike in Ooij became a main dike, which meant that a dike chair had to be established. The *Landtbrief* established a fixed draining regime in the *Circul van de Ooij* along with other matters, such as the repair of dikes and the construction of sluices (van Eck, 2005). As a result, the landlords lost their power base.

At the beginning of the 20th century Nijmegen looked to Ooijpolder as an area for urban expansion. The city's first plan to annex Ooijpolder was presented in a letter to Gelderland provincial executive dated 3 January 1900. The city wanted to expand eastwards because 'the residents of the municipality of Ubbergen live too far away from schools and churches'. The municipality of Ubbergen reacted in a report dated 30 January 1900 that the polder residents' interests 'will be covered by the village council. For example, although the number of residents is limited, infrastructure for electricity will be laid on to the border of the city of Nijmegen. Besides, there are a few hundred hectares of open sites in neighbouring villages to the west of the city'. Nevertheless, in a law passed in 1914 the municipality of Ubbergen did lose part of its territory. It received financial compensation and a parcel of land of Ooijpolder from the city of Nijmegen in part exchange (van Eck, 1999). The province of Gelderland had managed to prevent the annexation of Ooijpolder.

In the 1960s, however, the city once again targeted Ooijpolder for annexation, but this time it was not the province of Gelderland or the municipality of Ubbergen but the residents who withstood the plan and got the housing minister to intervene. On 9 February 1970 he sent a letter to the city of Nijmegen in which he rejected Ooijpolder as a site for housing development. referring to its diversity of landscapes, including the push moraine and the specific characteristics of the river landscape, which were considered important to conserve (Bullinga & Offermans, 1993). In the meantime, the residents were also confronted by a plan for dike reinforcement. The mayor of Ubbergen ensured that they were represented in the discussion on the plans for dike reinforcement (Bullinga & Offermans, 1993).

The municipality of Ubbergen generally took a low-key profile when supporting the residents and in discussions with other authorities, but the government plan for emergency water storage prompted the municipality to adopt a more prominent role, led by its mayor. Nationally the municipality still operated in the background, but locally it

had a strong profile. Mayor Wilbers, who is known for his wilfulness (see Gemeente Ubbergen, 2008) was strongly motivated to profile himself as a people's keeper: 'For a mayor nothing is better than a near disaster'. He felt that the residents expect this from him: 'I am their spokesman. I have to make it clear that although rising sea levels necessitate government action, you cannot keep on raising the dikes. But he was not convinced of the usefulness and necessity of the government plan. 'I do not know what effect the measure will have. It has not been properly established whether the dikes would have to be heightened once again and what the effect will be of measures taken in Germany.' When he saw that the state secretary would not give way he assumed an active stance, but only to a certain extent. He took the initiative in forming an alliance of 14 municipalities, both Dutch and German, to commission a contra-expertise. The purpose of the study was to gather evidence to take the edge off the arguments for the need for emergency water storage by contesting the premise of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas. Wilbers believed an alliance with the riverine municipalities was needed because 'otherwise you will easily be charged with being a NIMBY. Here we call it NIMFABY, not in my front and back yard.... While people used to consider a flood to be an act of God, nowadays it evokes an aggressive attitude. You are the government, so you have to take make sure my parquet floor will not be flooded; that's the NIMBY response. The attitude of the residents' organisation High Water Platform is one of the reasons we have not been accused of a NIMBY response. In every war there are screamers and that was the role adopted by the High Water Platform, who attacked the government plan. I had to consult with the state secretary.'⁸²⁹

The impact of the local government's organisational culture on its action can be considered to be weak.

Local group's cultural background and the impact of this on its action

For centuries the residents of Ooijpolder have known what opposition means. Their polder was a theatre of conflicts in the field of flood protection, which were also bound up with disagreements about who has authority in the area. In the past the individual interests of the local lords were flatly opposed to regional interests. History shows that such conflicts could be resolved through the agency of the magistrates of the city of Nijmegen, who had direct access to the higher authorities, like the Duchy of Gelre and the King of the Netherlands. As a consequence the local lords had often to concede defeat. However, they were used to standing up for themselves and were not afraid to fight their corner (Roth et al., 2006a). The local lords and gentleman farmers, who owned most of the land in the polder, did not bother much about flooding. That was the concern of the leaseholders and labourers, who suffered the ill effects.

Later, despite the changes to the polder regulations on water management issues, money for dike repair was difficult to find, also after the 1926 flood, which was the last time Ooijpolder and Duffelt were flooded. The centuries of work on the river had changed the original broad river bed into a narrow channel. From the 18th century the river was

constrained to a narrow channel, but the risk of flooding remained. This put pressure on the relationship between the Netherlands and Germany, which was marred by long drawn out conflicts about drainage between water boards upstream and downstream. However, in the 20th century when the national border became the water management border the relationship between both countries improved. This is illustrated by the construction of the Dutch-German pumping station in 1933, which provided a common water drainage system to the benefit of the residents in the area (Roth et al., 2006a).

However, the fight against the authorities was given a new impetus from conflicts about territorial boundaries. The municipality of Ubbergen withstood the first attempt to annex Ooijpolder in 1900. In the 1960s the city of Nijmegen again attempted to annex the polder. Soon after the housing ministry rejected the plan for housing development in the polder Rijkswaterstaat presented a proposal to cut off the Waal curve near Groenlanden in Ooijpolder. Joint action by the residents forced the state secretary for water management to concede defeat. Plans for dike reinforcement emerged in 1985, and again between 1995 and 1998 when the Government adopted the Major Rivers Delta Plan (*Deltawet Grote Rivieren*) and the Flood Defence Act, which contained proposals for a dike reinforcement programme along the rivers, including Ooijpolder. Despite fierce protests by the residents of Ooijpolder, the dike reinforcement projects went ahead with some minor alterations and compensation for the affected residents (Bullinga & Offermans, 1993).

In 2000 Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage. Once again, the residents succeeded in resisting a government plan, driven by the confidence born of their historical winning streak, a strong drive to act as a group, their readiness to oppose whatever government without fear, and the skills at their disposal to influence decision-making.

The impact of the local group's cultural background on its action can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, with its tradition of intervention, Rijkswaterstaat's organisational culture had a strong influence on its action. However, in the emergency water storage case the organisation's position was weakened by disagreements between its own officials and with lower-tier authorities and citizens about uncertainties and the types of measures that would be most appropriate. The impact of the organisational culture of the province of Gelderland on its action was moderate, based on its long tradition of getting its views across, particularly in disputes with Charles V and Holland in the past and more recently in opposition to Rijkswaterstaat. The impact of the organisational culture of the municipality of Ubbergen on its action was weak because throughout the centuries it has not had a distinct 'voice'. Although its standpoint of 'no, unless' in the discussion about emergency water storage was clear and its position in the discussion reflected the solidarity among lower-tier authorities against the national government, the municipality's aim was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. The

cultural background of the local group had a strong impact on its action. Its strong culture of resistance found has its origin in various disputes with the national government, varying from opposition to housing development, shortening a river bend and dike reinforcement to the plan for emergency water storage. Apart from its resistance to the dike reinforcement programme, in which it achieved a few small successes, it won all these battles. Its strong cohesion and unity in fighting against government plans, also reflected in its organisation, made it a fearsome opponent.

6.2.6 Summary and discussion

The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study can be summarised as follows.

The interaction between the authorities and the local group in the Ooijpolder case study can be broken down into the interaction between the authorities and the local group and between the different authorities: the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local authority (municipality of Ubbergen).

The interaction between the national government and the local group can be characterised as conflict and debate, while the interaction between the lower-tier authorities and the local group can be characterised as collaboration. The interaction between authorities had various outcomes. The interaction between the national government and the provincial government resulted in debate, negotiation and dialogue, the interaction between the national government and the local government ended in conflict and debate, and the interaction between the provincial government and the local government led to dialogue and collaboration. The outcome of the interaction between the provincial governments was collaboration and between the local governments was dialogue and collaboration.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used two frames in its interaction with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It exercised a power frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The power frame was employed by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the person of the successive state secretaries; the identity frame was generally employed by government officials. The use of a power frame by the state secretaries left the officials little room to taking up another frame, such as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by government officials was therefore understandable as they had to deal with local and provincial authorities and the residents. The use of the conflict management frame and bridging strategies by the provincial government changed the interaction between the national and provincial government from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. The interaction between the national and local government remained one of debate as a

result of the national government's use of a power frame and an identity frame and the local government's use of an identity frame. In its interaction with the national government, the local government did not change its identity frame towards a conflict management frame, which had a negative impact on the interaction outcome, which was debate. In its interaction with the lower-tier authorities the local group employed a collaborative frame.

The national government built five types of power in its dealings with the local group (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability), while the local group built three power types (hindering power, knowledge power and media power; the latter two very often). The lower-tier authorities built two types of power in its dealings with the local group. The provincial government built knowledge power and sociability; the local government built legitimate power and sociability. The local group built one power type in its interaction with the local-tier authorities: sociability. The national government built three power types in its interaction with the lower-tier authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power), while the lower-tier authorities built four types of power in their interaction with the national government (legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and sociability).

The power building in the interaction between the national government and the local group had a considerable effect on their interaction outcomes: debate and conflict. The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national government and the local group's building of knowledge power and media power proved to be influential. The provincial government's building of knowledge power, media power and sociability in its interaction with the national government influenced the interaction outcomes, with substantial shifts towards debate, negotiation and dialogue. Its interaction strategies also contributed to these interaction outcomes. The interaction between the national and local government, which never reached a negotiated solution and remained stuck in debate, cannot be explained by their power building. These actors' interaction strategies therefore also needed to be taken into account (see above).

The analysis of the authorities' and local group's potentials to act shows that the national and local government's potential to act was weak, while the provincial government's potential to act proved to be moderate. The local group's potential to act can be considered strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms, consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative) and organisational and personal motivation, resulting in a failure to provide sufficient substantiation for the proposed plan. The provincial government's potential to act was moderate due to its extensive use of coordinating mechanisms and its consistency (to construct a narrative that a design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m³/s cannot enter the Netherlands smoothly, which was partly adopted by the national government) and the organisational and personal motivation. The local government's weak potential to

act was a result of its weak mandate and resource base and the absence of organisational ambition. The local group's strong potential to act was based on a strong capacity and motivation to act.

The analysis of the authorities' organisational culture and local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action shows that the influence of the national government's organisational culture on its action can be viewed as rather strong. Its engineering culture had a considerable influence on flood risk management practice. Rijkswaterstaat has a mandate for water safety, which is incorporated in its mission: ensuring that everyone has 'dry feet' and protecting the country from floods, but this cannot be guaranteed. Rijkswaterstaat views flood safety as government business and not something the public should necessarily be involved in. The impact of the provincial government's organisational culture on its actions proved to be moderate. It is used to getting its message across, in the past in its interaction with other provinces and Charles V, and today in its interaction with Rijkswaterstaat. Although the impact of the local government's organisational culture on its action was weak, its position in public debate clearly reflected the solidarity between the lower-tier authorities and the local group in opposing the national government. Nevertheless, the local government's aim was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. For centuries the residents of Ooijpolder were used to opposing government authorities, whether on water management or other issues, and were not afraid to defend their own interests. In the 20th century they had successfully opposed various government plans and when Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage in 2000 the polder residents succeeded once again. Their cultural background therefore had a strong impact on their action.

Discussion

The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study shows that the historical role of water boards in government–citizen relationships needs to be adjusted, knowledge rather than identity is the key factor in the government–citizen interaction, the local group's and local government's concern to avoid the charge of nimbyism (not in my backyard) was not convincing, and the actors used specific power strategies.

The history of Ooijpolder demonstrates that escalating conflicts in the field of water management were resolved at a higher level. The local lords' fierce defence of their own (individual) interest was flatly opposed to regional interests. Such conflicts could be resolved through the agency of the magistrates of the city of Nijmegen, who defended the interests of its citizen who owned land in the polder. They had direct access to higher authorities, such as the Duchy of Gelre and the King of the Netherlands, which resulted in the defeat of the local lords. Nevertheless, the local lords were used to standing up for themselves and were not afraid to fight for their own interests. Despite the changes to the polder regulations throughout the centuries, it remained difficult to find money for dike repairs, also after the 1926 flood. Since the 1953 flood in the southwest of the

Netherlands the country has largely banished the distress caused by flooding and has established a considerable degree of flood security. Rijkswaterstaat is to a large extent responsible for this transformation. It is therefore questionable whether collaboration as such is an important feature of water boards in government–citizen relationships (see Blockmans, 2009; Disco, 2006). Rather than being a forum for collaboration, the water boards turned out to be a relevant platform for authorities and landowners to discuss water issues at the local level. In particular, the combination of local decision-making and the possibility of regional and/or national intervention in the event of escalating conflicts proved to be effective.

The discussion on emergency water storage focused largely on the assumptions underlying the government plan, which indicates that knowledge was an important factor. Generally speaking, the national government is seen as being the repository of knowledge on river management par excellence, to which others must bow. This time it went differently. Lower-tier authorities and the local group did not accept the government's information and commissioned studies which they used to underpin their arguments. As a result, they became full discussion partners. By discussing standards, the dimensions of the designated areas for emergency water storage, and principles, the actors revealed the values they attribute to these subjects, such as 'the Netherlands deserves a robust river system with structural measures' (provincial government) and 'the national government is responsible for the safety of all citizens, not only for those living in densely populated areas' (the local group). The residents' arguments were based on their interests, including equity as basic principle for dealing with flood risk. Their connection to the area, their cultural background of opposing government plans and their solidarity, usually associated with emotions, were not brought into the discussion. This meant that the discussion was based on rational strategies rather than emotions. In the Netherlands it is a proven strategy of residents to take the authorities' argumentation as the point of departure and come up with alternatives. While the residents of Ooijpolder did the first, they did not do the second. They chose the confrontation tactic by calling the state secretary their 'enemy'. They used the media to get support and start a public debate. The expectation is that such an all-or-nothing strategy ends up with winners and losers. In this case, however, there were only winners: the national government did not lose face as the plan for controlled flooding was off the table thanks to a parliamentary motion, and the residents succeeded in their objective of thwarting the government plan.

The residents of Ooijpolder and the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen were afraid of being accused of taking a NIMBY (not in my backyard) position. As a consequence, in their communication with the national government the residents emphasised that they 'would basically be willing to make sacrifices in the interest of national security, if the arguments are based on solid grounds'.⁸³⁰ In addition, they chose to consult experts and adopt expert jargon in their communication with the national government. The mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen organised a contra-expertise in close

cooperation with Dutch and German municipalities to underpin his arguments against calamity polders. At the same time he took a low profile to remain on speaking terms with the national government. In the literature (see for example Dear, 1992) the NIMBY syndrome is associated with the first irrational reactions of residents when confronted by threats, such as government plans. It is the common-sense view that people react irrationally when they fall into the grip of emotional forces they cannot, or are unwilling to, control. Since emotion is commonly viewed as a disorganiser of ongoing deliberative behaviour, irrationality produced by emotional arousal will have a diffuse and impulsive character. However, as research by Damasio (1994) and others has shown, emotion is better treated as a precondition for deliberative behaviour, rather than as a disorganiser (Kühberger, 2002). Those who accuse residents of NIMBY behaviour are generally officials who view critical and opposing views of residents as obstacles to the implementation of their plans. According to community psychologists who have studied public reactions based on concerns about environmental threats, officials do not seem to understand that resolving questions about environmental threats goes beyond simply trying to convince the public of the validity of numbers derived from quantitative methods. Many also fail to appreciate public scepticism and do not understand how little these numbers seem to help people (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993).

When applied to the Ooijpolder case study we see that, apart from a few experts, the Rijkswaterstaat staff could not explain the numbers behind the statutory Rhine discharges of 16,000 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s, which were used to underpin the government plan for controlled flooding.⁸³¹ Models on individual and community dynamics that incorporate coping style, social support, uncertainty, attribution of responsibility, culture and context (economic, social, physical, environmental and political factors) suggest that responses to environmental threats follow patterns, are largely predictable, and are not as irrational as they appear (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). Although the idea of using science to quantify risks is appealing (for example the safety standards of 16,000 m³/s and 18,000 m³/s for the Rhine), risk assessment can be complex. An illustration of this complexity is uncertainty. Sjöberg (1980) states that even the best quantitative risk analysis is enveloped in uncertainty. In the Ooijpolder case, it was estimated that the safety standard of 18,000 m³/s would be reached at the end of the 21st century (100 years). However, the rationality of numbers does not relate to people's everyday lives and the choices they make; they are used to acting in accordance with the situation they believe in. In scientific decision theory this is rationality in its weakest form. A stronger interpretation of rationality is found in utility theory, which sees people as vigilant, calculating decision makers who assess choice environments with care, determine the probable utility associated with each possible choice and then choose to maximise their expected utility. However, the classical definition of rationality is blind to content and context (Kühberger, 2002). It is more likely that people's decision-making is shaped by situational recognition (matching features of the situation encountered to features of other situations that are already, at least partly, understood), personal identity (including all idiosyncratic factors that individuals bring with them into a social situation) and the

application of rules, such as explicit and codified guidelines for behaviour (codes of ethics or laws), but also the visible and explicit influence of social heuristics (such as 'women and children first') and habitual rituals (such as an equal division of resources) (Weber et al., 2004). This implies that the local group's and local government's fear of being labelled as exponents of NIMBY has no cogency.

Gambetta (1988) argues that societies which rely heavily on the use of power are likely to be less efficient, more costly and more unpleasant than those where trust is maintained by other means. This may lead to the hypothesis that there are two pathways: one via coercion, which does not always prove to be useful and effective, and the other via sociability. The Ooijpolder case study clearly demonstrates that sociability was built to a lesser extent than indirect coercive power and/or legitimate power. The interaction between the national government and the local group shows that distrust was prevalent. Sociability was used mainly in alliances or when partners expected to achieve a collaborative outcome, which turned out to be the case in the interaction between the provincial government and the local group, the local government and the local group, and between the lower-tier authorities. Here, trust in a positive outcome proved to be an important factor. The case thus confirms Gambetta's reasoning.

The analytical framework and ideas for further research

The analytical framework was successful in revealing that those opposing the government plan, the lower-tier authorities and the local group, worked in tandem. However, the role of experts inside and outside Rijkswaterstaat is not well covered in the analytical framework, which is based on a relationship between two parties: government authorities and the local group.

The analytical framework failed to reveal the discourse between the authorities and the local group. The questions remaining are at what moment the national government's narrative stalled and when the provincial government's story prevailed, how the experts' narrative received attention, and how this influenced the national government's narrative.

An idea for further research is the residents' conviction that uncontrolled flooding is to be preferred over controlled flooding. Relevant questions are: Do they think that an uncontrolled flooding will not occur in their lifetimes? Do they view uncontrolled flooding as a fact of life – something unavoidable that must be faced? and Do they not trust the government to use controlled flooding appropriately?

Chapter 7 Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study

The Terps⁸³² Plan in Overdiep Polder is a residents' initiative for a spatial redesign of their polder to make flood peak discharge possible.⁸³³ It contrasts with the other two cases, Dike Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder (Chapter 6), which are both government initiatives.

The case study covers the period running from the initiation of the terps plan in 2000 until the state secretary's decision to implement it in October 2008. Between May 2005 and October 2008, 15 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key persons, including the chair and vice chair of the resident organisation Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder*) (the latter was interviewed regularly since 2005), the two project managers (the first project manager was interviewed once and his successor three times), the provincial delegates (both from Noord-Brabant provincial government), the manager of the Project Department Room for the River (*PDR, Rijkswaterstaat*⁸³⁴), and the river branch manager of the same department (interviewed twice). Interviews were also held with four Rijkswaterstaat officials, an official from the province of Noord-Brabant, an official of the Government Service for Land and Water Management (*DLG*) and the deputy director and an associate of Habiforum.⁸³⁵ Besides the interviews, the research consisted of a literature study on Dutch river management and a desk study for which reports, letters, project documentation, articles and newspaper clippings were used.

7.1 Case narrative

The case narrative for the terps plan in Overdiep Polder includes a short review, a historical perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the residents' initiative and the description of the case from the government's point of view and the local group's position.

Terps plan in Overdiep Polder in brief⁸³⁶

Overdiep Polder is located in the province of Noord-Brabant, and is enclosed by the Bergsche Maas and the Oude Maasje, which form part of the Meuse basin. In the 1970s

technical interventions made the polder suitable for permanent occupation and year-round agricultural use. It is a small area: 550 hectares inside the dikes and a flood plain of 180 ha in the river forelands outside the river dike. The polder contains 17 farms, a marina and a military training area with an army barracks. In 2003 the polder had 94 inhabitants (Habiforum, 2003). Most farms are dairy farms of 25 to 40 hectares (partly owned in leasehold), each with between 30 and 100 cows. Some farmers combine dairy production with arable farming, cultivating maize, beetroot, peas, potatoes and other crops. The polder also contains two meat production farms.

Due to its favourable location on the Meuse, its earlier function as a retention area and the small number of residents, in the late 1990s the polder was designated as a 'search area' for river widening projects. The residents had not been consulted during the first survey of alternative locations for flood peak retention. Only the farmers' organisation ZLTO and the water board were initially informed. When a notice in the regional newspaper alerted the residents that the polder was a candidate for water retention, most were initially angry. The polder residents feared the water less than they feared the government (van Rooy et al., 2006). The farmers were especially apprehensive about a long period of uncertainty, which would have a negative impact on the future of their operations. Most of the residents were willing to resort to any legal means to block the government's plans. A few, however, saw new opportunities for their business. Pursuing action against the state would bring even more uncertainty, and the residents recognised the need for water storage in the public interest. Moreover, the government study was only exploratory, not a final plan. After intensive discussions the residents decided to negotiate rather than oppose the plans at any cost. They asked the provincial government to play an active role in planning the future of their polder. They formed the Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse Polder*) to represent their interests in the bargaining process with the government.

The establishment of the residents' group gave the residents an opportunity to develop their own plan for the polder. They developed a first draft of the 'terps plan' with the help of the farmers' organisation ZLTO. Later, they worked on an elaborated version of the 'terps plan' with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the provincial authority. The plan provides for the construction of artificial elevations along a yet to be constructed dike protecting the polder's southern perimeter to permit them to continue their farming operations during periods of flooding, which were calculated to occur on average once in 25 years. The northern dike would be lowered and a water inlet and outlet constructed to allow floodwater from the Meuse to flow right through the polder. This would achieve the principal project goal: reducing the water level in the Meuse by 30 cm. A second objective was to improve the agricultural structure in the polder by expanding the size of the farms. As there was not enough land to continue all operations (the plan anticipated a need for eight to ten terps for each farm) some of the existing farms would have to be phased out over time. Residents who wanted to discontinue their businesses or continue them elsewhere in the Netherlands or abroad

would be bought out by the province. Part of this land would be used to build additional infrastructure and the rest would be used to compensate the remaining residents for the reduction in the value of their land expected as a result of the flood measures. The remaining farms would therefore also have more land.

The terps plan meshed well with the government's desire for a new approach to water projects. The government-instated Water Vision group (*Bezinningsgroep Water*) classified the terps plan as a 'demonstration project' (*spiegelproject*) (Habiforum, 2003), an experiment in which governments work in close cooperation with residents on sustainable solutions for water management.⁸³⁷ Remarkably, facilitation of the planning process was delegated to the province of Noord-Brabant and not put directly under direction of Rijkswaterstaat, a novelty in Rijkswaterstaat's history.

After many conflicts, great progress had been made in negotiations between Rijkswaterstaat and the province, and between the province and the residents. Subjects for discussion included compensation for flood damage, compensation for those who intend to leave and those who want to stay, the design of the terps, the location of the farm buildings and the new dike. While most disputes were about the allocation of responsibilities between the government authorities, the residents remained focused and cooperated closely with the project manager and the provincial delegate, who assisted them as much as possible. The residents and project manager held informal meetings to prepare project decisions jointly. The residents put a lot of time and energy into the project, which would be not only in their own interests, but also in the wider public interest. The national government, which was in great need of a first real success in its new water policy, had no choice but to engage in negotiations with the affected residents. Moreover, it had to accept the inevitable uncertainties of such an open-ended process. In the coming period decisions will have to be made about who will stay in the polder and who will leave and the implementation of the terps plan. At the time of writing, the question of whether the plan will be a success for the government, for the farmers, or for both, remains unanswered.

Figure 7.1 The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder




Table 7.1 contains a process outline showing the different stages that can be distinguished in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study

Table 7.1 Process outline for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study

Process stage	Date	Method	Participants
Preparatory stage (February 2000 – March 2001)			
Launch of White Paper on Room for the River	28 February 2000	Presentation of studies at Loevestein Castle	State secretary of Water Management
Explanation of 'search areas' in Overdiep Polder, among others	May 2000	Information meeting	Provincial delegate province of Noord-Brabant
Publication report 'Overdiep... retention Polder?'	March 2001	Report	Farmers' organisation ZLTO in cooperation with residents
Development stage (April 2001 – June 2003)			
Development of terps plan in Overdiep Polder	October 2002 – June 2003	Design workshop with residents under supervision of Habiforum	Habiforum* in cooperation with residents
Decision-making stage (September 2003 – October 2008)			
State secretary's agreement with fore-runner status of terps plan in Overdiep Polder	2 June 2004	State secretary's decision	State secretary of Water Management
Signing of administrative agreement of terps plan in Overdiep Polder	14 December 2004	Administrative agreement between Ministry of Water Management and province of Noord-Brabant	Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and provincial delegate province of Noord-Brabant
Cabinet's decision Spatial Planning Key Decision Room for the River Part 1 includes terps plan in Overdiep Polder	May 2005	Cabinet's decision	Cabinet
State secretary's agreement with implementation of terps plan in Overdiep Polder	8 October 2008	State secretary's decision	State secretary of Water Management

*Habiforum is a non-governmental organisation for multifunctional land-use.

Overdiep Polder in historical perspective

This section sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the residents' initiative.

Overdiep Polder: one of the most recently inhabited polders

Overdiep Polder was one of the last polders to become inhabited in the western part of the Netherlands. It was created by the excavation of the Bergsche Maas in 1904 to improve the discharge capacity of the Meuse. Until the 1960s the polder was inundated each winter. After the completion of the Haringvliet dam in 1971, the polder was largely free of regular inundations. Until then, farmers had used the land only for extensive farming activities, mainly as hay meadows (Habiforum, 2003).

After the construction of a sluice in 1975 and a second land reallocation, 17 farming families from the nearby villages of Waspik and Raamsdonk settled in the polder. Although they were used to living with high water and land reallocations, moving from a village to Overdiep Polder was quite a radical step in those days. As one farmer said, 'My land was spread out over great distances; part of it was even as far as 12 kilometres away. I found that difficult. When the land consolidation project began, one of the farmers had decided to try his luck in the province of Flevoland. He received a subsidy to build a farm and could buy land close to his house. We regarded this as a strange decision, going so far away. But after some time I decided to call the farmer who had moved and asked if I could come and have a look at his new farm. After I went there with my wife, we became convinced of the advantages of moving elsewhere. They had a new farm, with the land very close. If he wanted to harrow and then found that the land was too wet, he could just turn around and come back the next day. I could not do that. After a twelve kilometre tractor drive to my land I would never return before having finished the job. These things made us, and also other families, decide to move to Overdiep Polder.'⁸³⁸

Having moved from the same villages at the same time and working in the same small polder, the farmers are a close-knit community. This is manifested in the close social relationships and cooperative networks between the farming families, especially between adjoining farms. The close social relationships are based on kinship ties (several families are closely related) and bonds of friendship (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008). Examples of reciprocity are help with harvesting, occupation of the farm during holidays and daily help with work on the farm. During one very wet summer season one of the farmer could not harvest his potatoes on time, so other farmers helped him, one with a powerful tractor, others with old but useful tools. At that time every bit of help was welcome. Some families also help each other during holidays. On one occasion the children of one family slept in their neighbour's farm so that it was occupied, making a short holiday possible for their neighbours (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

Overdiep Polder covers an area of 550 hectares, with an additional 180 hectares of river

forelands. The polder falls within two municipalities, the majority belonging to Waalwijk and the remainder to Geertruidenberg. Currently the polder contains 17 farms, a marina with 340 berths, and a military training site with army barracks covering about 4 hectares.

The total population is 94 people (2003). Many residents are relatively young (30–45 years old). Most have a dairy farm with 30–80 cows and around thirty hectares of land. Some farmers combine dairy farming with other agricultural activities like cultivation of maize, beets, peas and potatoes. There is also a pig farm and a beef farm. The current land use and settlement pattern dates from the early 1970s, when the land was drained and reallocated (Habiforum, 2003).

Farm sizes vary from 25 to 40 hectares. Not all the land is owned by the farmers who live in the polder: 60% is privately owned and 40% is worked in leasehold. Several farms work land in the river forelands or inside the dikes in leasehold. While the State Property Department (*Dienst der Domeinen*)⁸³⁹ owns the river forelands, the owners of land in leasehold are primarily small private investors, municipalities, the church and charitable institutions. In the past, farmers who died often bequeathed land to the church. The church still derives income from this land through leasehold contracts for land and milk quota tied to the land. These leasehold contracts often cover a six year period and are routinely continued as long as the contracting parties agree to do so. Finally, some farmers living in the polder own, lease or rent agricultural land outside the polder (Habiforum, 2003).

Government perspective

In this section the terps plan in Overdiep Polder is described from the government's point of view.

From 'search area' to residents' initiative

As the small number of residents in Overdiep Polder and its historical water retention function made the polder a suitable location as a floodwater retention area, it was included as one of the 'search areas' in government studies carried out in the mid 1990s to find more room for the river (see below). As described in Chapter 2, after the 1995 high water episode, government plans to strengthen and raise dikes and construct emergency dikes along the main rivers (Major Rivers Delta Plan, *Deltaplan Grote Rivieren*) were rapidly endorsed by Parliament and the Council of State.⁸⁴⁰ The high water had been a window of opportunity for pushing through radical flood protection measures (Meijerink, 2005; Wiering & Arts, 2006). However, water experts at Rijkswaterstaat also feared that a continued policy of dike reinforcement would be difficult to pursue without losing public support, because of its negative impact on the river landscape. In addition, climate change scenarios, including rising sea levels and falling land levels, suggested that a continued focus on dikes would not be sufficient to

accommodate the expected discharges. Moreover, the increasingly elevated dikes could create a false sense of security.⁸⁴¹ Breaches might cause rapid inundation and a 'bath tub' effect, from which residents would not be able to escape in time.⁸⁴²

In response to the 1995 high water episode, the government had already raised the safety standards from a river discharge of 15,000 m³/s to 16,000 m³/s for the Rhine near Lobith⁸⁴³ and 3,650 m³/s to 3,800 m³/s for the Meuse near Borgharen.^{844, 845} This standard, laid down by law, formed the basis of the new Room for the River policy (*Ruimte voor de Rivier*). In the meantime, additional studies were made – Room for Rhine Branches (*Ruimte voor Rijntakken*) in 1998 and Integrated Study of the Downstream Rivers (*Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivieren*) in 1999 – to investigate how a Rhine discharge of 16,000 m³/s could be safely accommodated without heightening the dikes. The first study examined the upstream stretches of the rivers, the second the downstream sections. The latter study identified Overdiep Polder as a possible retention area. Only a few interest groups had been involved in the study, including representatives of the farmers' organisation ZLTO and the water boards, but it did not pass unnoticed. A resident read in a local newspaper that Rijkswaterstaat was looking for more room for the Meuse in their polder. When he informed his colleagues, most of them were surprised and indignant about it. Fearing a threat to the continuity of their farming activities, they decided to try to find the best lawyers in the country to block this process.

However, the study was a preliminary investigation rather than a final plan. The outcomes were presented by a Noord-Brabant provincial delegate, Jan Boelhouwer. Afterwards, two residents asked him if they could join the brainstorming session on finding room for the river in their neighbourhood. They recognised the important public interest involved in these flood protection measures, but doubted the government's ability to decide quickly on the issue. According to the chairman of the residents' group, 'most people in the polder were more afraid of the government than of the water' (van Rooy et al., 2006). They also sensed that embarking on the road to litigation would probably delay decision-making, but also start an even longer period of uncertainty that could lead to the demise of their farming enterprises. Therefore, these farmers opted for a critically cooperative rather than a defensive approach. 'If something has to be done, then preferably quickly and on our conditions', was their basic attitude (Slootweg, 2004). They established a residents' association, Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder*) to represent their interests in negotiation with the government.

Meanwhile an appointment was made for a meeting between provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer and four polder residents. They asked the provincial delegate if they were allowed to make their own plan to combine living and farming in their polder with provisions for accommodating flood water and if so, on what conditions. With the help of the farmers' organisation ZLTO the residents developed a first draft of the 'terps plan'

with the following conditions: 1) compensation for all farmers involved; 2) a flood risk of once in 25 years; and 3) a speedy planning process, because a lack of clarity is destructive for entrepreneurs.⁸⁴⁶ Later, they worked on an elaborated version of the 'terps plan' with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the provincial government.

The province accepted the plan as a point of departure. The plan sought to combine the objective of water storage with strengthening the agricultural structure, in other words to invest in farms so that they would be economically viable in future. As several farming families would leave the polder, their land could be bought by the government. Some of this land could then be sold to farmers remaining in the polder to improve the viability and economic prospects of their farms; other areas could be used for the new infrastructure needed for the terps plan (terps, dikes, roads). The residents currently living in the polder would have priority over 'outsiders' in buying land from those moving out (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

Plan embedded in policy

The plan for the polder came at a time when water management policy was open to approaches. The Water Vision Group⁸⁴⁷ was looking for projects that could put the new water policy into practice. Provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer proposed the residents' plan for Overdiep Polder. The Group was surprised by this plan,⁸⁴⁸ which it considered suitable as a pilot project to illustrate the new approach to water management.⁸⁴⁹ He also informed the state secretary about the plan.⁸⁵⁰ She replied that the plan had to be anchored in the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River and proposed to put the plan before the Upstream Rivers Steering Committee⁸⁵¹ as this Committee had been asked to draw up a regional report on options for river widening. The provincial delegate who chaired the Committee carried out the state secretary's instructions and the members gave the green light for an experiment (Habiforum, 2003). The terps plan thus became a demonstration project (*spiegelproject*, literally 'mirror project'⁸⁵²), an experiment in which the authorities work in close cooperation with residents on sustainable solutions for water management.⁸⁵³ The premise was that residents should be the starting point for the planning process, a new element in Dutch water management. The national government provides the primary infrastructure, but increasingly devolves responsibility for implementation to lower-tier agencies, in this case Noord-Brabant provincial government, which became the first provincial authority to take charge of a river project. But while the provincial delegate arranged for a central role for the residents in the planning process – which is very uncommon – he ran the risk of alienating all the government authorities. In taking this action he stuck his neck out and displayed unusual initiative in using his both networks and the government hierarchy⁸⁵⁴ to get the plan institutionally embedded.

After the publication in March 2001 of the ZLTO report in which the residents presented their conditions for redesigning their polder as a retention area, it took more

than two years to get the plan accepted by various government authorities and incorporate it into current policy. In autumn 2001 the mayor of Waalwijk invited the chair of the Water Vision Group to visit Overdiep Polder to discuss why the project was not moving forward. Behind the scenes the province was pushing and pulling,⁸⁵⁵ but Rijkswaterstaat officials were trying to thwart the terps plan, for example by expressing doubts about its usefulness and diplomatically suggesting how it could be rejected (Slootweg, 2004). From June 2002, when it became clear that the effects of climate change would substantially increase the discharge of the Bergsche Maas, the project started to move.

Nevertheless, eleven versions of the project proposal were required, five of which after the state secretary had agreed to it, before all it was accepted by all the government authorities involved. It took a further 16 months (from July 2001 to October 2002) before the demonstration project could be implemented (Slootweg, 2004). The Downstream Rivers Steering Committee,⁸⁵⁶ first chaired by provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer and later by his successor Lambert Verheijen, stipulated that a feasibility study would have to be carried out before it could adopt the plan.⁸⁵⁷ In the meantime the residents worked on the development of the terps plan for water storage in their polder under the supervision of Habiforum. They finally chose the option which located 8 to 10 mounds along the newly built southern dike and lowered the northern dike, in which an inlet and outlet are constructed. The plan would lower the water level of the Bergsche Maas by 30 cm and it proved to be cost-effective.⁸⁵⁸

Although the government authorities involved were positive about the outcome of the demonstration project (Habiforum, 2003), the residents worried about how their plan would fit in with other planning proposals. This was not without reason. The Wijde Biesbosch Area Commission, for example, was working on an 'area plan' (*gebiedsplan*) in which two side channels were planned, one of which in the Overdiep Polder to lower the water level in the Bergsche Maas.⁸⁵⁹ However, this proved unacceptable to the residents. They complained that the municipality of Waalwijk was not forcefully promoting the terps plan in the Commission while it was chaired by the mayor of Waalwijk. As a result, the Commission was not willing to take the terps plan into consideration.⁸⁶⁰ This was resolved through the efforts of their water expert, an associate of Habiforum, the provincial delegate and the chair of the Water Vision Group. The water expert pulled strings to make the plan a subject for discussion.⁸⁶¹ The province then rejected the plan for two side channels and opted for the terps plan in Overdiep Polder. From the province's point of view, this option would make a greater contribution to reducing the water level in the Bergsche Maas than the proposed side channels. Furthermore, this plan would cost less.⁸⁶² Later, the province argued that 'the execution of two projects along the Bergsche Maas could not be explained to the general public....In fact, the side-channel project was overtaken by events.'⁸⁶³ The province convinced the state secretary to postpone the plan for the side channels indefinitely while waiting for the alternative plan for the Overdiep Polder.⁸⁶⁴ One of the

considerations was that if the plan for side channels was realised, other measures would have to be taken⁸⁶⁵ to meet Rijkswaterstaat's conditions in the Room for the River policy. Finally, in his capacity as chair of the Area Commission the mayor of Waalwijk received a letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group in which he was politely but firmly called to account for his position and role in the process ('I knew that you would carry considerable weight').⁸⁶⁶ Following the decision by the Wijde Biesbosch Area Commission to change their position and support the province's standpoint,⁸⁶⁷ the mayor yielded to the political pressure and became an advocate of the residents' plan once again (Slootweg, 2004).

There were more hurdles ahead. First, development of the terps plan was not allowed to begin until the Government had finally adopted the national spatial planning instrument SPKD Room for the River. There was no money available⁸⁶⁸ since the budget for the Room for the River projects had not yet been approved by the Government (SPKD procedure).⁸⁶⁹ The cost of the residents' plan was estimated at between 90 and 150 million euros.⁸⁷⁰ The province was prepared to provide an advance of 10 million euros.⁸⁷¹ From the Rijkswaterstaat's point of view, the plan was too expensive (Slootweg, 2004) in relation to the total budget for Room for River measures.^{872, 873} As the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder was one of 39 Room for the River projects, the government authority did not want to set a precedent. The plan was then given a low priority.⁸⁷⁴ A meeting with the provincial delegate and the state secretary revealed that the topic was not to be off-limits.⁸⁷⁵ It proved that the state secretary's main concern was that giving the plan a formal status ahead of the SPKD would contravene the existing regulations,⁸⁷⁶ but this could be solved procedurally.⁸⁷⁷ As soon as the terps plan was given front-runner status the budget was arranged. However, the provincial contribution of 10 million euros was disputed. 'It was money from the national government which the province was told it did not have to pay back, so the province kept it. The province now says that it is its own money, but this is a matter of perception.'⁸⁷⁸ Finally, on 2 June 2004 the state secretary agreed to a proposal by the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee to nominate the terps plan as front-runner project.^{879, 880} From that point the Committee's influence decreased.⁸⁸¹

Another hurdle was the administrative agreement between the national government and the province, which took six months to finalise after many meetings and telephone calls. As one provincial official said, 'At least ten drafts were made; alterations included words, details. It was clear that some government officials had some difficulty with it. There was no question of buckling down and getting a draft ready within a week.'⁸⁸² Finally, on 14 December 2004, the administrative agreement between the ministry and the province was signed.⁸⁸³

All in all, three years passed without any visible progress for the residents and no start had yet been made with getting the plan through all the necessary required procedures.

Getting the plan through the procedures and overcoming ‘teething troubles’

Although known for her firmness,⁸⁸⁴ the state secretary could not speed up the slow progress of the terps plan through the required procedures, nor was she able to help to overcome the ‘teething problems’⁸⁸⁵ that emerged during the planning process. Like the preceding phase to get the plan approved, the future of the terps plan was mainly in the hands of Rijkswaterstaat officials. The principal problems to be tackled were the project auditing (the auditing method and frequency of reporting) and the environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure (which variants will be studied). Most of these problems led to disputes about responsibility between Rijkswaterstaat and the province,⁸⁸⁶ which proved to be an extra obstacle to accelerate the process.

As the terps plan was the first project to be delegated to the province, the project auditing became a disputed issue. This was closely related to the question of how to deal with responsibility. Although the national government was used to entering into contracts with government authorities on various topics, this was the first time in its history that the Department of Water Management had signed an administrative agreement with the province. The contract covered just a single sheet of paper and listed the main agreements. From the viewpoint of Rijkswaterstaat this proved to be a very narrow basis to work on. It had just been reorganised and it wanted to exert tighter control over the process.⁸⁸⁷ Its main argument was its responsibility to Parliament. ‘What was required was a clear description of the relationship between the national government and province, what the project was about, which options would be studied and how to audit the project, because we have to manage the project planning, the approach and the risk management.’ Everything had to be audited externally, including the property issues and compensation, and it turned out to be a full review: ‘this is running smoothly; that could be better’.⁸⁸⁸ Rijkswaterstaat and the province finally agreed to a compromise. The province continued to report to the state secretary every six months (rather than every three months, which Rijkswaterstaat preferred), but in line with Rijkswaterstaat’s auditing requirements (‘It is useless to stick on your own rules and regulations’).⁸⁸⁹

An obligatory step in the planning of infrastructure is the EIA procedure in which various alternatives are studied. However, the residents had already bypassed this stage and stuck to their terps plan, saying there must be a way to adapt the EIA procedure. The province was amenable to their argument and proposed studying three variants for the construction of the inlet and outlet and the number, forms and locations of the terps.⁸⁹⁰ Rijkswaterstaat, however, did not agree to this. Finally, the government agencies agreed to a compromise in which the terps plan would be the point of departure for the EIA procedure, in which four variants would be studied.⁸⁹¹ While the government authorities felt confident about the negotiated solution, the residents considered it to be ‘wasting money on something that you already know’.⁸⁹²

Avoiding setting precedents

Other disputed issues included the land value (how to value land) and property assessment (is the provincial regulation or the Rijkswaterstaat regulation applicable).

Land valuation and property assessment were disputed issues, because these proved to be within the competence of both the provincial government and the national government. The terps plan requires a restructuring of the polder, including rebuilding farms and reallocating land. A flexible plan that causes minimal disruption would be needed to ensure undisturbed continuation of farming operations during implementation. Land will be needed for new infrastructure (dikes, terps, roads and water-related infrastructure) and for expansion of the farms that will continue in the polder. As only some of the residents will remain in the polder, land transactions will be an important element in the implementation of the project to give those who stay an opportunity to expand their enterprises. Strengthening the farm structure is generally seen as the only way to ensure they have an economically viable future, which is needed to justify the project investments (Habiforum, 2003). In order to operate as flexibly as possible and buy out families that decided to move or to stop farming, the province drew up regulations to acquire their land at an early stage, even before the national decision-making on the SPKD Room for the River and the project had been completed (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). These 'anticipatory purchases' (*anticiperende aankopen*) offered residents the opportunity to look for alternative locations in the Netherlands or abroad at an early stage, and allowed the province to use the land for relocating enterprises, land exchange and reallocation. Those who decided to stay could sell their property (farm buildings) to the province, but continue to use it until they moved to a terp (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). However, there were many ways of dealing with such land transactions. They could either be concluded on the basis of agricultural value (*agrarische waarde*) or market value, or on the basis of compulsory purchase value (*onteiningswaarde*), the former being much lower than the latter. The project manager estimated the difference at 25 to 30 per cent.⁸⁹³ The various parties directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of the project had different approaches to this issue. Whereas the province takes the compulsory purchase value as its point of departure for land acquisition, the Government Service for Land and Water Management (*Dienst Landelijk Gebied*, DLG), which is involved in habitat development projects, takes a different approach. Although DLG was not yet involved in Overdiep Polder it kept a close eye on the development. Generally, it regards compulsory purchase as a measure of last resort if voluntary agreements and incentives do not work. A DLG official stated that the province's approach could easily create precedents for future projects in the Room for the River programme.⁸⁹⁴

The residents demanded a purchasing policy based on the compulsory purchase value of their property, and stated that they had always been clear on this point (van Rooy et al., 2006). At the same time they feared a difference in purchasing policy between land inside and outside the polder. Some residents not only owned land inside the polder, but

also in the surrounding area. It was important for those who decide to move to know whether the province would buy all their land or only the land they own inside the polder. The province stressed the need to provide the residents with the best possible help in looking for solutions, which meant that it intended to buy not only their land in the polder but also their other land (with assistance from DLG, for which this is part of their core business for habitat restoration and creation projects) if the farmers concerned want this (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

Regarding land values, tensions arose between the provincial government's limited leeway in offering flexibility and incentives to residents and the residents' conditions, and between central government control over the process (by Rijkswaterstaat) and the decentralised implementation (by the province). Furthermore, while the province wanted the residents to decide on their future as soon as possible, some residents might want to postpone their decision for personal reasons or to influence negotiations (see 'Residents' perspective' below). The province opted to acquire the land at the compulsory purchase value, but this changed following central government intervention. For the time being this friction between the national and provincial government was solved by establishing a Property Coordination Team (*Coördinatie Team Vastgoed*),⁸⁹⁵ but the tension between the province and the residents continued. The province offered 10,500 euros per cow and four euros per square metre (agricultural land value), but the residents did not accept this. 'We asked for a second opinion and this was 15,000 or 16,000 euros per cow. With the provincial offer you neither can stay nor leave.'⁸⁹⁶ Although the province promised to obtain a second opinion and that the final price would be a realistic value ('we review current land prices; if our estimate turns out to be too low than we may amend it'), the residents' dissatisfaction with the provincial offer remained. 'The impression is that apart from the residents everybody will be better off. In that case it is useless to continue.'⁸⁹⁷

Further negotiation and fine tuning of the terps plan

In 2008 new disputes arose between Rijkswaterstaat and the province concerning the increased project costs (how to economise), the new river guideline containing engineering and design specification, such as the materials to be used in dike construction (the extent to which it applies as it leads to a considerable increase in project costs), the policy objective of 'spatial quality' (how far this guidance is applicable as it goes against other government regulations), and the reduction in water level resulting from the plan (30 cm in the original plan; 27 cm according to later calculations by Rijkswaterstaat and 28 cm calculated by consultants).

In spring 2008 the province submitted a draft plan for the polder that met 80–90 per cent of the original objectives. The project manager: 'We made clear that if Rijkswaterstaat wants a 100 per cent match with the new river guideline, the other objectives [such as spatial quality] would decrease towards 20 per cent. We presented it as a package deal, but this was not considered acceptable. From Rijkswaterstaat's point

of view, the first priority is the effect on lowering the water level. We had to prove that the package deal was the way to meet the various objectives.⁸⁹⁸

Apart from the new river guideline, inflation correction, earth moving, prices of land and real estate and higher wages all led to an increase in the project costs. The project manager: 'A major part of the budget will go on the special clay required by the river guideline, which is only available in Germany. As we were afraid that building the dike with lower quality clay would not be approved, we included the heaviest dike option using the best clay. But we want to discuss about other options because the price is so high.'⁸⁹⁹

As spatial quality is the second objective of the Room for the River programme it has to be included in the design of the plan. The concept of spatial quality is connected to notions of functionality (practical value), attractiveness (perception) and sustainability (future quality), and may be interpreted in different ways. This vagueness has also a function: it makes context specific interpretations and negotiations about objectives possible. This combination of safety and spatial quality objectives is designed to make the river landscape viable, sustainable and attractive (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 2007). To implement this in current plans a Q-team (landscape quality team) was established to advise on this subject, which meant a new player in the policy field. In 2006 the influence of the Q-team was becoming apparent. The contacts between the residents and the national landscape adviser were laborious (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). The project manager: 'The Q-team was disappointed with our design of the plan. They said it was too vague and they wanted to see detailed maps. Our route was a different one. We focused first on the procedural part of the planning process. The ideas of the Q-team did not fit in at all with those of the province or the residents. We talked about this openly, also with the ministry. Finally, our landscape designer and the Q-team arrived at a negotiated solution. The spatial quality objective came in halfway through the process and we had to meet it somehow.'⁹⁰⁰

The effects of the terps plan on the water level were originally calculated at around 30 cm. The project manager: 'We have tried our utmost to achieve that number, but even if you demolish everything the maximum effect would be 27 or 28 cm. For example, the demolition of the army barracks will lower the water level by 1.5 cm, but the army asked for compensation of 6 million euros for the new build. Rijkswaterstaat then said: "Just don't do it". Then there's the war monument. Demolishing that gains a further 0.9 cm reduction. If the terps were to be built close to each other you win a few more millimetres, but the effect is minimal. The only solution is to relocate the dike more towards the Oude Maasje, but then you lose some spatial quality and part of the planned habitat development area. We work "area specific", in other words, all objectives run parallel and at the end a maximum might be achieved of 80–90 per cent. This implies that everyone will have to make some concessions. The residents knew that; 95–98 per cent of the original plan has been retained and they accepted that a 100 per cent match

would not be realistic. But now we have to convince the others.’⁹⁰¹

The increase in the project costs of the terps plan (125 million euros instead of the expected 86 million euros) led to the question of which government authority has to pay. Rijkswaterstaat used this in the discussion about who is responsible for the implementation. ‘Rijkswaterstaat said: “You [the province] could implement it, but then you have to take on the risk”. We [the province] thought: “OK, we have some money, but to take on the risk for a government project for which we are the executing agency? It is a state responsibility! We won’t do that.” We negotiated and arrived at the solution of economising as much as possible (111 million euros proved acceptable) and both the water board and the province became responsible for the implementation phase.’⁹⁰²

After the state secretary agreed to the plan study in October 2008, negotiations between the province and the residents were directed at compensation measures concerning the purchase of land and real estate, the distribution of the terps, and the construction of the terps and dike.

The arguments

Department of Water Management and Directorate-General for Water Affairs

Various state secretaries were involved in the terps plan. The first agreed to the experimental status of the terps plan, the second approved the front-runner status of the plan, and the third approved the plan study. Whereas the first and third lacked vigour, the second dared to show leadership.⁹⁰³ However, realising the terps plan was primarily a job for government officials.

The second state secretary was the most explicit when she said during the annual ‘Mirror Day’ organised by Habiforum in 2003 (to discuss/review the various demonstration projects (*spiegel projecten*)): ‘In an unusual way residents have taken the initiative for the redesign of their polder.’⁹⁰⁴ From their point of view it was not a question of whether the terps plan would be implemented, but when and in what form. Although she was not certain about the budget⁹⁰⁵ and decision-making in June 2004 she was convinced of the need for this sort of creative thinking. ‘I am not employed to be creative with water; that job is better done at the local level.’⁹⁰⁶

The director-general for water affairs, who was the contact person for Noord-Brabant provincial government to evaluate the progress of the terps plan, confirmed that the Overdiep Polder was in fact the first ‘experimental garden’ in which the responsibility for planning has been delegated to the province. ‘Traditionally we did it ourselves. As we want to learn from these experiences we asked Habiforum to reflect on the process. I am satisfied with the experiment. What we learn with Noord-Brabant we may apply at a larger scale in the Netherlands’ (Habiforum, 2006).

Rijkswaterstaat

The delegation of the terps plan to a lower-tier authority was not undisputed among Rijkswaterstaat officials. An opponent: 'I always said: "Rijkswaterstaat has to take the lead, along with a steering group." But no way, it must be totally different. The provinces have never done such a job, but they want to. "We are going to do it", they said. But everybody with a bit of experience knows that some things can better be done by others. It is better to form a good project team; then it is up and running. We have completed many projects this way.' According to this government official it became too complicated when the residents asked for full participation. 'I would have done it differently: make a survey of the farms, give the residents a bag of money, construct the terps for those who want to stay and let them build their own farm buildings. I would even venture to bet that nobody will remain, and then you have an unoccupied area.'⁹⁰⁷ However, others viewed it more positively. 'People in Overdiep Polder looked at the opportunities underlying the threat of making room for water. Instead of waiting until the government had made a decision, they initiated their own plan. This pays off as it is partly an agricultural reconstruction and for most of them it offers new prospects for the future.'⁹⁰⁸

The terps plan was new in many ways. First, residents initiated a plan that will be implemented; second, the province was in charge of a river project; third, during the planning process many aspects emerged which required further research⁹⁰⁹ and adaptation of rules and regulations;⁹¹⁰ and fourth, it demanded a new working style. The last three were acknowledged by the Room for the River programme manager. 'I found it challenging to be a front runner. They are the first to face teething problems and face a situation in which they have to invent the wheel. These situations emerged because the nature of the Room for the River programme – creating space for the river – and the decentralised implementation of the measures are both new. This implied that you do not always have a standard solution. That is sometimes hard for front-runner projects, but other projects can benefit from the way they learned how to deal with specific problems.... Sometimes, this process was one of trial and error, but we need to give each other a helping hand. This is an unfamiliar and new way of working in water management.'⁹¹¹ Writing on his blog, the programme manager showed his communicative side. In daily practice, however, he proved to be a tough negotiator who stands for the government interest and a traditional way of governing.⁹¹² But he was well aware that compromises are inevitable. In his field the manager is known for being verbally adept in the sense that he is open to other opinions and able to negotiate a joint solution.⁹¹³ On the terps plan the programme manager said: '[Since 2006] there has been a regular project manager who knows how to run a project, whereas his predecessor was really a policy-maker. Now there is an atmosphere of trust. Provincial delegate Annemarie Moons and I are in regular telephone contact.'⁹¹⁴

A government official: 'The formal line runs from Rijkswaterstaat to the province. And the province organises the process. Apart from the fact that we have an opinion on that,

it is the province's responsibility.' He also mentioned the different roles played by Rijkswaterstaat in the process. 'We have different roles: a controlling role that implies that each project has to deliver progress reports about the planning, the budget, spatial quality, the hydraulic engineering aspects, effectiveness and risk management, and a facilitating role, but this has to be developed yet.' About the terps plan, he said: 'My opinion of the terps plan is that it does not matter whether it is a sensible choice or not. As a government official my job is to make choices within certain conditions. It must be accountable to society and the politicians make the final decisions.' His reaction to the issue of disputed accountability: 'I thought I was facilitating and not directive, in other words, I said: "We disagree on many issues, but if you discuss them as early on in the process as possible they will not be consequential. They will be resolved."' ⁹¹⁵

Noord-Brabant provincial government

From the very beginning the Noord-Brabant provincial delegate, Jan Boelhouwer, was the contact person for the residents in Overdiep Polder. He managed to get the plan accepted by other government authorities. He found this to be a hard job. He felt that the Rijkswaterstaat officials had a 'not invented here' attitude. ⁹¹⁶ He explained: 'I was not surprised when the state secretary presented a map of the Netherlands with large areas coloured blue, but it scared the residents. From my weekly cycle tour I know Overdiep Polder well, and I was deeply impressed when the residents showed their ideas to build their farms on terps. After the intense media exposure in the beginning, the daily routine set in. The government authorities looked at each other and made an inventory of all sorts of negative arguments to avoid having to stick their necks out, such as: it is expensive; we don't need to implement it for the next twenty years; it is not our ministry's responsibility, but yours. No admiration for the residents, no new thinking, no learning experiment that pays off in follow-up projects. And then the costing of the plan, which consultants showed was so high because of the inclusion of contingency plans and contingencies for contingencies.' ⁹¹⁷ The action taken by the residents of Overdiep Polder was very uncommon. He described his motive for helping them as follows: 'The government's intention to make areas suitable for floodwater retention stirred the residents in Overdiep Polder to initiate their own plan to meet their wishes and secure clarity about the status of their polder for possible flood risk measures. While this is entirely reasonable, we as government authorities are not very responsive in clarifying this type of question. Problems need to be answered adequately by setting clear conditions for the use of areas for flood risk management. We need to learn to deal with uncertainties and to be decisive about them. It is not fair to shift the disadvantages [of such measures] onto the residents.' ⁹¹⁸ He noted that Rijkswaterstaat took a less constructive attitude, ⁹¹⁹ which he believed had to do with the hierarchical structure in which Rijkswaterstaat was used to operating and its feeling that it was losing control. ⁹²⁰

It was the job of his successor, Lambert Verheijen, to get the state secretary's approval. He was not confident about the state secretary's official reaction during the annual

‘Mirror Day’ in 2003. ‘The good news is that she thinks that it is a likely project that could serve as an example. The bad news is that she is not willing to spend any money on it. That is disappointing for the residents, who made a good plan and prefer to start at once.’⁹²¹ Some progress was made following a meeting between the delegate and the state secretary in spring 2003 in which the state secretary said that the issue was not ‘off-limits’.⁹²² Finally, after various meetings and letters⁹²³ the terps plan was incorporated into the advice by the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, which the state secretary approved. Verheijen commented that ‘Rijkswaterstaat found it very difficult to share the planning of the project with the province’.⁹²⁴

The third provincial delegate in charge of the terps plan, Annemarie Moons, had the same proactive attitude as her predecessors. She is proud of the project. ‘First, because the farmers’ plan still stands; second, we are looking after the residents and all are treated properly; third, we have always had the farmers’ support. We had some difficult moments, but we did not fall on our face. Furthermore, for all parties it has been a creative process that focused on multifunctional land use, combining agriculture, water storage, nature and recreation in the redesign of the polder. This required some hard thinking.’⁹²⁵ According to her, the relationship between the province and the residents is not always harmonious and there were often tough confrontations.⁹²⁶ With regard to Rijkswaterstaat, her experience was that Rijkswaterstaat ‘always started with a rigid attitude. Rijkswaterstaat polices the planning process like a terrier. But Ingwer [the Room for the River programme manager] can give ground; he is rather careful.’⁹²⁷ She emphasised that ‘during negotiations it is crucial that you understand each other’.⁹²⁸ Apart from a cooperative attitude, the provincial delegate knew that the atmosphere is an important factor in relationships. For example, she resolved disputes over dinner in a restaurant to avoid excuses like ‘I have no time’ and seized the opportunity to come to a better understanding with her conversation partner.⁹²⁹

The first project manager for the terps plan was a provincial official. From his point of view the biggest innovation in the planning of the terps plan was juggling with the many legal procedures. ‘If they are all followed in sequence, it will take more than ten years to complete the reconstruction of the polder. The art is to synchronise and combine the procedures without making mistakes that can be punished by the Council of State. However, this required a ‘front-runner mentality’ by all the government authorities involved (government decision makers and government officials) and the residents (van Rooy et al., 2006).

His successor was appointed from outside the province. He was very supportive of the residents and the terps plan. ‘The key is to keep talking to the residents. Some 50 to 60 per cent of my working hours are devoted to the residents. I am well aware that you can keep on communicating with other government authorities and your own organisation; it could take up all your time. But that is not what I want.’ He did not want to have to say ‘the operation was successful, but the patient died’. ‘If I did not appear in the polder

or contact the residents, they would alert me to the need to stay in touch to avoid disagreements of conflicts in future.⁹³⁰ He admitted that ‘the residents’ trust has been based mainly on what they see in practice.’⁹³¹ The relationship with Rijkswaterstaat was reasonable when it was about ‘the day-to-day wheeling and dealing. But when it comes to issues like lowering the water level it proved difficult. They then tended to fall back on their Rijkswaterstaat reflexes. But the province is not part of Rijkswaterstaat.’⁹³² He explained: ‘Their argument is that they have to be in control because Parliament wants to know what is happening. Our defence is: “You are allowed to be in control, that is OK, but we have an administrative agreement with you. This implies that the project has been decentralised and that we make our own administrative judgements. There is no going back on this decision. We would not accept this.”’⁹³³ At the same time he qualified this statement. ‘It is easy to criticise Rijkswaterstaat. But I see it differently. Rijkswaterstaat has the assignment to realise 39 river projects before 2015 and within a budget of 2.2 billion euros. In fact, the government authorities have a very narrow assignment. As a provincial government we stand at the heart of society. We therefore have a different remit; we would sooner say ‘this is not possible’, while Rijkswaterstaat would say: “You have to do it”. Moreover, we are closer to politics, not only in the region but also at a national level.... To get things done the playing field has to be wider and Rijkswaterstaat has to be accommodating, which means we have to “push”.’⁹³⁴ His personal objective is to show that the province is able to lead a river project.⁹³⁵

Municipality of Waalwijk and municipality of Geertruidenberg

Mayor De Beus of Waalwijk qualified the residents’ condition that the flood frequency should not exceed once in 25 years. ‘Nature cannot be tied to legal frameworks. But if nature is forced to exceed the norm, appropriate damage compensation must be arranged.’⁹³⁶

The responsible executive councillors of Waalwijk and Geertruidenberg were happy with the project and the integrated approach. ‘The common goal of flood control has been met.’ They welcomed the fact that the farmers’ initiative was based on seizing opportunities rather than resisting threats, resulting in the preservation of farms. From their point of view, the provincial government proved itself capable of implementing river projects. ‘The province is the bridge between national and lower-tier government authorities. It quickly assesses the various issues at stake and listens carefully to the region, and the provincial delegate is always willing to explain the ins and outs of the project to the residents. As municipalities we cooperated by passing responsibility for incorporating the terps plan into the current local land use plan (inpassingsplan)⁹³⁷ to the province. This proved to be advantageous, because the province made an overall plan for the whole area, the first in Dutch history.’⁹³⁸

Residents' perspective

In this section the terps plan in Overdiep Polder is described from the residents' point of view.

Negotiating blue services

The terps plan, a farmers' initiative, makes retention, or rather 'flowing with the river' (*meestromen*), possible, while also protecting property and guaranteeing the socioeconomic continuity of the farms. Such local initiatives are quite new in the water world and form the basis for experiments with more interactive forms of policy-making and planning. Although the parties agreed to the project goals, the points of departure of the parties in the Overdiep project are quite different. What the government regards as 'flood risk management' is in the eyes of the residents concerned primarily a government intervention that presents both opportunities and threats to their daily life, their property and the continuity of their farms. The government priority is finding spatial options for flood protection by adapting the 'green' functions of agricultural land in such a way as to accommodate 'blue' functions. For the residents, selection of such measures might imply a long period of uncertainty and doubts about the future, a disincentive to investments in their farms and decreasing property prices. For them, therefore, these are primarily negotiations about their property and property rights, their future social and economic security, and the continuity of their enterprises (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

What about my cows?

A few interest groups, like the farmers' organisation ZLTO and the water board, knew about the government intentions for water storage in the region. Sjaak Broekmans from Overdiep Polder was a member of both organisations and was therefore acquainted with the ideas.⁹³⁹ But this did not mean that the message did not shock the residents. His neighbour Nol Hooijmaijers: 'It was a bitter pill for me to swallow. We thought that we might stay here for two or three generations. When you get home you realise what it means. I thought, "What about my cows?"'⁹⁴⁰ It is a typical human characteristic to resist such threats, but that is not what he wanted. 'You have to recognise the opportunity,' he said. He remembered it well. 'It was a warm day. For a while he was thinking about how to deal with this water storage issue. He sat under his chestnut tree when Sjaak Broekmans passed on his bike. He asked Sjaak to join him and they started listing the pros and cons of redesigning their polder for water retention. At that moment the terps plan was born.'⁹⁴¹ Looking back at that period he said: 'When we got over the initial shock, the phase of contributing ideas started soon afterwards. Frustrate the plans is of no help. Besides, the government could use their power of compulsory purchase.'⁹⁴²

Broekmans and Hooijmaijers decided to work together on their terps plan. They took the initiative and established the residents' organisation Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Belangenvereniging Overdiepse polder*), with Sjaak Broekmans as chair and Nol Hooijmaijers as vice chair. The support of the provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer proved

to be indispensable. He treated them as serious partners and was available in case of emergency. Once on a Friday evening Nol Hooijmaijers called Jan Boelhouwer about a dispute among the farmers about one of the options for water storage. As promised, the provincial delegate came to the polder the next day. He confirmed that the disputed option would never be taken seriously.⁹⁴³ With the help of farmers' organisation ZLTO the residents concluded that combining water storage and agriculture would work in their polder⁹⁴⁴ under the following conditions: 1) compensation for all farmers involved; 2) a flood risk of once in 25 years; and 3) a speedy planning process as a lack of clarity is destructive for entrepreneurs.⁹⁴⁵

The residents' role

From the beginning the residents demanded a key role in the planning process. It was their condition for cooperating with the authorities on realising their plan. They wanted to be part of the project organisation, not in a traditional advisory group or 'sounding board' (*klankbord group*) but as a full member of the project group, a role usually reserved for officials of the government agencies involved. From the experience of some members who held positions in various government authorities, for example in Waalwijk Municipal Council and the water board, they knew that crucial project decisions are prepared at the project level. It would therefore be possible to influence decision-making if they could take part in project decisions. While the residents were represented in the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep*, ABG), their water expert, who was also their confidant,⁹⁴⁶ participated in the official supervisory group and the steering group. In the latter he participated firstly as an observer and later as adviser. The participation of the residents in the official supervisory group and the advisory role of the water expert in the steering group were a source of tension between the government authorities and the residents and between the government authorities. All the parties finally agreed to this arrangement, although some with reservations.⁹⁴⁷ The residents also arranged a series of informal meetings (called SNP meetings after the initials of first names of the two residents Sjaak and Nol and the water expert Peter) in which the project manager and provincial officials were also present. These meetings usually took place prior to the formal meetings.⁹⁴⁸

During the planning process it became clear that the residents' input would be crucial, not only on the issues of property and tenure, animal welfare and regulations, but also because of their knowledge of the area, the logistics of the farms and not least because of their entrepreneurial mentality, their willingness to negotiate and skill in resolving conflicts. The complex regulations and variety of policy fields involved proved to be a perfect context for practical 'hands on' entrepreneurs used to remaining focused on the long term and averse to too much detail. Besides, the residents were very receptive towards all the project partners and to questions from media, researchers and others. They were willing to embrace anyone as an owner of the project, whether a government authority or consultant, which proved to be a useful strategy. Who does not want to be the owner of a successful project?

Internal coherence

Although the residents were a small group of farmers, it could not be assumed without question that all the residents would support the terps plan during the whole planning process. From the start in 2000 the board of the residents' organisation did not expect this. After the first few years in which the project did not move forward, the first resident moved out. He did not accept the residents' organisation's policy of focusing on embedding the plan in the formal decision-making procedures and government policy. Other residents also considered leaving the polder at difficult moments when the interests of the group seemed to contradict their private interests. Some of them stipulated impossible conditions in private negotiations with the province ('he has euro signs in his eyes'⁹⁴⁹). These residents were seen by the group as simply wanting to 'get their own way'. As the vice chair of the residents' group said, 'They offer resistance; if they don't it might be disadvantageous later'.⁹⁵⁰ One resident moved out, but knew that his brother, with whom he co-owned a farm, would remain a member of the residents' association and would keep him informed. An important factor in the internal cohesion of the residents' group was the bonds of friendship between the residents. In particular the weekly sewing circle in which all the women in the polder met each other was crucial (Provincie Noord-Brabant 2008). For the province it did not matter whether a resident was a member of the residents' group. The provincial strategy remained the same: group matters were discussed with the residents' group, individual matters with the resident in question. For those who wanted to stay in the polder, membership of the residents' group proved to be particularly important when their future livelihoods were up for discussion, such as the design of the terps, the dike and polder, the allocation of land and the implementation of the project.⁹⁵¹

Replacement of the project manager

In their relationship with the province the residents were not afraid to discuss personal matters, such as the functioning of the project manager. After a good start, their relationship with the project manager became strained, because he focused more on internal matters than on the project. His often vague responses to residents' questions⁹⁵² concerning progress with the project led to questions about his passivity. Another complaint was that he adopted a risk avoidance attitude. The residents therefore asked for him to be replaced. Although it was an unwelcome message for the provincial delegate, she finally accepted the residents' argument and the residents' profile for the new project manager: a young and audacious leader. The newly appointed head proved to be the right man for the job.⁹⁵³

Other issues were also disputed. Some of these are discussed below, including the valuation of land inside the dikes and land outside the dikes, other consequences of water storage, the 'all-are-equal' principle and the continuity of the farms.

Land valuation

The valuation of the land inside the dikes and outside the dikes proved to be a delicate

question as the land is a main source of income for the residents in Overdiep Polder. The value of the land is determined mainly by its quality, the size and shape of parcels and elevation, but its location in relation to the farm is also important. Land near a farm has a higher value than a more distant field. Apart from land inside the dikes of the Overdiep Polder, the farmers also use some 180 hectares of flood plain outside the dike, which is regularly inundated during winter (two or three times a year for several days or weeks). Four of five farmers use this land, most of which is state property. Generally, this land is of lower economic and market value than land inside the dikes because of the flood risk. Flooding means that the land can be contaminated with pollutants. The risk of this is relatively high along the Meuse because it contains sewage discharges from various large cities in Belgium and nutrients from fertilisers applied to agricultural land in the river basin upstream. These pollutants can cause damage when farmers grow maize or potatoes on land outside the dikes and the crops are then considered to pose a risk to human health. The farmers therefore do not use this land as intensively as land inside the dikes, over which they have more control.⁹⁵⁴ Implementation of the terps plan implies that land currently located inside the dikes will become land outside the dikes. The question then arises of how to value this land after the plan has been realised. The answer to this question can be found in the 'regulations' drawn up by the residents and the province. However, these leave much room for further negotiation, interpretation and debate.

The province intended to include land inside and outside the dikes in a land consolidation scheme. The objective of this reallocation of land was to give owners and tenants land near their farms. This meant that the future terps and farmland would have to be divided in such a way that each farmer would have a suitable parcel. Reducing the number of farm enterprises to eight or nine would make reallocation in accordance with farmers' priorities easier: they wanted to have land close to their farm buildings to make grazing possible. If more farmers opted to stay in the polder, the land could only have been allocated in very long plots stretching across the breadth of the polder along a length of almost one kilometre. This would seriously complicate putting the cows out to pasture, as cows will not cover such distances and part of the grazing land would remain unused.

Because of the water retention function of the polder, land inside and outside the dikes will have the same value, which means that the value of land inside the dikes will decrease. As the expected flood frequency is once in 25 years, it is uncertain in which season flooding will occur. High water during the cropping season is rare; winter or early spring is more likely, which will probably result in limited damage. As it is also difficult to estimate the damage resulting from the deposition of silt and sludge and the damage to fences and watercourses, the land valuation surveyors assessed the reduction in value as a result of all relevant aspects, such as damage and consequential losses.

The parties involved focused on two options for compensation for damages caused by planning decisions (in this case a flood risk measure). The first option is to compensate the farmers in advance for future damage through the payment of a lump sum. They can invest this money directly or set up a fund. The alternative is to provide compensation payments after each flooding event. As the administrative costs of an event-based form of compensation will probably be higher as after each flood all the damages will have to be assessed, this option was not favoured by the government authorities. They wanted to classify such events as 'normal entrepreneurial risk' under existing procedures for compensation for total damages caused by flooding beforehand. Under the first option the national government offered compensation amounting to a 5% reduction in the value of the land. This was not acceptable to the residents, who claimed a much higher percentage, although they did not want to fix this percentage at that stage of the negotiations (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). Finally, the residents chose the alternative (second) option of 100 per cent compensation.⁹⁵⁵

Other consequences of water storage

Negotiations about property not only concern crucial decisions related to land and real estate, but also a more distant future in which the use of the polder for temporary water storage may become a reality. Actual use may bring new threats and uncertainties related to the polluting impact of the river water on (grazing) land, crops and products, such as milk and meat. In their negotiations with the provincial government, the residents proved to be keenly aware of the possibility of polluted sediment and polluted water damaging their future farming operations. The residents demanded clarity on this issue, pointing to other river flooding cases, such as the Elbe.⁹⁵⁶

The flooding of farmland is not unusual in the Dutch river landscape. Farming on the regularly inundated land outside the river dikes is quite common, and has never caused great difficulties for farmers. Most farmers in Overdiep Polder share a long history of delivering their milk to the same milk cooperative. According to this company, milk from cows grazing outside the river dikes is seldom rejected, although these areas are flooded once or twice every winter. However, the Overdiep farmers regarded this as a serious point in their negotiations with the province. They demanded reliable estimations of the environmental impact of using the polder for water storage and its consequences in terms of environmental and food safety regulations.

The issue was crucial for those who were considering staying in the polder. They would only stay on the condition that a clear arrangement was made on the reduction in land value, damage compensation and marketing restrictions related to food safety. Most of them were in principle in favour of the government compensation for loss of value and damage in a one-time payment in advance on the basis of a negotiated agreement. At the same time, they doubted how it would be possible to estimate and deal with risks pertaining to agricultural production. A resident: 'If the polder is used for water storage at the end of the winter, this means that we run the risk of having to do without the first

mowing period of the year. In order to be able to deal with such a situation, we always need to have a stock of dry fodder available that is sufficient for one year.”⁹⁵⁷

While the residents did not easily accept the uncertainties relating to such issues, and wanted to distinguish them from ‘normal entrepreneurial risk’, the provincial government wanted the opposite. The project manager: ‘The farmers asked things like, “If we cannot continue production, will you buy up everything from us?” We cannot do that, of course. There are two tracks in dealing with this: first, reduce this issue to the dimension of normal entrepreneurial risk; second, devise a regulation for compensation. My preference would be to buy it off once and for all, which has the advantages of a lot of money for the farmers and no legal procedures for the government in future. This would mean that this is reduced to a normal business risk, for which the government will be partly accountable’ (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). As stated earlier, the residents chose for an event-based 100 per cent damage compensation.

Same rights, but not equal

The residents’ organisation realised that guarding the interests of all farmers was crucial in elaborating the various options and incorporating them into the Room for the River programme. Efforts were geared to getting all the farmers ‘on board’, even those who intended to move and had apparently less interest in the outcomes of the design process of the terps plan. Although discussions about design options were not very relevant to them, negotiations about procedures and compensation were. Therefore, the strategy was to focus first on reaching a general agreement on the terps plan and then the design of the terps, dike and polder.

Although the province intended to treat each resident equally, this proved to be difficult in practice. Each individual resident’s situation is different, despite the fact that the conditions set by the residents themselves were the point of departure for the planning process. The residents negotiated a ‘new for old’ arrangement (the opportunity to sell their old farm and build a new one) under which those who intended to move would be compensated. However, the number of residents who can stay is limited by the number of terps. If more residents want to stay, the principle of free choice and equal treatment will come under pressure.

The provincial government’s need for clarity about which farmers will move and who will stay and the differences in the intentions, strategies and initiatives of the residents for dealing with the terps plan led to differences in the opportunities available to individual residents to negotiate their future. There is a fixed budget (89 million euros) for the planning (3 million euros) and implementation of the terps plan (86 million euros), including the anticipatory purchase of land from one resident in January 2006. Additional money became available later for other anticipatory purchases. However, the residents did not know the provincial budget and its purchasing strategy. Also, the division of the residents into those who want to stay, those who have already stopped

dairy farming, and those who intend to move out undermined the 'all-have-the-same-rights principle'. Those who want to stay have to negotiate a price for their land and farm buildings that is sufficient to buy newly parcelled land, a terp and some extra land to ensure they have an economically viable enterprise. Those who have already stopped dairy farming have no other choice than to move out of the polder, because the terps are reserved for dairy farmers. Residents who decide to move to another location in the Netherlands will be compensated with land: between 30 and 40 hectares per farming family, and another five hectares as additional compensation. Residents who intend to emigrate and start a farm abroad (for example in Denmark, Canada or Portugal) will be bought out in such a way as to make this feasible. There are also differences between farms in terms of ownership and leasehold structure, the quality of the land, crops cultivated, kind and number of animals, and value of infrastructure. In addition, the location of the current farm is important. Some farms are located where the new dike will be built; others are in the middle of the polder or near the flood plains along the Bergsche Maas. The land reallocation and the new parcelling will be crucial. Those living where the new dike will be built and who want to stay may claim a terp nearby. 'We must be honest, all farmers are not equal. If terps are going to be constructed along the dike as planned, those who live there now and intend to stay will prefer to keep their own land. It will be extremely difficult for another farmer to claim to a terp there. The province said that all farmers have equal opportunities...In fact, all may have equal rights, but not equal opportunities. This awareness of existing differences becomes increasingly apparent as we move towards the final choice [of whether to stay or move].'⁹⁵⁸

Finally, the group of residents is not homogenous in terms of household composition, ownership of the enterprise, plans, ambitions, objectives and ideas and expectations about the terps plan. Each resident has a different starting position, strategy and objective in these negotiations. Much depends on the negotiation process between each resident individually and the province (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

Property, uncertainty and continuity of the farm

The choice residents have to make between staying in the polder and moving out is complicated by a number of crucial issues that are not primarily to do with the prospect of 'living with water', but rather with the future of the property and the continuity of the farming enterprise, property transfer across generations (inheritance) and the presence or absence of children capable of and willing to take the farm over, and social networks, kinship and family relations. Continuation of production may require investments in farm infrastructure to increase production capacity or meet legal requirements on environmental protection and animal welfare. While the project puts pressure on residents not to make such investments shortly before project implementation, the uncertainty about future options inside or outside the polder may induce residents to continue investing. Although other residents and the officials saw this as loss of capital (the new infrastructure will increase the sums needed to purchase

these residents land), they also understand that some farmers cannot run the risk of their farm enterprises stagnating. Issues of property transfers from one generation to another and of the distribution of property among heirs may also influence decision-making about farming. For example, uncertainty about long-term continuity of a farm due to the young age of the children and suddenly changing family circumstances may be an important source of doubt about staying or moving away. With the option of transferring the farm to the children still very unclear, changing family circumstances may put pressure on the family to sell all their property in Overdiep Polder and continue farming on another farm.

Inheritance conflict is a crucial factor in decision-making about the future. If a farmer has several children who want to take over the farm, this might complicate decision-making. If there are no successors, buying a terp to continuing farming will be questioned by other residents. Moreover, conditions for succession laid down in a will may complicate a purchase. An example is a provision requiring the proceeds of selling the farm within a certain period of taking it over to be shared between all the beneficiaries of the will (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).

Emerging new objectives and procedures

New objectives and procedures emerged during the planning process. This is exemplified by the design of the terps made by the Q-team appointed by the government to ensure that landscape quality was properly addressed in the plan (see also government perspective). This team proposed a uniform terp design with a big farmhouse, without taking into account the residents' views. The province's response to this design proposal was to tell the Q-team to deal with the residents because they were responsible for the terps plan. The residents were clear: they could not afford such a farmhouse ('this would cost an additional 1.5 million euros per farm'). The dimensions of the livestock shed proposed in the plan were not sufficient to meet the minimum legal animal welfare standards. Furthermore, the proposed location of the farmhouse was too far from the shed and 9-metre-high trees were proposed around the terp, which they did not prefer because they wanted to see their cows. Furthermore, this 'green wall' was designed without an opening at the back and a slanting slope to provide access for cows and machinery. Although the residents were not happy with this, they knew that a completely satisfactory solution was not realistic and so they accepted the planting around the terp, but they arranged for an opening to provide access for their cows and machines. In addition, they did manage to obtain a reduction in the size of the farmhouse and an entirely free hand to design their own yard.⁹⁵⁹

Cumbersome government bureaucracy

In October 2007 the vice chair of the residents' organisation invited a journalist from a national newspaper to interview him about the slow progress being made with the project. 'After seven years', he said, 'Overdiep Polder has become a sort of place of pilgrimage for the famous Dutch hydraulic engineering works. After French and Belgian

television, we had journalists from Le Monde and The Guardian. Busloads of students from abroad have also come to look at Overdiep Polder, an area with grazing cows and a few geese.' According to him the dominant style was now the characteristic Dutch bureaucracy: 'We are up to our ears in memorandums, meetings, reports and procedures. The innovative approach to water management in the terps plan still depends on piles of paper and a scale model. That takes so much time; it is really unbelievable. After World War II half of Berlin was rebuilt in twelve years. What is the reason for waiting for more than 14 or 15 years to reconstruct our polder of 550 hectares? The reason is that we are a front-runner project that stands for an innovative approach to reducing flood risk. Planning procedures used to be time consuming, but now it will take even more time because of the unique character of this front-runner project.'⁹⁶⁰

In October 2008, a year after this interview, the state secretary gave the go-ahead to implement the project. The residents are now waiting to cut the first sod. They believe it might happen any time now.

The arguments

The chair of the residents' organisation

Sjaak Broekmans is the chair of the residents' organisation. 'Most people in the polder were more afraid of the government than of the water. Since the provincial delegate, the mayor and even the state secretary really wanted to listen to our story, this distrust turned into a feeling that we were being taken seriously. Naturally we do not determine what will happen here, but without our cooperation nothing will happen. Although all the media reports might suggest that the project is a fairy tale, this is quite the wrong impression. It demands much of the residents, because cooperation with government authorities is difficult. They think in years and in paper, whereas we are concerned about the continuity of our farms each year, and for us paper is a necessary evil.' (van Rooy et al., 2006). 'At the beginning, the terps plan did not match Rijkswaterstaat's objectives. I can imagine this, because they were used to making their own plans. Heaven and earth have been moved to get the terps plan through. We finally succeeded because Rijkswaterstaat backed down. Although the plan has been approved there is no reason for celebration. Seven years ago we made exactly the same plan that has now been offered to the state secretary [submission of plan study in spring 2008]. Why did it take so much time [to get it approved]? For the residents this is the main obstacle. Entrepreneurship, just getting things done, is what I miss in Rijkswaterstaat. The delay has cost a lot of money as real estate prices have risen by 30 to 40 per cent over the last two years. And how can we quickly buy a new farmhouse [in the current market]? It is the procedural prying that annoys me.'⁹⁶¹

The vice chair of the residents' organisation

Nol Hooijmaijers plays an important part in his position as vice chair. In fact, he is the informal leader of the farmers as he prepared the residents' standpoint, took on a leadership role in negotiations and developed strategies and follow-up steps in the project.⁹⁶² 'There is neither a NIMBY (not in my back yard) effect in Overdiep Polder nor the intention to lodge an objection with the Council of State. More than that, the residents have cooperated from the beginning on the redesign of their polder as a retention area and initiated a plan to rebuild their farms on terps. We thus collaborated in solving a public problem which is not ours. We contributed to the reduction of flooding upstream so that those people can keep their feet dry. If we fill our polder full of water, this might lower the water level near the city of Den Bosch by as much as 30 cm in the event of flooding.'⁹⁶³ The farmers who stay cannot use the land for arable farming, only dairy farming will be possible. The quality of the water from the Meuse is not good enough for arable land.'

He was well aware that Rijkswaterstaat hampered the planning process, particularly during the initial years. Apart from obstructive tactics used by government officials, including continuously altering drafts of the administrative agreement,⁹⁶⁴ he noticed the use of other tactics such as the high turnover of government officials involved (five representatives from Rijkswaterstaat were moved to another position in six or seven years), not turning up to project meetings, not adequately replying to emails and questions, not reading project documents and reports and not being sufficiently informed about the project.⁹⁶⁵ With regard to the question of the responsibility for implementing the project, his response was that if the decision to delegate the implementation of the terps plan to the province was revoked they would immediately contact the NOVA current affairs programme on television.⁹⁶⁶

So far the residents have been satisfied, but he admitted that lobbying is time consuming: 'All that going to the province in Den Bosch, Rijkswaterstaat in The Hague, and Waalwijk municipal council. My son once even asked whether he was working alone.'⁹⁶⁷

A member of the residents' organisation

Hans Verschure is a farmer with a farm near the river forelands in the north of the polder. When he heard about the government ideas for water storage he had just bought the farm from his father. He wanted to develop the farm but felt inhibited by the water plans. 'My philosophy is that in the initial years you have to develop your business. But our future perspective became clouded. We intended to renovate the livestock shed, which dates from 1976. But is it sensible if you know that you have to leave within five years?' He decided to make only minor repairs and postponed the renovation of the cubicle shed for eighteen months until summer 2002. 'It was said that we would get a clear answer soon, but we have waited in vain. Since it is no longer sensible to wait we cut the knot. My situation is not that good. I have land in leasehold in the forelands. The

contract states that the land can be used for water management at any time and then my contract expires, which means that half of my milk quota⁹⁶⁸ will be removed. My farm is therefore not attractive to buy. We cannot move out of the polder, whether we would like to or not.⁹⁶⁹

Water expert, confidant, moderator, facilitator and mediator

Water expert Peter van Rooy,⁹⁷⁰ the confidant of the residents, was extremely critical of the role played by Rijkswaterstaat at the beginning of the project. He dealt with government officials in various roles, such as moderator, facilitator and mediator. 'Government officials felt ill at ease in their new role [of delegating responsibility]. For more than two hundred years Rijkswaterstaat had been in charge of planning for the people, but now the residents of Overdiep Polder had developed their own plan. After the provincial delegate had intensively lobbied the House of Representatives, the front-runner status of the terps plan was approved. Just before the vote Rijkswaterstaat officials visited the polder and asked the residents whether they really wanted to cooperate. Unseemly!⁹⁷¹

7.2 Case analysis of the terps plan in Overdiep Polder

The case analysis of the terps plan in Overdiep Polder follows the framework laid down in Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the authorities and the local group. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship between these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, their power building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the government–citizen interaction. The authorities' organisational culture and the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. The case analysis ends with a summary and discussion.

In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case the principal actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant) and the local group Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (*Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder*). As different authorities, the national and provincial government, were involved, a distinction has been made between these authorities and the local group, and between the government authorities.

The terps plan was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River, which meant that the plan would be decided at the national level. As the project was the first that the national government delegated to a lower-tier authority, the division of tasks between the authorities only became clear during the course of the planning process. Until the end of 2006, the national government was actively engaged in allocating tasks to the various government

authorities, including determining the design discharge for the Rhine and Meuse, the budget and the project organisation (ten Heuvelhof et al., 2007). For the terps plan it was expected that Rijkswaterstaat would take on a central coordinating and supervisory role (*regisseur*) and the project planning would be delegated to the province (Noord-Brabant provincial government in this case). What this would actually mean in practice was left unclear, such as the responsibility for implementation the project after the planning stage was completed.

As mentioned earlier, the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study differs from the other case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder (Chapter 6), because of its bottom-up approach.

7.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local group

In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local group is the object of analysis. Again, a distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local group on the one hand, and between the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant) and the local group on the other. As the interaction between the authorities is considered important for the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and the local group, this has also been taken into account.

Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine the interaction between the national and provincial governments and the local group, and between the national and provincial government. Second, how can these interactions be characterised according to the typology of conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration?

Interaction between national government and the local group: mutual resistance

Two types of interactions can be differentiated in the relationship between the national government and the local group:⁹⁷² direct and indirect interaction. The forum for direct interaction was the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep*, ABG), which contained representatives from government authorities and the local group since its inception at the beginning of 2005, but the national government and the local group hardly interacted directly with each other. Therefore, most interaction occurred indirectly via other parties, such as the local group's water expert, who was also a member of the official supervisory group,⁹⁷³ the provincial delegate, the project manager and members of the House of Representatives.⁹⁷⁴ This indirect interaction started around 2001, at the beginning of the project, and continued throughout the planning process.

Rijkswaterstaat officials were suspicious of the residents' terps plan. As soon as the

residents set out their plan in a report by the farmers' organisation ZLTO they resisted it being incorporated into current policy by slowing down the process. During this process Rijkswaterstaat and the residents mainly interacted only indirectly. But also later in the planning process, when both were members of the official supervisory group, indirect interaction was prevalent.

This turned out to be a deliberate policy of Rijkswaterstaat. The standard procedure until then was to set up a traditional project organisation, with a project group whose membership was reserved for government officials of the authorities involved. As the province now had the responsibility for the project planning, it was the right institution to deal with project matters. ('The formal line runs from Rijkswaterstaat to the province. And the province must organise the process.... It is the province's responsibility.')975 As a result, it was the province that agreed to the residents' membership of the official supervisory group. Still, the Rijkswaterstaat official's opinion about the residents' involvement in the project organisation was also a factor. 'Residents are not officials, so it is really ridiculous that they represented in the official supervisory group'.⁹⁷⁶

However, the residents played an important role in the background. For example, their water expert, who also participated in the official supervisory group, had authority in the policy field and access to a wide range of elected officials, government officials and MPs. He was thus able to raise issues.⁹⁷⁷ In the official supervisory group the province and the water expert were in charge of interacting with Rijkswaterstaat. There were some exceptions, for example when the issue of the visual appearance of the new polder landscape was discussed. The government-appointed landscape quality team (also referred to as the 'Q-team'), which was charged with safeguarding the spatial quality of the landscape, prepared a design for the dike, the terps and the polder. The direct interaction between the Q-team and the residents occurred as a result of the province's position: 'They [Rijkswaterstaat] have to deal with the residents; they are in charge of the terps plan'.⁹⁷⁸ Although Rijkswaterstaat promised that the Q-team would visit the residents to make sure that their voice would be heard – which did not happen – the proposed spatial quality plan did not meet the residents' expectations.⁹⁷⁹ The province then had to mediate and started negotiations on a design solution that both could support.⁹⁸⁰

To summarise, the national government prevented direct interaction with the local group as much as possible and preferred to communicate via others, such as the provincial project manager. But the few times direct interaction did occur it resulted in debate and often escalated into conflict. With the help of the province this always ended in a negotiated solution.

Interaction between provincial government and the local group: an alliance

The first interaction between the province and the residents was positive. The provincial delegate was positively engaged with the residents' initiative to come up with ideas on

how to deal with the 'blue spots' in their polder on government maps. The province and the residents formed an alliance at the start of the process. They worked together to get the residents' ideas approved by other government authorities. Despite their willingness to cooperate, disputes emerged, for example about the risk avoidance attitude of the first project manager, who concentrated too much on formal procedures and risk avoidance, and too little on experimentation and taking initiatives.⁹⁸¹ It took time before the residents convinced the provincial delegate to replace him. They finally made sure that the province started a selection procedure for a new project manager in which the residents had a strong hand in drawing up the profile of the desired candidate. The newly appointed project manager proved to be the right man in the right job⁹⁸² and gave a boost to the existing alliance. The renewed alliance continued their collaborative efforts, but now for the realisation of the terps plan. Both parties knew that they depended on each other's input and both focused on the final objective. They were convinced that there were many pathways to achieve the objective and that new tensions were inevitable.

The alliance between the province and the residents was threatened by the tensions that emerged in their interaction. Illustrations of these tensions include the complexity of the rules and procedures the province had to negotiate to realise the terps plan,⁹⁸³ the 'collective approach' taken by the local group versus the 'rationality' of the individual residents of Overdiep Polder, new regulations and objectives which emerged during the planning process, and the impact of the front-runner status of the project – in other words, what has been called the dialectics of progress.⁹⁸⁴ As a new approach was being taken, it threw up new questions that needed to be adequately resolved. There was not previous experience to go on and this also proved to be a source of tension (for example, what is the best way to deal with the problem at issue? Do we follow a safe course while proposing our solution?). The tensions that occurred between the provincial government and the residents show that disputes were never far away, but these never led to conflicts. Disagreement between the provincial government and the local group remained limited mainly to specific approaches, but never escalated, because in tense situations the parties alerted each other to the possibility of a breakdown in communication.⁹⁸⁵ The project manager and the residents were crucial actors in preparing negotiated solutions in the province's interaction with Rijkswaterstaat.

The alliance between the province and the local group persisted with regard to 'group matters', such as the design of the dike, terps and polder, and compensation. As negotiations concerning the buyout fees and land compensation for residents who wanted to stay had not taken place yet, it was not clear whether the alliance would endure. With regard to the 'individual matters', the alliance had a positive influence, because residents who already moved out were happy with the negotiated resolutions.

Although the interaction between the province and the local group can be characterised as an alliance, there was regular discord. Every relationship has its ups and downs, and disputes or even crises in a relationship may result in a stronger bond, depending on

how partners deal with these disputes or crises. As Colson (1995:70-71) states, 'the attention given to dispute settlement and its setting assumes that the appropriate outcome to negotiation is the restoration of good relationship'. Additionally, the very nature of a dispute leads the people involved to think about and formulate the points of tension between them.

To summarise, the interaction between the provincial government and the local group can be characterised as one of openness to debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration rather than conflict. Both were continuously in 'dialogue mode'. If disputes emerged, they started negotiations and after arriving at a negotiated solution they cooperated until the next hurdle emerged, which usually arose in the dialogues between them.

Interaction between government authorities: perpetuating conflict

As soon as the farmers' organisation ZLTO published the residents' plan to redesign their polder as a water retention area, Rijkswaterstaat officials turned against it. This resistance was manifested in slowing down the process to incorporate the plan into current policy. This is illustrated by the production of eleven versions of the project proposal before it was finally approved, five of which were produced after the state secretary had agreed to the residents' plan, and by the 16 months that elapsed (from July 2001 to October 2002 before Habiforum's⁹⁸⁶ contract to elaborate the residents' plan was approved (Slootweg, 2004). While Rijkswaterstaat officials avoided taking any action and tried to thwart the terps plan, for example by doubting the usefulness of the terps plan and clearly but diplomatically stating how to reject it (Slootweg 2004), the province was pushing and pulling behind the scenes. In the meantime, the mayor of Waalwijk, to which Overdiep Polder mainly belongs, arranged a meeting with the chair of the Water Vision Group⁹⁸⁷ to ascertain why the project was not making any progress. The chair then asked the state secretary for her opinion of the project, but this had not changed since her initial positive reaction to the residents' initiative in 2000.⁹⁸⁸

The results of studies on climate change which indicated a considerable increase in the water level of the Meuse finally prompted Rijkswaterstaat officials to work on the terps plan (Slootweg, 2004). This led to approval of the contract with Habiforum, opening the way for a joint investigation of options. The provincial delegate, in his role as chair of the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, then proposed the residents' preferred option for water retention. It included artificial elevations along a new dike protecting the polder's southern perimeter. The northern dike would be lowered and a water inlet and outlet constructed to allow floodwater from the Meuse to flow right through the polder. Before agreement could be given the Steering Committee asked for a feasibility study of the terps plan, which concluded that the plan was cost-effective.⁹⁸⁹

While it was close to being approved at the regional level, which meant that the terps plan had almost been accepted by the Downstream River Steering Committee, it was uncertain whether it would have the support of the lower-tier government authorities,

such as the water board and the municipality of Waalwijk. Two side channels had been planned along the Bergsche Maas, one of which was in Overdiep Polder. The Wijde Biesbosch Area Commission, chaired by the mayor of Waalwijk, insisted on this option. After intervention by the province, which was unwilling to pay for this option as it proved to be an ineffective measure to lower the water level, the state secretary agreed to postpone the decision-making until the final outcome of the terps plan was available. In the end the chair of the Water Vision Group wrote a letter to the mayor in which he politely but firmly called him to account for his position and role in the process. Helped by the changed standpoint of the Area Commission, which decided to concur with the province's standpoint, the mayor became an advocate of the residents' plan once again (Slootweg, 2004). The terps plan could now be incorporated into the regional advice to the state secretary.

But then the state secretary gave low priority to the project. Prompted by the provincial delegate, who chaired the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, the state secretary finally agreed to give the terps plan front-runner status. As soon as this became clear, Rijkswaterstaat officials renewed their tactic of slowing the process down. The administrative agreement between the national government and the province took six months to conclude after many meetings and telephone calls. 'At least ten drafts were made; alterations included words, details. It was clear that some government officials had some difficulty with it.'⁹⁹⁰ Finally, on 14 December 2004, the administrative agreement, which filled just one page, was signed.⁹⁹¹

Meanwhile the province's proposal to prefinance the project to accelerate the process ahead of the SPKD became disputed. Other issues followed, such as getting the project through all the required procedures, the teething problems (such as the project auditing and deciding which variants would be studied) and the responsibility for the project implementation. The role of the provincial delegate was crucial, as she resolved many disputes with the Room for the River programme manager, often over dinner in a restaurant.⁹⁹²

To summarise, the interaction between the national and provincial government was dominated by conflict, debate and negotiation rather than dialogue and collaboration. In the interaction between the authorities disputes often arose, which then either escalated into conflict followed by negotiation or were directly subject to negotiation. Negotiation between the government authorities mainly occurred at the managerial level in an atmosphere conducive to de-escalating the debate (often in restaurants). The provincial government was always the one to start negotiation, but this never developed further into dialogue and collaboration between the national and provincial government.

Table 7.2 presents an overview of the interactions between the government authorities and the local group. Although direct interaction between the national government and

the local group was rare, when it did happen it often led to debate and conflict, which were resolved with the help of the provincial government. The prevailing outcomes of the interaction between the provincial government and the local group were debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The interaction between the national and provincial government was dominated by conflict, debate and negotiation.

Table 7.2 Interaction of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov) and local group (Loc gr)

		conflict	debate	negotiation	dialogue	collaboration
Nat	Prov	+	+	+	o	o
Nat	Loc gr	+	+	o	o	o
Prov	Loc gr	o	+	+	+	+

o = not occurring + = occurring

7.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group

In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local group.

The interaction strategies of both authorities and the local group can be divided into framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When people make a distinction between 'us' and 'them' they are using an identity frame. In this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to 'us' and 'them'. A conflict management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or to achieve a joint objective.

If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of

their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiver, 2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one-dimensional: 'all or nothing'. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena to justify actions that may be accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. Sometimes this ends in 'frozen' frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the identity frame with a conflict management frame.

Again, in the analysis of the interaction between authorities and the local group a distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant).

The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction between the authorities and the local group, and between the authorities? Here, a distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, the interaction strategies used by the provincial government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, and the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the provincial government and vice versa. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group explain the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local group and between the authorities?

Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local group

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local group

Rijkswaterstaat used framing and buffering strategies when dealing with the local group. Since these were mostly used implicitly, illustrations of the interaction strategies include

either quotes of what others said about Rijkswaterstaat or quotes by Rijkswaterstaat officials that can be interpreted as such.

Because the national government delegated the planning of the terps plan to the provincial government, it was considered a provincial government business to communicate with the residents. However, the residents and their water expert participated in the project organisation,⁹⁹³ which implied that Rijkswaterstaat was obliged to deal with them, although the government authority tried to limit this as much as possible. On the few occasions direct interaction occurred the organisation generally used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. An illustration of Rijkswaterstaat's identity frame is its dominance in tackling the problem of buying out residents. A resident: 'Rijkswaterstaat thinks that we will be millionaires, but this is not the case. We offer a public service and that has to be paid for. We are not much better off.'⁹⁹⁴ Here, the government authority tried to position the residents in a way that would justify a lower purchase price for their land and property. In other words, the residents ('them') stood to gain a lot from the terps plan, while the government ('us') could use this money for other objectives. An example of its power frame is the government-appointed Q-team (landscape quality team). The team did not approve the design for the dike, terps and polder prepared by the province and the local group, and proposed a completely different design, without taking the residents' views into account.⁹⁹⁵

During the start of the project planning in 2005 Rijkswaterstaat made particular use of buffering strategies towards the local group. Examples are the questioning of the residents' membership of the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep*, ABG) ('I'll be straightforward: residents are not officials....[their membership of the official supervisory group] is therefore really ridiculous')⁹⁹⁶ and the negation of the residents' role in the process ('No, I do not have their telephone numbers, and they do not have mine').⁹⁹⁷ Apart from a few bridging strategies ('I try to be facilitating, and let me help them a bit'),⁹⁹⁸ buffering strategies were mostly used.

To summarise, when the national government interacted directly with the local group it used an identity frame or a power frame. Buffering strategies were the most commonly used strategies.

Interaction strategies of provincial government when the dealing with the local group

The provincial government used framing and bridging and buffering strategies in its interaction with the local group.

In its interaction with the local group the province rarely displayed an identity frame, and only when the first project manager was in charge. After the administrative agreement between the Department of Water Management and the province of Noord-Brabant was signed in December 2004, he used an identity frame by focusing on

internal procedures and risk avoidance behaviour. Illustrations of this frame include not replying to residents' questions during information meetings,⁹⁹⁹ which suggested that he was more committed to the provincial's position in the process than to the project. In addition, he was not willing to adopt a proactive role in the project.¹⁰⁰⁰ After the new project manager took over in March 2006, both the provincial delegate and the project manager used a collaborative frame and a conflict management frame. Their point of departure was to work with the residents on the realisation of the terps plan and so they were always disposed to hear the residents' point of view and willing to take this into account. If disagreements arose they changed frame from a collaboration frame to a conflict management frame, which implies that they were looking for possible solutions and were willing to give in. Both used bridging strategies. Examples include the delegate inviting the residents to call her personally at difficult moments¹⁰⁰¹ and the project manager allocating 50 to 60 per cent of his time to the people in the polder.¹⁰⁰²

In its interaction with the local group the provincial government used many bridging strategies. As the province also had to deal with individual residents in questions such as the purchase of their property and enforcement of the relevant regulations, the provincial government sometimes used buffering strategies.

To summarise, the provincial government rarely used an identity frame in its dealings with the local group. Throughout the planning process it generally used a collaborative frame, a conflict management frame and bridging strategies when dealing with the local group. The province's conflict management frame and bridging strategies prevented many disputes and prevented disagreements from escalating.

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with authorities

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the national government

The local group used framing and bridging strategies in its interaction with the national government.

At the very beginning of the terps plan in 2001 the residents used an identity frame when dealing with the national government. They used this frame to position themselves in the policy arena and made their involvement in the process conditional on their terps plan being the starting point of the planning process, which implied a key role for themselves. Rijkswaterstaat rejected this. Their attitude was that the terps plan was 'not invented here',¹⁰⁰³ which in practice meant that it did not accept the terps plan and was not prepared to support a key role for the residents. An identity frame was employed in 2006, for example during the dispute about spatial quality, when a resident asked ironically, 'Does Rijkswaterstaat also look after spatial quality?'¹⁰⁰⁴ However, the residents never presented a frozen frame. When the situation moved towards discord they soon adopted a conflict management frame by keeping an open mind and being receptive to

signals, particularly from the provincial officials and provincial delegate who turned out to be mediators in the process, particularly in the relationship between the national government and the residents.

Throughout the planning process the residents generally used a conflict management frame in its dealings with the national government. Although they remained steadfast in their determination to get their terps plan approved, they were well aware that the route to achieve this objective would not be a linear one. Not only the approach but also the substantive issues, such as the design of the terps and the dike, would be subject to negotiation. The residents were always prepared to negotiate ('you never can win everything').¹⁰⁰⁵ An illustration of the residents' conflict management frame is that they were prepared to share 'ownership' of the terps plan. In other words, any government authority or consultant could be the owner of the project and work for its success.

The local group used a few bridging strategies when dealing with Rijkswaterstaat, including its attempts to start informal talks with Rijkswaterstaat officials.¹⁰⁰⁶

To summarise, at the beginning of the planning process in 2001 the local group generally used a conflict management frame and sometimes it employed an identity frame in its dealings with the national government. On a few occasions the local group used bridging strategies and often used buffering strategies.

Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the provincial government

The local group used framing and bridging strategies in its dealings with the provincial government.

The residents started with an identity frame by positioning themselves in the policy arena as a group of residents with a plan, which was in the first instance directed at the provincial level. The residents made their involvement in the process conditional on their terps plan being the starting point of the planning process, which implied a key role for themselves. Furthermore, they expected a cooperative approach from the government authorities involved,¹⁰⁰⁷ including the provincial government. The provincial delegate met the local group's expectation by picking this up and bringing it to the attention of other government authorities and the state secretary.¹⁰⁰⁸ The identity frame was also used when disputes could not be resolved, but this rarely occurred. An example is when the first project manager focused on internal rules and procedures rather than on substantive aspects of the project. The residents felt that he was not contributing much to the realisation of the terps plan. 'We cannot realise the terps plan with someone who shows risk avoidance behaviour'.¹⁰⁰⁹ Here, they made a distinction between 'us' (proactive people) and 'him' (a provincial official with a risk avoidance attitude focused too much on internal rules). Still, the residents' conflict management frame was predominant when dealing with the provincial government. Before an issue became disputed, the residents' identity frame rapidly changed into a conflict

management frame. The residents knew that good relations with the province were a prerequisite for realising their plan, and an identity frame would not be suited to achieving this goal. After the replacement of the project manager the residents particularly employed a collaborative frame, which implies a cooperative attitude, when dealing with the province.

The residents particularly used bridging strategies when dealing with the provincial government, for example during informal meetings (the so-called SNP meetings between two residents, the water expert and provincial officials) to align the expectations and demands of the residents with the provincial officials in advance of the formal meetings. Other bridging strategies included resolving specific problems, including how to deal with the land that became available when one of the farmers decided to sell up,¹⁰¹⁰ contributing to negotiated solutions, such as the design of the terps, the dike and the polder,¹⁰¹¹ and making suggestions for accelerating the process.¹⁰¹² Buffering strategies were sometimes used by individual residents in their private negotiations with the provincial government.

To summarise, while the local group sometimes fell back on an identity frame, it mainly used a collaborative frame and a conflict management frame in its interaction with the provincial government. Reframing – changing from an identity frame towards a conflict management frame – was brought about by the local group aligning themselves with the provincial officials and the water expert. A collaborative frame came into being particularly after the first project manager was replaced, since when disputes between the local group and the province were rare because both employed bridging strategies. Buffering strategies were sometimes used by individual residents in their private negotiations with the provincial government.

Interaction strategies between authorities

Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with provincial government

Rijkswaterstaat used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies in its interaction with the provincial government. As these were mostly used implicitly, the interaction strategies are sometimes illustrated by either quotes of what others said about Rijkswaterstaat or quotes by Rijkswaterstaat officials that can be interpreted as such.

The national government mainly employed an identity frame and occasionally a power frame when dealing with the province. Soon after the administrative agreement between the Department of Water Management and Noord-Brabant provincial government was signed at the end of 2004, Rijkswaterstaat identified itself as the key organisation for decision-making (identity frame) and proved to be dominant during the process (for example through the use of a power frame). Examples of the identity frame include the

following statements by a government official. 'Neither the province nor us decides, but the state secretary.'¹⁰¹³ At the same time, Rijkswaterstaat felt that, being close to the state secretary, it had an important position in the decision-making process. 'Rijkswaterstaat is not able to work without controlling mechanisms, as we always have to be accountable to the state secretary.'¹⁰¹⁴ In other words, 'you' have to know what 'our' position is, so 'you' have to comply with 'our' procedures.

The power frame was used to demonstrate which government authority was in charge. When Rijkswaterstaat delegated the terps plan to Noord-Brabant provincial government the mandate was limited to the project planning; the project implementation was excluded. It then did not become an issue because the province was at time simply concerned with assuming responsibility for the terps plan. More than a year before the finalisation of the planning in October 2008, the province raised the question of responsibility and expressed its willingness to continue.¹⁰¹⁵ Once again Rijkswaterstaat showed its power frame by questioning this, then attaching conditions to giving responsibility for the implementation to the province, and finally delaying the decision on this issue to a late stage in the planning process.¹⁰¹⁶

Apart from an identity frame and a power frame, a third frame emerged with some regularity: a conflict management frame. This frame was particularly used by the Room for the River programme manager. He kept this frame in reserve, for use only if a dispute arose or if a disagreement was in danger of escalating. The provincial delegate knew by experience that 'Rijkswaterstaat always started with a rigid attitude. They were guarding the process like a terrier [which often led to discord]. But Ingwer [the programme manager] could move; he is rather careful.'¹⁰¹⁷ In his field the manager is known for being verbally adept in the sense that he is open to other opinions and able to negotiate a joint solution.¹⁰¹⁸

In addition, Rijkswaterstaat officials displayed a conflict management frame by taking a constructive attitude in the official supervisory group. A government official: 'I have a constructive role in a dispute. I will not say that it is not possible or not allowed, instead I say, "Prove me wrong. We are working on the same project; we have to find a compromise"'¹⁰¹⁹ But underlying this was a power frame, as revealed by his remark, 'I try to be involved in the project [in the official supervisory group] which the others sometimes experience as unpleasant. I also have an opinion and the supervisory group appears to be the appropriate platform to put that forward. And then Rijkswaterstaat has a substantial influence.'¹⁰²⁰ This shows that Rijkswaterstaat's opinion held more weight than the others. As Rijkswaterstaat officials were known to be strong defenders of the official line, they largely determined the outcome. This was especially the case for Rijkswaterstaat's tasks, such as the calculations of the project costs and the effects of the proposed measure on the water level. The power frame was felt by the residents, the water expert (Slootweg, 2004) and the provincial delegate,¹⁰²¹ although no-one put a name to that feeling (see also section 7.2.3). The project manager, for example, put it this way: 'Concerning the daily wheeling and dealing, the relationship with Rijkswaterstaat turned

out to be reasonable, but when it came to issues such as lowering the water level it was tough.¹⁰²² A Rijkswaterstaat official confirmed this and at the same time revealed a conflict management frame: 'We will disagree on many issues, but if you discuss them as early on in the process as possible they will not be consequential. They will be resolved.'¹⁰²³ However, besides discussing such issues, which actually proved to be rather difficult in practice,¹⁰²⁴ resolving them was not always as easy as the government official suggested. Many, if not all, disputed issues were resolved via the programme manager. The provincial delegate said that what usually happened was that she would call the programme manager to say it was not working out and make an appointment for dinner, when the issue was resolved.¹⁰²⁵

The government officials particularly used buffering strategies. An example is the focus on Rijkswaterstaat's interests during the planning process ('It is not our plan.').¹⁰²⁶ resulting in a passive attitude at the beginning of the project, from 2001 until 2003, when the project made no progress. Other buffering strategies included the use of the take-it-or-leave-it principle in the discussion concerning the responsibility for the implementation of the terps plan. Although the province had indicated that it was willing to be responsible for the project implementation, Rijkswaterstaat did not want to decide at once. Rijkswaterstaat officials raised the question of responsibility in the discussion about how to economise on the project costs, a new issue. The project manager: 'As the planning was a provincial responsibility it went without saying that the implementation would also be delegated to the province. Then the project costs increased significantly. Rijkswaterstaat officials said: "If you want to take the risk you may implement it".'¹⁰²⁷ The province refused to take the risk ('Take the risk for a national project for which we are the executive agency? It is a national responsibility! We won't do that.'¹⁰²⁸). Rijkswaterstaat's response: 'Then we will delegate it to the water board.'¹⁰²⁹

Apart from a few bridging strategies by government officials, such as 'I could withdraw to my formal role in the planning process and wait until the quarterly progress reports are sent, leaving the official supervisory group for what it is. Well, that is not what I want. So I said: "Let's talk"',¹⁰³⁰ it was mainly the programme manager who used bridging strategies. After the provincial delegate and the programme manager met to discuss disputed issues the latter used bridging strategies and started reframing. This implied that the programme manager replaced his identity or power frame by a conflict management frame. This usually ended into a negotiated solution.

To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national government showed two faces: one in the person of the Room for the River programme manager, who was more open to different views and ideas, and the other by government officials in charge of project matters, who strictly followed the official line. While the former mainly used a conflict management frame as he was often willing to find a joint resolution, the latter mainly employed an identity frame by positioning the government authority as the key party in decision-making and a power frame when the provincial government tried

to adopt a position of authority. Buffering strategies were commonly used by government officials, while bridging strategies were sometimes used by the programme manager.

Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with national government

The provincial government used framing as well as bridging strategies when dealing with the national government.

The province particularly used a conflict management frame when dealing with Rijkswaterstaat and always put the project first. During the planning process the province had to convince Rijkswaterstaat of its approach to realising the project objectives. By using a conflict management frame the provincial officials and the provincial delegate were able to change their position according to the situation. This occurred regularly, as evidenced by their contributions to resolving various conflicts. The province was always open to other opinions and attempted to find joint solutions. However, most disputes could not be resolved at the level of the provincial officials as Rijkswaterstaat officials mainly used an identity frame or power frame followed by buffering strategies. This implies that they were not prepared to negotiate. Almost all disputed questions, therefore, had to be resolved at a senior management level, and it was always the province that took the initiative.

However, an identity frame emerged on a few occasions. For example when the 'spatial quality' objective of the Room for the River programme – after safety the most important objective and thus a condition for the terps plan – was put on the agenda, the provincial government's response was 'We have authority to act'.¹⁰³¹ What they meant was that this issue is part of the regional plan (streekplan) and therefore provincial government business, and so it had the responsibility to determine whether it should meet additional conditions and regulations. From Rijkswaterstaat's point of view, this was a clear example that the province did not always use a conflict management frame.

The province was always willing to listen to the views and opinions of others. At all times it started from its own position and then took Rijkswaterstaat's conditions into the equation. It tried to arrange joint negotiating positions as far as possible, but if a negotiated solution could not be achieved, alternative strategies were employed, such as the delegation of the responsibility for the project implementation to the province and the water board. The project manager: 'We had already agreed an arrangement with the water board on managing external consultants to carry out the implementation of the project. It showed that we are willing to take the lead jointly'.¹⁰³² Another alternative strategy was the province's use of its influence in the government hierarchy, but this was used as a last resort. In its regular meetings with the state secretary, with whom the province signed an administrative agreement, the provincial delegate used to go through the main issues concerning the terps plan.¹⁰³³ Such contacts could be

eventually used in negotiations with the director-general of Rijkswaterstaat, but this did not prove necessary.

Gender probably helped in the province's attempts to connect with the national government. Empirical studies reveal that women tend to be more conflict averse than men and more willing to adapt their strategies and behaviour, usually by listening to external advice, more aware of social bonds and show greater reciprocity and altruism (Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Patt et al., 2007). The third provincial delegate involved in the planning process was a woman. She emphasised that 'during negotiations it is good to understand each other'. She put down the positive results of the negotiations to her good understanding with the manager: 'That is crucial'.¹⁰³⁴ In addition to a cooperative attitude, the provincial delegate knew that atmosphere is an important factor in relationships. For example, she resolved disputes by meeting the relevant parties over dinner so that they could not use lack of time as an excuse. She also took the trouble to get to know the programme manager.¹⁰³⁵

To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the provincial government was generally willing to work with the national government to find joint solutions, as evidenced by its preparations for coming to negotiated solutions and the development of alternative resolution strategies. The provincial government displayed a conflict management frame accompanied by bridging strategies. The provincial government rarely used an identity frame.

An overview of the interaction strategies used by the government authorities and the local group is presented in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Interactional strategies of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov)

		framing	buffering strategies	bridging strategies
Nat	Prov	I P CM CM I	+ o	± ++
Nat	Loc gr	I P CM I	+ +	± ±
Prov	Loc gr	C CM I C CM I	± ±	++ ++

and local group (Loc gr)

C = collaborative frame CM = conflict management frame I = identity frame P = power frame
o = zero ± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The analysis of the interaction strategies between the authorities and the local group shows that buffering strategies are not useful when employing a conflict management frame. Bridging strategies were always present, particularly when a conflict management frame was used.

It can be concluded that the provincial government's conflict management frame and bridging strategies ensured that its interaction with the local group varied from debate, negotiation and dialogue to collaboration, the last due to the provincial government's and local groups' collaborative frame. Negotiation did not occur in the interaction between the local group and the national government. As a consequence, debate proved to be the 'maximum' outcome due to the fact that a conflict management frame was not included in the national government's portfolio of interaction strategies when dealing with the residents. As the province's conflict management frame and bridging strategies were needed for a negotiated solution, the interaction between national government and the local group always resulted in debate or conflict. As result of the provincial government's conflict management frame and bridging strategies the interaction between the authorities always ended in a negotiated solution.

7.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group

In this section we analyse the building of power by the authorities and the local group. The following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials (frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are used first to achieve the government's objective, such as the use of indirect coercive power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of the actor concerned and expanding the field of influence of the actors involved, which offers an opportunity to get support. The sociability of an actor is considered a separate power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also Chapter 3) because it tends to call forth

reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others. Since respondents rarely said anything about the sociability of other people, I noted their opinions of other actors or quotes that can be interpreted as such.

In this analysis the authorities are differentiated into national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant). Two questions about power building by the authorities and the local group are posited. First, which power types are built by the authorities and the local group? Here, a distinction can be made between the power exerted by the national government over the local groups and vice versa, the power exerted by the provincial government over the local group and vice versa, and the exertion of power by the national government over the provincial government and vice versa. Second, what are the consequences of power building by the authorities and the local group for their interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local group and between the national and provincial government authorities?

Power building by authorities with regard to the local group

National government's power building with regard to the local group

The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power when dealing with the local group.

The national government built indirect coercive power through its power of compulsory purchase,¹⁰³⁶ which proved to be a threat to the local group. Another example is the high turnover of officials involved in the project. A resident: 'In six or seven years I counted about five government officials who represented Rijkswaterstaat in the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG*)'.¹⁰³⁷

It built legitimate power by regularly referring to its mandate to take decisions ('it is the state secretary who decides'¹⁰³⁸).

The national government's building of hindering power was often evident throughout the planning process. Rijkswaterstaat's tactics included not showing up or arriving late during project meetings, not passing on information adequately, not adequately replying to emails and questions, not reading project documentation and reports, not being sufficiently informed about the project and answering evasively.¹⁰³⁹

Provincial government's power building with regard to the local group

In its interaction with the local group the provincial government built indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability.

The province used indirect coercive power during the six-monthly information meetings for the residents. At each meeting the provincial delegate explained to the residents how she dealt with issues such as who would stay or have to move, irrespective of their own decision. She decided that residents who live near the planned locations of the terps would have the first option of staying in the polder. In spring 2008 a declaration of intent was drawn up stating clearly who would stay and who would move. In personal meetings with the first movers the province explained the implications: they had lost their right to claim a terp.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, some of these residents did not take any action. In personal meetings with the residents the province told them about the consequences of not deciding whether to stay or move. They would then start proceedings for the compulsory purchase of farm buildings. Its expectation was that all but a few residents would come to an agreement.¹⁰⁴¹ Since the deadline for starting compulsory purchase proceedings had not yet been reached at the end of the research period (October 2008), the province had not yet taken any action at the time of writing.

When dealing with the local group the province often built knowledge power by asking agriculture and real estate consultants for advice. An illustration of this is the report known as 'the regulations' which sets out the legal instruments and regulations that could be used for the reconstruction of Overdiep Polder, including the financial arrangements for the farms and for land reallocation, the possibilities for those who stay and move, compulsory purchase and damage compensation.¹⁰⁴² Provincial officials built knowledge power by using their own knowledge of the procedures for the purchase of existing farms or farmland with a 'building plot' (permission to build a farmhouse and livestock shed) for those who intended to move, and the prohibition on new build in certain areas.¹⁰⁴³

The provincial government sometimes built sociability. While the project manager was always open to suggestions and available to support the residents most of his time, the provincial delegate showed her sociability particularly during the information meetings for the residents. Both told the residents that the province was always ready to buy out those who want to move out the polder, if reasonable conditions could be agreed.

To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the provincial government built indirect coercive power to demonstrate who was in charge, knowledge power to remain informed about current issues, and sociability to show that a solution could always be found if reasonable conditions could be agreed.

Power building by the local group with regard to authorities

Local group's power building with regard to the national government

The local group built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability in its dealings with the national government.

In its interaction with the national government the local group built legitimate power occasionally. An example is the residents' reaction to the design for the terps proposed by the Q-team (landscape quality team), which included a screen of trees around the terp, a farmhouse with a size of 750 m³ (designed to be 'icons' in the landscape) and an inappropriately located livestock shed. The residents said that the government should provide 1.5 million euros compensation for the extra 100 m³ in the size of the farmhouse because the farmers could not afford such large accommodation. Moreover, the farms could not operate without an opening in the tree planting to provide access to their land. They also complained that the livestock shed was too far from the farmhouse and it also had to be relocated to meet animal welfare regulations.

Hindering power was built incidentally by individual members of the local group. For example, some did not allow Rijkswaterstaat officials onto their land.¹⁰⁴⁴

Knowledge power was sometimes built, for example by asking experts from the farmers' organisation ZLTO for legal advice and getting support from a property developer and an account manager from ZLTO.¹⁰⁴⁵ In addition, they approached their bank for financial advice and a lawyer for expertise in the field of leasehold legislation.¹⁰⁴⁶ The residents built knowledge power by using their knowledge of farming during discussions with the Q-team about the design of the terps, in particular their knowledge of current regulations on dairy farming and on farming practices in general, such as the distance between the farmhouse and the livestock shed, the location of the shed, the need for a shallow ramp to the terp to provide access for machinery and cows.¹⁰⁴⁷

When dealing with the national government the local group built media power occasionally. This type of power was particularly built when no progress was being made with the project, either by actually using this power or just the threat of obtaining media exposure. However, the local group viewed this as a last resource after discussions, talks and meetings were not successful in moving the project forward. This is illustrated by the response of one resident to the decision not to delegate the implementation of the terps plan to the province: 'If that is the case, in no time we will be on NOVA [a current affairs programme on national television].'¹⁰⁴⁸ Another example is the use of media exposure to publicise the sluggish decision-making process. After the vice chair and the provincial delegate had given their views on the progress being made with the project on a current affairs programme on television, the issue was raised during a meeting of the steering group. The residents' water expert said that they had received various requests from other television programmes. The Room for the River programme manager replied that more publicity would not be advantageous because it would be solely negative. The water expert's response: 'Then you will have to get the state secretary's signature soon.' As a result of this, the state secretary received the letter to sign at home on Friday and returned the signed letter on Monday.¹⁰⁴⁹

The local group sometimes built sociability in its dealings with the national

government. An illustration of this power type is the residents' effort to start informal talks with government officials involved in the terps plan during the breaks in project meetings or afterwards.¹⁰⁵⁰

To summarise, in the interaction with the national government the local group built legitimate power to let the national government know that its position has to be taken into account, knowledge power to get information on specific subjects or to bring their own knowledge into the process, hindering power to make the national government's work more difficult, media power to get the planning process moving, and sociability to get acquainted with government officials.

Local group's power building with regard to the provincial government

The local group built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability when dealing with the provincial government.

The local group sometimes built legitimate power in its interaction with the provincial government. An illustration of this power type is the residents' disapproval of the first project manager's performance. They exerted pressure on the provincial delegate to replace him, because he focused on internal procedures rather than the project. A resident: 'He is not moving the terps plan forward'.¹⁰⁵¹ In doing so, the residents put their position as key players in the planning process to the test. By getting the project manager replaced they legitimised their role in the process.

Some residents built hindering power in its dealings with the province. This occurred incidentally, particularly in private negotiations between residents and the provincial government. The residents stipulated impossible conditions in the conviction that if they did not do so 'it might be disadvantageous later'.¹⁰⁵² Another illustration of hindering power is the plan by some residents to go to court,¹⁰⁵³ which would hinder the planning process considerably.

In their interaction with the provincial government the residents built knowledge power by regularly demanding a second opinion. The provincial delegate: 'The residents arranged a second opinion for everything. They have right to do that, but to be honest, I get tired of it'.¹⁰⁵⁴ The provincial delegate thus interpreted this knowledge power as hindering power. The residents also employed their own knowledge. Examples are their suggestions on how to deal with the land that the province bought from the first farmer to move, their ideas for accelerating the process and how to deal with procedures, and their proposals for the design of the terps.¹⁰⁵⁵

The residents occasionally built media power by making public their dissatisfaction with the province about the lack of progress. A resident: 'Although all the media reports might suggest that the project is a fairy tale, this is quite the wrong impression. It demands much of the residents, because cooperation with government authorities is

difficult. They think in years and in paper, whereas we are concerned about the continuity of our farms each year, and for us paper is a necessary evil' (van Rooy et al., 2006).

The local group sometimes built sociability towards the provincial government by being friendly and engaging. The local group did its utmost to continue the alliance with the province. Sociability was particularly built to show appreciation of the project manager's efforts in the project by complimenting him.¹⁰⁵⁶

To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the local group built legitimate power to let the provincial government know that its conditions has to be taken into account, knowledge power to get information on specific subjects or to bring their own knowledge into the process, media power to get the planning process moving, and sociability to maintain the relationship with the provincial government.

Power building by authorities

National government's power building with regard to the provincial government

In its interaction with the provincial government the national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power.

An example of indirect coercive power built by Rijkswaterstaat is the rumour that spread among its officials. It said that the government authority was not certain of the competence of the Noord-Brabant provincial government to lead a river project.¹⁰⁵⁷ The provincial government was consequently limited to the planning, which was laid down in an administrative agreement at a later stage. This agreement is another illustration of the use of indirect coercive power, as Rijkswaterstaat brought it up again more than a year after it was signed, claiming that it was a bad agreement and was irrelevant.¹⁰⁵⁸ Rijkswaterstaat did not agree with the conditions listed in the agreement and called for rigorous auditing rules. A government official: 'I can live with it if we make good arrangements. If these are not kept then the agreement is useless.'¹⁰⁵⁹ However, this was not easy. The Room for the River programme manager had to throw his authority into the fray to convince the province that adaptation of the agreement was an absolute necessity. 'The SPKD Room for the River framework includes large projects and a vague agreement will not do. Large projects imply auditing obligations. The relationship between the national and the provincial government was not that clear. For other projects there are now agreements between the state secretary and the regional initiators which set out in detail what they will do....It took six months before the province saw that this was in its interest.'¹⁰⁶⁰ The province had no choice but to comply with the current rules set by Rijkswaterstaat, but it took time before the organisation was convinced that there was no other option than compliance, which can be considered to be a case of indirect coercive power. Another illustration of indirect

coercive power is the high turnover of Rijkswaterstaat officials involved in the project, which was a way of showing who was actually in charge.¹⁰⁶¹

Legitimate power was built by Rijkswaterstaat by substantiating its responsibility for the terps plan. An example is Rijkswaterstaat's regular reference to its responsibility towards Parliament: 'We are accountable to Parliament'.¹⁰⁶² Another example is the confirmation of its role in the process: the communication plan for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) had to be approved by Rijkswaterstaat. It approved the plan, but stated that it had to be consulted about all contacts with the media.¹⁰⁶³ Besides, the national government pointed out how to deal with the residents: 'Make it clear that the people will be consulted, but that the state secretary makes the decisions and the residents' group can only give advice'.¹⁰⁶⁴

Hindering power was built during the start of the terps plan in 2001, when Rijkswaterstaat slowed the process down. It took a long time before Rijkswaterstaat accepted the project proposal, signed the contract with Habiforum to develop the residents' plan (Slootweg, 2004) and incorporated the terps plan in its regional advice.¹⁰⁶⁵ Another illustration of hindering power is its refusal to provide the details of the cost calculations for the terps plan and its effect on the water level (Slootweg, 2004). Rijkswaterstaat also continued to use hindering power in the planning process until December 2004, when the administrative agreement between the Department of Water Management and Noord-Brabant provincial government was prepared. The agreement went through ten rounds of editing.¹⁰⁶⁶

Rijkswaterstaat built knowledge power through its access to cost calculation methods (Slootweg, 2004), calculations of the effect of the proposed measures on the water level and experts who could interpret the results. This type of power was used as hindering power when Rijkswaterstaat was not willing to give the provincial government and the local group detailed information on the calculation method or to explain the evidence base underlying the outcomes (Slootweg, 2004). The numerical superiority of involved Rijkswaterstaat officials and experts in the planning process can also be considered to be a form of knowledge power. The project manager: 'For the purchase of real estate Rijkswaterstaat established a commission (*Commissie Vastgoedteam*) to 'advise', as it was called. But the government authority always wanted to say something about the content. As a consequence, the process acquired a life of its own. The first time we met the commission there were six people at the table, the next time it had increased to ten.'¹⁰⁶⁷

To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national government built indirect coercive power to let the provincial government know who is in charge, legitimate power to stress the rules and procedures for accountability, hindering power to slow down the planning process, and knowledge power to demonstrate its access to instruments and experts who could interpret the outcomes.

It used hindering power particularly from the beginning of the process until the voluntary agreement between the national and provincial government was signed.

Provincial government's power building power with regard to the national government

In its interaction with the national government the provincial government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and sociability.

The provincial government built indirect coercive power as a last resort on one occasion, when the dispute about the responsibility for the implementation of the terps plan reached a climax in a meeting with the state secretary. The provincial delegate pointed out that in an earlier meeting a promise was made that the province would be responsible for the implementation. She argued that although it was a verbal agreement, it was still valid. After the state secretary denied this, as she wanted to let it go, the provincial delegate played her last card: 'If this is how it's going to be, I'll return the assignment'.¹⁰⁶⁸

Legitimate power was built, for example, in discussions with the national government about responsibility. The project manager: 'Their [Rijkswaterstaat's] focus is "we have to be in control because Parliament wants to know what is happening". Our defence is "you are allowed to have control, that is OK, but we have an administrative agreement with you. This implies that the project has been decentralised and that we make our own administrative appraisal. There is no going back on this decision"'¹⁰⁶⁹

An illustration of sociability is the project manager's attitude towards Rijkswaterstaat, which can be interpreted as one of accommodation. Regarding the presentation of the arguments for the terps plan he said, 'My attitude is to just do it in the way they want'.¹⁰⁷⁰ He made a conscious decision to use this type of power because he expected it would yield a return: 'So you will not run the risk of a delay in the planning process'.¹⁰⁷¹

To summarise, in its dealings with the national government the provincial government built indirect coercive power to show that making a fool of the province would not work, legitimate power to demonstrate its position in relation to the national government and sociability to put the national government in the right mood.

Table 7.4 contains an overview of the authorities' and the local group's power building.

Table 7.4 Building power by national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov) and local group (Loc gr)

		direct coercive power	indirect coercive power	legitimate power	reward power	hindering power	knowledge power	media power	sociability
Nat	Prov	o o	+ ±	+ +	o o	++ o	± o	o o	o ±
Nat	Loc gr	o	±	+ ±	o o	+ ±	o ±	o ±	o ±
Prov	Loc gr	o	±	o ±	o o	o ±	+ +	o ±	± ±

C = collaborative frame CM = conflict management frame I = identity frame P = power frame
 o = zero ± = low + = moderate ++ = high

The most striking outcomes of the analysis of the power building by the authorities and the local group are the absence of ultimatums, the number of power types built by the local group and by the authorities, and the difficulties experienced by the government authorities in cooperating with each other.

The analysis shows that no ultimatums were issued by the authorities or the residents. It proves that influence was exerted indirectly rather than directly.

The local group proved to be rather powerful in its dealings with the authorities, particularly because it built more types of power than the authorities did. In its interaction with the national government the local group built five power types (legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability), while the national government built three power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power) in its interaction with the local group. The use of knowledge power and media power by the local group proved to be determining factors in putting pressure on the national government. In its interaction with the provincial government the local group built the same five power types as it did in its interaction with the national government, whereas the province built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). As in its interaction with the national government, knowledge power and media power were the most important social power weapons in the local group's interaction with the provincial government. The local group's power building did not seem to have repercussions for its interaction with the provincial government because of the provincial government's use of a conflict management frame and bridging strategies.

The power building in the interaction between the authorities was more or less balanced. The national government built four power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power), while the provincial government built three power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and sociability). The main reasons for this rough balance were the existence of the administrative agreement between the national and provincial government and the

close cooperation between the provincial government and the local group. The presence of the local group in the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep*, ABG) posed a threat to the national government because it did not follow accepted conventions in relations between government authorities: it questioned the performance of certain officials and used media power to bring disputes into the open.

Collaboration between the authorities did not happen. This type of interaction may occur if both authorities exercise restraint or even abandon their use of indirect coercive power and legitimate power. Although legitimate power is a less dominant type of power building than indirect coercive power, in this case it had an adverse effect on the development of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and tolerance in which trust may grow. This can be considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as was shown in the analysis of power building in the interaction between the provincial government and the local group.

7.2.4 Authorities' and local group's potential to act

In this section we analyse the authorities' and the local group's potential to act. Both potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard to the authorities a differentiation has been made between the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant). Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities' and the local group's potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities' and the local group's power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the interaction between the authorities and the local group?

National government's potential to act

The national government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

National government's capacity to act

The national government's capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

The national government's mandate was to realise the Room for the River policy that was included in a national planning instrument, the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD). This policy is to lower the water level of the rivers Rhine and Meuse in 2015 to accommodate peak discharges in future. The mandate was in fact cut back in the political drive for a 'leaner and meaner government', leaving the target of realising 39

projects beyond Rijkswaterstaat's capacity.¹⁰⁷² The majority of these projects were therefore to be devolved to lower-tier authorities, which is why an administrative agreement was signed between the Department of Water Management and Noord-Brabant provincial government. Rijkswaterstaat's mandate now included the overall management of the Room for the River policy and the final responsibility for the delegated river projects, which had to meet its requirements. This arrangement led to recurring disputes between Rijkswaterstaat and the province.

The national government's mandate can thus be considered moderate.

Resources

The resources of the national government included budget and people.

The national government provided a budget (2.2 billion euros) for implementing 39 Room for the River projects, including the terps plan. Considering the number and variety of the river projects, the budget was not that big. As the terps plan was one of the first river projects to be implemented, the national government wanted to keep the project costs as low as possible to set a precedent for subsequent projects.¹⁰⁷³ This made the project costs a recurring point of contention between Rijkswaterstaat and the province. An example is the province's budget proposal for the implementation of the terps plan, which was presented in the form of a package deal for meeting 80 to 90 per cent of all the project's objectives. At the same time a discussion arose about the question of responsibility for the implementation. Rijkswaterstaat made the transfer of responsibility to the province conditional upon the province bearing the risk, but this was rejected by the province, which led to a dispute. The province then negotiated with Rijkswaterstaat and agreed to economise as much as possible and to share the responsibility for implementation with the water board.¹⁰⁷⁴

The national government had ample staff to effectively manage the Room for the River project and exert its authority in the field of water management (Meijerink, 2004). Despite the number of staff available, the number of disciplines represented was limited and the spatial planning element of the project required a totally different set of skills than 'traditional' water management, which deals with projects such as the maintenance of the water infrastructure (see also 2.2). The government officials assigned to the project were therefore not adequately equipped to deal with collaborative planning processes and devolve responsibilities.

The resources of the national government can therefore be considered moderate.

Coordinating mechanisms

The internal coordination was strong and functioned fairly well, although it took some time for government officials to implement decisions made by the state secretary as they initially had difficulty with the residents' plan. The coordination with the province,

which was based on a brief administrative agreement, was a different matter. Rijkswaterstaat was unable to relinquish its authoritative attitude and relied mainly on the existing hierarchy to get things done, rather than embracing its new coordinating and supervisory role of first laying down the ground rules and monitoring condition compliance.

The coordinating mechanisms of the national government can therefore be described as weak.

Consistency

The consistency of the national government (the construction or adoption of a narrative) was weak. The construction and adoption of a project narrative for the terps plan proved to be problematic for the national government since the terps plan was delegated to the provincial government. This difficulty was rooted in the difference between the views of the government ministers (Department of Water Management) and departmental officials (*Rijkswaterstaat*). The successive state secretaries were convinced that the terps plan was a successful bottom-up initiative, but it took time before government officials understood that the project's success would reflect on the department. The responsible politicians wanted to find a way to adopt the terps plan and added it to Rijkswaterstaat's portfolio because of earlier experiences, such as the dike relocation in Lent (see Chapter 5). In that project the government plan had been approved by the Dutch Parliament, but it left an ill-feeling about the process in the community. In the Overdiep Polder project, however, the residents' narrative became the project narrative. This was so strong that Rijkswaterstaat's inability to adopt it had a negative influence on its capacity to act. What authority can afford to deny a successful project?

National government's motivation to act

The national government's motivation to act entails political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

The political priority of the national government was to reduce flood risk, as stated in the Room for the River policy. The terps plan, initiated by residents, met the government conditions for lowering the water level in the river Meuse. As the state secretary was open to special initiatives that would meet the conditions of the Room for the River policy, she agreed to adopt the terps plan as a demonstration project, an experiment in which authorities work in close cooperation with residents on sustainable solutions for water management.¹⁰⁷⁵

The political priority of the national government can therefore be considered high.

Organisational ambition

While the overall organisational ambition of the national government was supportive of the political priority given to flood safety, delegating responsibility for the terps plan to the provincial government was not accepted by all officials. A government official: ‘The province has never directed such projects. But everybody with a bit of experience knows that some things can be done better by others’ [read: Rijkswaterstaat].¹⁰⁷⁶ This led to various hindering tactics as described earlier (see section 7.2.3). The ambition of Rijkswaterstaat was strong as it was highly motivated to meet water management and flood safety objectives, but less enthusiastic about the terps plan in particular, which led to a slowing down of the planning process.

The organisational ambition of the national government can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Personal vision

The successive state secretaries for water management did not present a unified and explicit personal vision for the project. The first agreed to the experimental status of the terps plan, the second decided on the front-runner position of the plan and agreed to the delegation of the planning to the provincial government, while the third approved the start of the implementation of the terps plan.

However, realising the terps plan was for the most part a job for a government official. The viewpoint of the Room for the River programme manager was clear: all 39 projects had to be realised by 2015 and within the budget of 2.2 billion euros. He was open to negotiated solutions that would lead to achieving this objective. Government officials were somewhat reluctant to express their personal views on the terps plan. In a private talk it became clear that government officials did not have a positive feeling about the plan. Asked why not, the response was ‘It is not our project’.¹⁰⁷⁷ Until the summer of 2006 they did not support the terps plan. They expressed this in various ways, for example in statements like ‘I do not understand why residents have to participate in the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG*)’, ‘They are not officials’ and ‘My opinion on whether Overdiep Polder is a sensible choice does not matter. As a government official it is my task to make choices that meet the required conditions. In the end it is society that has to come to an opinion based on something that is reasonable. Then the politicians decide’.¹⁰⁷⁸ Their change of mind in mid 2006 was prompted more by their own experiences than encouragement from their superiors.

The personal vision of the state secretaries as well as government officials can therefore be considered to be moderate.

To summarise, the national government’s potential to act proved to be weak. This was based on a weak capacity to act and a moderate motivation to act. For an overview see Table 7.5.

Table 7.5 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government

	capacity to act				motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency	political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	+	+	±	±	++	+	+	
National government	+	+	±	±	±	++	+	±

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Provincial government's potential to act

The provincial government's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

Provincial government's capacity to act

The provincial government's capacity to act encompasses its mandate, resources, coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).

Mandate

The adoption of the Room for the River policy in 1996 introduced a new element into planning. The role of the region, including the provinces, water boards and municipalities, became crucial in elaborating policy. Until that point the provincial government was responsible for preparing and enforcing the regional plan (*streekplan*) and the competent authority for dike management, while its role in river management was not considered influential. Since the mid 1990s, however, the provinces wanted to play a more prominent role in river management, as Gelderland did after the peak discharges of 1993 and 1995 (see section 6.2.5). The terps plan in Overdiep Polder was the first plan the national government delegated to a lower-tier authority, in this case Noord-Brabant provincial government. The provincial government became responsible for the planning process, but Rijkswaterstaat was not used to devolving responsibility. This resulted in many disputes between the national and the provincial government.

The mandate of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Resources

The resources of the regional government included budget and people. The provincial government intended to use its budget of 10 million euros to prefinance the terps plan to get the ball rolling. Although this money was disputed,¹⁰⁷⁹ as described earlier (see section 7.1), it proved to be a key factor in the province's relationship with the national government as it gave the province more authority to act independently of Rijkswaterstaat, for example the way it dealt with the anticipatory purchases.¹⁰⁸⁰ In this phase these funds were therefore sufficient and made a positive contribution.

With regard to the people involved in the terps plan, there were two provincial officials working full-time on the project and one on a part-time basis. In addition, the province had many experts at its disposal.¹⁰⁸¹ The number of people was relatively low, but they had the right experience and knowledge of the relevant disciplines, which proved positive.

The resources of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be moderate.

Coordinating mechanisms

In contrast to the national government, the provincial government did not depend entirely on hierarchical coordinating mechanisms. The province was able to use the government hierarchy and informal networks and to bring together different government authorities in various fields. The provincial government's internal coordinating mechanisms worked well. The provincial delegate, for example, was always available for questions from the project manager. Apart from a team dedicated to realising the terps plan, the province also had various experts at its disposal who could be called upon at any time.¹⁰⁸²

The coordinating mechanisms can therefore be considered to be strong.

Consistency

The provincial government had a low-profile and took a supportive approach towards the local group. It therefore did not have to invent its own narrative and easily adopted the local group's narrative.

The consistency of the provincial government (the adoption of a narrative) can therefore be considered to be strong.

Provincial government's motivation to act

The provincial government's motivation includes political priority, organisational ambition and personal vision.

Political priority

In recent decades the authority of the province has been limited by the creation of an administrative entity, the city-region (stadsregio). These were established to create an administrative structure for close cooperation between cities and the surrounding municipalities in the fields of spatial planning, housing, transport, employment and youth welfare.¹⁰⁸³ This undermined the influence of the provincial governments in many fields. In this context, Noord-Brabant provincial government welcomed being given responsibility for the river project as it saw this as recognition of its legitimate role in the government hierarchy and an opportunity to build a more direct relationship with its citizens. The province used the terps plan as a vehicle to convince the national government that it has the capacity to implement a river project, and to show the

residents that it is a dedicated, responsive, trustworthy and supportive organisation (see also 7.2.5). The political priority of the provincial government was to play a role in river management and take charge of the planning and implementation of the terps plan, which was in line with provincial policy.

The political priority of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be high.

Organisational ambition

The organisational ambition of the provincial government supported its political priority and the performance of the government officers supported the policy line that the province is competent to realise a river project.

The organisational ambition of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be strong.

Personal vision

The provincial delegates and the project managers provided the driving force behind the terps plan. Their motivation to act was particularly driven by their interest in making the province's first river project a success. The personal motivation of the successive provincial delegates was to promote the terps plan to various government authorities. The various project managers were indispensable. The current project manager explained his drive as follows: 'We want to show that the province is capable of implementing a river project. I am absolutely convinced that we can, despite the fact that we only have three people available for the project.'¹⁰⁸⁴

The personal vision of the provincial delegates and officials can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, with a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the provincial government's potential to act proved to be moderate. For an overview, see Table 7.6.

Table 7.6 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of provincial government

	capacity to act				motivation to act			potential to act
	resources	mandate	coordinating mechanisms	consistency	political priority	organisational ambition	personal vision	
	+	+	++	++	++	++	++	
Provincial government	+	+	++	++	++	++	++	+

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high

Local group's potential to act

The local group's potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act.

Local group's capacity to act

The local groups' capacity to act includes resources, trust and social identity.

Resources

The local group's resources include dispositional force, bonding force, bridging force and linking force.

The local group's dispositional force (skills, people, resources, available time) was strong. Two residents among the 17 families became the driving force of the local group. They had administrative skills acquired during their time as a member of Waalwijk Municipal Council and as a member of the water board and the farmers' organisation, as well as negotiating skills and leadership skills, the vice chair having an informal leadership style.¹⁰⁸⁵ Furthermore, they knew how to run an organisation and their media skills were excellent. The residents had land, which proved to be a strong asset in negotiations with the government authorities and one of the key factors during the process. The leaders of the residents managed to spend a lot of their time working on the project. The chair of the local group had just handed over the running of his farm to his son and the vice chair had a joint venture with his son. Other residents also devoted time to the local group's activities.

The bonding force was strong and based on the closely knit social network of 17 farmers and an owner of a marina. This was manifested in close social relationships and networks of (reciprocal) cooperation that exist between farming families, especially between adjoining farms. Examples of this reciprocity were help with the harvest, occupation of the farm during holidays and helping with day-to-day farming activities. This bonding force is illustrated by the ability of the group to dispel the initial resistance of some farmers to the idea of water retention in their polder. They convinced their colleagues to see this idea as an opportunity to improve their farms rather than as a threat.¹⁰⁸⁶ Apart from a few families the whole community relied on the two leaders during the planning process.¹⁰⁸⁷

The bridging force of the residents was very strong. It started when some farmers approached the provincial delegate after an information meeting organised to inform the residents about the results of a study to identify 'search areas' for water retention, including Overdiep Polder. As they were member of various organisations, including Waalwijk Municipal Council, the water board and the farmers' organisation ZLTO, they knew the area very well and had extensive networks. The local group also had direct access to the provincial delegate if they needed his advice on urgent issues. In their relationship with both the national government and the provincial government the residents opted for a critical but cooperative approach rather than a defensive attitude. 'If something has to

be done, it should be done quickly and on our terms' was their attitude (Verhoeven 2006). The residents also used their bridging skills to engage the media. They knew when to use the media and when to use the threat of doing so would be sufficient. They were straightforward and authentic in their contacts with the media, using the right words and never blaming others or exaggerating.

Their linking force was also very strong. They were able to convince the government authorities that they wanted to take fully part in project decisions and arranged membership of the official supervisory group (*ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG*), usually not open to residents. The residents' water expert was also appointed to the steering group, first as an observer and later as an adviser. However, as they were key players in the project and supported by the province, they knew their place. They discussed and aligned their decisions informally before formalising them in the official supervisory group.

In order to influence the outcome of decisions that would affect them, they exercised their bonding force (to operate as a group), bridging force (to take part in formal networks) and linking force (to negotiate with authorities and experts and take fully part in project decisions). An example is their ability to alter the design of the terps, dike and polder drawn up by the government-appointed Q-team. They employed all the types of forces: their bonding force, as all the residents relied on the leaders; their bridging force, because they were able to manage the conflict to reach a negotiated solution; and their linking force, because the province identified the residents as the key actors in the negotiation.

The local group's resource basis can therefore be considered to be strong.

Trust

The local group had great faith in the water expert associated with Habiforum,¹⁰⁸⁸ who became their confidant, moderator, facilitator and mediator,¹⁰⁸⁹ and in the provincial delegate and the project manager. While the local group's trust in the water expert was rapidly built up, their trust in the provincial delegate and the project manager took much longer to develop. As the chairs of the local group were members of various government authorities this did not prove to be a hard job because they were used to working with government decision-makers and government officials. The local group was very clear in what it expected from the province: a cooperative approach towards the terps plan.¹⁰⁹⁰ The provincial delegate met the local group's expectation by promoting the terps plan at various levels of government.¹⁰⁹¹ The provincial delegate's willingness to be available to the residents in an emergency also increased their trust in him. This was boosted further after a dispute among the residents when the provincial delegate promised to visit the polder on a Saturday morning. When he confirmed his earlier statement that he would stick with options supported by all the residents, the foundation for a good understanding was finally laid.¹⁰⁹² The first project manager had built the sluice in Overdiep Polder, his first assignment for the province. 'So he got our trust'.¹⁰⁹³

However, the residents' trust in specific individuals proved to be dependent on those people's abilities to resolve conflicts and find solutions and the relationship could easily change if the person in question was no longer be able to meet the residents' demands, as the first project manager found out. The residents asked for him to be replaced because they viewed his inability to step outside the basic formal framework as a constraint on the prospects for getting the project implemented. The provincial delegate accepted the residents' demand and replaced the project manager with someone whose profile matched the residents' wishes.

In addition, from the beginning the residents had a strong belief in the ultimate success of the terps plan. This process trust was based mainly on their faith in individuals: their water expert, the provincial delegate and the project manager. The project manager: 'The residents' trust was mainly based on what they saw happening in practice.'¹⁰⁹⁴

The local group's trust can therefore be considered to be high.

Social identity

The residents had a strong social identity; they were a closely knit community attached to their land. This social identity goes back to the mid 1970s when the Overdiep Polder was protected from flooding. Previously, the farmers had used the land mainly for hay production. This bond first took shape when they met each other in the home of the vice chair to decide what to do after the government's plan for water retention became public. The residents were motivated to act by the feeling of uncertainty about their future combined with their aversion to dependence on the government: 'Most people are more afraid of the government than the water' (van Rooy et al., 2006). This group feeling dominated during the whole planning process. An example is this statement by the local group chairman: 'Naturally we do not determine what will happen here, but without our cooperation nothing will happen.'¹⁰⁹⁵

The social identity of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.

Local group's motivation to act

The local group's motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity.

Common purpose

The common purpose of the residents was clear: they wanted to reconstruct their polder to accommodate a one in 25 year flood in order to meet the public interest and secure an economically viable future for their farms. They conceived the terps plan to make water retention possible while providing for the continuation of eight to ten farms. Their shared purpose had a historical basis. A resident: 'We arrived in Overdiep Polder in the 1970s to settle here for at least two generations. So, we really wanted to stay here.'¹⁰⁹⁶

The common purpose of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.

Solidarity

Throughout the process the residents were able to act as a group, despite sometimes divergent personal interests. Although some residents put their personal interests above their common interests, most residents remained to support the local group. The local group chairman: 'A 100 per cent support is not possible. A few residents left the group. That is quite a problem as we could not say that we represent the interests of about ten people, and those of the other four or five do not matter.'¹⁰⁹⁷ The farmers demonstrated solidarity with their colleagues. The local group chairs, for example, provided confidential advice to other farmers on private matters, such as buying farms, deciding whether to stay or move, and on damage compensation.¹⁰⁹⁸

The solidarity of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, with a strong capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the local group's potential to act was strong. For an overview, see Table 7.7.

Table 7.7 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local group

Local group	capacity to act							motivation to act			potential to act
	resources				trust	social identity	common purpose		solidarity		
	d	bo	br	l							
	++	++	+++	+++	++	++	++	++	++	++	

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high +++ = very strong/very high
d = dispositional force bo = bonding force br = bridging force l = linking force

Table 7.8 summaries the potential to act of all the parties involved in the case study. The national government's potential to act was weak, the provincial government's potential to act was moderate and the local group's potential to act was strong.

Table 7.8 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government, provincial government and local group

	capacity to act	motivation to act	potential to act
National government	±	+	±
Provincial government	+	++	+
Local group	++	++	++

± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high
Note that ++ for the local group will not result in a better potential to act than the provincial government's +. Here, two different standards are used, i.e. weak, moderate and strong in relation to what government or local group normally has when it comes to money, skills etc. The outcomes thus are relative

The analysis of the authorities' and the local group's potential to act demonstrates that the national government fell short in the field of coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative), which resulted in a weak capacity to act. The provincial government had a moderate mandate and resource base, combined with strong coordinating mechanisms and consistency, which resulted in a moderate capacity to act. While the national government had a moderate motivation to act, the provincial government's motivation to act proved to be strong. Although the national government's potential to act was weak, its influence in the planning process was considerable, partly due to its power building and interaction strategies. The national government's weak potential to act, therefore, does not seem to have had much effect on its power building, its interaction strategies and interaction outcomes.

7.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action

In this section the authorities' organisational culture and local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action is analysed. Object of analysis is the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action, the organisational culture of the provincial government and the impact of this on its action and the cultural background of the local group and the impact of this on its action respectively.

National government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

From its inception Rijkswaterstaat had been a line-management agency at national government level with regional offices. As discussed in Chapter 2, throughout its history Rijkswaterstaat has rigorously defended and executed government policy. It was an exponent of an authoritative government style and enjoyed a dominant role in water management, preferably without interference or supervision by any other government body or office holders (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998). Over the centuries it has worked quietly on creating a new system of water management, new coastal defences and infrastructure works, all based on its own expertise and thinking. Indeed, many of its projects were only given a legislative basis when implementation had already started. However, Rijkswaterstaat was not a power unto itself as it was accountable to the Government and to Parliament, although it had a difficult relationship with both, and sometimes with its own minister. Many politicians found the closed nature of the organisation difficult to deal with, while Rijkswaterstaat officials, mostly engineers, had little patience with the limited responsiveness and decisiveness of politicians and preferred to fight internally rather than participate in a societal debate (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998).

Particularly after World War II, Rijkswaterstaat worked vigorously on the closure of many sea inlets, the construction of the national motorway network and the canalisation of the Rhine, Lek and Nederrijn (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998). Although from the 1960s parliamentary control increased and Rijkswaterstaat was obliged to follow legislative procedures in its daily practice, its authoritative attitude remained, including the limited openness and its preference for internal discussion over public debate. Its main opponents were no longer politicians, but citizens who were affected by the infrastructure it worked on and opposed the damage to the cultural landscape, supported by environmental groups in their defence of nature and the landscape (Wolsink, 2006; van Heezik, 2007). The clash between environmental groups and Rijkswaterstaat reached a climax in the conflict about the closing of the Eastern Scheldt in the mid 1970s, in which the government authority stood for flood safety and the environmental groups promoted a healthy ecosystem. Rijkswaterstaat had to accept partial defeat and were required to design the storm surge barrier with open compartments that can be closed when necessary, but it incorporated the 'ecosystem values' into its policies and adopted a green image. As a result, green engineers were now welcome at Rijkswaterstaat. It also adapted its policy and working style in an attempt to avoid public opposition to new infrastructure as much as possible and co-opted environmental groups. At the same time, the ideas of integrated water management, including overcoming sectoral interests, found acceptance and were easily adopted by Rijkswaterstaat as the main water bodies, the rivers, were still 'theirs'. However, the inclusion of citizens as stakeholders in the planning process and the devolution of responsibilities have so far been fraught with difficulties.

At the beginning of the 21st century a new actor entered Rijkswaterstaat's theatre of operations: residents who came up with their own plan and demanded a key role in the planning process. Their plan was entirely compatible with national water policy; it met the conditions for flood safety and proved to be cost effective. However, dealing with residents who demand a key role in the planning process was a major challenge for Rijkswaterstaat. It went against the grain of the organisation's engineering culture, in which government officials usually prepare a plan themselves and the role of residents is limited to giving their opinion during a public consultation round when the plan is almost ready (Winnubst & Ovaa, in prep.).

In addition, as part of the policy drive for a 'meaner and leaner' government Rijkswaterstaat was required to transform itself into an executive agency¹⁰⁹⁹ by the end of 2006. With only fifteen years to complete the 39 projects in the Room for the River programme, which was launched in 2000, delegation to lower-tier authorities appeared to be the only option for achieving this organisational objective. This devolution of responsibilities was encapsulated in the motto 'local where possible, central where necessary'.¹¹⁰⁰ However, Rijkswaterstaat officials saw this as a threat to their 'natural' mandate to prepare flood risk management plans for the country.¹¹⁰¹ During the planning for the first delegated project, the terps plan in Overdiep Polder, they reacted

accordingly. Until midway through the planning process in 2004, Rijkswaterstaat deliberately obstructed progress by failing to take decisions, exactly the attitude it disliked in politicians in the past.

Although this attitude faded during the course of the planning process, its authoritative stance and bureaucratic characteristics persisted. This became apparent in the disputes about the division of responsibilities between Rijkswaterstaat and the province. Bosch and van der Ham (1998) attributed this to the organisation's military origins, which were manifested in its organisational culture.¹¹⁰² Rijkswaterstaat's organisational culture followed from the nature of its work. The operational management of the organisation is complex, from the maintenance of the water system and engineering works and the management of surface waters, motorways and shipping to the execution of public works. To make the organisation manageable many rules and regulations were formulated which continuously change in the light of alterations in demands and technological requirements. Apart from the question of whether this proved effective, the question of transparency arose. Furthermore, it led to bureaucracy and – to a certain extent – conservatism, which took shape in the relationship between Rijkswaterstaat and the province, as revealed by a statement by the project manager of the terps plan: 'Rijkswaterstaat has the tendency to fall back on its reflexes. The province is not part of Rijkswaterstaat.'¹¹⁰³

The impact of Rijkswaterstaat's organisational culture on its action can therefore be considered to be strong, as it has a long tradition in water management.

Provincial government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action

The provincial government's organisational culture is based on a multisectoral approach. As a lower-tier agency operating between the national and the local level, the province's culture is distinctive. In its position in the middle of the government hierarchy it is used to dealing with different governmental tiers, styles and cultures. According to van Kemenade and Tetteroo (2007) the province fulfils the role of 'administrative gristle'. The province gives support, aligns and coordinates policy, and integrates and mediates in conflicts between authorities. It has a central coordinating and supervisory role in governmental and public networks, including business, transport, agriculture, nature and environmental organisations. Generally speaking, the province deals with issues that exceed the scope and capacity of local government, but are not important enough for the national government to take on.¹¹⁰⁴ One of the province's major policy instruments is the regional plan (*streekplan*). The province determines where urban expansion can take place and where industrial estates and business parks can be built, and has various tasks in the field of water management.¹¹⁰⁵ Apart from spatial planning and water management, the main tasks of the province include the environment, youth welfare, rural development, culture, cultural heritage, traffic and transport.

Not only has the province been struggling for decades to overcome its negative image – often reflected in a poor turnout at the provincial elections (van Kemenade & Tetteroo, 2007) – but the pressure to profile itself was increased by the appearance in 1994 of a new regional authority, the city region. This administrative layer was established to ensure close cooperation between cities and the towns in the surrounding travel-to-work region and operate in the same policy areas as the province, such as spatial planning, housing, transport, employment and youth welfare.¹¹⁰⁶ In response the provinces have sought to raise their profile in policy areas such as the care of the elderly and disabled, nature conservation, recreation and tourism, regional archaeology and the preservation of historic buildings and monuments, but also by taking up other responsibilities (Peters, 2007), such as playing an active role in water management, like Noord-Brabant and Gelderland (see Chapter 6). Although some of these new tasks and roles have their basis in legislation (Arpad & Biermann, 2007), the province feels a need to restore or enhance its authority. It is still working on transforming itself from a modest and invisible provincial government with limited tasks and steering options into an important administrative layer involved in issues of public importance (Peters, 2007). Van Kemenade and Tetteroo (2007) argue in favour of specialisation and developing in-depth expertise rather than broadening their range of duties, which is leading to ‘administrative confusion’ due to an overkill of intermunicipal cooperation networks. As a consequence, the province increasingly faces scale and coordination problems (trying to tackle major issues that properly require action at the national or local level) and conflicts of interest with national and local government in specific policy areas (van Kemenade & Tetteroo, 2007).

Although the provincial governments are recognised within government circles, the public know little about this tier of government, despite its wide range of duties (Peters, 2007). Its activities are less visible to its residents than those of the national government and local authorities. Generally, the provincial government only comes into direct contact with residents when the law requires it, for example in public consultation procedures. Conversely, residents rarely seek direct contact with the province. Noord-Brabant provincial government set about bridging this distance to the public by earmarking a considerable annual budget to raise the profile and visibility of the organisation within the province (Peters, 2007).

When Jan Boelhouwer took office as a provincial delegate of Noord-Brabant in 1999, one of the policy areas in his portfolio was water. There was no political interest in this portfolio at that time, because the general opinion was that ‘we are finished with water; the Major Rivers Delta Plan was almost completed so the delegate’s role would be limited to cutting the tapes’, as Jan Boelhouwer remarked.¹¹⁰⁷ But it turned out otherwise. Jan Boelhouwer: ‘I received some signals that indicated that something was changing. In 1999 some Rijkswaterstaat officials visited me and presented several drawings, such as green rivers and retention areas, which put more blue areas on the map of the Netherlands. There was a discussion about opening the Haringvliet [a dam

that closes off one of the sea inlets in the southwest of the Netherlands]. Then, in 2000 in her Loevestein speech¹¹⁰⁸ the state secretary questioned the safety of the country as a result of climate change and problems like soil subsidence. I was informed about what the state secretary would say that very day, but for the residents it was a shock.¹¹⁰⁹ During a meeting in which the provincial delegate informed the region about the blue areas on the map, farmers in Overdiep Polder asked him if they could develop their own plan. The provincial delegate agreed to this and seized the opportunity to take the lead in the farmers' initiative to redesign their polder as a water retention area in a way that would allow them to continue farming. This implied a new provincial responsibility as well as an opportunity to increase the province's visibility.

The impact of the provincial government's organisational culture on its action can therefore be considered to be moderate, in the sense that it is relatively flexible in its position towards other government authorities and citizens.

Local group's cultural background and the impact of this on its action

Since nearly all the residents of Overdiep Polder were farmers, they can be considered to have a farming culture. Apart from one pig farmer, all were dairy farmers. Except for their production system and farming practice, an important aspect of their culture is that most of the farms are family businesses. The farms are exposed to the vagaries of the weather, the volatility of the market and the influence of government regulations. While the farmers were used to living with the first variable, the second and third proved more difficult to live with as their impacts on the production system and farming practice had been increasing in recent decades. In the past, arable and dairy farmers in particular had had an almost free licence to produce and a nearly exclusive right to the land, but this changed as their importance in the food supply declined and their production process became increasingly associated with environmental degradation, animal diseases and adverse effects on animal welfare. In addition, as employment in the sector declined, so did its electoral and political significance. The overall trend is that the importance of the sector is decreasing relative to that of industry and the tertiary sectors. The once leading position of Dutch agriculture in Europe now seems to be falling behind as a result of increased productivity abroad, the 'limits to growth' imposed by overproduction measures (quota) and environmental regulations to prevent pollution and other adverse side-effects (Klijn et al., 2008).

As a result, specific characteristics of the farmers' culture, such as their pro-active attitude and standing up for their interests, including polder management, and the establishment of cooperatives for their products and banking, also changed. Today, they are just one of many actors in a global economy, which implies that they can no longer rely on the national government for compensation for loss of income resulting from low market prices for their products. This means that their 'traditional' approach to defending their financial interests – organising protest actions and asking for compensation measures, and using all possible means to overturn any negative

government decisions – is no longer a useful strategy. Nevertheless, in regional land use questions they still use this tactic, which means first responding negatively to regional developments, and if this is not successful in quashing the proposal, threatening to obstruct the planning process.

A few farmers in Overdiep Polder took this traditional approach in response to the news that their polder was a potential retention area. However, two other farmers in Overdiep Polder convinced their colleagues to develop a plan that would serve the public interest of flood protection as well as their private interest, a viable economic perspective. Based on their common identity as farmers, the residents of Overdiep Polder were able to form a group identity and used this to define a common purpose: to redesign their polder as a water retention area. What particularly stirred the residents was their aversion to the government ('better soon and on our conditions, rather than uncertainty'¹¹¹⁰). Instead of waiting until the national government came up with options for water retention and then fighting them in the courts right up to the Council of State, they drew up their own plan. As a group they took the lead, which proved to be a new phenomenon in Dutch river management since residents first started to oppose government plans for dike reinforcement in the 1960s and 1970s.

From their point of view, the farmers' action was understandable. For centuries they had played a dominant role in water management in the polder and their dominant role in land consolidation schemes dates from the 1960s. But now they had to deal with other emergent issues. In agriculture a similar development to that in river management policy had taken place: the problem was no longer how to raise productivity in agriculture; the main task was to accommodate and regulate different and often conflicting claims on land (see Aarts & van Woerkum, 1996; Glasbergen, 2000). It was generally felt that the quality of the agricultural environment was poor and needed improvement in the short term. At the national level this led to a new and ambitious vision for governance. The policy sought to enhance the socioeconomic perspectives for agriculture while improving the quality of physical space and the environment. These elements were combined in what has been called the pursuit of sustainable development of the rural area. Key features of this policy were a process-oriented approach, regional differentiation and private participation (Glasbergen, 2000), including new institutional arrangements, such as environmental cooperatives, which usually have a noncommittal character.

While the first two key features are also characteristics of the SPKD Room for the River, the last is not. The farmers' initiative can be viewed as private participation and in government terms as a form of self-governance. Although it was not part of the Room for the River programme, the farmers managed to get the authorities to accept their initiative. Unlike the noncommittal character of agricultural institutional arrangements, the farmers managed to play a full part in the project organisation, which resulted in both their and the authorities' commitment to the realisation of the terps plan.

The new role that the farmers had adopted was a matter of course in their common history of about 30 years of farming in the same polder, which they considered to be 'their' polder and 'their' land. Although a small player in the field, the farmers felt capable of taking a risk for the sake of the continuation of their farms. The fact that it also served the public interest was a secondary consideration, but no less important. The basis for their interaction with government authorities was the long history of farming in their families, their knowledge of farming, their experience of various land consolidation schemes, and the support of the farmers' organisation ZLTO, which they could fall back on at any time. The farmers were able to maintain their group identity during the planning process since it was based on kinship ties and bonds of friendship. These close bonds could withstand the distrust of some farmers who were mainly intent on getting the best out of it for themselves. Rather than using their identity in discussions with the authorities, the farmers emphasised their main interest: an economically viable future perspective for their farms.

The farmers' 'hands-on' mentality and direct communication provided an incentive for the provincial government's interaction, and indirectly for the national government's responsiveness. While the provincial government was sensitive to accommodating the residents' culture, the national government was not, but it was indirectly influenced by the local group's interaction as the final goal – the realisation of the terps plan – fitted in perfectly with national policy.

The local group's cultural background and the impact of this on its action can therefore be considered to be strong.

To summarise, the authorities' organisational culture and local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action were manifested in different ways. The national government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action can be considered to be rather strong, particularly as result of Rijkswaterstaat's engineering culture, which has existed since its inception in 1798. Rijkswaterstaat is a proponent of acting forcefully, as illustrated by its approach to water management by building and maintaining dikes and other infrastructure. To accommodate public criticism that the organisation was not taking nature and landscape values into account, it incorporated nature conservation into its policies. However, so far it has had difficulty in including citizens in the planning process and dealing with citizens who put forward their own plans to reduce flood risk. The provincial government's organisational culture and the impact of this on its action can be considered moderate due to its position in the middle of the government hierarchy and its experience in dealing with different governmental styles and cultures. The local group's cultural background and the impact of this on its action can be considered strong. The residents' initiative to redesign their polder as a water retention area was based on their drive to continue their farms and trust in their own strength.

The organisational culture of the government authorities and the cultural background of the local group have a limited explanatory power because they highlight the starting position of the actors and shed light on their position during the planning process rather than explaining the process of itself. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the cultural factor had an impact on their potential to act, their power building, interaction strategies and interaction outcomes. The national government's power building, its interaction strategies and its interaction outcomes can to a certain degree be considered as culturally determined in that it has been responsible for flood safety and reducing flood risks since 1798. The organisational culture of the provincial government – steering a middle course – matched well with both the national government's organisational culture and the local group's cultural background and can partly explain its potential to act, its power building, its interaction strategies and its interaction outcomes. As the local group depended mainly on the provincial government to realise its plan, its cultural background only partly explains its potential to act, its power building, its interaction strategies and its interaction outcomes.

7.2.6 Summary and discussion

The analysis of the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study can be summarised as follows.

The interaction between the authorities and the local group can be broken down into the interaction between the government authorities and the local group and between the two authorities: the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant).

The interaction between the national government and the local group always ended in debate and conflict, which in most cases was resolved with the help of the province. The interaction between the provincial government and the local group resulted in debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. If disputes emerged these always ended in a negotiated solution, but discord was generally prevented because the provincial government and the local group were continuously in 'dialogue mode'. The interaction between the authorities led to debate and conflict as a result of recurring disputes in the area of responsibility. Thanks to the provincial government's bridging strategies, these interaction outcomes always ended in a negotiated solution. Hence, negotiation was part of the interaction outcomes.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government generally used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame when dealing with the local group. The local group combined an identity frame and a conflict management frame in its

interaction with the national government. Both occasionally used buffering and bridging strategies, which can be considered a conscious strategy. The local group alternated between a conflict management frame and an identity frame when dealing with the provincial government, while the provincial government mainly used a conflict management frame and a collaborative frame. The identity frame of the local group occurred incidentally. Under the influence of the provincial government's bridging strategies and the local group's open mind and receptive attitude to signals from others, the local group reframed and replaced its identity frame with a conflict management frame. After the first project manager was replaced the local group mainly employed a collaborative frame, but this did not mean that discord was absent. In addition, many potential disputes were resolved or even prevented, particularly by the provincial government's attempts to bridge towards the local group. The provincial government and the local group used many bridging strategies and occasionally buffering strategies. The provincial government used buffering strategies particularly in private negotiations with residents, as did the residents. In its interaction with the provincial government the national government used a conflict management frame at the decision-making level, while government officials used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. This power frame proved to be an important cause of disputes between the national and the provincial government, mostly in the area of responsibility. The provincial government generally used a conflict management frame when dealing with the national government. In a few cases, however, the province employed an identity frame, but this only emerged at the officer level. After the replacement of the project manager, the provincial government used only a conflict management frame. National government officials in particular used buffering strategies towards the provincial government, while bridging strategies were sometimes used at the decision-making level. This implied that at the decision-making level the national government was prepared to negotiate. However, negotiation only started with the help of the provincial government, which always took the first step. This was also the case when disputes emerged between the national government and the local group.

The national government built three power types in its interaction with the local group (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power), while the local group built five power types (legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability). The local group built the same five power types in its dealings with the provincial government, which built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). The province built indirect coercive power as a last resort in its interaction with the farmers who were unwilling to negotiate about their land and real estate. The local group's power building in its dealings with the provincial government did not have repercussions for their interaction outcomes, which varied from debate and negotiation to dialogue and collaboration due to the provincial government's conflict management frame and bridging strategies. In the interaction between the authorities, the national government built four power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power) and the

provincial government built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). As the power building of both authorities were more or less balanced, the provincial government's use of a conflict management frame and bridging strategies were able to move the interaction outcomes of debate and conflict towards negotiation. In addition, when a government authority used indirect coercive power the other party, whether this was the other authority or the local group, was less willing to employ a conflict management frame and apply bridging strategies. The provincial government's building of specific power types, particularly knowledge power and sociability, is understandable, since its interest in realising the terps plan demanded restraint in building indirect coercive power.

Despite the more or less balanced power building between the national and the provincial government, collaboration proved difficult for them to achieve. This type of interaction outcome might have occurred if both authorities restrained or abandoned the building of indirect coercive power (national and provincial government) and legitimate power (national government). Although legitimate power is a less dominant power type than indirect coercive power, it proved disadvantageous for the creation of mutual understanding and a tolerant atmosphere in which trust may grow. This can be considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as shown by the power building by the provincial government and the local group.

The national government's potential to act was weak, the provincial government's was moderate and the local group's was strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms and consistency, which resulted in a weak capacity to act. Additionally, the national government had a moderate motivation to act. Despite its weak potential to act, the national government's influence on the planning process was considerable, due partly to its power building, its interaction strategies and its organisational culture. The provincial government's moderate potential to act was based on a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, and it proved a good basis for its interaction with the national government and the local group. The local group's strong potential to act, which was based on its strong capacity and motivation to act, made it a forceful counterpart for both the national government and the provincial government.

The national government's organisational culture and the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action were strong, while this was moderate for the provincial government. The engineering culture that has dominated Rijkswaterstaat since its inception in 1798 still has a strong impact on its organisational culture. Rijkswaterstaat is a proponent of forceful action, as illustrated by its approach to water management by building and maintaining dikes and other infrastructure. To accommodate public criticism that the organisation was not taking nature and landscape values into account, it incorporated nature conservation into its policies. However, so far it has had difficulty in including citizens in the planning process and dealing with citizens

who put forward their own plans to reduce flood risk. The provincial government's organisational culture, which can be characterised as following a middle course, proved to be effective in its interaction with both the national government and the local group. Although the local group's cultural background influenced its power building, interaction strategies and interaction outcomes strongly, it was very much dependent on the provincial government to achieve its objective. The organisational culture of the authorities and the local group's cultural background therefore highlight their starting position and shed light on their position during the planning process rather than explaining the process.

Discussion

The question under discussion here is whether embedding a bottom-up initiative like the terps plan in national policy can be repeated elsewhere.

The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study shows that a well organised group, assisted by the provincial government, can develop a plan that meets both its own interests and the wider public interest and get this plan adopted and implemented. In the Dutch situation, in which Rijkswaterstaat has for centuries played a dominant and authoritative role in water management, this can be considered a miracle. It was not only a result of the close cooperation between the provincial government and the local group, but also due to specific circumstances: it was a period in which the national government was open to experiments; Rijkswaterstaat was going through a reorganisation which obliged it to delegate river projects to lower-tier authorities; and the involvement of the independent organisation Habiforum was crucial in holding the government authorities together, particularly at the beginning of the process.

At first sight, it seems highly improbable that a similar initiative to the terps plan could be repeated elsewhere. During the planning process Rijkswaterstaat showed that devolving responsibility was not its strongest point. Instead of first laying down the ground rules and monitoring condition compliance, it wanted to have a strong finger in the pie. Furthermore, it did not publicise the terps plan as a success story at the national level, as it did internationally, probably because it did not have the lead; it was unable to deal with the fact that the residents came up with their own plan to reduce flood risk and was afraid to lose face. Citizen involvement like that in Overdiep Polder will therefore not become standard policy, at least not yet. Another argument is that the time for residents with ideas in the field of water management has past; now it is time to implement projects, at least along the main rivers. Although this is not the case for the small rivers, where there is room for new projects, the regional water problems are not that big and solutions are often found in combination with habitat restoration by buying out farmers.

It could also be argued that this experiment can well be repeated, because despite considerable opposition a residents' plan that meets both the public interest and the residents' interest will rise to the surface of its own accord. However, the Overdiep case

study shows that some help is not only desirable but also necessary. Who then would help the residents? The national government is out of the question. What about the lower-tier authorities? The province is a likely candidate, but this is highly dependent on having a provincial delegate who wants to make a case for it, as in the Overdiep case study, and whether the residents' ideas are compatible with the provincial water policy, which was the case for the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder (see Chapter 6). If we take the position of the municipality of Nijmegen into consideration (in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study, see Chapter 5), then the response is clear: one cannot expect any help. There are exceptions, such as the municipality of Ubbergen (see Chapter 6), but this depended on the mayor being willing to seize the opportunity to profile himself. Other options are the water boards and the Government Service for Land and Water Management (*DLG*),¹¹¹¹ but these authorities are not known for their inclusive approach. The last option is an independent organisation, such as Habiforum, that operates in a vacuum, waiting for an authority that will assume the responsibility to take the lead. In fact, it all comes down to the driving force of individuals who are willing to stick their neck out for the residents. The Overdiep case study showed that involving citizens during the planning process, from brainstorming to implementation, is not common practice for government authorities in the field of water management. In itself it is a rather strange phenomenon that government authorities that work for society are not willing or able to work with society to resolve public problems, especially because in the new Dutch style of governance citizens are seen as active participants and the government is working on a transformation into a more public-oriented organisation (see van den Brink, 2009). Apart from the fact that citizen inclusion is considered politically risky, a sense of urgency is missing. Although most projects in the Room for the River programme have passed the design phase and some are ready for implementation, this does not exonerate government authorities from the need to include residents in the implementation phase of the planning process and consider them as full actors. Their creativity, knowledge and values are needed to be able to cope with the complex problems facing society today. The Overdiep case study demonstrates that this input has value for government and residents alike. A vital condition is the willingness of both to search for solutions that meet the interests of society as a whole as well as the local residents.

The analytical framework and ideas for further research

The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study demonstrates that some issues not included in the analytical framework, or only partially, had a considerable influence on the interaction between the authorities and the local group. First, relevant information, like the fact that the terps plan is a bottom-up initiative that was incorporated into current policy, but in a non-traditional manner as the residents were key players in the planning process, can only be obtained through the richness of citations used for analysing the case study. Second, a common discourse or 'project narrative' developed between the main participants – the national government, the provincial government and the residents. The analytical framework was not adequate for answering the question

of which arguments the key players used during the process and how the residents' narrative developed into a dominant one. Third, the interaction between the authorities and the local group depended mainly on the personal drive of certain people, including the water expert. The dual basis of the analytical framework proved to be too small for the inclusion of 'external people'. This was partially resolved by considering the water expert as one of the residents.

In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study actors consciously and unconsciously used interaction strategies and power building. This would be an interesting subject for further research. Questions that could be addressed include: Why do the participants bring specific interaction strategies and power types into action? Do they have a particular objective in mind? Is this coincidental or is it an appropriate strategy? Another subject for research is the interaction patterns between the authorities and the local group and between the authorities. The question here is to what extent the interaction patterns are conscious or unconscious, and on which repertoires the actors rely.

Chapter 8 Discussion

This chapter is a reflection on the Cross-Scale Interaction (CSI) framework and the study as a whole, and presents suggestions for further research.

8.1 Key characteristics of the CSI framework

Several remarks can be made about the practicability of the analytical framework used in this study, the CSI framework. The main characteristics of the CSI framework are described below.

Development of the CSI framework and its usefulness

To a large extent the CSI framework is an inductive outcome of the research project. In other words, the researcher and the framework ‘grew up together’ during the data gathering and the analysis of the case studies. This is particularly noticeable in the concepts. The analytical framework began with a few ideas about concepts, such as action potentials of actors, conflict and collaboration, and only took final shape after various concepts were added during the research period.

In general, as explained in Chapter 3, the framework provided useful information that otherwise would not have been obtained. In particular, it gave insight into the relationship between the actors, between the government authorities and the citizens and between different government authorities, and the power and interaction strategies they used from the start of their interaction until the final outcome. The framework unravelled many layers that are at work in government–citizen interaction, particularly concerning the actors’ potential to act, their building of social power, their use of interaction strategies and the outcomes of their interaction. Additionally, the framework gave insight into the actions of authorities in governance processes and how these processes are shaped. In other words, the CSI framework did its work quite well.

Based on its systematic and detailed character, its clarity of causal linkages, its well-defined relations with theory (see Chapter 3) and its proven workability in three complex cases, the framework seems to be a worthy basis for analytical research into cross-scale governance in general if used in combination with the researcher’s own insights, theoretical schemata and interests. This implies that the framework may also be a useful

analytical instrument for other researchers interested in the complexities of planning processes, particularly in the authorities' and local group's roles, their power and interaction strategies and the specific outcomes of the projects in which government authorities and local groups are involved. But the scope of the framework is by no means limited to the field of spatial planning. The SCI framework may also be useful in other areas, such as resource and environmental management, housing and infrastructure.

As the duality between authorities and citizens was the pillar of the CSI framework, it was difficult to incorporate third parties, such as water experts, businesses or external NGOs, into it. In other words, the framework as it stands would appear to be less useful for less dichotomous, more 'round-table' situations involving actors that fall outside the authority–citizen nexus.

Ease of use for analysis

The use of the SCI framework and the interpretation of the analysis require some explanation. The framework proved to be easy to use, but like many analytical tools it requires dedication on the part of the researcher. It takes some time to get to grips with the results of the analysis and determine which results are relevant. My experience with the SCI framework is that the analysis started with the interaction outcomes, then turned to the interaction strategies, the power building and the actors' action potential, before finally addressing the organisational culture of the authorities and the cultural background of the local groups. Analysing government–citizen interaction implied that the relationship between the authorities also had to be taken into account. The assumption that this relationship might have an influence on the outcome of the government–citizen interaction led to another extensive analysis, this time of the authorities involved. The belief that relevant information would otherwise be lost was the driving force for this systematic, even 'bureaucratic' approach.

Such systematic comprehensiveness is good for the analysis. However, if this is reported without further structuring of the information, it burdens readers with too many unstructured details. Further work is needed to sift out the key actions, actors and events. This process makes the outcomes more stylised, but it can increase the level of insight and the reader will certainly be a lot happier.

The location of culture

When the analytical framework was near finalisation the concept of culture emerged. This seemed to be a factor that would be essential for interpreting the interaction outcomes. It was decided to call the concept of culture 'culture and traditions' when applied to the local groups and 'organisational culture and traditions' when applied to the government authorities. In addition, the concept was placed within dotted lines at the edge of the analytical framework to indicate its relevance in relation to the other concepts. This acknowledges culture as a potentially important background phenomenon, which may become more influential during the causal claim. The disadvantage of this structuring is

that it does not invite the researcher to always look at cultural aspects of interactions.

8.2 Reflection on the study and the results

This section reflects on the study and the results. These are grouped under four questions: What worked? What turned out to be difficult? Which findings were unexpected? and What outcomes were expected?

What worked?

As mentioned earlier the SCI framework did its work quite well. The framework provided answers to the main research question (see Chapter 9) and gave insight in how and why the interaction between authorities and local group proceeded.

What turned out to be difficult?

At certain points difficulties were encountered in the development and application of the CSI framework. A few are described here.

While the properties of the local group's potential to act were relatively easily derived from the literature, this was not the case for the authorities' potential to act. A literature search with the terms 'authorities' capacity to act' and 'authorities' motivation to act' did not result in workable properties. The same was true for a search with more general terms. Therefore, the chosen research strategy was to formulate properties for the authorities' potential to act and then to look for evidence of these properties in literature. This strategy proved to be useful, but the question of whether this subject had already been studied from this perspective or not remained unanswered.

The fact that the elements of the authorities' and the local group's potentials to act differed substantially made it difficult to compare their action potentials. Difficulties were also encountered during the assessment. How should action potentials, the use of building power and interaction strategies, and the interaction outcomes be assessed? I decided to base the estimation of the occurrence of these concepts on two, three or four moments in the planning process when, for example, evidence was found for a specific power that was built or an interaction strategy that was used. Nevertheless, prudence is called for when comparing the outcomes.

The inductive approach for constructing the CSI framework implied that the framework was subject to alteration until the last stage of the research. Accordingly, the empirical chapters had to be revised several times. Examples of these alterations of the framework include the types of social power. While analysing the building of social power it became clear that the difference between indirect coercive power and legitimate power was not that clear. However, it seemed important to distinguish between the two. The first was viewed as a more 'forceful' power, although indirect, whereas the second was seen as a

demonstration or affirmation of being just and legitimate. While the first can be understood as serving an intention to coerce, the second shows that actors concerned are bound by rules and procedures, irrespective of whether or not they use these power types in practice. Therefore, indirect coercive power involves threat to use force or the law, or calling for the use of force or the law, whereas legitimate power can be interpreted as referring to one's legitimate position. Although these types of power are essentially different expressions or degrees of the same thing and making a distinction between the two is rather analytical, this distinction proved to be useful. It was also difficult to distinguish between expert power and knowledge power. Expert power was conceived as originating from experts hired by citizens or authorities for contra-expertise or advisory work, or from experts working for the authorities, while knowledge power was viewed as the use of knowledge held by the citizens and officials themselves. The interpretation of knowledge power proved to be problematic: the boundaries between both types of power proved not to be clear cut because knowledge of a specific field or activity held by citizens can also be considered as expert knowledge. For example, farmers in Overdiep Polder are expert in farming, including land and water management in the polder. In contrast to indirect coercive power and legitimate power, distinguishing between expert power and knowledge power proved not to be important. It was not the owner of the knowledge that mattered, not whether or not it was bought in, but that the knowledge was used as an input to the discussion. I therefore decided to merge these two power types into one power type called 'knowledge power'.

At first, the SCI framework included credibility because it was assumed to be a relevant type of power. Including credibility meant that the framework could account for the various faces of power, varying from coercion to trustworthiness. However, during the course of the research it became clear that this type of power throws up methodological problems. Credibility could be interpreted in different ways and some interpretations overlapped with other types of power (indirect coercive power and knowledge power). In addition, the exact meaning of credibility was not clear as the concept turned out to be multifaceted. The literature states that credibility is related to sociability, competence, character, composure and extraversion. I decided to use one of these meanings – sociability – instead of credibility, for two reasons. First, a clear definition and a narrower scope would make the concept useful for analysis. Second, I considered the 'human' factor of social power to be too important to leave out.

It proved difficult to discriminate between the interaction outcomes 'debate' and 'conflict' and between the outcomes 'dialogue' and 'collaboration'. Attempts to distinguish between these outcomes highlighted the difficulty of determining at what point debate changes into conflict and vice versa, and when dialogue changes into collaboration and vice versa. This study demonstrates that the area between conflict and debate and between dialogue and collaboration is rather complicated, and depends, among other things, on the actors' own interpretations (see also etic-emic approaches below).

Which findings were unexpected?

The unexpected findings are stated in the headings below, accompanied by a brief explanation.

Collaboration required the addition of a collaboration frame

Initially the frames used in this study were based on Gray's (2003) conflict frames, three of which were included in this study: power frame, identity frame and conflict management frame. However, my empirical data revealed that collaboration, although uncommon, was a possible interaction outcome, which implied that a collaboration frame had to be added – a logical step given that one of the interaction outcomes was collaboration. This development shows my bias as researcher: a focus on conflict rather than collaboration.

Media power had to be added to the set of power types

The analysis of the actors' building of power indicated that one type of power was missing: media power. The media, whether television, newspapers or internet, provided an important platform that offered citizens and sometimes also government decision-makers of lower-tier authorities, including mayors and provincial delegates, the opportunity to influence decision-making. The question was whether media power actually existed. A literature search was carried out, after which media power was added to the set of types of power.

Evidence for the identity frame was hard to find

During the course of the research it proved to be difficult to find evidence for the identity frame as defined by Gray (2003). Instead of defining their own identities, the actors mainly described the characterisations they had of others. This did not correspond with Gray's definition and typology of frames, which include a characterisation frame. Instead, I used Gray's characterisation frame to obtain evidence for the identity frame.

Differences between the etic and emic view of the interaction process between the actors involved

A question that emerged during the last stage of the study was the difference between the etic and emic view: the outsider perspective and the insider perspective. I did not expect this, but it is understandable that the analysis of an interaction process by 'insiders' who were part of the process may be different from the analysis made by an external observer or researcher. In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study, for example, my assessment differed from the citizens' and authorities' (emic) judgement. Both were taken into account (see also section 8.3).

Situational factors may have an important impact on the planning process

Situational factors and their influence on the planning process proved to be important. One type of situational factor is a political momentum, for example the maternity leave taken by the state secretary (which led to a political 'vacuum', at least in the short term, as

the responsible minister who took over was not informed about all the details of the planning process), a majority in the House of Representatives, and the political skill of two MPs in avoiding loss of face by the state secretary. Another situational factor is a window of opportunity in policy terms, for example a period conducive to experimentation and a reorganisation of national government that entailed the delegation of responsibilities to lower-tier authorities. Situational factors may therefore be advantageous for one actor and disadvantageous for another. Although advantageous situational factors tend to lead to a good outcome for one of the parties, this does not have to be the case. If there is a 'missing link' somewhere, such as a failure to take appropriate action to exploit the advantageous situational factor, the outcome may nevertheless be disadvantageous for the same party.

Social identity and solidarity may also be different

From the literature I expected that social identity and solidarity would be similar, but this study shows that there may be a substantial difference between these two properties. The expectation that social identity is the same as solidarity was not borne out by my findings. An example is the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. The local groups had a strong social identity, but solidarity among the residents proved to be weak.

The number of power types depends on the interaction outcome

It turned out that the number of power types built by the actors depended on the interaction outcome. Where there was debate and conflict, the power strategy of authorities and local groups was based on the building of as many power types as possible. This was the other way round where there was dialogue and/or collaboration, in which case both parties built a minimum number of power types. When these interaction outcomes were extended to conflict management and debate the number of power types increased.

Both the authorities and the local groups built hindering power

Both the authorities and the local groups built hindering power during debate and conflict. Whereas authorities built hindering power covertly, local groups tended to be open in their hindering tactics. This made it difficult for local groups to deal with the hindering power exerted by the authorities, for example by invoking the freedom of information legislation, the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*). Hindering power was also built between authorities during conflict and debate, mostly as a result of disputes in the field of responsibility.

Local groups' use of the identity frame was based on interest; the authorities' use of the identity frame was based on interest or institution

The identity frame of local groups was solely based on interest and not on locality (e.g. where they were based, or the places where people live or work) or both. However, it was expected that the local groups would not base their identities on characteristics of social stratification (e.g. class, race, gender or ethnicity), people's roles (e.g. a carpenter or social

reformer), or the institutions with which people are associated (e.g. a national government employee). Although citizens' protests and plans were about the location where they lived (e.g. the village of Lent, Ooijpolder and Overdiep Polder), they never based their arguments on purely personal opinions or reasons, such as 'we live in a beautiful area and want to keep it that way', 'we need to conserve this area for our grandchildren' or 'we have farmed this land for thirty years'. In all cases, the local groups emphasised their objections to the government's arguments or plans, or the way they proposed to meet the public interest. In the Dike relocation in Lent case study, citizens showed that they had an alternative to the government plan to relocate the dike, which meant the demolition of 55 houses. In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study, the polder residents argued that the assumption underlying the government plan, that there was a need for a 'calamity polder', had not been properly substantiated. Furthermore, they emphasised the unequal treatment of people living in the outlying rural areas and those living in the core urban areas, questioning why their polder should be used as an emergency water storage area to protect the densely populated urban areas from flooding. In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study the farmers drew up their own plan to redesign the polder as a flood retention area with terps for their farms. They strived to combine the public interest of reducing the risk of flooding by the river Meuse with their own interest, a viable economic perspective for their farms. It was also unexpected that the identity frame of authorities would be based mainly on the interests at stake or the institution. The interest was always the public good, for example increasing flood safety. Sometimes government officials referred to their institution to motivate their actions (e.g. 'the following procedures have to be followed').

The identity frame was sometimes used interactionally

This study shows that identity frames could be used in different ways. This is illustrated by the use of the identity frame by the local government in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study in its dealings with the local groups and the national government. While it told the residents that it was not responsible for the decision-making, the local government let the national government know that it also had its own agenda. By deploying its identity frame strategically the local government used the identity frame interactionally.

Buffering and bridging strategies were always combined, except when the interaction outcome was collaboration

Buffering and bridging strategies were accompanied by the interaction outcomes of conflict, debate, negotiation and dialogue. Buffering strategies were not used only when the interaction outcome was collaboration. This indicates that the parties involved believed there was always an opportunity for a way out, even in situations of conflict or debate. The case studies show that both parties must use bridging strategies for there to be a realistic chance of moving from 'conflictive' interaction outcomes, e.g. conflict and debate, to 'collaborative' interaction outcomes, such as dialogue and collaboration.

Citizens and authorities undergo a learning process

Although it was expected that the actors in the planning process would undergo some form of learning process, it was unexpected that they would adopt 'third party' roles themselves. Actors in the Terps Plan of Overdiep Polder case study recognised the 'inner' cycles of the planning process, such as the stages of debate. They were also able to determine the appropriate time to facilitate, when to use conflict, when resolution is needed, when to engage in dialogue and when it was necessary to moderate. Additionally, the actors were able to facilitate debate, to mediate conflict and to moderate dialogue themselves. Another form of learning in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study was that citizens cooperating closely with the provincial government of Noord-Brabant knew exactly how far they could go when disputes arose. When necessary they reframed from an identity frame to a conflict management frame to make negotiation possible. The provincial government placed great importance on meeting the citizens' wishes and knew what was acceptable to the citizens. As the provincial government always used a conflict management frame it was not difficult to start talks about resolving disputes. Both parties found that by using a give and take mechanism in their relationship they would finally achieve their common goal.

Government–citizen interaction is embedded in various relational 'modes'

The context of government–citizen interaction proved to be important. However, the extent to which this influenced the government–citizen interaction was unexpected. By context I mean the set of facts and circumstances on which the relationship is based. When a relationship involves an alliance or coalition, in other words when it can be defined as a 'collaborative' mode, it may be characterised by debate, negotiation, dialogue or collaboration. When a relationship involves conflict, in other words when it can be defined as a 'conflictive' mode, then it may be characterised by debate and conflict. Whereas a 'collaborative' relationship may easily change into a 'conflictive' one, the reverse may be hard to achieve; the case studies show that it is difficult to escape from such a 'conflictive' mode. The relational 'modes' in which government–citizen interaction was embedded and the possibility or impossibility of changing from one mode to another mode were unexpected outcomes of this study.

Functional interdependencies between authorities and citizens only occurred when they shared a common goal

Functional interdependencies between authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning only occurred when both parties were involved in a river project and jointly defined a common goal. The pathway to their joint objective was paved with disputes, which in fact were conflicts of interest. To collaborate, both parties need to be aware of their interdependency and they need to be able to look beyond their disputes of interest and the attraction of short-lived gains. If they are able to remaining focused on their common goal, they can create a constructive atmosphere in which they can work together to achieve it.

Co-opting citizens is not needed if both the public interest and the citizens' interest can be combined

Co-option of local interests by the national government is not needed if the authorities and the citizens are fully engaged in a planning process and both the public interest and the interests of the people directly affected can be combined.

Planning processes involving different spatial and temporal scales were successful when the leading authority was flexible in its actions

Planning processes that involve different spatial and temporal scales did not hamper the governance process as long as the leading authority was flexible in moving from one spatial scale to another and took account of the different timescales of the actors involved, whether these were citizens, government officers or government decision-makers. An example of this flexibility is the conduct of Noord-Brabant provincial government in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study. It was able to move from the national level (the national authority in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat) to the local level (the municipalities of Waalwijk and Geertruidenberg). At the same time the province took the timescales of the various actors into account. It had, for example, to comply with Rijkswaterstaat officials, who were bound to the project auditing scheme, and local government officials, who were responsible for the local land use plan. In addition, it tried to speed up the process as much as possible to meet the citizens' wishes. The provincial government supported the national government and local government officials through linking procedures and by bringing them into a coherent time frame, which shortened the planning process. The provincial government provided a stable team of key players who supported their provincial delegate, who, as a politician, worked with a short time horizon and often changed position. For all the actors, particularly citizens who take part voluntarily, this process requires persistence, patience and dedication to achieving a satisfactory outcome.

What outcomes were expected?

The expected findings are stated in the headings below, accompanied by a brief explanation.

Some propositions stated at the beginning were correct

This study demonstrated that some of the propositions stated at the beginning of the research were correct, such as history is an important factor in today's government-citizen relationship, once a top-down approach by the government has been set in motion it is very hard to change, and collaboration is difficult to achieve in the government-citizen interaction while conflict is a more likely interaction outcome.

Conflict is difficult to resolve in a formal setting

The case studies confirmed the expectation that conflicts between authorities and local groups are difficult to resolve in a formal setting because it means one or more of the authorities involved will lose face.

Authorities with a low and moderate potential to act are more willing to engage when the government–citizen relationship can be characterised as an alliance or coalition

It was expected that authorities with a low and moderate potential to act are more willing to engage and that the resulting government–citizen interaction will generally end in dialogue or collaboration. However, this is conditional on the interaction taking place in a ‘collaborative’ mode in which the relationship between authorities and citizens can be characterised as an alliance or coalition.

Power is central in planning processes and mainly used in a pragmatic way

As expected, power was central in the planning processes. This study confirmed that Dutch river landscape planning practice can be perceived as a battle between actors who continuously build power in their dealings with one another. Actors who opposed each other proved to be flexible in the type of power they built. This was not so much a conscious strategy, but rather it seemed a pragmatic estimation of their chances of gaining influence. In the case of the local groups this depended mainly on situational factors, like the presence of a water expert who was willing to support the groups (to build knowledge power), a journalist who was interested in following the local groups’ actions (to build media power), the reactions of the opponent, and their assessment of which type of power was most appropriate for the situation at hand. In the case of the government authorities, the government decision-makers often had different interests than the government officials, and therefore adopted different power strategies. The strategies used by government decision-makers were leading. Sometimes this led to a supporting strategy by government officials, particularly when they worked at the head office. Officials who worked at the regional office and had regular contacts with societal groups often chose a softening strategy. However, the position taken by their superiors finally determined the amount of leeway they had to operate in line with their own vision.

Dialogue and collaboration flourished best in an informal setting

Another expected outcome of this study was the fact that dialogue and collaboration flourished best in an informal setting. When authorities and citizens were interacting in an informal setting, reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms and unwritten rules, proved to be the dominant form of interaction. In this informal setting actors worked on strengthening their relationship and building trust.

Lower-tier authorities were better equipped to maintain relationships with local groups than national government

An expectation that was borne out by the case studies was that a longstanding relationship between authorities and citizens was very helpful for governance practices. However, this study showed that lower-tier authorities, if they were willing to engage, proved to be better equipped to maintain a relationship with local groups than national government.

Social interaction takes place vertically

The expectation that social interaction in Dutch river landscape planning occurs vertically

(across levels of organisations) was also borne out this study. Citizens who organised themselves into local groups did not have contacts with other groups from different places. Their attention was directed solely at the government authorities and their interaction with the authorities was locally based. This may be because Rijkswaterstaat is a very strong, outspoken government actor and the local groups had no knowledge of horizontal planning.

Citizens' opposition is a demand for a say in the planning process

Another expected outcome of this study was that public opposition to government plans in Dutch river landscape planning occurs in the context of the public's role as a source of policy ideas and the need for broader citizen engagement in making policy, rather than purely an expression of evasive or overt resistance. This study demonstrated that citizens' opposition in Dutch river landscape planning has to be viewed as a demand for a say in the planning process.

The command and control approach by national government hampers the process of engagement and re-engagement of the authorities and citizens

Despite the internal changes within government and the existence of multilevel governance, the interaction between the national government and citizens can be characterised more by command and control than by dialogue and negotiation. When the national government takes a command and control approach rather than a governance approach, this hampers the process of engagement and re-engagement of partners. Interaction between authorities involves both command and control and dialogue and negotiation, which means that enduring conflict between authorities will hinder both in achieving their ends. Therefore, authorities are more or less obliged to include conflict management in their interaction portfolio.

Conflicts in Dutch river landscape planning are divisible rather than indivisible

An expected outcome of this study was that the conflicts that occurred in the context of Dutch river landscape planning were 'divisible' conflicts about 'getting more or less what you want' rather than indivisible ones of an 'either/or' nature (e.g. when personal attachments to the river landscape is at stake and changes in the landscape are perceived as an attack on one's identity). An example of a divisible conflict is the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. Here, authorities and citizens took opposing positions regarding the demolition of 55 houses in the government plan. The local groups presented an alternative which would meet the national government's aim of relieving the bottleneck in the river while retaining these 55 houses. The conflict in Ooijpolder (Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study) may be viewed as indivisible as far as the local group's strategy is concerned. The residents attempted to get the government plan off the table by presenting themselves as people living in a polder near the Dutch/German border to be used as a calamity polder to prevent flooding in the densely populated areas of the country – in other words, by highlighting the inequality between 'us' and 'them' regarding flood safety. However, a closer look at this conflict reveals that it is actually a divisible conflict, because the local group

stated that if the government plan was properly substantiated with clear evidence that the government plan for emergency water storage in their polder was needed, they would have accepted it. Moreover, the residents' identity frame referred solely to their interest. Although their interest had much to do with their personal attachment to their locality, they never made a reference to their locality when arguing their case with the national government. Their pragmatic strategy towards the national government showed an initial willingness to comply with the government plan, rather than a response to a perceived attack on their identity. The conflict in Ooijpolder is therefore divisible rather than indivisible.

Dutch river landscape planning practice reflects a struggle between a representative model of democracy and a deliberative model of democracy

It was expected that the playing field of Dutch river landscape planning practice would involve a struggle between a representative model of democracy and a deliberative model of democracy. This study indicates that this conflict is indeed present. It also provides insights in how this can be dealt with. An illustration is the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study in which Noord-Brabant provincial government proved to be a skilful leader in dealing with citizens who initiated their own plan, which was going to be implemented, and Rijkswaterstaat, with its command and control approach.

Citizens need to meet certain conditions to be taken seriously by the authorities

As Dutch government authorities do not feel comfortable when people are angry about their proposals, in planning processes they continue to discuss and negotiate with those involved in an attempt to accommodate the local population's wishes. Therefore it was expected that the best way for citizens to be heard and taken seriously was to use the language of officialdom and expert jargon. The alternative, organising protest action to get public attention, possibly in an atmosphere of threat, would not be successful because government authorities do not view this type of protest as constructive and would not therefore feel obliged to involve the citizens in the planning process. Additionally, a constituency of people with various backgrounds was not decisive in getting the local group accepted by the authorities as a serious partner. In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study the local group consisted of people of various backgrounds, while in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study all the members of the local group were farmers. However, in both case studies the residents were accepted by the authorities as a serious partner. A condition for success is that the spokesperson must be willing to adopt the communicative rules of the authorities.

8.3 Suggestions for further research

This study has generated new insights into the government–citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning. Five subjects are selected for further research: building power in the fine grain of people's routines, policy discourse and governance practices; motivations for using bridging and buffering strategies and frames; integrating etic and emic into the

analytic framework; and horizontal planning in a vertical embedding; is it an incentive for collaborative planning or doomed to fail?

Building power in the fine grain of people's routines, policy discourse and governance practice

A study area that would be of interest is the embedded dimension of power, Lukes' third dimension of power that shapes and modifies people's desires and beliefs (Lukes 1986:10) and which is found in the fine grain of the daily routines of people, policy discourses and governance practices (Healey 2003). This proposed research can be divided into three parts. The first part is a study at the micro level into the wishes and beliefs of government authorities and citizens. The topics to be investigated include the factors that influence the wishes and beliefs of government authorities and citizens, the effects of these factors on these wishes and beliefs, and the power mechanisms that are at work when making these wishes and beliefs explicit. The second part of the research is a study at the meso level. This research would seek to gain more understanding of the policy discourse. It would address questions such as how the policy discourse has been developed, who is in charge and who is not, how the actors influence the policy discourse to suit their own ends, what input the actors have, and which mechanisms underlie the policy discourse. The third part of the research is a study at the macro level. This research may be designed to understand governance practices from a power perspective at a more aggregate level. Questions that may be addressed include how governance practices evolve in terms of power relations between the actors involved, what are the most emergent factors that influence the power relations between the actors in these processes, and what patterns of power relations between actors in governance processes can be distinguished.

Motivations to use frames and bridging and buffering strategies

Another subject for further research is the motivations of authorities and citizens to use frames and bridging and buffering strategies. Topics that can be addressed include who has the decisive influence over the use of specific frames; who has the leading role in reframing; what motivates authorities and citizens to use buffering or bridging strategies in a conflict, debate, negotiation and dialogue; how they assess the effect of the use of these strategies; what their reasons are for continuing a conflict or debate; how they assess the opportunities to move from conflict to a more collaborative interaction outcome, such as debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration; what motivates them to be engaged in collaboration and dialogue; their reasons for falling back into debate and conflict; and their motives for accepting negotiation.

Integrating etic and emic into the analytic framework

Although the SCI framework is based on the authorities' and citizens' views on their interaction, it was essentially my idea to explore the meaning of social interaction. The main reason was that government–citizen interaction could be studied on an abstract level. During the application of the CSI framework two approaches to culture and society became apparent: the etic and emic approaches (Pike, 1967). This concept derives from linguistics,

but has been extensively applied in anthropology and, to a certain degree, in other social sciences, such as behavioural psychology. The etic or outsider perspective draws on anthropological approaches that link cultural practices to external, antecedent factors, such as economic and ecological conditions, that may not be salient to cultural insiders (Harris, 1979) and it also draws on the tradition of behaviourist psychology that looks at the use of experimental procedures to study behaviour in relation to the environment (Skinner, 1938). The emic or insider perspective predominates in cultural anthropologist studies that seek to understand culture from the 'native's point of view', such as Malinowski's (1922) study of the Pacific and in the tradition of psychological studies of folk beliefs (Morris et al., 1999). The emic perspective on government–citizen interaction will not always correspond with the etic perspective. The difference between etic and emic became apparent after verifying the main results with the actors involved by asking them about their vision on the planning process. As a result, some outcomes of the government–citizen interaction had to be interpreted differently, such as the authorities' and citizens' action potential and their power building in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. The actors' assessment of their action potential was not the same as the results of my analysis, which were that the action potential of the local groups was weak and the action potential of the national government was strong. The expectation, therefore, was that the local groups would not have a strong basis to act, in contrast to the national government's action potential. The citizens and authorities felt that the national government's basis to act was less strong and the local groups' basis to act was stronger. My assessment of power building in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study was that the authorities and citizens used a similar number of power types. The local groups built five types of power in their dealings with the national government and built four types of power in their dealings with the local government. The citizens' and the authorities' assessments of the authorities' building of power were that it was less influential than the citizens' building of power. How etic and emic can be integrated in an analytical framework remains a subject for further research.

Horizontal planning in a strong government environment: is it an incentive for collaborative planning or doomed to fail?

This study covered cross-scale (vertical) planning practice between authorities and citizens. I found that the vertical planning routines used in the case studies were not flexible enough to accommodate horizontal planning initiatives. This suggests that vertical planning practice and horizontal planning initiatives lead to complicated relationships. A subject for research may be horizontal planning initiatives in an environment of strong government like the Netherlands. Experiences with horizontal planning in countries with a weak government structure would be relevant to this research. Questions to be explored are: what would horizontal planning look like in these situations; what are the experiences with current horizontal projects; what are the main tensions horizontal projects would face in a vertical planning environment; are institutions flexible enough to include a horizontal project in their portfolio; and how do government decision-makers deal with differences between the vertical planning practice and horizontal planning projects?

Chapter 9 Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the topics most closely related to the research question. The subject of this thesis is cross-scale interaction between government authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning. The research question was What factors and mechanisms influence government–citizen interaction? I will answer this question by reviewing the emergent and underlying factors that influence government–citizen interaction and the mechanisms involved.

Emergent factors

The emergent factors that influence government–citizen interaction identified from the empirical data and analysis are: building trust, uncertainties, citizen exclusion, institutions with a focus on formal roles, authorities' and citizens' willingness to engage and situational factors. The headings below can be read as brief conclusions.

Building trust is difficult in government–citizen relationships

Trust turned out to be a crucial factor in government–citizen interaction. Without trust the government–citizen relationship will not evolve and will remain stuck in a 'conflictive' mode (see below), resulting in 'conflictive' interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate, at one end of a continuum on which dialogue and collaboration are considered 'collaborative' interaction outcomes. Building trust proved to be difficult for both authorities and citizens as both parties tended to distrust each other. Difficulties were experienced both when the authorities were leading in a planning project and when they were not, and both when citizens were affected by a government plan and when they were the initiators of their own plan. Building trust requires a continuous effort by both parties. Authorities and citizens need to know each other in order to be able to answer the question of whether the other party is trustworthy and so it generally takes time before parties trust each other. Building trust requires vigilance. As the Dutch saying goes, 'trust comes by foot and leaves on horseback'.

A difficulty to build trust is that government authorities in particular operate in a formal setting, while trust is most easily built and maintained in an informal setting. An important obstacle to building trust in a formal setting is that contacts between people are based mainly on contracts, agreements, laws, procedures and rules. This is often referred to as 'formalised distrust', which is a characteristic of government in modern democratic societies. A key requirement for building trust is the exchange of

information based on reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms ('If I do this for you, you do that for me') and unwritten rules. This implies that authorities and citizens have to invest in dealing with each other in an informal way, which requires open communication about the parties' wishes, their objectives, their views on how to achieve their ends, and a reflective attitude in which each party's actions and behaviour are open to discussion.

Governance processes throw up new uncertainties

In essence, governance processes seek to deal with uncertainties, for example about the outcomes and the actors involved. However, they also create new uncertainties, for example about decision-making (how much influence do the actors have?) and creating precedents. Generally, in a traditional approach the process is relatively fixed and designed to exclude uncertainties as much as possible, while in a more interactive style the process is open, which implies there will be many uncertainties. Uncertainties proved to be problematic, particularly for the government authorities. Government decision-makers possess a survival instinct that drives them to choose pathways that involve less risk, and strategies that minimise risk often mean falling back on a traditional approach. This generally entails a 'closed' participation process using traditional participation instruments, such as consultation and information meetings, rather than instruments that foster deliberation, such as design workshops and round-table meetings. Top-down approaches usually leave little room for government officials to pursue an open planning process. This often means that they are bound to procedures and are restricted to traditional pathways. Government decision-makers who are involved in an interactive planning process may perceive uncertainties as a threat to their legitimacy and their traditional role, or they may welcome them as offering an opportunity to emphasise other aspects of their portfolio (e.g. public participation) and raise their public profile.

Citizens generally consider uncertainties to be less problematic as they will always be present, whether they are opposing a government plan or involved in a joint initiative. When opposing a government plan, citizens face uncertainties about the process – will their views be heard and will they be included in the planning process? – and about the outcome – will they win or lose? When they are involved in a joint initiative, the uncertainties regarding the process are about how they can ensure that they are part of the decision-making process and that the joint initiative will be continued throughout the process despite a high turnover of government officials. They will also not be certain that the joint initiative will be successful. Uncertainties are an important factor in government–citizen interaction because they increase the risk of a breakdown in trust between the actors involved.

Citizen exclusion is a source of conflict between authorities and citizens

Excluding citizens from the design process and/or follow-up phases of the planning process creates distrust towards authorities. This study indicates that the exclusion of

citizens in planning processes is a relevant factor that has far-reaching consequences for government–citizen interaction. If citizens are excluded the interaction will start in a ‘conflictive’ government–citizen relationship (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate. Moreover, as actors in a conflictive relationship tend to focus on their differences rather than their similarities or common goals, it is hard to normalise such relationships in an attempt to escape from this ‘conflictive’ mode.

Institutions with a focus on formal roles cannot adequately support governance processes
Many government institutions are solely embedded in the formal world where the foundation of actions is formalised distrust based on laws, procedures, rules and contracts. In contrast, most everyday social interactions are informal. This study shows that government institutions that are unable to link the formal with the informal world had a negative impact on government–citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. Government institutions in which one or a few individuals could make a difference by switching from the formal to the informal world had a positive influence on the government–citizen interaction by stimulating dialogue and collaboration.

Authorities’ willingness to engage is a condition for being responsive in governance processes
Contracts and constitutional provisions are considered to limit government responsiveness, but if individual government officials are able to deal with the complexities and uncertainties in governance processes, these are viewed as palliative measures at best (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988). Although such individuals are courageous in the sense that they stick their neck out, their actions are in fact a stopgap because they will not solve the problems of government unresponsiveness unless, for example, all the officials involved have internalised strategies for dealing with the complexities and uncertainties in governance processes. This study shows that when government actions are under the control of individuals (as a result of their willingness to engage) the relevant authorities were more responsive. They were more willing to respond to citizens’ demands to be included in the planning process, among others, while policy-making (the Room for the River programme) determined the prerequisites for the authorities’ responsiveness. The most important factor, however, is a change in organisational culture. This enables the staff to internalise different cultural beliefs so that policy agreements are put into practice by all involved rather than just a few. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the authorities that were willing to engage had a positive effect on the government–citizen interaction, which often resulted in dialogue and collaboration. When the authorities were not willing to engage they had a negative impact on the government–citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. The authorities’ willingness to engage is therefore an important factor in government–citizen interaction.

Citizens’ willingness to engage needs to be taken seriously by the authorities
An emergent factor is the citizens’ willingness to engage, which influences the

government–citizen interaction. The analysis indicates that citizens' willingness to engage leads to a 'conflictive' government–citizen relationship when the authorities exclude citizens (see also the emergent factor concerning citizen exclusion). It may also result in a 'collaborative' government–citizen relationship, particularly when both the public interest and the local citizens' interest can be met, which implies citizen involvement. While the former always has a negative impact on the government–citizen interaction because it will end in conflict and debate, the latter may influence the government–citizen interaction positively because it will result in either a mixture of debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration or a mixture of dialogue and collaboration.

Situational factors are crucial in governance processes

Situational factors, such as the opportunity to get the support of a water expert and the policy change in water management that allowed the national government to broaden the scope of its policy measures to include land outside the river dikes, have a large impact on government–citizen interaction. Such factors influenced the government–citizen interaction by opening up new opportunities. The context in which this occurred determined whether this impact could be described as negative, resulting in conflict and debate, or positive, resulting in debate, negotiation, dialogue and/or collaboration.

Underlying factors

The analysis of the empirical data identified three underlying factors. The first is related to the different 'modes' of relationship in which government–citizen interaction takes place and the dynamics of the interaction. The second and third are related to the rapidly changing societal configurations of state, civil society and the market.

Long-term modes and short-term dynamics are part of government–citizen interaction

This study shows that the relationship between authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning was based on a stable pattern. A distinction can be made between a conflictive and collaborative mode. While the conflictive mode of the government–citizen relationship evolves in a conflictive situation, the collaborative mode originates in situations in which the partners have a positive attitude towards each other, which is reflected in the form of their relationship: an alliance or a coalition. Moving from one mode to another is difficult, but within the modes changes may occur in quick succession, which can be viewed as the short-term dynamics of the government–citizen relationship. This means that when the relationship is in a conflictive mode it is hard to find a way out and when it is in a collaborative mode this situation will continue. The latter by no means implies that no disputes will occur. However, partners operating in a collaborative mode are willing to solve the dispute, but this is not the case when partners are in a conflictive mode. Partners who are engaged in a conflictive mode of relationship may change their interaction from debate to conflict from one moment to the next. Partners engaged in a collaborative mode of relationship may change their interaction from debate to negotiation and subsequently to dialogue or collaboration.

The dynamic may then evolve further from collaboration back to dialogue and then debate. It may also start from another interaction outcome and develop from debate via negotiation into dialogue and collaboration.

Institutional change determines whether a top-down approach may change towards a more collaborative approach

Institutional change has an effect on government–citizen interaction. The case studies show that it is hard to change from a top-down approach to a more collaborative approach, despite demands by citizens to be included in the process. This implies that a change from a state-centred mode of government to one that is less state-centred has to be realised at the start of a planning process, because the authorities will then not lose face. However, this does not mean that a collaborative approach will last, because it may be replaced by a top-down approach at any time. There is less chance of this happening when a lower-tier authority is responsible for the project management.

People's demands for inclusion put increasing pressure on authorities to act as governance actors rather than government actors

The growing desire of people to have a say in changes to their living environment cannot be ignored by government authorities. They have to include them somehow in the planning process. This development can be viewed as a factor underlying government–citizen interaction. It influences the government–citizen interaction in such a way that it increasingly puts pressure on the authorities to take citizens' values into account and include them in planning processes. This requires them to change their role from a government actor to a governance actor.

Mechanisms

Two mechanisms that influence government–citizen interaction can be identified from the empirical data and analysis: power and culture. The headings briefly describe the conclusions.

Power is the key mechanism in governance processes

Planning processes can be viewed as a battlefield in which power makes a difference. As such, power can be seen as a mechanism that influences government–citizen interaction. The analysis of the case studies shows that not only the authorities but also the citizens built power. In conflictive situations the authorities and citizens tried to build as much power as possible, but when they were engaged in an alliance or coalition power did not seem to be an overt issue. The authorities mainly built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas citizens mainly built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. The authorities and citizens influenced their interaction through their power building. The authorities made a difference especially through the use of indirect coercive power and legitimate power, whereas citizens did so with knowledge power and media power. The authorities and citizens built hindering power. The authorities did this covertly while citizens did it openly. For citizens, however, it was difficult to bring the authorities'

hindering power into the open, for example by appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*). In addition, the authorities also built power in their relationship with other authorities. In these cases they often built hindering power in disputes in the area of responsibility.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that power prevails. Most often this means that the authority responsible for water management in the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, is ruling. Does this mean that collaborative planning in Dutch river landscape planning is an ideal that is hard to reach? This study shows that if the configuration of actors is such that all actors are involved on the basis of respect and equality, collaborative planning may result in Rijkswaterstaat endorsing the collaborative outcome.

Culture is noticeable throughout the planning process

This study shows that culture is noticeable throughout the planning process. It can therefore be considered to be a mechanism that influences government–citizen interaction. Government authorities with a strong organisational culture, such as Rijkswaterstaat, always tried to change the planning process to suit their own ends, while government authorities with a less pronounced organisational culture, like the province of Noord-Brabant, proved to be flexible in their dealings with other authorities as well as citizens. Citizens with a strong cultural background were able to cope with all types of problems they encountered during a planning process, while citizens with a weak cultural background proved less capable of dealing with obstacles in the planning process. Culture was not an issue in government–citizen interaction. Instead, economic arguments played a role. However, culture is very important in the performance of local groups and is reflected in their capacity and motivation to act.

In the literature the change in Dutch water management policy is described as a transition (van der Brugge et al., 2005). However, from the results of this study and analysis I draw the conclusion that this is not the case with regard to the institutions. Although they have tried to accommodate these changes as much as possible and the manifestations of these accommodations differ from institution to institution, the cultural pattern on which the institutions are based remained unchanged.

Summary

In this thesis the object of research is cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning. The aim of this research was to understand the relationship between government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning and whether this leads to conflict or collaboration. The research question was: What factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning? Government authorities are broken down into national, regional (provincial) and local government; citizens are viewed as one group.

Methods

The thesis is framework-led as well as based on empirical data from three case studies. The framework developed in this study is an operationalisation of social interaction, the central theme of this research. The properties of social interaction identified at the beginning of the study were used to construct a basic framework, which then evolved interactively during the course of the study using the results of the inductive analysis of empirical data from the three cases. Deductive analysis of the developed concepts was then used to give the framework its final shape, the CSI framework for cross-scale interaction.

The CSI framework consists of four properties of social interaction which provide insight in how social interaction between government and citizens proceeds and what factors and mechanisms influence this interaction.

The first property of social interaction is the actors' potential to act comprising their capacity and motivation to act.

The second property of social interaction is the actors' use of various types of social power: coercion, legitimacy, reward, hindering, knowledge, media exposure and sociability. Coercion may be used in the meaning of acting forcefully through police work and penalisation (defined as direct coercive power), but it may also be used indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials (frequently moving officials to different positions) (defined as indirect coercive power). In modern democracies the government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other

options are used first to achieve the government's objective, such as the use of indirect coercive power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is rewarded in a material way, e.g. in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, through a honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment to honorary member. Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented through obstruction or slowing down. Knowledge power entails the use of knowledge to influence the position of actors in their interaction. Examples are calling in external experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of the actor concerned and disseminating their message more widely. The sociability of an actor is considered a separate power source because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others.

The third property of social interaction are interaction strategies comprising framing, buffering and bridging strategies. Framing gives meaning to events and therefore are an interpretation of government–citizen interaction. There are four frames distinguished: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a sense of superiority. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When people make a distinction between 'us' and 'them' they are using an identity frame. A conflict management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or to reach a joint objective. Buffering strategies are directed at justifying actions. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the group or organisation to which one belongs. This type of strategy may be used to convince others in a persuasive manner. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions.

The fourth property of social interaction are the interaction outcomes which are broken down in conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration.

Apart from these four properties also culture and traditions play a role in the government–citizen interaction; the organisational culture as far as authorities are concerned, and the cultural background with regard to citizens and the impact of these on their action.

The causal line runs from the four properties of social interaction between authorities and citizens and the culture and traditions of both: the culture and traditions influence the action potential which leads to the building of power. This creates the interaction strategies which finally results in the interaction outcomes. In the analysis the sequence of properties was the other way around which means that first the actors' interaction was analysed, followed by their interaction strategies, their power building, their potential to act, and finally their culture and traditions. The analysis works against the causal line; first the consequences are subject of analysis, then the focus is on the causes. It is therefore an explaining route. As the interaction between the authorities is considered important for the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and the local group, this has also been taken into account.

The case studies which form the empirical basis of this study are the Dike Relocation in Lent, Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder. The case studies were selected according to specific criteria. First, the expected outcomes of the social interaction between government authorities and citizens in river projects should represent outcomes at both extremes of the continuum. This implies selecting a river project in which actors tended to collaborate with one another, and a project in which actors stood diametrically opposed one another. Second, the way citizens organised themselves in local groups to achieve their objective must be incorporated, which meant that a variety of local groups was needed, including a homogeneous group of citizens, a group of citizens with a heterogeneous constitution and various local groups pursuing their own interests. Third, the case studies should include diverse government agencies. Based on these criteria, the Dike Relocation in Lent was selected because of the involvement of several local groups, the involvement of national and local governments, and government authorities and citizens are in opposition to one another; the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder because of the involvement of a heterogeneous group of citizens, the inclusion of national, provincial and local governments, and the interaction has been based on conflict; and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder because of the involvement of a homogeneous group of citizens, the involvement of national and provincial governments, and government authorities and citizens have the intention to collaborate.

The case studies relied solely on qualitative data, for which interviews and a desk study were the main research methods. The data gathered from these methods were consolidated to provide evidence that can be used to answer the research question.

Setting the scene

The scene in which this thesis is embedded is Dutch water management. Like other European countries in north-western Europe, water policy in the Netherlands faced a similar shift in approach since the 1990s onwards. A traditional focus on defending against floods was gradually replaced by a focus on managing flood risk. In the Dutch Room for the River policy spatial planning is key to water management which includes taking measures outside the dikes, such as lowering groynes, as well as inside the dikes, including dike relocations, bypasses and 'green' side channels.

Due to developments in society in the last decades the role of government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning changed. While the command and control approach of the national authority in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat, was still present the last decades it has been regularly pushed to the background resulting in attempts to a more adaptive approach. On the part of the citizens, citizens' protest from 1960s and 1970s onwards showed the agency of citizens as 'makers and shapers' who set agendas rather than as 'users and choosers' (a clientelist, consumer model) of interventions or services designed by the government. This active citizenship fits in the new design of the Dutch government in which citizens are seen as active participants.

Analysis of the case studies

Dike Relocation in Lent case study

In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the main actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the local government (municipality of Nijmegen) and three active local groups. The plan for a dike relocation in Lent was a state initiative to reduce flood risk by widening the bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent and the city of Nijmegen. The government plan was incorporated in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River for finding space for the rivers. The plan which involves to relocate the dike 350 m. land inwards and a side channel, was planned at the same location of the Waalsprong housing development of the municipality of Nijmegen. The dike relocation in Lent was the first river project in the Room for the River programme that was steered by the ministry and devolved to a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the environment impact analysis (EIA) studies. A new phenomenon was the involvement of the municipality of Nijmegen. Relocating the dike land inwards implied that Rijkswaterstaat had to deal with the municipality of Nijmegen authority for this area. It thus had to cede responsibility. After the launch of the plan fierce citizens' protest followed which mainly focused on the demolition of 55 houses. With the help of a water expert the local groups developed an alternative which consisted of excavating the flood plain including a 'green' channel and a land reservation for a dike relocation in future.

The interaction between the national government and the local groups led to debate and conflict. Although the national government attempted to acknowledge the residents' concerns to prevent escalation, this never ended in negotiation. Most issues, however, escalated into conflict, which remained unresolved. The interaction between the local government and the local groups evolved in a similar way: issues were disputed and then often escalated into conflicts which also remained unresolved. The interaction between the authorities resulted in debate and negotiation. Most debates were about the division of responsibilities. Negotiation took place once, when the national government decided to contribute to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal in order to get the support of the local government.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used a power frame throughout the planning process. The most striking examples are the launch of the government plan without first discussing it with its own officials and the local government, and the way it dealt with the residents' alternative, which was considered to be the 'second best' right from the start. The local government and the local groups employed an identity frame. The local government used its identity frame interactionally. In its dealings with the national government it emphasised that 'conforming to the national interest is our legitimate role, but under certain conditions', but to the residents its position was that 'it is the state secretary who decides' to avoid being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness. Neither the national government nor the local government changed their frame from an identity frame to a conflict management frame. In its interaction with the local groups the national government used buffering strategies very often, while the local groups employed this type of strategy regularly. Both used bridging strategies occasionally. The local government and the local groups both used buffering strategies moderately in the interaction with each other, and bridging strategies incidentally. The government authorities occasionally used buffering and bridging strategies when interacting with each other.

Concerning the power building by authorities and the local groups, both the national government and the local groups built five types of power in their interaction. The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability. The local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. The local government and the local groups both built four power types in their interaction. The local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. The national government built four power types in its dealings with the local government (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power and hindering power), whereas the local government built two power types (legitimate power and hindering power). The most important use of power was the national government's use of reward power when dealing with the local government, in the form

of a contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.

The power building by the government authorities and local groups gives insight into both the use of interaction strategies and the interaction outcomes. The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered the development of the interaction outcomes negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose to enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis therefore demonstrates that neither a power frame nor an identity frame are conducive to dialogue and collaboration. The latter requires a common understanding and an atmosphere of tolerance in which trust may grow. This will not happen as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests are the most important.

The analysis of the authorities' and local groups' potentials to act shows that the national government's potential to act proved to be strong, whereas the local government's and the local groups' potential to act proved to be moderate and weak respectively. While the national government's potential to act was powerful and the local groups' potential to act appeared to be less influential, this was viewed differently by the actors involved. The national government's potential to act was weakened by its inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of its excessive concern with presenting the government plan in a positive manner, its difficulty in dealing with opposing views, and the lack of transparency of its actions. In addition, it did not have an answer to the local groups' building of knowledge power and media power. The local groups, however, turned out to be more influential than their potential to act would suggest, which indicates that their lack of 'in-house' experts, a broad network of active people, a united front, a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and their inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of their fixation on their own interests were not as significant or consequential as expected. The 'weak' potential to act of the national government and the 'strong' potential to act of the local groups, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, was mainly a result of the local groups building various power types, in particular knowledge power and media power. This implies that the action potential of the actors better explains their position in the planning process than the process of interaction. Therefore, the power building and interaction strategies have to be taken into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the analysis need to be discussed with the actors involved in order to assess the influence of the power building and interaction strategies on the government–citizen interaction from their point of view. As this case study shows, the actors may have a different interpretation of the outcome than my analysis.

Concerning the authorities' organisational culture and the citizens' cultural background and the impact of these on their action, the analysis shows that culture had a strong impact on the national government's action, a moderate influence on the local government's action and a weak influence on the local groups' action. The organisational culture of Rijkswaterstaat was largely an authoritarian style of

governance. In practice this meant that Rijkswaterstaat took a technical approach to water management and tended to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial planning. The Room for the River programme resulted in new forms of governance, including cooperation with lower-tier authorities, but the organisation did not change its style of operation. The Room for the River programme was set up in such a way that a command and control approach operated in the background. Examples are the presentation of national projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, the emphasis on procedures and the focus on flood safety which meant that other river values and functions, such as landscape and biodiversity, were given a lower priority. The municipality of Nijmegen pursued its own course independently of the public interest which the national government defended, and the residents' interest. In the past the local community in Lent had been unable to change the authorities' mind when infrastructure works were planned in their village and this has not changed.

Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study

In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study the main actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland), the local government (municipality of Ubbergen) and the local group. The government plan for emergency water storage was considered additional to measures to be taken in the Room for the River programme for finding space for the rivers. The measure was presented as an option in the event of an extreme Rhine discharge of 18,000 m³/s. Of the three locations provisionally designated as 'calamity polders', Ooijpolder is the first polder on the south bank of the Rhine after it enters the Netherlands from Germany. The residents in the Ooijpolder protested fiercely against the designation of their polder as an area for emergency water storage. The government plan was originally classified as a security issue, which meant it followed a 'security chain' directly from the ministry to the responsible government officers. Instead, it was decided to widely publicising the government plan for emergency water storage as the miracle cure for the country's water problems.

The interaction between the national government and the local group can be characterised as conflict and debate, while the interaction between the lower-tier authorities and the local group can be characterised as collaboration. The interaction between authorities had various outcomes. The interaction between the national government and the provincial government resulted in debate, negotiation and dialogue, the interaction between the national government and the local government ended in conflict and debate, and the interaction between the provincial government and the local government led to dialogue and collaboration.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used two frames in its interaction with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It exercised a power frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The power frame was employed

by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the person of the successive state secretaries; the identity frame was generally employed by government officials. The use of a power frame by the state secretaries left the officials little room to taking up another frame, such as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by government officials was therefore understandable as they had to deal with local and regional authorities and the residents. The use of the conflict management frame and bridging strategies by the provincial government changed the interaction between the national and provincial government from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. The interaction between the national and local government remained one of debate as a result of the national government's use of a power frame and an identity frame and the local government's use of an identity frame. In its interaction with the national government, the local government did not change its identity frame towards a conflict management frame, which had a negative impact on the interaction outcome, which was debate. In its interaction with the lower-tier authorities the local group employed a collaborative frame.

Concerning the power building by the authorities and the local group, the national government built five types of power in its dealings with the local group (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability), while the local group built three power types (hindering power, knowledge power and media power; the latter two very often). The lower-tier authorities built two types of power in its dealings with the local group. The provincial government built knowledge power and sociability; the local government built legitimate power and sociability. The local group built one power type in its interaction with the local-tier authorities: sociability. The national government built three power types in its interaction with the lower-tier authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power), while the lower-tier authorities built four types of power in their interaction with the national government (legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and sociability). The power building in the interaction between the national government and the local group had a considerable effect on their interaction outcomes: debate and conflict. The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national government and the local group's building of knowledge power and media power proved to be influential. The provincial government's building of knowledge power, media power and sociability in its interaction with the national government influenced the interaction outcomes, with substantial shifts towards debate, negotiation and dialogue. Its interaction strategies also contributed to these interaction outcomes. The interaction between the national and local government, which never reached a negotiated solution and remained stuck in debate, cannot be explained by their power building. These actors' interaction strategies therefore also needed to be taken into account (see above).

The analysis of the authorities' and local group's potentials to act shows that the national and local government's potential to act was weak, while the provincial government's

potential to act proved to be moderate. The local group's potential to act can be considered strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms, consistency (the construction of a narrative) and organisational and personal motivation, resulting in a failure to provide sufficient substantiation for the proposed plan. The provincial government's potential to act was moderate due to its extensive use of coordinating mechanisms and its consistency (to construct a narrative that a design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m³/s cannot enter the Netherlands smoothly, which was partly adopted by the national government) and organisational and personal motivation. The local government's weak potential to act was a result of its weak mandate and resource base and the absence of organisational ambition. The local group's strong potential to act was based on a strong capacity and motivation to act.

Concerning the authorities' organisational culture and local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action, the analysis shows that the influence of the national government's organisational culture on its action can be viewed as rather strong, and respectively moderate and weak for the provincial government's and the local government's organisational culture, while the local group's cultural background had a strong impact on its action. The national government's engineering culture had a considerable influence on flood risk management practice. Rijkswaterstaat has a mandate for safety, which is incorporated in its mission: ensuring that everyone has 'dry feet' and protecting the country from floods, but this cannot be guaranteed. Rijkswaterstaat views water safety as government business and not something the public should necessarily be involved in. The impact of the provincial government's organisational culture on its action proved to be moderate. It is used to getting its message across, in the past in its interaction with other provinces and Charles V, and today in its interaction with Rijkswaterstaat. Although the impact of the local government's organisational culture on its action was weak, its position in public debate clearly reflected the solidarity between the lower-tier authorities and the local group in opposing the national government. Nevertheless, the local government's aim was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. For centuries the residents of Ooijpolder were used to opposing government authorities, whether on water management or other issues, and were not afraid to defend their own interests. In the 20th century they had successfully opposed various government plans and when Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage in 2000 the polder residents succeeded once again. Their cultural background therefore had a strong impact on their action.

Terps plan in Overdiep Polder case study

In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study the main actors were the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant) and a local group. The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder is a residents' initiative

for a spatial redesign of their polder to make flood peak discharge possible in the Meuse. The terps plan was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River for finding space for the rivers. As the project was the first that the national government delegated to a lower-tier authority, the division of tasks between the authorities only became clear during the course of the planning process. Due to its favourable location on the Meuse, its earlier function as a retention area and the small number of residents, in the late 1990s the polder was designated as a 'search area' for river widening projects. Some citizens in Overdiep polder initiated a terps plan in their polder. They wanted to reconstruct their polder to accommodate a one in 25 year flood in order to meet the public interest and secure an economically viable future for their farms.

The interaction between the national government and the local group always led to debate and conflict, which in most cases was resolved with the help of the province. The interaction between the provincial government and the local group resulted in debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. If disputes emerged these always ended in a negotiated solution, but discord was generally prevented because the provincial government and the local group were continuously in 'dialogue mode'. The interaction between the authorities led to debate and conflict as a result of recurring disputes in the area of responsibility. Thanks to the provincial government's bridging strategies, these interaction outcomes always ended in a negotiated solution. Hence, negotiation was part of the interaction outcomes.

With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government generally used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame when dealing with the local group. The local group combined an identity frame and a conflict management frame in its interaction with the national government. Both occasionally used buffering and bridging strategies, which can be considered a conscious strategy. The local group alternated between a conflict management frame and an identity frame when dealing with the provincial government, while the provincial government mainly used a conflict management frame and a collaborative frame. The identity frame of the local group occurred incidentally. Under the influence of the provincial government's bridging strategies and the local group's open mind and receptive attitude to signals from others, the local group reframed and replaced its identity frame with a conflict management frame. After the first project manager was replaced the local group mainly employed a collaborative frame, but this did not mean that discord was absent. In addition, many potential disputes were resolved or even prevented, particularly by the provincial government's attempts to bridge towards the local group. The provincial government and the local group used many bridging strategies and occasionally buffering strategies. The provincial government used buffering strategies particularly in private negotiations with residents, as did the residents. In its interaction with the provincial government the national government used a conflict management frame at the decision-making level, while government officials used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. This

power frame proved to be an important cause of disputes between the national and the provincial government, mostly in the area of responsibility. The provincial government generally used a conflict management frame when dealing with the national government. In a few cases, however, the province employed an identity frame, but this only emerged at the officer level. After the replacement of the project manager, the provincial government used only a conflict management frame. National government officials in particular used buffering strategies towards the provincial government, while bridging strategies were sometimes used at the decision-making level. This implied that at the decision-making level the national government was prepared to negotiate. However, negotiation only started with the help of the provincial government, which always took the first step. This was also the case when disputes emerged between the national government and the local group.

Concerning the power building by the authorities and the local group, the national government built three power types in its interaction with the local group (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power), while the local group built five power types (legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability). The local group built the same five power types in its dealings with the provincial government, which built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). The province built indirect coercive power as a last resort in its interaction with the farmers who were unwilling to negotiate about their land and real estate. The local group's power building in its dealings with the provincial government did not have repercussions for their interaction outcomes, which varied from debate and negotiation to dialogue and collaboration due to the provincial government's conflict management frame and bridging strategies. In the interaction between the authorities, the national government built four power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power) and the provincial government built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). As the power building of both authorities were more or less balanced, the provincial government's use of a conflict management frame and bridging strategies were able to move the interaction outcomes of debate and conflict towards negotiation. In addition, when a government authority used indirect coercive power the other party, whether this was the other authority or the local group, was less willing to employ a conflict management frame and apply bridging strategies. The provincial government's building of specific power types, particularly knowledge power and sociability, is understandable, since its interest in realising its first river project demanded restraint in building indirect coercive power. Despite the more or less balanced power building between the national and the provincial government, collaboration proved difficult for them to achieve. This type of interaction outcome might have occurred if both authorities restrained or abandoned the building of indirect coercive power (national and provincial government) and legitimate power (national government). Although legitimate power is a less dominant power type than indirect coercive power, it proved disadvantageous for the creation of mutual

understanding and a tolerant atmosphere in which trust may grow. This can be considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as shown by the power building by the provincial government and the local group.

The analysis of the authorities' and local group's potentials to act shows that the national government's potential to act was weak, the provincial government's was moderate and the local group's was strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative), which resulted in a weak capacity to act. Additionally, the national government had a moderate motivation to act. Despite its weak potential to act, the national government's influence on the planning process was considerable, due partly to its power building and its interaction strategies. The provincial government's moderate potential to act was based on a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, and it proved a good basis for its interaction with the national government and the local group. The local group's strong potential to act, which was based on its strong capacity and motivation to act, made it a forceful counterpart for both the national government and the provincial government.

Concerning the authorities' organisational culture and the local group's cultural background, the analysis shows that the national government's organisational culture and the local group's cultural background and the impact of these on their action were strong, while this was moderate for the provincial government. The engineering culture that has dominated Rijkswaterstaat since its inception in 1798 still has a strong impact on its organisational culture. Rijkswaterstaat is a proponent of forceful action, as illustrated by its approach to water management by building and maintaining dikes and other infrastructure. To accommodate public criticism that the organisation was not taking nature and landscape values into account, it incorporated nature conservation into its policies. However, so far it has had difficulty in including citizens in the planning process and dealing with citizens who put forward their own plans to reduce flood risk. The provincial government's organisational culture, which can be characterised as following a middle course, proved to be effective in its interaction with both the national government and the local group. Although the local group's cultural background influenced its power building, interaction strategies and interaction outcomes strongly, it was very much dependent on the provincial government to achieve its objective. The organisational culture of the authorities and the local group's cultural background therefore highlight their starting position and shed light on their position during the planning process rather than explaining the process.

Discussion

In general the CSI framework provided useful information that otherwise would not have been obtained. In particular, it gave insight into the relationship between the actors, between the government authorities and the citizens and between different government authorities, and the power and interaction strategies they used from the

start of their interaction until the final outcome. The framework unravelled many layers that are at work in government–citizen interaction, particularly concerning the actors' potential to act, their building of social power, their use of interaction strategies and the outcomes of their interaction. Additionally, the framework gave insight into the actions of authorities in governance processes and how these processes are shaped. In other words, the CSI framework did its work quite well.

During the case analysis several methodological problems occurred. These varied from simple ones, e.g. the inclusion of culture and traditions in the framework, to more complex questions, e.g. the replacement of credibility by sociability as a type of social power, as these required for example a new literature search and a consideration whether replacement would be worth while.

Conclusion

The research question was What factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning? This question will be answered by reviewing the emergent and underlying factors that influence government–citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning and the mechanisms involved.

Emergent factors

The emergent factors that influence government–citizen interaction identified from the empirical data and analysis are: building trust, uncertainties, citizen exclusion, institutions with a focus on formal roles, authorities' and citizens' willingness to engage and situational factors. The headings below can be read as brief conclusions.

Building trust is difficult in government–citizen relationships

Trust turned out to be a crucial factor in government–citizen interaction. Without trust the government–citizen relationship will not evolve and will remain stuck in a 'conflictive' mode (see below), resulting in 'conflictive' interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate, at one end of a continuum on which dialogue and collaboration are considered 'collaborative' interaction outcomes. Building trust proved to be difficult for both authorities and citizens as both parties tended to distrust each other. Difficulties were experienced both when the authorities were leading in a planning project and when they were not, and both when citizens were affected by a government plan and when they were the initiators of their own plan. Building trust requires a continuous effort by both parties. Authorities and citizens need to know each other in order to be able to answer the question of whether the other party is trustworthy and so it generally takes time before parties trust each other. Building trust requires vigilance. As the Dutch saying goes, 'trust comes by foot and leaves on horseback'.

A difficulty to build trust is that government authorities in particular operate in a formal setting, while trust is most easily built and maintained in an informal setting. An important obstacle to building trust in a formal setting is that contacts between people

are based mainly on contracts, agreements, laws, procedures and rules. This is often referred to as 'formalised distrust', which is a characteristic of government in modern democratic societies. A key requirement for building trust is the exchange of information based on reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms ('If I do this for you, you do that for me') and unwritten rules. This implies that authorities and citizens have to invest in dealing with each other in an informal way, which requires open communication about the parties' wishes, their objectives, their views on how to achieve their ends, and a reflective attitude in which each party's actions and behaviour are open to discussion.

Governance processes throw up new uncertainties

In essence, governance processes seek to deal with uncertainties, for example about the outcomes and the actors involved. However, they also create new uncertainties, for example about decision-making (how much influence do the actors have?) and creating precedents. Generally, in a traditional approach the process is relatively fixed and designed to exclude uncertainties as much as possible, while in a more interactive style the process is open, which implies there will be many uncertainties. Uncertainties proved to be problematic, particularly for the government authorities. Government decision-makers may perceive uncertainties as a threat to their legitimacy and their traditional role. Generally, government decision-makers possess a survival instinct that drives them to choose pathways that involve less risk, and strategies that minimise risk often mean falling back on a traditional approach. This entails a 'closed' participation process using traditional participation instruments, such as consultation and information meetings, rather than instruments that foster deliberation, such as design workshops and round-table meetings. Traditional approaches usually leave little room for government officials to pursue an open planning process. This means that they are bound to procedures and are restricted to traditional pathways.

Citizens generally consider uncertainties to be less problematic as they will always be present, whether they are opposing a government plan or involved in a joint initiative. When opposing a government plan, citizens face uncertainties about the process – will their views be heard and will they be included in the planning process? – and about the outcome – will they win or lose? When they are involved in a joint initiative, the uncertainties regarding the process are about how they can ensure that they are part of the decision-making process and that the joint initiative will be continued throughout the process despite a high turnover of government officials. They will also not be certain that the joint initiative will be successful. Uncertainties are an important factor in government–citizen interaction because they increase the risk of a breakdown in trust between the actors involved.

Citizen exclusion is a source of conflict between authorities and citizens

Excluding citizens from the design process and/or follow-up phases of the planning process creates distrust towards authorities. This study indicates that the exclusion of

citizens in planning processes is a relevant factor that has far-reaching consequences for government–citizen interaction. If citizens are excluded the interaction will start in a ‘conflictive’ government–citizen relationship (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate. Moreover, as actors in a conflictive relationship tend to focus on their differences rather than their similarities or common goals, it is hard to normalise such relationships in an attempt to escape from this conflictive mode.

Institutions with a focus on formal roles cannot adequately support governance processes

Many government institutions are solely embedded in the formal world where the foundation of actions is formalised distrust based on laws, procedures, rules and contracts. In contrast, most everyday social interactions are informal. This study shows that government institutions that are unable to link the formal with the informal world had a negative impact on government–citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. Government institutions in which one or a few individuals could make a difference by switching from the formal to the informal world had a positive influence on the government–citizen interaction by stimulating dialogue and collaboration.

Authorities’ willingness to engage is a condition for being responsive in governance processes

Contracts and constitutional provisions are considered to limit government responsiveness, but if individual government officials are able to deal with the complexities and uncertainties in governance processes, these are viewed as palliative measures at best (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988). Although such individuals are courageous in the sense that they stick their neck out, their actions are in fact a stopgap because they will not solve the problems of government unresponsiveness unless, for example, all the officials involved have internalised strategies for dealing with the complexities and uncertainties in governance processes. This study shows that when government actions are under the control of individuals (as a result of their willingness to engage) the relevant authorities were more responsive. They were more willing to respond to citizens’ demands to be included in the planning process, among others. The most important factor, however, is a change in the authorities’ organisational culture. This enables the staff to internalise different cultural beliefs so that policy agreements are put into practice by all involved rather than just a few. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the authorities that were willing to engage had a positive effect on the government–citizen interaction, which often resulted in dialogue and collaboration. When the authorities were not willing to engage they had a negative impact on the government–citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. The authorities’ willingness to engage is therefore an important factor in government–citizen interaction.

Citizens’ willingness to engage needs to be taken seriously by the authorities

An emergent factor is the citizens’ willingness to engage, which influences the government–citizen interaction. The analysis indicates that citizens’ willingness to

engage leads to a 'conflictive' government–citizen relationship when the authorities exclude citizens (see also the emergent factor concerning citizen exclusion). It may also result in a 'collaborative' government–citizen relationship, particularly when both the public interest and the local citizens' interest can be met, which implies citizen involvement. While the former always has a negative impact on the government–citizen interaction because it will end in conflict and debate, the latter may influence the government–citizen interaction positively because it will result in either a mixture of debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration or a mixture of dialogue and collaboration.

Situational factors are crucial in governance processes

Situational factors, such as the opportunity to get the support of a water expert and the policy change in water management that allowed the national government to broaden the scope of its policy measures to include land outside the river dikes, have a large impact on government–citizen interaction. Such factors influenced the government–citizen interaction by opening up new opportunities. The context in which this occurred determined whether this impact could be described as negative, resulting in conflict and debate, or positive, resulting in debate, negotiation, dialogue and/or collaboration.

Underlying factors

The analysis of the empirical data identified three underlying factors. The first is related to the different 'modes' of relationship in which government–citizen interaction takes place and the dynamics of the interaction. The second and third are related to the rapidly changing societal configurations of state, civil society and the market.

Long-term modes and short-term dynamics are part of government–citizen interaction

This study shows that the relationship between authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape planning was based on a stable pattern. A distinction can be made between a conflictive and collaborative mode. While the conflictive mode of the government–citizen relationship evolves in a conflictive situation, the collaborative mode of the government–citizen relationship originates in situations in which the partners have a positive attitude towards each other, which is reflected in the form of their relationship: an alliance or a coalition. Moving from one mode to another is difficult, but within the modes changes may occur in quick succession, which can be viewed as the short-term dynamics of the government–citizen relationship. This means that when the relationship is in a conflictive mode it is hard to find a way out and when it is in a collaborative mode this situation will continue. The latter by no means implies that no disputes will occur. However, partners operating in a collaborative mode are willing to solve the dispute, but this is not the case when partners are in a conflictive mode. Partners who are engaged in a conflictive mode of relationship may change their interaction from debate to conflict from one moment to the next. Partners engaged in a collaborative mode of relationship may change their interaction from debate to negotiation and subsequently to dialogue or collaboration. The dynamic may then

evolve further from collaboration back to dialogue and then debate. It may also start from another interaction outcome and develop from dialogue to debate via negotiation into dialogue and collaboration.

Institutional change determines whether a top-down approach may change towards a more collaborative approach

Institutional change has an effect on government–citizen interaction. The case studies show that it is hard to change from a top-down approach to a more collaborative approach, despite demands by citizens to be included in the process. This implies that a change from a state-centred mode of government to one that is less state-centred has to be realised at the start of a planning process, because the authorities will then not lose face. However, this does not mean that a collaborative approach will last, because it may be replaced by a top-down approach at any time. There is less chance of this happening when a lower-tier authority is responsible for the project management.

People's demands for inclusion put increasing pressure on authorities to act as governance actors rather than government actors

The growing desire of people to have a say in changes to their living environment cannot be ignored by government authorities. They have to include them somehow in the planning process. This development can be viewed as a factor underlying government–citizen interaction. It influences the government–citizen interaction in such a way that it increasingly puts pressure on the authorities to take citizens' values into account and include them in planning processes. This requires them to change their role from a government actor to a governance actor.

Mechanisms

Two mechanisms that influence government–citizen interaction can be identified from the empirical data and analysis: power and culture. The headings briefly describe the conclusions.

Power is the key mechanism in governance processes

Planning processes can be viewed as a battlefield in which power makes a difference. As such, power can be seen as a mechanism that influences government–citizen interaction. The analysis of the case studies shows that not only the authorities but also the citizens built power. In conflictive situations the authorities and citizens tried to build as much power as possible, but when they were engaged in an alliance or coalition power did not seem to be an overt issue. The authorities mainly built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas citizens mainly built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. The authorities and citizens influenced their interaction through their power building. The authorities made a difference especially through the use of indirect coercive power and legitimate power, whereas citizens did so with knowledge power and media power. The authorities and citizens built hindering power. The authorities did this covertly

while citizens did it openly. For citizens, however, it was difficult to bring the authorities' hindering power into the open, for example by appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (*Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*). In addition, the authorities also built power in their relationship with other authorities. In these cases they often built hindering power in disputes in the area of responsibility.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that power prevails in Dutch river landscape planning. Most often this means that the authority responsible for water management in the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, is ruling. Does this mean that collaborative planning in Dutch river landscape planning is an ideal that is hard to reach? This study shows that if the configuration of actors is such that all actors are involved on the basis of respect and equality, collaborative planning may result in Rijkswaterstaat endorsing the collaborative outcome.

Culture is noticeable throughout the planning process

This study shows that culture is noticeable throughout the planning process. It can therefore be considered to be a mechanism that influences government–citizen interaction. Government authorities with a strong organisational culture, such as Rijkswaterstaat, always tried to change the planning process to suit their own ends, while government authorities with a less pronounced organisational culture, like the province of Noord-Brabant, proved to be flexible in their dealings with other authorities as well as citizens. Citizens with a strong cultural background were able to cope with all types of problems they encountered during a planning process, while citizens with a weak cultural background proved less capable of dealing with obstacles in the planning process. Culture was not an issue in government–citizen interaction. Instead, economic arguments played a role. However, culture is very important in the performance of local groups and is reflected in their capacity and motivation to act.

In the literature the change in Dutch water management policy is described as a transition (van der Brugge et al., 2005). However, from the results of this study and analysis I draw the conclusion that this is not the case with regard to the institutions. Although they have tried to accommodate these changes as much as possible and the manifestations of these accommodations differ from institution to institution, the cultural pattern on which the institutions are based remained unchanged.

Samenvatting

Deze studie gaat over sociale interactie tussen overheid en burgers in rivierprojecten. Het doel van de studie is het verkrijgen van inzicht in de relatie tussen overheid en burgers als het gaat om ruimtelijke planning in het rivierengebied en in de uitkomst: in hoeverre mondt deze relatie uit in conflict of samenwerking? De onderzoeksvraag is: Welke factoren en mechanismen beïnvloeden de interactie tussen overheid en burgers in planningsprocessen in het rivierengebied? Onder overheid wordt verstaan de rijksoverheid, de provincies en de gemeenten. Burgers worden als groep gezien.

Methoden

In deze studie is gebruik gemaakt van een analytisch kader en gegevens die verzameld zijn aan de hand van drie case studies. Het theoretisch kader dat ontwikkeld is voor het analyseren van de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, het Cross-Scale Interaction (CSI) raamwerk, is een operationalisatie van sociale interactie. In het begin was het analysekader vrij beperkt maar in de loop van het onderzoek werd het uitgebreid aan de hand van inductieve analyse van empirische gegevens van drie case studies. Door deductieve analyse van de ontwikkelde concepten kreeg het analysekader zijn uiteindelijke vorm.

Het analytisch kader bestaat uit vier kenmerken van sociale interactie die inzicht geven in de manier waarop sociale interactie plaatsvindt en welke factoren en mechanismen hierop van invloed zijn.

Het eerste kenmerk van sociale interactie is het actiepotentieel van actoren (potential to act) dat bestaat uit hun capaciteit (capacity to act) en motivatie (motivation to act) voor het ondernemen van actie.

Het tweede kenmerk van sociale interactie is het opbouwen van macht (social power) waarbij zeven machtsbronnen worden onderscheiden: dwang, legitimatie, beloning, hinderen, kennis, media-optreden en 'een sociaal gezicht'. Dwang kan betekenen met machtsvertoon optreden, bijvoorbeeld door de politie of het geven van straf. Dit wordt directe dwang genoemd. Het kan ook zijn dat dwang op indirecte wijze wordt uitgeoefend. Dat kan op een expliciet manier door te dreigen met of te appelleren aan dwangmaatregelen of de wet, of impliciet door medewerkers vaak van baan te laten veranderen; dit valt onder indirecte dwang. In moderne samenlevingen is de overheid doorgaans terughoudend met het uitoefenen van directe dwang omdat het beschouwd wordt als een laatste redmiddel om een gewenst maatschappelijk resultaat te bereiken. Eerst wordt gebruik gemaakt van andere opties om het overheidsdoel te bereiken, zoals het gebruik van indirecte dwang. Legitimatie is aan de orde als actoren refereren aan hun positie in een sociale structuur, bijvoorbeeld hiërarchie, of verwijzen naar andere sociale normen, zoals reciprociteit, gelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid. Beloning houdt in dat een actor wordt beloond op een materiële manier, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van

geld of goederen, of op een immateriële manier, bijvoorbeeld door middel van een eervolle vermelding, een lintje of een benoeming tot erelid. Hinderen betekent dat een actie wordt belemmerd of voorkomen door obstructie of vertraging. Kennis wordt gebruikt om de positie van actoren te beïnvloeden. Voorbeelden zijn het inhuren van experts, het laten uitvoeren van onderzoek of het regelen dat een groot aantal experts aan tafel zit waar het signaal van uit gaat dat het onderwerp serieus wordt genomen. Het kan ook gaan om specifieke kennis van de betrokken partijen. Het optreden van actoren in de media geeft betekenis aan hun waarden en interpreteert deze. Actoren gaan naar de media om bijvoorbeeld draagvlak te organiseren, het belang van hun zaak te onderstrepen en hun boodschap te verspreiden. 'Een sociaal gezicht' van een actor wordt beschouwd als een afzonderlijke machtsbron omdat het te maken heeft met reciprociteit. Het is gepast om iets terug te doen voor iemand die altijd behulpzaam is of een luisterend oor heeft. Men kan ook sociaal zijn in de verwachting dat dit een keer wordt beantwoord.

Het derde kenmerk van sociale interactie zijn interactiestrategieën die worden onderscheiden in framing en beschermende- en overbruggingsstrategieën. Framing geeft betekenis aan gebeurtenissen waardoor de interactie tussen overheid en burgers geïnterpreteerd kan worden. In deze studie wordt onderscheid gemaakt in vier frames: een machtsframe, een identiteitsframe, een conflicthanteringsframe en een samenwerkingsframe. Een machtsframe wordt hoofdzakelijk gebruikt om te laten zien wie autoriteit heeft en wie bepaalt wat er gebeurt. Het gaat gepaard met dominantie of superioriteitsgevoel. Een identiteitsframe wordt vaak gebruikt in situaties waarin mensen zich onzeker voelen, zich bedreigd voelen of worden uitgedaagd. Bij dergelijke gevoelens reageert men direct door terug te vallen op de groep waar men toe behoort en deze te positioneren tegenover anderen. Als mensen het onderscheid maken tussen 'wij' en 'zij' maken zij gebruik van een identiteitsframe. Een conflicthanteringsframe laat zien dat men open staat voor denkbeelden en meningen van anderen. Het geeft aan dat men de wil heeft om naar overeenkomsten te kijken in plaats van naar verschillen. Een samenwerkingsframe duidt op een gezamenlijke actie tussen actoren tegen een opponent of voor het bereiken van een gezamenlijk doel. Beschermende strategieën worden gebruikt om de eigen acties te rechtvaardigen. De argumentatie die daarbij wordt gebruikt gaat vaak uit van het eigen perspectief, in veel gevallen van de groep of organisatie waartoe men behoort. Dit type strategie kan worden gebruikt om anderen op een persuasieve manier te overtuigen. Overbruggingsstrategieën zijn bedoeld om problemen op te lossen en gezamenlijke oplossingen te vinden. Dit type strategie wordt gebruikt om te laten zien dat men bereid is een brug te slaan naar een ander, ontvankelijk is voor denkbeelden en meningen van anderen en de discussie aan wil gaan.

Het vierde kenmerk van sociale interactie zijn de uitkomsten van sociale interactie. Er is onderscheid gemaakt in conflict, debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking.

Naast deze vier kenmerken spelen ook cultuur en tradities van de actoren een rol in de

interactie tussen overheid en burgers. Bij de overheid gaat het om de organisatiecultuur en de impact hiervan op haar handelen, bij de burgers om hun culturele achtergrond en de impact hiervan op hun handelen.

De causale lijn loopt via de vier kenmerken van sociale interactie tussen overheid en burgers en de cultuur en tradities van beide actoren: de cultuur en tradities beïnvloedt het actiepotentieel dat vervolgens leidt tot het opbouwen van macht, die de interactiestrategieën creëert en uiteindelijk resulteert in de interactie uitkomsten. Tijdens de analyse werd een omgekeerde volgorde aangehouden. Eerst werden de uitkomsten van de interactie geanalyseerd, vervolgens de interactiestrategieën, dan het opbouwen van macht en het actiepotentieel van de actoren, en tenslotte hun cultuur en tradities. De analyse gaat dus tegen de causale stroom in: eerst worden de gevolgen geanalyseerd en daarna de oorzaken. Het is daardoor een verklarende route.

De case studies die in deze studie zijn geanalyseerd zijn de dijkteruglegging in Lent, het noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder en het terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder. De keuze voor deze drie case studies was gebaseerd op specifieke criteria. Ten eerste, de verwachte uitkomsten van sociale interactie tussen overheden en burgers in rivierprojecten zou de uitkomsten op beide extremen van het continuüm moeten representeren. Dit betekent de selectie van een rivierproject waarin actoren de intentie hebben tot samenwerking en een project waarin de actoren diametriaal tegenover elkaar staan. Ten tweede, de manier waarop burgers zich organiseren in lokale groepen om hun doelen te bereiken zou moeten worden meegenomen in de selectieprocedure. Dit betekent een selectie van lokale groepen op basis van verscheidenheid, variërend van een homogene groep van burgers, een groep die heterogeen van samenstelling is en verschillende lokale groepen die hun eigen belangen behartigen. Ten derde, in de case studies zouden verschillende overheden moeten figureren. Op basis van deze criteria was de case study Dijkteruglegging in Lent gekozen vanwege de verschillende lokale groepen die betrokken waren, de betrokkenheid van de rijksoverheid en de lokale overheid en dat overheden en burgers tegenover elkaar stonden. De case study Noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder was geselecteerd omdat een heterogene groep burgers was betrokken, de rijksoverheid, de provinciale overheid en de lokale overheid waren betrokken en de interactie tussen overheid en burgers gebaseerd was op conflict. De case study Terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder was gekozen vanwege de betrokkenheid van een homogene groep burgers, de rijksoverheid en de provinciale overheid die waren betrokken en de overheid en burgers hadden de intentie tot samenwerken. Aangezien in deze case studies meerdere overheden waren betrokken betekende dit dat naast de relatie tussen overheid en burgers ook de relatie tussen de overheden moest worden geanalyseerd.

Setting

De setting waarin deze studie zich afspeelt is het Nederlandse waterbeheer. Evenals in andere Europese landen in Noordwest-Europa vond in het Nederlandse waterbeleid sinds 1990 een verandering van aanpak plaats. De traditionele aanpak gericht op de

verdediging tegen overstromingen werd vervangen door een werkwijze die zich concentreerde op het beheer van overstromingsrisico's. In het Nederlandse Ruimte voor de Rivier beleid is ruimtelijke ordening een belangrijke sleutel. Dit betekent dat maatregelen zowel tussen de dijken (het verlagen van kribben) als achter de dijken (dijkverleggingen, bypasses en nevengeulen) genomen kunnen worden.

Als gevolg van maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen in de afgelopen decennia is de rol van overheden en burgers in het rivierbeheer veranderd. Hoewel de laatste decennia de autoritaire bestuursstijl van Rijkswaterstaat steeds aanwezig was, raakte deze regelmatig op de achtergrond door pogingen van de organisatie om haar werkwijze aan te passen. Het burgerprotest in de jaren '60 en '70 tegen dijkverzwaringen laat eerder de agency van burgers als 'makers and shapers' zien die in staat zijn de politieke agenda te bepalen dan dat zij zich gedragen als 'users and choosers' (volgens een klanten- of consumentenmodel) van interventies of diensten van de overheid. Dit actieve burgerschap past in de nieuwe werkwijze van de rijksoverheid waarin burgers als actieve deelnemers aan de besluitvorming worden beschouwd.

Analyse case studies

Dijkteruglegging in Lent

In de case study Dijkteruglegging in Lent waren de belangrijkste actoren de rijksoverheid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als uitvoeringsorganisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de lokale overheid (de gemeente Nijmegen) en drie actieve lokale groepen. Het plan voor de dijkteruglegging in Lent was een initiatief van de rijksoverheid om het overstromingsrisico te verminderen door de flessenhals in de Waal tussen het dorp Lent en de stad Nijmegen op te lossen. Het plan maakte deel uit van de Planologische Kernbeslissing (PKB) Ruimte voor de Rivier. De dijkteruglegging in Lent was het eerste rivierproject in het programma Ruimte voor de Rivier dat de rijksoverheid lanceerde en een regionale dienst van Rijkswaterstaat verantwoordelijk was voor de milieueffectrapportage (m.e.r.). Het project omvatte een dijkteruglegging, de dijk bij Lent zou 350 meter teruggelegd worden, en de aanleg van een nevengeul in de uiterwaard. Het rivierproject was gepland in hetzelfde gebied als de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong, een stadsuitbreiding van de gemeente Nijmegen. Na de lancering van het overheidsplan volgden felle protesten van burgers die zich keerden tegen de afbraak van 55 huizen die weg zouden moeten vanwege de geplande dijkteruglegging. Met behulp van een water-expert – die alleen in het begin van het planningsproces betrokken was – ontwikkelden de lokale groepen een alternatief plan dat voorzag in een verlaging van de uiterwaard voor een 'groene' nevengeul en een mogelijke dijkteruglegging in de toekomst.

De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groepen leidde tot debat en conflict.

Hoewel de rijksoverheid probeerde aan de wensen van de bewoners tegemoet te komen om escalatie te voorkomen, eindigde de interactie nooit in onderhandeling. De meeste onenigheden escaleerden en leidden tot een conflict dat vervolgens onopgelost bleef. De interactie tussen de gemeente en de lokale groepen ontwikkelde zich op eenzelfde manier: zaken werden onderwerp van discussie en escaleerden vaak tot conflicten die niet opgelost werden. De interactie tussen de overheden resulteerde in debat en onderhandeling. Onenigheden waren in essentie een competentiestrijd tussen beide overheden. Onderhandeling kwam één keer voor toen de rijksoverheid besloot bij te dragen aan de kosten van de tweede Waalbrug en akkoord ging met de compensatie voor de huizen die niet gebouwd konden worden in de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong. Hierdoor verzekerde zij zich van de steun van de gemeente voor het dijkterugleggingsplan.

In hun interactie gebruikten de overheden en lokale groepen verschillende interactiestrategieën. De rijksoverheid gebruikte in de interactie met de lokale groepen en de gemeente gedurende het hele planningsproces een machtsframe. De belangrijkste voorbeelden waren de lancering van het plan zonder afstemming met de eigen ambtenaren en de gemeente in kwestie en de manier waarop het omging met het alternatief van de burgers dat op voorhand als 'tweede keus' werd bestempeld. De gemeente en de lokale groepen gebruikten een identiteitsframe. De gemeente zette haar identiteitsframe interactioneel in. Terwijl de gemeente de bewoners liet weten dat het geen rol had in de besluitvorming zodat zij niet kon worden aangesproken op het feit dat zij niet thuis gaf voor de bewoners, gebruikte ze het in de interactie met de rijksoverheid om haar positie te benadrukken in de overheidshiërarchie: "het is onze legitieme rol om het algemeen belang te ondersteunen maar onder bepaalde voorwaarden". Noch de rijksoverheid, noch de gemeente verving het identiteitsframe door een conflicthanteeringsframe. In de interactie met de lokale groepen zette de rijksoverheid heel vaak beschermende strategieën in en weinig overbruggingsstrategieën. De lokale groepen gebruikten vaak beschermende strategieën en weinig overbruggingsstrategieën. In de interactie tussen de gemeente en de lokale groepen zetten beide vaak beschermende strategieën in. Zij maakten weinig gebruik van overbruggingstrategieën. In de interactie tussen de overheden zetten beide af en toe beschermende strategieën en overbruggingsstrategieën in.

Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht gebruikten de overheden en de lokale groepen hetzelfde aantal machtstypen. In de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groepen zetten beide vijf machtstypen in. De rijksoverheid gebruikte indirecte dwang, legitiematiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. De lokale groepen gebruikten legitiematiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht, mediamacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. De gemeente en de lokale groepen gebruikten beide vier machtstypen in hun interactie. De machtstypen die de gemeente inzette waren indirecte dwang, legitiematiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht terwijl de lokale groepen legitiematiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht gebruikten. Door het gebruik van uiteenlopende machtstypen waren de lokale groepen invloedrijk. In de interactie tussen de

overheden zette de rijksoverheid vier machtstypen in (indirecte dwang, legitimatiemacht, beloningsmacht en hindermacht) terwijl de gemeente gebruik maakte van twee machtstypen (legitimatiemacht en hindermacht). Het gebruik van beloningsmacht door de rijksoverheid (de bijdrage aan de kosten van de tweede Waalbrug) was bepalend voor de steun van de gemeente aan het dijkterugleggingsplan. Het gebruik van macht door de overheden en de lokale groepen geeft inzicht in zowel de gebruikte interactiestrategieën als de interactie uitkomsten. Het gebruik van indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht verhinderde de ontwikkeling van de interactieuitkomsten in de richting van onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking. De overheden gaven de voorkeur aan forceren boven onderhandeling. De analyse laat zien dat noch een machtsframe, noch een identiteitsframe bevordelijk is voor dialoog en samenwerking. De laatste vereist een goede verstandhouding en een atmosfeer van tolerantie waarin vertrouwen kan groeien. Dit zal niet gebeuren zolang partijen ervan overtuigd zijn dat hun eigen belangen de belangrijkste zijn.

De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid gekenschetst kan worden als sterk terwijl het actiepotentieel van de gemeente en de lokale groepen als respectievelijk gemiddeld en zwak getypeerd kunnen worden. Terwijl het actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid als machtig kan worden beschouwd en het actiepotentieel van de lokale groepen als minder invloedrijk, hadden beide actoren daarvan een ander beeld tijdens het planningsproces. De rijksoverheid leek minder machtig mede door het onvermogen om een conflicthanteringsframe te gebruiken als gevolg van het overmatig profileren van het overheidsplan op een zo positief mogelijke manier, het ondervinden van moeilijkheden bij het omgaan met andere meningen en het gebrek aan transparantie in haar handelen. De lokale groepen hadden daarentegen meer invloed dan op grond van hun actiepotentieel verwacht kon worden waardoor hun gebrek aan experts die hen pro-deo advies konden geven gedurende het hele planningsproces, een breed netwerk van actieve leden, een gemeenschappelijke profilering, een doordachte strategie voor de overheden en hun onvermogen om een conflicthanteringsframe te gebruiken als gevolg van hun fixatie op het eigen belang minder negatief leek uit te pakken. Het 'zwakke' actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid en het 'sterke' actiepotentieel van de lokale groepen in de beeldvorming van beide partijen had vooral te maken met de inzet van verschillende machtstypen door de lokale groepen, met name kennismacht en mediamacht. Dit betekent dat het actiepotentieel van de actoren eerder hun positie tijdens het planningsproces verklaart dan dat het iets zegt over het proces. Daarvoor moeten de opbouw van macht door beide actoren en hun interactiestrategieën in de analyse worden betrokken. Van belang is dat de uitkomsten van de analyse vervolgens worden voorgelegd aan de actoren om een oordeel te kunnen geven over de invloed van het gebruik van macht en interactiestrategieën op de interactie tussen overheden en burgers. Zoals deze case study laat zien, kunnen actoren een andere interpretatie van de uitkomsten hebben dan mijn analyse.

Met betrekking tot de organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groepen en de invloed hiervan op hun acties, had de organisatiecultuur van de rijksoverheid en de gemeente respectievelijk een sterke en gemiddelde invloed op hun handelen en had de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep een zwakke invloed op zijn handelen. De organisatiecultuur van Rijkswaterstaat was voornamelijk gebaseerd op een autoritaire bestuursstijl. Dit vertaalde zich in een technische aanpak in waterbeheer en de tendens om van bovenaf maatregelen door te voeren. Het programma Ruimte voor de Rivier resulteerde weliswaar in nieuwe vormen van governance, waaronder samenwerking met lagere overheden, maar niet in een andere bestuursstijl. Het karakter van het programma was zodanig van opzet dat een 'command and control' stijl altijd op de achtergrond aanwezig was. Voorbeelden hiervan waren het presenteren van nationale projecten, zoals de dijkteruglegging in Lent, de nadruk op procedures en de gerichtheid op het vergroten van de waterveiligheid waardoor andere rivierwaarden en -functies, zoals landschap en biodiversiteit, minder prioriteit hadden. De gemeente Nijmegen voer een eigen koers voornamelijk gericht op de realisatie van de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong, los van het algemene belang en het belang van de burgers van Lent. De gemeenschap in Lent was in het verleden niet in staat om de overheid op andere gedachten te brengen toen deze plannen had voor de aanleg van infrastructurele werken in haar dorp. Dat is tot op de dag van vandaag niet veranderd.

Noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder

In de case study Noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder waren de belangrijkste actoren de rijksoverheid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als uitvoeringsorganisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de provincie (Gelderland), de gemeente (Ubbergen) en de lokale groep. Het plan voor noodoverloopgebieden had tot doel om het restrisico op overstromingen te verminderen. Het was als een noodmaatregel aangekondigd aanvullend op de PKB Ruimte voor de Rivier in het geval maatregelen die in dit kader worden genomen niet afdoende zouden blijken om een waterhoeveelheid van 18,000 m³/s van de Rijn het hoofd te bieden. Nadat de Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden een rapport publiceerde waarin drie locaties voor gecontroleerd overstroomd waren opgenomen, waaronder de Ooijpolder, protesteerden de bewoners in de Ooijpolder tegen de aanwijzing van hun polder als calamiteitenpolder. Het plan voor noodoverloopgebieden zou in eerste instantie als een nationale veiligheidskwestie worden behandeld. Dit betekent dat alleen het verantwoordelijke ministerie en betrokken ambtenaren hier weet van hebben. In plaats daarvan werd besloten het overheidsplan te presenteren als de ultieme oplossing voor 's land's waterproblemen.

De uitkomsten van de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep kunnen aangeduid worden als debat en conflict, en samenwerking als het ging om de interactie tussen de lagere overheden en de lokale groep. De interactie tussen de overheden had uiteenlopende uitkomsten. Terwijl de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie resulteerde in debat, onderhandeling en dialoog, de interactie tussen de rijksover-

heid en de gemeente uitmondde in debat, leidde de interactie tussen de provincie en de gemeente tot dialoog en samenwerking.

Met betrekking tot interactiestrategieën gebruikte de rijksoverheid twee frames in de interactie met de lokale groep en de lagere overheden: een machtsframe en een identiteitsframe. Het eerste frame werd vooral ingezet door de verschillende staatssecretarissen, terwijl het tweede frame werd gebruikt door rijksambtenaren. Het gebruik van een machtsframe door de staatssecretarissen liet de ambtenaren weinig ruimte om van frame te wisselen, bijvoorbeeld van een identiteitsframe naar een conflicthanteringsframe. Het gebruik van een identiteitsframe door rijksambtenaren was begrijpelijk omdat zij met zowel de lagere en provinciale overheden als bewoners te maken hadden. Als gevolg van het gebruik van een conflicthanteringsframe en overbruggingsstrategieën door de provincie veranderde de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie van debat naar onderhandeling en dialoog. De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de gemeente bleef steken in debat als gevolg van het gebruik van een machtsframe door de rijksoverheid en een identiteitsframe door de gemeente. In de interactie met de rijksoverheid veranderde de gemeente niet van frame, het bleef een identiteitsframe hanteren. Dit had een negatieve invloed op de interactie uitkomst die eindigde in debat. In de interactie met de lagere overheden gebruikte de lokale groep een samenwerkingsframe.

Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht maakte de rijksoverheid in de interactie met de lokale groep gebruik van vijf machtstypen: indirecte dwang, legitimiteitsmacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. De lokale groep daarentegen gebruikte drie machtstypen: hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht waarbij de laatste twee zeer vaak werden ingezet. De lagere overheden gebruikten twee machtstypen in hun interactie met de lokale groep. De provincie zette kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht' in, de gemeente gebruikte legitimatiemacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. De lokale groep gebruikte één machtstype in de interactie met de lagere overheden: 'een sociaal gezicht'. In de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lagere overheden gebruikte de rijksoverheid drie machtstypen: indirecte dwang, legitimatiemacht en kennismacht. Zowel de provincie als de gemeente zetten vier machtstypen in: legitimatiemacht, kennismacht, mediamacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. De opbouw van macht in de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep had een aanzienlijk effect op de interactieuitkomsten: debat en conflict. Het gebruik van indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht door de rijksoverheid en de inzet van kennismacht en mediamacht door de lokale groep bleek invloedrijk. Het gebruik van kennismacht, mediamacht en 'een sociaal gezicht' door de provincie in de interactie met de rijksoverheid beïnvloedde de interactieuitkomsten zodanig dat deze uitmondde in debat, onderhandeling en dialoog. De interactiestrategieën die de provincie gebruikte droegen ook bij aan deze interactieuitkomsten. De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de gemeente eindigde nooit in een oplossing maar bleven steken in debat. Dit kan niet verklaard worden door het gebruik van macht door beide actoren. De interactiestrategieën van beide actoren moeten hierbij betrokken worden (zie boven).

De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep gekenschetst kan worden als respectievelijk zwak en gemiddeld als het om de rijksoverheid en de provincie ging en sterk als het de lokale groep betrof. De rijksoverheid schoot tekort op het gebied van coördinerende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen van een verhaallijn), en de motivatie van zowel de organisatie als de ambtenaren. De provincie dankte haar gemiddelde actiepotentieel vooral aan het vermogen om gebruik te maken van coördinerende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen van een verhaallijn dat een waterafvoer van 18,000 m³/s van de Rijn in Nederland niet realistisch is, die later in het proces gedeeltelijk werd overgenomen door de rijksoverheid) en de motivatie van de bestuurder, de organisatie en de ambtenaren. Het zwakke actiepotentieel van de gemeente was voornamelijk het gevolg van een zwak mandaat op het gebied van waterbeheer en middelen, en de afwezigheid van een ambtelijke ambitie op dit gebied. Het sterke actiepotentieel van de lokale groep was gebaseerd op een sterke capaciteit en motivatie voor het ondernemen van actie.

De organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep en de invloed hiervan op hun handelen was sterk, gemiddeld en zwak als het ging om de organisatiecultuur van respectievelijk de rijksoverheid, de provincie en de gemeente en sterk als het de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep betrof. De ingenieurscultuur van Rijkswaterstaat beïnvloedt in hoge mate de dagelijkse praktijk van het tegenwoordige waterbeheer. Rijkswaterstaat heeft een mandaat voor waterveiligheid, hetgeen de organisatie vertaalt in zijn missie: het streven naar 'droge voeten' en het land behoeden voor overstromingen, maar dat kan niet gegarandeerd worden. In de optiek van Rijkswaterstaat is waterveiligheid een overheidstaak. Het betrekken van burgers bij dit vraagstuk wordt niet gezien als vanzelfsprekend. De invloed van de organisatiecultuur van de provincie op haar handelen was gemiddeld. Was Gelderland vroeger gewend haar invloed te laten gelden, tegenwoordig probeert de provincie Rijkswaterstaat te overtuigen van haar ideeën op het gebied van waterbeheer. De invloed van de organisatiecultuur van de gemeente op haar handelen was zwak. Als gevolg van haar plaats in de overheidshiërarchie is zij vooral volgend. In de discussie over noodoverloopgebieden kwam de gemeente Ubbergen op voor de belangen van haar bewoners maar zorgde zij er tevens voor dat zij on speaking terms bleef met de rijksoverheid. De bewoners in de Ooijpolder zijn door de eeuwen heen regelmatig in opstand gekomen tegen overheden. Of het nu ging om waterbeheer of andere zaken, zij waren niet bang op te komen voor hun eigen belang. In de 20e eeuw voerden zij verschillende keren met succes oppositie tegen overheidsplannen. Ook toen de Ooijpolder in 2000 zoekgebied voor noodoverloop werd slaagden de bewoners erin het overheidsplan tegen te houden. Hun culturele achtergrond had daarom een sterke invloed op hun handelen.

Terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder

In de case study Terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder waren de belangrijkste actoren de rijksoverheid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als uit-

voeringsorganisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de provincie (Noord-Brabant) en de lokale groep. Het Terpenplan is een bewoners' initiatief om de polder geschikt te maken voor piekafvoeren in de Bergsche Maas. Het Terpenplan was onderdeel van de PKB Ruimte voor de Rivier. Het Terpenplan was het eerste rivierproject dat de rijksoverheid delegerde naar een lagere overheid waardoor de taakverdeling gedurende het planningsproces duidelijk zou worden. Vanwege zijn geschikte lokatie langs de Maas, zijn vroegere functie als retentiegebied en het kleine aantal bewoners werd de Overdiepse polder eind jaren '90 zoekgebied voor waterberging. Enkele bewoners van de Overdiepse polder initieerde een terpenplan waarbij hun polder een keer in de 25 jaar volstroomt, ook wel stromende berging genoemd. Het doel dat hen voor ogen stond was om het algemeen belang van een verlaagde waterstand in de Bergsche Maas bij hoogwater te combineren met een duurzaam economisch bedrijfs perspectief voor hun boerenbedrijven.

De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep mondde uit in debat en conflict. Vaak werden conflicten opgelost met behulp van de provincie. De interactie tussen de provincie en de lokale groep resulteerde in debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking. Als onenigheden voorkwamen werden deze altijd opgelost. Vaak werden deze voorkomen omdat zowel de provincie als de lokale groep voortdurend in de 'dialoog-modus' stonden. De interactie tussen de overheden leidde tot debat en conflict als gevolg van onenigheden over competenties. Dankzij overbruggingsstrategieën van de provincie eindigden conflicten altijd in een voor beide acceptabele oplossing. Dit betekende dat onderhandeling ook deel uitmaakte van de interactie uitkomsten.

Met betrekking tot interactiestrategieën zette de rijksoverheid in de interactie met de lokale groep doorgaans een identiteitsframe in en af en toe een machtsframe, terwijl de lokale groep gebruik maakte van een identiteitsframe en conflicthanteringsframe. Beide actoren gebruikten vaak beschermende strategieën en soms overbruggingsstrategieën. De inzet van beschermende en overbruggingsstrategieën kan gezien worden als een bewuste strategie. In de interactie tussen de provincie en de lokale groep combineerde de lokale groep een conflicthanteringsframe en een identiteitsframe, terwijl de provincie hoofdzakelijk een conflicthanteringsframe en een samenwerkingsframe gebruikte. De lokale groep gebruikte een identiteitsframe incidenteel. Dankzij de overbruggingsstrategieën van de provincie en de open houding van de lokale groep en het openstaan voor signalen van anderen, veranderde de lokale groep van frame en verving het identiteitsframe voor een conflicthanteringsframe. Na het aantreden van een andere projectleider gebruikte de lokale groep hoofdzakelijk een samenwerkingsframe. Dit betekende niet dat er geen onenigheden waren. Onderwerpen of situaties die hiervoor aanleiding gaven werden besproken waardoor meningsverschillen werden opgelost of zelfs voorkomen, vooral door pogingen van de provincie om de verschillen met de lokale groep te overbruggen. De provincie en de lokale groep gebruikten veel overbruggingsstrategieën en af en toe beschermende strategieën. De provincie zette beschermende strategieën alleen in bij onderhandelingen met bewoners over de aankoop van hun land en

onroerend goed. Hetzelfde deden de bewoners. In de interactie met de provincie maakte de rijksoverheid gebruik van een machtsframe, een conflicthanteringsframe en een identiteitsframe. Terwijl op management niveau af en toe gebruik werd gemaakt van een conflicthanteringsframe, werd op ambtelijk niveau gewoonlijk een identiteitsframe en soms een machtsframe ingezet. Het machtsframe bleek een belangrijke voedingsbodem te zijn voor onenigheden tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie waarbij het vaak ging om een competentiestrijd. De provincie zette meestal een conflicthanteringsframe in. Incidenteel gebruikte de provincie een identiteitsframe, maar dit kwam alleen voor op ambtelijk niveau. In de interactie met de provincie werd op ambtelijk niveau vaak gebruik gemaakt van beschermende strategieën terwijl op management niveau af en toe overbruggingsstrategieën werden gebruikt. Dit hield in dat de rijksoverheid op managementniveau in was voor onderhandeling. Onderhandeling startte echter alleen door toedoen van de provincie die daarvoor altijd de eerste stap zette. Dit was ook het geval wanneer sprake was van onenigheden in de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep.

Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht maakte de rijksoverheid in de interactie met de lokale groep gebruik van drie machtsstypen (indirecte dwang, legitiemacht en hindermacht), terwijl de lokale groep vijf machtsstypen hanteerde (legitiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht, mediamacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'). De lokale groep gebruikte dezelfde machtsstypen in de interactie met de provincie. De provincie zette drie machtsstypen in: indirecte dwang, kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'. Het gebruik van vijf machtsstypen door de lokale groep in de interactie met de provincie had geen repercussies voor de interactieuitkomsten die varieerden van debat, onderhandeling, dialoog tot samenwerking dankzij het conflicthanteringsframe dat de provincie gebruikte in combinatie met overbruggingsstrategieën. In de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie gebruikte de rijksoverheid vier machtsstypen (indirecte dwang, legitiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht) en de provincie gebruikte drie machtsstypen (indirecte dwang, kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht'). Omdat de machtsbalans tussen beide overheden enigszins in evenwicht was, en dankzij het door de provincie gebruikte conflicthanteringsframe in combinatie met overbruggingsstrategieën veranderden de interactieuitkomsten van debat en conflict naar onderhandeling. Wanneer een overheidsorganisatie gebruik maakt van indirecte dwang zal een andere partij, of dit nu een andere overheidsorganisatie is of een lokale groep, minder geneigd zijn om een conflicthanteringsframe en overbruggingsstrategieën te gebruiken. Het gebruik van specifieke machtsstypen door de provincie, vooral kennismacht en 'een sociaal gezicht', is begrijpelijk omdat de provincie zijn eerste rivierproject wilde realiseren en dit vraagt terughoudendheid in het gebruik van indirecte dwang als machtsstypen. Ondanks het feit dat de machtsbalans tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie enigszins in balans was bleek dat samenwerking moeilijk bereikbaar was (zie onder).

De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid en de provincie gekenmerkt kan worden als res-

pectievelijk zwak en gemiddeld, terwijl het actiepotentieel van de lokale groep kan worden getypeerd als sterk. De rijksoverheid schoot tekort op het gebied van coördinerende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen of overnemen van een verhaallijn) hetgeen resulteerde in een zwakke capaciteit. Daarbij had de rijksoverheid een middelmatige motivatie. Ondanks haar zwakke actiepotentieel had de rijksoverheid aanzienlijke invloed op het planningsproces dankzij het gebruik van sociale macht en de inzet van interactiestrategieën. Het gemiddelde actiepotentieel van de provincie was een gevolg van een gemiddelde capaciteit en een sterke motivatie om te handelen, dat een goede basis bleek voor de interactie met de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep. Het sterke actiepotentieel van de lokale groep, dat gebaseerd was op een sterke capaciteit en motivatie voor het ondernemen van actie, zorgde ervoor dat de lokale groep een sterke partij was zowel in de interactie met de rijksoverheid als de provincie.

De organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep en de invloed op hun handelen was sterk als het ging om de organisatiecultuur van de rijksoverheid en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep en gemiddeld als het de organisatiecultuur van de provincie betrof. De ingenieurscultuur die Rijkswaterstaat kenmerkt sinds zijn oprichting in 1798 heeft een sterke invloed op zijn werkwijze. De organisatie staat voor krachtadig overheidsoptreden. In de praktijk van het waterbeheer heeft Rijkswaterstaat dit laten zien door de aanleg van infrastructuur en het beheer ervan. Om tegemoet te komen aan maatschappelijke kritiek dat de organisatie geen rekening hield met natuur- en landschapswaarden, heeft het natuur geïncorporeerd in haar beleid. Rijkswaterstaat heeft echter moeite met het betrekken van burgers bij planningsprocessen en met het omgaan met burgers die een eigen plan hebben ontwikkeld, zoals in de Overdiepse polder, dat zowel het algemeen belang dient, het verlagen van het overstromingsrisico bij hoogwater, als het belang van de burgers, een duurzaam economisch perspectief voor hun boerenbedrijven. De organisatiecultuur van de provincie die gekarakteriseerd kan worden als een middenweg volgend, bleek effectief in de interactie met de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep. Hoewel de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep de machtsopbouw, de interactiestrategieën en de interactieuitkomsten sterk beïnvloedde was de lokale groep erg afhankelijk van de provincie om zijn doel te bereiken. De organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep geeft inzicht in hun positie tijdens het planningsproces maar kan niet het proces verklaren.

Een algemene conclusie uit deze case is dat samenwerking tussen overheden alleen kan voorkomen in het geval beide overheden terughoudend zijn of afzien van indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht. Hoewel legitimatiemacht een minder dominant machts-type is dan indirecte dwang bleek het nadelig voor een goede verstandhouding en het creëren van een atmosfeer van tolerantie waarin vertrouwen de kans krijgt te groeien. Een goede verstandhouding kan als voorwaarde worden beschouwd voor samenwerking zoals het gebruik van macht door de provincie en de lokale groep laat zien.

Discussie

Tijdens het analyseren van de case studies bleek het Cross Scale Interaction (CSI) kader bruikbaar voor het verkrijgen van inzicht in de sociale interactie tussen overheid en burgers. Het gaf in het bijzonder inzicht in de relatie tussen de actoren, tussen de overheden en de burgers en tussen de verschillende overheden, en de macht- en interactiestrategieën die zij gebruikten vanaf het begin van hun interactie tot de uiteindelijke uitkomst van hun interactie. Het voldeed dus precies aan de doelstelling. Het CSI kader ontrafelde de vele lagen van de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, vooral als het ging om de cultuur en tradities van de actoren, hun actiepotentieel, het opbouwen van macht, de interactiestrategieën die actoren gebruiken en de interactieuitkomsten. Het analytisch kader gaf ook inzicht in hoe overheden optreden in governance processen and hoe deze processen vorm krijgen in de praktijk.

Tijdens de analyse van de case studies kwamen verschillende methodologische problemen naar voren. Deze varieerden van eenvoudige kwesties, zoals het invoegen van cultuur en tradities in het CSI kader tot meer complexe vraagstukken, waaronder de vervanging van credibility (geloofwaardigheid) door sociability (het laten zien van 'een sociaal gezicht') hetgeen bijvoorbeeld een literatuurstudie vereiste en de afweging gemaakt moest worden of vervanging zinvol was.

Conclusie

De onderzoeksvraag was: Welke factoren en mechanismen beïnvloeden de interactie tussen overheid en burgers in planningsprocessen in het Nederlandse rivierengebied? Bij de beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvraag wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen factoren die in het oog springen en onderliggende factoren, en mechanismen die de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden.

Deze studie laat zien dat er zeven factoren zijn die direct invloed hebben op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers. De eerste factor is vertrouwen. Het opbouwen van vertrouwen is moeilijk in interacties tussen overheid en burgers omdat beide partijen elkaar doorgaans wantrouwen. Zonder vertrouwen zal de relatie tussen overheid en burgers zich niet ontwikkelen en in een 'conflict' modus belanden (zie onder) die interactieuitkomsten tot gevolg heeft, waaronder conflict en debat, op een schaal waarbij dialoog en samenwerking beschouwd worden als 'samenwerkings' interactieuitkomsten. Vertrouwen krijgen in elkaar blijkt moeilijk voor zowel overheden als burgers omdat beide partijen elkaar neigen te wantrouwen. Dit gebeurt in het geval overheden de leiding hebben in een planningsproces en wanneer zij dat niet hebben, in het geval burgers de negatieve gevolgen van een overheidsplan ondervinden en wanneer zij hun eigen plan initiëren. Vertrouwen krijgen in elkaar vraagt van beide partijen een continue inspanning. Overheden en burgers moeten elkaar eerst leren kennen om de vraag te kunnen beantwoorden of de andere partij betrouwbaar is en daarom vergt het tijd voordat partijen elkaar vertrouwen.

Een moeilijkheid hierbij is dat de overheid vooral werkt in een formele setting terwijl vertrouwen het beste gedijt in een informele omgeving. Een belangrijk obstakel bij het opbouwen van vertrouwen is dat in een formele setting de contacten tussen mensen hoofdzakelijk gebaseerd zijn op contracten, overeenkomsten, wetten, procedures en regels. Dit wordt vaak 'geformaliseerd wantrouwen' genoemd, een kenmerk van overheden in moderne samenlevingen. Wat nodig is bij het opbouwen van vertrouwen is uitwisseling van informatie op basis van reciprociteit, zoals mechanismen voor geven en nemen ('Als ik dit voor jou doe, dan doe jij dit voor mij') en ongeschreven regels. Het opbouwen van vertrouwen betekent dus dat de overheid en burgers op een informele manier moeten investeren in elkaar. Dit vereist open communicatie over de wensen van beide partijen, hun doelen en opinies en gezichtspunten op welke manier zij hun doel willen bereiken, en het kunnen reflecteren op elkaar zodat beider gedrag onderwerp van discussie kan worden.

De tweede factor zijn onzekerheden. Governance processen hebben in essentie tot doel met onzekerheden om te gaan, bijvoorbeeld als het gaat om de uitkomsten van het planningsproces of de actoren die betrokken moeten worden. Governance processen leveren echter ook onzekerheden op, zoals de besluitvorming (in hoeverre hebben betrokken burgers invloed?) en het creëren van precedënten. Over het algemeen zijn traditionele processen redelijk vastomlijnd en gericht op het zoveel mogelijk uitsluiten van risico's terwijl bij een meer interactieve aanpak het proces open is hetgeen leidt tot meer onzekerheden. Onzekerheden blijken vooral een issue voor bestuurders. Bestuurders kunnen een interactief proces zien als een bedreiging van hun legitimiteit en hun traditionele rol als bestuurder. Zij willen dan zo min mogelijk risico lopen om in politiek opzicht te kunnen overleven. Het gevolg is dat zij veelal kiezen voor een traditionele benadering waarin weinig ruimte is voor publieke participatie omdat die de uitkomst onzeker maakt en/of het proces vertraagt. Een traditionele aanpak van planningsprocessen betekent in de regel een gesloten proces waarbij traditionele participatie-instrumenten worden gebruikt, zoals consultatie en informatiebijeenkomsten in plaats van instrumenten waarvoor een actieve inbreng van burgers nodig is, zoals werkateliers en rondetafelbijeenkomsten. De traditionele aanpak van participatieprocessen laat ambtenaren in veel gevallen weinig ruimte om deze te veranderen in een open planningsproces aangezien zij gebonden zijn aan regels en procedures en gehouden zijn aan het bewandelen van de gebaande paden. Burgers worden geconfronteerd met onzekerheden in planningsprocessen, of zij nu tegen een overheidsplan zijn of betrokken zijn bij een gezamenlijk initiatief. Wat betreft het eerste, onzekerheden met betrekking tot het proces zijn: Wordt hun stem gehoord; worden zij betrokken in het planningsproces? En inzake de uitkomst: Zullen ze winnen of verliezen? Wat betreft het tweede, onzekerheden aangaande het proces zijn: Hoe bewerkstelligen burgers dat zij deel uitmaken van het besluitvormingsproces; hoe krijgen ze het voor elkaar dat het gezamenlijke initiatief centraal blijft staan gedurende het planningsproces ondanks de voortdurende wisselingen van bestuurders en ambtenaren? Als het gaat om de uitkomst: Zal het gezamenlijk doel behaald worden? Dit betekent dat onzekerheden een belang-

rijke factor zijn in de interactie tussen overheid en burgers aangezien het risico altijd aanwezig is dat het vertrouwen van de betrokken partijen geschaad wordt.

De derde factor is uitsluiting van burgers. Het uitsluiten van burgers in planningsprocessen is een bron van conflict in de interactie tussen overheid en burgers. Als burgers niet worden betrokken in de ontwerpfase of in een vervolg van een planningsproces wordt het wantrouwen van burgers jegens de overheid versterkt. Het gevolg is dat het moeilijk is om de relatie tussen overheid en burgers te normaliseren omdat een uitweg vinden uit een 'conflict' modus waarin de interactie plaatsvindt (zie onder), bijvoorbeeld een conflictueuze relatie, niet eenvoudig is. Partners die in een conflictueuze relatie verwickeld zijn zullen eerder de verschillen tussen hen benadrukken dan dat zij het accent leggen op overeenkomsten of gezamenlijke doelen.

De vierde factor betreffen instituties die vooral gericht zijn op formele rollen waardoor zij niet in staat zijn om governance processen adequaat te ondersteunen. Sociale interacties zijn hoofdzakelijk informeel terwijl veel overheidsorganisaties ingebed zijn in de formele wereld waar de basis van handelen voortkomt uit geformaliseerd wantrouwen. Overheidsorganisaties waarin een of meerdere individuen het verschil weten te maken door te switchen van de formele naar de informele wereld bleken een positieve invloed te hebben op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, dat wil zeggen dat deze dialoog en samenwerking stimuleerden.

De vijfde factor is de wil van de overheid om zich te engageren hetgeen een voorwaarde is voor hun responsiviteit in governance processen. Contracten en het maken van wettelijke voorbehouden worden beschouwd als het beperken van de responsiviteit van overheden. Individen binnen de overheid die in staat zijn om te gaan met de complexiteit en onzekerheden die gepaard gaan met governance processen kunnen volgens Rodrik & Zeckhauser (1988) beschouwd worden als 'palliatieve maatregelen'. Hoewel deze individuen moedig zijn omdat zij hun nek uitsteken, is hun handelen in feite geen oplossing voor het probleem van de responsiviteit van overheden, tenzij alle ambtenaren de strategieën om om te gaan met complexiteit en onzekerheden in governance processen hebben geïnternaliseerd. Deze studie laat zien dat wanneer het handelen van de overheid voortkomt uit acties van individuen omdat zij zich engageren dit de responsiviteit van de betrokken overheid verhoogde. De betrokken overheid bleek bijvoorbeeld meer genegen tegemoet te komen aan behoeften van burgers om een rol te spelen in het planningsproces. De belangrijkste factor is echter een verandering van organisatiecultuur van de overheden. Dit geeft ambtenaren de gelegenheid om verschillende culturele overtuigingen te internaliseren waardoor beleidsovereenkomsten in praktijk kunnen worden gebracht door alle betrokkenen in plaats van een paar geëngageerde individuen. De conclusie die hieruit kan worden getrokken is dat overheden die zich engageerden een positief effect hadden op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers; met andere woorden: het resulteerde vaak in dialoog en samenwerking. Overheden die zich niet engageerden hadden een negatief effect op de interactie tussen

overheid en burgers, met als gevolg dat het uitmondde in debat en conflict. De wil van overheden om zich te engageren is dus een belangrijke factor in de relatie tussen overheid en burger.

De zesde factor is de wil van burgers om zich te engageren die door de overheid serieus genomen dient te worden. Als de overheid burgers die zich willen engageren uitsluit zal dat ertoe leiden dat de relatie tussen overheid en burgers in een conflict modus raakt (zie onder), bijvoorbeeld een conflictueuze relatie (zie ook de derde factor die uitsluiting van burgers betreft). Wanneer het algemeen belang en het burgerbelang kan worden meegenomen, hetgeen betekent dat burgers betrokken worden, dan kan de relatie tussen overheid en burgers in een positieve modus komen, bijvoorbeeld een alliantie of coalitie. Terwijl de eerstgenoemde de interactie tussen overheid en burgers altijd negatief zal beïnvloeden, omdat het zal eindigen in debat en conflict, heeft de laatstgenoemde een positief effect op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers aangezien het zal leiden tot een mix van dialoog, onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking, of een mix van dialoog en samenwerking.

Tenslotte beïnvloeden situationele factoren de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, zoals de gelegenheid die zich voordoet dat bewoners ondersteuning krijgen van een water-expert of dat er een beleidswijziging in het waterbeheer plaatsvindt waardoor de rijksoverheid haar werkterrein voor het nemen van maatregelen verbreedt en niet alleen kijkt naar opties tussen de dijken, zoals kribverlaging, maar ook achter de dijken, waaronder dijkterugleggingen, bypasses en nevengeulen. Hoewel situationele factoren cruciaal zijn in governance processen is het afhankelijk van de context of deze een positieve of negatieve invloed hebben op de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Bij de eerstgenoemde zal de interactie uitmonden in debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en/of samenwerking, bij de laatstgenoemde zal de interactie eindigen in debat en conflict.

De onderliggende factoren die de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden zijn respectievelijk de verschillende modi en dynamieken die deel uitmaken van de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, en twee andere factoren die te maken hebben met de snel veranderende maatschappelijke configuraties van staat, civil society en markt.

De eerste onderliggende factor is dat de relatie tussen overheid en burgers in planingsprocessen in het Nederlandse rivierlandschap gebaseerd is op een stabiel patroon. Hierbij kan een onderscheid gemaakt worden in een conflict- en samenwerkingsmodus. Terwijl de conflictmodus van de relatie tussen overheid en burgers zich ontwikkelt in een conflictueuze situatie, is een samenwerkingsmodus terug te voeren tot een situatie waarin partners een positieve houding hebben tot elkaar, hetgeen gerelateerd is aan de vorm van hun relatie: een alliantie of coalitie. Het bewegen van de ene modus naar de andere is moeilijk maar binnen de modi kunnen veranderingen in rap tempo optreden. Deze veranderingen kunnen gezien worden als korte termijn dynamieken van de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Dit betekent dat als actoren eenmaal in een conflict-

modus belanden het heel moeilijk is om er uit te komen, en eenmaal in een samenwerkingsmodus is dat voor de lange duur, maar dat wil geenszins zeggen dat er geen sprake is van onenigheden. De analyse van de case studies laat zien dat partners in een samenwerkingsmodus bereid waren om onenigheden op te lossen terwijl dit niet gold voor partners die in een conflictmodus zitten. Partners in een conflictmodus van de relatie tussen overheid en burgers kunnen hun interactie van het ene op het andere moment veranderen van debat naar conflict. Partners in een samenwerkingsmodus van de relatie tussen overheid en burgers kunnen hun interactie veranderen van debat naar onderhandeling en vervolgens naar dialoog en samenwerking. De interactie kan zich verder ontwikkelen van samenwerking terug naar dialoog en debat. Het kan ook starten bij een andere interactieuitkomst, en zich ontwikkelen van dialoog naar debat, via onderhandeling naar dialoog en samenwerking.

De tweede onderliggende factor is institutionele verandering die een effect heeft op de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Deze studie laat zien dat het moeilijk is om een top-down benadering te veranderen in een richting waarbij de koers gezamenlijk wordt bepaald ondanks het feit dat burgers aangaven dat zij betrokken wilden zijn. Dit betekent dat een institutionele verandering van een overheid die alle touwtjes in handen heeft (government) naar een die meer in een netwerk van actoren opereert (governance) plaats moet vinden vanaf het begin van een planningsproces ter voorkoming van gezichtsverlies voor de overheid (in casu: de betrokken minister of staatssecretaris). Dit betekent echter niet dat een gezamenlijke benadering altijd zal voortduren omdat deze op elk moment vervangen kan worden door een top-down aanpak. De kans dat dit zal gebeuren vermindert als een lagere overheid betrokken is en verantwoordelijk is voor het project management.

De derde onderliggende factor is de vraag van burgers om betrokken te worden in toenemende mate druk uitoefent op de overheid om zich op te stellen als governance actor en niet als government actor. De wens van burgers om een stem te krijgen bij veranderingen in hun leefomgeving kunnen niet door de overheid genegeerd worden. Zij moet burgers op de een of andere wijze betrekken in het planningsproces. Deze ontwikkeling kan gezien worden als een onderliggende factor in de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Het beïnvloedt de interactie tussen overheid en burgers zodanig dat het de druk op de overheid vergroot om rekening te houden met de wensen van de burgers en hen te betrekken bij het planningsproces. Dit vereist een verandering van de rol van de overheid: van government actor naar governance actor.

Twee mechanismen die de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden zijn macht en cultuur.

Deze studie laat zien dat macht het zwaarst telt in governance processen. Planningsprocessen kunnen worden beschouwd als een arena waarin macht het verschil maakt. Macht kan worden gezien als een mechanisme dat de interactie tussen overheid en bur-

gers beïnvloedt. De analyse van de case studies laat zien dat niet alleen overheden maar ook burgers macht opbouwen. In conflictsituaties proberen overheden en burgers zoveel mogelijk macht op te bouwen, maar wanneer zij partner zijn in een alliantie of coalitie lijkt macht geen issue. De overheden gebruiken vooral indirecte dwang, legitimatiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht, terwijl burgers gebruik maken van legitimatiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht. Zowel de overheid als de burgers beïnvloeden hun interactie door het gebruik van macht. De overheid maakt het verschil met indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht, burgers doen dit door de inzet van kennismacht en mediamacht. Beide partijen gebruiken hindermacht. De overheid doet dit in het verborgene, de burgers in alle openheid. Uit de case studies blijkt dat het voor burgers moeilijk is om een vinger te leggen op de hindermacht van de overheid, bijvoorbeeld door gebruik te maken van de Wet openbaar bestuur. Overheden gebruiken hindermacht ook in hun relatie met andere overheden. Hindermacht wordt vaak ingezet als er sprake is van een competentiestrijd tussen de overheden.

De conclusie kan worden getrokken dat macht prevaleert in planningsprocessen in het Nederlandse rivierengebied. Dit houdt in dat Rijkswaterstaat meestal bepaalt. Betekent dit dat een gezamenlijke aanpak in het Nederlandse rivierenlandschap een ideaal is dat moeilijk te verwezenlijken is? Deze studie laat zien dat als de configuratie van actoren zodanig is dat de actoren betrokken zijn op basis van respect en gelijkwaardigheid, een gezamenlijke aanpak ertoe kan leiden dat Rijkswaterstaat de gezamenlijke uitkomst goedkeurt.

Deze studie laat zien dat cultuur waarneembaar is gedurende het hele planningsproces. Het kan worden beschouwd als een mechanisme dat de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloedt. Een overheid met een sterke organisatiecultuur, zoals Rijkswaterstaat, probeerde altijd het planningsproces in haar richting te bewegen terwijl een overheid met een minder uitgesproken organisatiecultuur, zoals provincie Noord-Brabant, flexibel was in de interactie met andere overheden en burgers. Burgers met een sterke culturele achtergrond bleken in staat om tegenslagen tijdens het planningsproces te overwinnen terwijl burgers met een zwakke culturele achtergrond minder capabel waren om met obstakels in het planningsproces om te gaan. In de interactie tussen overheid en burgers is cultuur geen issue; dan wordt alleen de economische kaart gespeeld. Cultuur speelt echter een belangrijke rol in de lokale groepen hetgeen zowel in de capaciteit als motivatie voor het ondernemen van actie tot uiting komt.

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NOTES

¹ For a definition of governance see Chapter 2.

² With regional authorities is meant the provinces. The terms provincial and regional authorities are used interchangeably.

³ Here governance is taken to be about the state learning to steer society in new ways as well as the development of complex networks and the rise of more bottom-up approaches to decision making (Pierre & Peters, 2000).

⁴ Rijkswaterstaat is the Directorate-General for Water Management in the Netherlands, and as such responsible for the management of the main rivers: the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt.

⁵ Interview with W. Silva, W. ten Brink and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2005.

⁶ www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/over_ons/missiekerntaken, accessed on 23 July 2010.

⁷ Statement by E. van Lith, former Member of Parliament for the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), De Water, October 2006 – italics in the original text.

⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁹ In this study government authorities are viewed as part of a pluralist state structure, a highly fragmented set of organisations that are not monolithic (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1985).

¹⁰ According to Etzioni, 'potential' refers to the latent energy and 'actual' capacity refers to the energising itself (Etzioni, 1968:110-111).

¹¹ Putnam (1995) views social capital as 'features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives'. Rudd (2000:133) views social capital as 'generalised trust', formed largely as a by-product of the activities of individuals interacting with each other within voluntary or informal associations.

¹² The explanation of Luke's power dimensions is based on http://www.scribd.com/full/4850452?access_key=key-izfk9x9kobzyjq7nubs, accessed on 7 February 2010, Gaventa (2006) and Veneklassen and Miller (2007).

¹³ Civil society can be described as interest groups trying to divert public sources to their favoured causes. It serves to balance the power of the state and to protect individuals from the state's power (Fukuyama, 2001). These interest groups are mainly horizontal networks, as opposed to the vertical relationship between local groups and government authorities analysed in this study.

¹⁴ Governance is considered to be dynamic and seeks to understand how actors, public and private, control economic activities and produce desired outcomes, while government is viewed as having a central role in producing economic out-

comes and helping to manage the tensions of modern economies in the global environment (Pierre & Peters, 2000:23).

¹⁵ The difficulty with the term 'potential' [= the possibility for coming into being] is that it means much the same as capacity. In spite of this I use this term until I have found a better one.

¹⁶ Organisational culture can be defined as the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that influences the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organisation (Hill & Jones, 2001).

¹⁷ Pierre and Peters (2000) view governance as emerging through the development of complex networks and the rise of more bottom-up approaches to decision-making. According to Stoker (1998), the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government.

8

¹ Solidarity may be directly related to social identity, but this is not always the case. Whether a strong social identity leads to strong solidarity or weak solidarity depends on the community (see Chapter 5).

¹⁹ Prof. T. Taillieu, Department Labour & Organisation Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, pers. comm., 5 June 2009.

²⁰ Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and as such considered as the national government.

²¹ This study was part of the Boundaries of Space research programme commissioned by the executive board of Wageningen University Research Centre, which ran from 2004 to 2006. It resulted in various publications (Roth & Warner, 2007; Roth et al., 2006a, 2006b; Warner, 2008; Warner et al., 2008) which are used for describing the case.

²² Loevestein castle which is situated on the river Meuse was the place where the state secretary launched her White Paper on Room for the River. This meeting is also referred to as the 'Loevestein meeting'.

²³ Safety along the rivers in the Rhine estuary – the Nederrijn, Lek, Merwede and Waal – and the downstream part of the Meuse has to meet the legally required standard in 2015. For the Rhine this means a design discharge of 16,000 m³/s near Lobith, where the Rhine enters the Netherlands from Germany, and for the Meuse a design discharge of 3,800 m³/s near Borgharen on the Belgian/Dutch border.

²⁴ An executive councillor is a portfolio holder in the municipal executive, a small team headed by the mayor.

²⁵ Rijkswaterstaat is the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management, the executive agency responsible for the management of the Dutch main rivers.

²⁶ This historical part of the case description is based on Jansen (1998), Verhalen van Lent. Een veranderend landschap [*History of Lent. A landscape in change*], Lent: Municipalities of Elst and Nijmegen; Schenkels (1986), Lent lang vervlogen tijden [*Lent in former times*]: www.noviomagus.nl/Lent/001.htm, accessed on 6 February 2009; Mulder, Spaan & de Wolf (2001), In de ban van de Betuwe dijken, deel 2 Oosterhout [*Under the spell of the dikes in the Betuwe, part 2 Oosterhout*], Alterra report 311; Terugblik Tegen de stroom

in', zeven eeuwen waterbeheer in de Betuwe (*Against the current: A retrospective – Seven centuries of water management in the Betuwe*), Jaarboek Stichting Batavorum [2008]; G.P. van de Ven [Ed.], (1995), Niets is bestendig; de geschiedenis van de rivieroverstromingen in Nederland, [Nothing is enduring; the history of river floods in the Netherlands], Utrecht.

²⁷ Derived from 'street interviews' held by the author in March 2005. Of 32 respondents, four backed dike relocation (one lived in Lent, two were new residents of the Waalsprong housing development, and one was a resident of Nijmegen and worked in Lent), four did not have an opinion, and 24 were proponents of the residents' alternative Lentse Warande.

²⁸ Street interview with H. van Vosselen, member of the local voluntary fire brigade, 15 March 2005.

²⁹ Room for the Rhine Branches (*Ruimte voor Rijnakken*) and Integrated Studies of the Downstream Rivers (*Integrale Verkenningen Benedenrivieren*).

³⁰ The Room for the River policy was published in 1996.

³¹ Interview with M.E.F. Leewis, 18 November 2005.

³² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³³ 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' [*Rivierwater fnuikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevarenzone bij hoogwater*], NRC Handelsblad 14 March 2000.

³⁴ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

³⁵ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

³⁶ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁷ Proposal by the municipal executive to approve the voluntary agreements on the dike relocation Veur-Lent (*Voorstel B&W in te stemmen met overeenkomsten over dijkeruglegging Veur-Lent*), 12 June 2003.

³⁸ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁹ The municipality of Nijmegen was an 'article 12 municipality', which means that its finances were controlled by national government; interview H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁰ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005; interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

⁴¹ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴² 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' [*Rivierwater fnuikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevarenzone bij hoogwater*], NRC Handelsblad, 14 March 2000.

⁴³ 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' [*Rivierwater fnuikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevarenzone bij hoogwater*], NRC Handelsblad, 14 March 2000.

⁴⁴ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of

Representatives, 30 January 2001; The Quick Scan included the study of the dike relocation, two by pass alternatives (a green river along north of Lent and a green river in the middle of Lent) and a combination alternative aiming at widening the river channel.

⁴⁵ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.

⁴⁶ <http://nijmegen.sp.nl/opinie/op1/stm> accessed on 7 December 2007.

⁴⁷ 'The Waalsprong Nijmegen will go ahead' [*De Waalsprong Nijmegen gaat door*], press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 20 September 2000.

⁴⁸ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

⁴⁹ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council, no. 2.17050/date meeting City Council 12 June 2003, 9 April 2002.

⁵⁰ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁵¹ 'Conformation of agreement concerning Waalsprong measures' (*Bevestiging afspraken over maatregelen Waalsprong*), press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 13 October 2000.

⁵² Van Ellen side channel was later included in the residents' alternative, Lentse Warande.

⁵³ 'State secretary De Vries answers questions from the municipality of Nijmegen' (*Staatssecretaris De Vries beantwoordt vragen gemeente Nijmegen*), press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 22 December 2000.

⁵⁴ 'Nijmegen trips us up' [*Nijmegen licht ons een pootje*], Gelderlander, 22 December 2000.

⁵⁵ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.

⁵⁶ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council (*Raadsvoorstel Nijmeegse gemeenteraad*), 12 June 2002.

⁵⁷ The Brokx Advisory Commission consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W), the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), Rijkswaterstaat, province of Gelderland, the municipality of Nijmegen, Rivierenland water board, and Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (KAN).

⁵⁸ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.

⁵⁹ 'De Vries acknowledges that the Van Ellen plan for the Waal has some qualities' [*De Vries erkent paar kwaliteiten in plan Van Ellen voor Waal*], Gelderlander, 31 January 2001.

⁶⁰ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council (*Raadsvoorstel Nijmeegse gemeenteraad*), 12 June 2002.

⁶¹ 'Waalsprong Nijmegen will go ahead' (*Waalsprong Nijmegen gaat door*), press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 20 September 2000, www.nieuwsbank.nl, accessed on 12 December 2007.

⁶² Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

⁶³ This report in the form of a Memorandum concerning the bottleneck at Nijmegen, dated 18 January 2001, was presented to the council committee on the Waalsprong by Royal Haskoning, 12 February 2001; a copy of the report had not been published officially. Source: 'Haskoning did not see the good of alternative' (*Haskoning ziet weinig in alternatieven*), Gelderlander, n.d.

⁶⁴ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen' (*Depla: Geen nader onderzoek Van Ellen*), Gelderlander, February 2001, n.d.

⁶⁵ Draft Communication Strategy for the Dike Relocation in Lent Plan (*Concept Aanpak Communicatie Planstudie Dijkteruglegging Lent*), 29 November 2002.

⁶⁶ Draft Communication Strategy for the Dike Relocation in Lent Plan (*Concept Aanpak Communicatie Planstudie Dijkteruglegging Lent*), 29 November 2002.

⁶⁷ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council (*Raadsvoorstel Nijmeegse gemeenteraad*), 12 June 2002.

⁶⁸ ON-1420 Agreement new cross river connection on the river Waal (*Overeenkomst nieuwe Waaloververbinding*) and ON-1421 Agreement Diike relocation in Lent (*Overeenkomst dijkteruglegging Lent*).

⁶⁹ This contribution was not extracted from the budget of the Room for the River programme.

⁷⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁷¹ Draft Communication Strategy for the Diike Relocation in Lent Plan (*Concept Aanpak Communicatie Planstudie Dijkteruglegging Lent*), 29 November 2002.

⁷² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁷³ As the residents were the spokesmen of the advisory group, the author often refers to the residents.

⁷⁴ Information bulletin Spronglevend, February 2003; report of the advisory group meeting, 20 January 2003; Memorandum of D. van der Graaf, 3 December 2002; Draft letter from project manager to invited members, 2 December 2002; Agenda advisory group, 19 December 2002. Invitees were Lentse Federatie, Stichting Dorpsraad Lent, Platform Waalsprong, Kamer van Koophandel, Lentse Ondernemersvereniging, Gelderse Milieu Federatie, Lent 800/Werkgroep BOOM, Historische Vereniging Marithaime, KSCC Schipperscentrum, KSV Schuttevaer afd. Gelderland, Stichting Centrum Management Nijmegen, Vogelwerkgroep 'Rijk van Nijmegen e.o.', and Fietsersbond afd. Nijmegen.

⁷⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁷⁶ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁷⁷ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

⁷⁸ Interview with A. Augustijn, 7 February 2005.

⁷⁹ Residents, staff and government decision-makers of the government authorities involved did not assess these conditions in the same way.

⁸⁰ During this period people may make written or oral representations to the Provincial Executive, which is the competent authority for the environmental impact assessment (EIA)

procedure. The residents are solely allowed to respond on what should be studied in addition to what is stated in the Notification of Intent.

⁸¹ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁸² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁸³ Comparison of the two plans reveals different premises. The government plan (Plan Brokx) was designed for 16,000 m³/s with a maximum of about 18,000 m³/s, while the residents' alternative (Lentse Warande) could meet the design discharge of 16,000 m³/s. Source: Projectnota/M.e.r. Diike relocation Lent, Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands, March 2005, page 43, 48.

⁸⁴ News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 2, November 2003.

⁸⁵ Letter from M.J.M. Broekman to the director for water management of Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands, H.T.C. van Stokkom, 28 April 2003.

⁸⁶ Email from C.Th. Smit of Royal Haskoning to M.C. de Vriend and others, 19 May 2003

⁸⁷ Letter from the chair of the advisory group to executive councillor P.F.G. Depla, 29 June 2004.

⁸⁸ Report of the advisory group meeting, 17 June 2004.

⁸⁹ News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 3, April 2004.

⁹⁰ These were showed in News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 3, April 2004.

⁹¹ This option was developed by landscape architect Ashok Bhalotra.

⁹² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

⁹³ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

⁹⁴ News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 3, April 2004.

⁹⁵ Letter from the chair of the advisory group to the Provincial Executive of province of Gelderland, 10 February 2004.

⁹⁶ Interview with M.C. de Vriend, 17 March 2008.

⁹⁷ Report of the advisory group meeting, 20 April 2004.

⁹⁸ Email from G.J.M. Verstappen to J. Tielen, 26 March 2004; Letter from M.J.M. Broekman 'Reaction 28 March 2004', n.d..

⁹⁹ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

¹⁰¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005; News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 4, December 2004.

¹⁰² The costs of both plans were not included in the table published in News Bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety [*Nieuwsbulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*], no. 4, December 2004.

¹⁰³ Report of the project group meeting, 2 December 2004.

¹⁰⁴ Report of the project group meeting, 4 November 2004.

¹⁰⁵ Reactions advisory group on environmental impact assessment (EIA) [Projectnota/M.e.r.], 14 September 2004.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with O. Feitsma, 11 January 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the project group meeting, 4 November 2004.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

¹⁰⁹ Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (KAN) and Ministry of Housing did not play a key role in the steering group. Therefore, their role has not been elaborated here.

¹¹⁰ Report of the steering group meeting, 19 November 2004.

¹¹¹ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

¹¹² Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

¹¹³ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

¹¹⁴ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen, 10 December 2004.

¹¹⁵ Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 19 November 2004.

¹¹⁶ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

¹¹⁷ This is laid down in the freedom of information legislation [Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur].

¹¹⁸ A draft version that has not been adopted was not thought to be legal. Unlike roads, water projects do not have a preliminary design decision (voorontwerp besluit) that is available to the public; pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

¹¹⁹ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

¹²⁰ Report of the project group meeting, 13 January 2005.

¹²¹ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 20 December 2004.

¹²² It was intended to make the final version of the EIA available to the public. The formal public consultation on the final EIA would take place in autumn 2005.

¹²³ Report of the advisory group meeting, 25 January 2005; Letter from the project group concerning steering group meeting on 1 February 2005, 7 January 2005.

¹²⁴ Letter from the project manager to the project group, 7 January 2005.

¹²⁵ This advisory report was an input to the 'SNIP 2a advice' regarding the choice for the preferred alternative and draft plan. The advice is from Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands and it goes via the director-general of Rijkswaterstaat and the director-general for Water Affairs to the state secretary. SNIP 3 and 4 is the project decision; SNIP 5 is the decision for

implementation.

¹²⁶ The long term costs covered the realisation of a dike relocation for both plans.

¹²⁷ Relating to the forecast effect of the government plan on the water level, a 27 cm decrease in the water level, the costs per 1 cm water decrease were estimated at €12,3 million for the dike relocation now. As the residents' alternative's effect on the water level was not included, the costs per cm water decrease for this plan could not be estimated. Source: Dike relocation in Lent, Advice SNIP 2a, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Directorate-General Public Works and Water Management, Regional Office East, February 2005.

¹²⁸ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

¹²⁹ The Room for the River project organisation consisted of a national office, a Downstream Rivers regional office and an Upstream Rivers regional office. The organisation was supported by the Room for the River Steering Committee. At the end of 2005 the project organisation was disbanded and replaced by the Project Department Room for the River [PDR] for the execution of Rijkswaterstaat's water policy. Source: First progress report Room for the River project organisation, 1 July 2002–31 December 2002, 11 May 2002.

¹³⁰ Report of the project group meeting, 17 March 2005.

¹³¹ 'Room for the river is not enough' [*Ruimte voor de rivier is niet genoeg*], Gelderlander, 24 March 2005.

¹³² 'Room for the river is not enough' [*Ruimte voor de rivier is niet genoeg*], Gelderlander 24 March 2005.

¹³³ Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 25 March 2005.

¹³⁴ Letter from the project manager to the project group, 7 April 2005.

¹³⁵ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2005.

¹³⁶ Report of the project group meeting, 19 May 2005.

¹³⁷ Plan for preparation project decision of the state secretary for Water Management on the dike relocation in Lent, 4 July 2005.

¹³⁸ See note 113 (Room for the River project organisation).

¹³⁹ Presentation of provincial delegate Harry Keereweier, 31 March 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Report of Tabula Rasa, final version, 28 April 2005.

¹⁴¹ Letter from the project manager to the advisory group, 17 March 2005.

¹⁴² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

¹⁴³ Report of the project group meeting, 7 July 2005.

¹⁴⁴ Report of the project group meeting, 13 October 2005.

¹⁴⁵ A front-runner status implies that the project may go on ahead of the SPKD procedural scheme.

- ¹⁴⁶ Report of the steering group meeting, 11 November 2005.
- ¹⁴⁷ They participated in the Water Management Committee; report of House of Representatives, meeting year 2005-2006, 30 080, no. 6.
- ¹⁴⁸ 'Support of House for residents' alternative' (*Steun Kamer voor Lents alternatief*), Gelderlander, 4 March 2006.
- ¹⁴⁹ Measure at the village of Lent (Maatregel Lent) – an analysis as a result of the public consultation round, explanation for the Water Management Committee of the House of Representatives, 16 March 2006.
- ¹⁵⁰ According to outcomes of the Report 'Measure at the village of Lent' (Maatregel Lent), 16 March 2006.
- ¹⁵¹ Besides, the residents' alternative would have a disadvantageous effect on the water distribution at Pannerdense Kop, where the Rhine divides into the river Waal and the Pannerdens Kanaal, which leads to the Nederrijn/Lek and IJssel. More water would have to be assigned to these rivers (100 m³/s more for the IJssel, which would raise the average water level and require measures to lower the water level by 10 cm, while the same quantity for the Waal would require measures to reduce the water level by 3 cm).
- ¹⁵² Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.
- ¹⁵³ The Upstream Rivers Steering Committee, the Room for the River Steering Committee, province of Gelderland and Rivierenland water board.
- ¹⁵⁴ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.
- ¹⁵⁵ Short report of the SPKD Room for the River hearing by W. Aarnink, directorate-general for Water Affairs, 20 April 2006.
- ¹⁵⁶ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 18 June 2006. Later he informed the state secretary about these meetings in which he participated without permission of the directorate-general for Water Affairs.
- ¹⁵⁷ Erik van Lith (Christian Democrats; CDA); 'River plans not properly substantiated' (*Plan rivieren niet goed onderbouwd*), NRC Handelsblad, 14 June 2006.
- ¹⁵⁸ Email from D. van der Graaf to G.J.M. Verstappen and others, 13 June 2006.
- ¹⁵⁹ Email from D. van der Graaf to project group, 23 June 2006.
- ¹⁶⁰ Report of the project group meeting, 22 August 2006.
- ¹⁶¹ Letter from the mayor of the municipality of Nijmegen to the residents of Lent, 28 June 2006.
- ¹⁶² Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 30 June 2006.
- ¹⁶³ Concerning the information on hydraulics this information may only be understood by experts, while the information about the altitude is difficult for those who are not used to read maps with cross sections.
- ¹⁶⁴ Report of the project group meeting, 19 September 2006.
- ¹⁶⁵ Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 19 September 2006.
- ¹⁶⁶ Press release by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 19 December 2006.
- ¹⁶⁷ Lecture by state secretary Monique de Vries during the fifth anniversary of the Vereniging van Waterbouwers in Bagger-, Kust- en Deverwerken (VBKO) in Rotterdam, 22 May 2000: www.nieuwsbank.nl, accessed on 12 December 2007.
- ¹⁶⁸ 'Waa sprong of the municipality of Nijmegen will go ahead' (*Waa sprong Nijmegen gaat door*): www.nieuwsbank.nl, accessed on 12 December 2007.
- ¹⁶⁹ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.
- ¹⁷⁰ 'Schultz is playing firm in the House' (*Schultz speelt het hard in Kamer*), Gelderlander, 10 March 2006.
- ¹⁷¹ 'Schultz: Still relocating dike' (*Schultz: dijk toch verleggen*), Gelderlander, 24 March 2006.
- ¹⁷² 'Relocating dike necessity' (*Verleggen dijk noodzaak*), Gelderlander, 2 June 2005.
- ¹⁷³ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.
- ¹⁷⁴ Interview with A. Augustijn, 10 January 2005.
- ¹⁷⁵ News report 'Gelderland: dike relocation Lent sustainable solution' (*Nieuwsbericht 'Gelderland: dike verlegging is duurzame oplossing*), 23 November 2004.
- ¹⁷⁶ At that moment the costs were not clear, so the dike reeve did not elaborate on this issue.
- ¹⁷⁷ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.
- ¹⁷⁸ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ¹⁷⁹ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ¹⁸⁰ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ¹⁸¹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ¹⁸² Report of a meeting attended by Royal Haskoning and Professor van Ellen, 21 December 2000.
- ¹⁸³ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ¹⁸⁴ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.
- ¹⁸⁵ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.
- ¹⁸⁶ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.
- ¹⁸⁷ In popular speech they were called the 'watchers' (those who will live near the newly planned dike), the 'stayers' (those who will stay) and 'leavers' (those who have to leave). Source: 'Small river, fast through limited hilly country' (*Smalle rivier, snel door eindig heuveland*), Staatscourant, no 81, 26 April 2006.
- ¹⁸⁸ Report of the advisory group meeting, 20 April 2004.
- ¹⁸⁹ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.

- ¹⁹⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekmans, 30 October 2008.
- ¹⁹¹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ¹⁹² Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ¹⁹³ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ¹⁹⁴ Report of a meeting attended by Royal Haskoning and Professor van Ellen, 21 December 2000.
- ¹⁹⁵ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005; M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2005.
- ¹⁹⁶ Motion by Green Left (Groen Links) 'Which future for Lent and Waalsprong', Overview of motions Nijmegen City Council, 18 December 2002.
- ¹⁹⁷ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.
- ¹⁹⁸ 'VD MP: many representations on dike relocation' [*WD-Kamerlid: veel inspraak bij dijkverlegging*], Gelderlander, December 2000, n.d.; 'Van Ellen's alternative did not get much attention' [*Alternatief Van Ellen krijgt te weinig aandacht*], Gelderlander, 21 December 2000.
- ¹⁹⁹ 'Nijmegen trips us up' [*Nijmegen licht ons een pootje*], Gelderlander, 22 December 2000.
- ²⁰⁰ 'Alternative Van Ellen did not get much attention' [*Alternatief Van Ellen krijgt te weinig aandacht*], Gelderlander, 21 December 2000.
- ²⁰¹ 'Relocating dike at the earliest about 6 years' [*Verleggen dijk Lent op vroegst over 6 jaar*], Gelderlander, 22 December 2000.
- ²⁰² Letter from W.F.T. van Ellen to G.J. Akkerman of Royal Haskoning, 27 December 2000.
- ²⁰³ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen's alternative' [*Depla: geen verder onderzoek naar alternatief Van Ellen*], Gelderlander, n.d.
- ²⁰⁴ Letter from W.F.T. van Ellen to the board of directors of Royal Haskoning, 13 February 2001.
- ²⁰⁵ Letter from W.F.T. van Ellen to the board of directors of Royal Haskoning, 1 March 2001.
- ²⁰⁶ The conflict was not surprising because various alternatives of Van Ellen channel were in circulation. Source: letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, concerning questions about widening river Waal near the city of Nijmegen, 30 January 2001.
- ²⁰⁷ 'Voluntary agreement on dike Lent postponed by a month' [*Convenant over dijk Lent een maand later*], Gelderlander, n.d.
- ²⁰⁸ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen' [*Depla: Geen nader onderzoek Van Ellen*], Gelderlander, n.d.
- ²⁰⁹ 'Depla under attack after remarks about dike relocation' [*Depla onder vuur na uitlatingen over dijkverlegging*], Gelderlander, n.d.
- ²¹⁰ 'First reaction to advisory report Brokx concerning dike relocation Lent' [*Eerste reactie op advies Brokx over dijkteruglegging*], press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 1 February 2001.
- ²¹¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ²¹² Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.
- ²¹³ 'Attitude of Nijmegen City Council hurts Lent' [*Houding raad gaat ten koste van Lent*], Brug, 21 February 2001.
- ²¹⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ²¹⁵ Motion by Green Left (Groen Links), 'Certainty and clarity', overview motions of Nijmegen City Council, 18 December 2002.
- ²¹⁶ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ²¹⁷ Interview with W. ten Brinke, C. Beekmans and W. Silva, 30 June 2004.
- ²¹⁸ The organisations represented in the advisory group included Fietersbond afd. Gelderland, Historische Vereniging Marithaime, Kamer van Koophandel, KSCC Centre for Captains of Barges, KSV Schuttevaer afd. Gelderland, Lentse Ondernemingsvereniging, Lentse Federatie, Lent 800/Werkgroep BOOM, Platform Waalsprong, Stichting Dorpsraad Lent, Vogelwerkgroep Rijk van Nijmegen e.o., Stichting Centrum Management Nijmegen. Source: News Bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety [*Nieuws Bulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*], no. 2, November 2003.
- ²¹⁹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.
- ²²⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 20 June 2005.
- ²²¹ http://www.waalspong.nl/archive_detail.asp?news_id=16, accessed on 15 January 2008.
- ²²² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ²²³ Relating to the forecast effect of the government plan on the water level, a 27 cm decrease in the water level, the costs per 1 cm water decrease were estimated at €12,3 million for the dike relocation now. As the residents' alternative's effect on the water level was not included, the costs per cm water decrease for this plan could not be estimated. Source: Dike relocation in Lent, Advice SNIP 2a, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Directorate-General Public Works and Water Management, Regional Office East, February 2005.
- ²²⁴ Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) [*Richtlijnen voor Milieu Effect Rapport [m.e.r.]*], November 2003.
- ²²⁵ Letter from the chair of the advisory group to the provincial executive of the province of Gelderland, 10 February 2004.
- ²²⁶ Attachment 1 to the advisory report of the advisory group, 20 April 2004.
- ²²⁷ Attachment 2 to agenda of the advisory group, 17 June 2004; Report of the advisory group meeting, 17 June 2004; letter from the chair of the advisory group to executive councillor Paul Depla, 29 June 2004.

- 228 Advisory report of the advisory group, 22 October 2004.
- 229 'Dike measure a step closer' (*Dijkreep komt nu dichterbij*), Gelderlander, 20 November 2004.
- 230 Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- 231 Interview with T. Berns, 13 January 2005.
- 232 'Nijmegen abandons Lent' (*Nijmegen laat belang Lent liggen*), Brug, 9 February 2005.
- 233 Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 20 December 2004.
- 234 'Dike relocation near Lent' (*Dijkteruglegging bij Lent*), Brug, 24 November 2004.
- 235 Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.
- 236 Email from City Party Nijmegen (Stadspartij Nijmegen) to Members of the House of Representatives, 16 June 2006; Motion 'Dike relocation not absolutely necessary' (*Dijkteruglegging te kort door de bocht*), 2 February 2005; letter from Nijmegen municipal executive to state secretary, n.d.
- 237 'Does his small farm have to make way for the river?' (*Moet zijn boerderijtje wijken voor de rivier?*), Volkskrant, 10 March 2005.
- 238 Letter from the chair of the advisory group to the state secretary, 17 February 2005.
- 239 'Dike committee Lent explains preference to Schultz' (*Lents dijkcomité legt Schultz voorkeur uit*), Gelderlander, 19 March 2006.
- 240 Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 25 March 2005.
- 241 'Ooij ready for party, Lent regains hope' (*Ooij klaar voor feest, Lent krijgt weer wat hoop*), Gelderlander, 25 March 2005.
- 242 Letter from the Room for the River project manager to Mrs van Ellen, 25 April 2006.
- 243 Objection to dike relocation Lent (*Bezwaarschrift dijkverlegging Lent*): <http://www.ammmerlaan.demon.nl/bezwaarschrift.htm>, accessed on 23 August 2005.
- 244 Room for the River, SPKD part 2, 22 December 2005.
- 245 Letter from the project manager to the steering group, 28 October 2005.
- 246 'Water levels and dike heights around Nijmegen' (*Waterstanden en dijkhoogtes rond Nijmegen*): <http://www.wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.
- 247 Attachment to the letter from F. Mikx including opinion paper to Volkskrant, 26 April 2006.
- 248 'Why Lent is right; Better for the environment and cheaper' (*Het gelijk van Lent; Beter voor het milieu en goedkoper*), Nijmeegse Stadskrant, May 2006.
- 249 Letter from the Room for the River programme manager to Mrs Van Ellen, 25 April 2006.
- 250 House of Representatives Transport and Water Management Committee (2e Kamercommissie Verkeer en Water), 8 March 2006: <http://www.wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.
- 251 Report of the project group meeting, 13 October 2005.
- 252 Report of the steering group meeting, 11 November 2005.
- 253 This implied that the government plan might go ahead before national decision-making has been finalized.
- 254 'House supports Lent alternative' (*Steun Kamer voor Lents alternatief*), Gelderlander, 4 March 2006.
- 255 'Residents of Lent argue for alternative plan' (Inwoners Lent pleiten voor alternatief plan), Trouw, 4 March 2006; 'House supports Lent alternative' (*Steun Kamer voor Lents alternatief*), Gelderlander, 4 March 2006.
- 256 'Visit House of Representatives to Veur Lent' (*Bezoek Tweede Kamer aan Veur Lent*): <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.
- 257 'Schultz statement on Lent heightens tensions' (*Schultz zet met uitspraak Lent zaak op scherpe*), Gelderlander, 9 March 2006.
- 258 This meant that too much water would flow into the Nederrijn/Lek and too little to the Waal; Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.
- 259 'State secretary's reply to House of Representatives' (*Reactie Staatssecretaris aan Tweede Kamer*): <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.
- 260 'House supports Lent alternative' (*Steun Kamer voor Lents alternatief*), Gelderlander, 4 March 2006.
- 261 Near Gendt.
- 262 SPKD Room for the River (PKB Ruimte voor de Rivier) part 1 is the national government's proposal to reduce flood risks; SPKD part 2 is the consultation round following the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); SPKD part 3 is the Government's decision.
- 263 Text by J.A.L. Rikken for meeting of Water Management Committee of the province of Gelderland, 29 March 2006.
- 264 Letter from J. Spaans to the Transport and Water Management Committee and Gelderland provincial executive, 24 March 2006.
- 265 'Motion by Provincial Council of the province of Gelderland on 12 April 2006' (*Motie Provinciale Staten van 12 april 2006*): <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.
- 266 'Provincial Council: Still little chance for Lent's alternative plan' (*Provinciale Staten: toch kleine kans voor Lents alternatief plan*), Gelderlander, 30 March 2006.
- 267 'Socialist Party demands emergency debate on high water side channel Veessen-Wapenveld and dike relocation in Lent' (*SP vraagt spoeddebat over hoogwatergeul Veessen-Wapenveld en dijkverlegging Lent*): <http:// gelderland.sp.nl/bericht/>, 6 October 2005; 'Flyer action against dike relocation Lent'

(Flyer-actie tegen dijkverlegging Lent), 10 October 2005, both accessed on 2 October 2007.

²⁶⁸ <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.

²⁶⁹ 'No legal basis for dike relocation in Lent' [*Geen wettelijke basis voor dijkteruglegging Lent*], SPKD Room for the River hearing, 20 April 2006.

²⁷⁰ M.J.M. Broekman, chair of GeWaLent and Lentse Federatie.

²⁷¹ Interview with M.C. de Vriend, 17 March 2008.

²⁷² List of conditions for new planning process with notes of M.C. de Vriend, 2 May 2006.

²⁷³ J.A.L. Rikken, chair of the Lent Village Council and F. Mikx of Lent 800.

²⁷⁴ Letter from the chair of the Lent Village Council to the board of directors of Royal Haskoning, 23 April 2006.

²⁷⁵ The website of Lent Village Council and a Member of the Provincial Executive of the province of Gelderland; Email from M.C. de Vriend to G.J.M. Verstappen and M.J.M. Broekman, 11 May 2006.

²⁷⁶ Interview with M.C. de Vriend, 17 March 2008.

²⁷⁷ Letter from the chair of the board of directors of Royal Haskoning to the chair of the Lent Village Council, 14 June 2006.

²⁷⁸ Note from M.C. de Vriend to the chief executive of Royal Haskoning, 10 May 2006.

²⁷⁹ Email from G.J.M. Verstappen to D. van der Graaf, 21 May 2006; Email from G.J.M. Verstappen to D. van der Graaf, 9 June 2006.

²⁸⁰ Email from D. van der Graaf to G.J.M. Verstappen, 13 June 2006.

²⁸¹ Email from G.J.M. Verstappen to L. Plezier, 16 June 2006.

²⁸² 'Lent loses dike relocation struggle' [*Lent verliest strijd dijkverlegging*], Gelderland, 20 June 2006.

²⁸³ 'Lent loses dike relocation struggle' [*Lent verliest strijd dijkverlegging*], Gelderland, 20 June 2006.

²⁸⁴ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 18 June 2006. Later he informed the state secretary about the meetings he attended without the permission of the directorate-general for Water Affairs.

²⁸⁵ 'Small river, flowing fast through finite hilly land' [*Smalle rivier, snel door eindig heuvelland*], Staatscourant, no. 81, 26 April 2006.

²⁸⁶ 'The endorsement is spurious' [*De instemming is schijn*], Trouw, 26 April 2006.

²⁸⁷ 'Rijkswaterstaat waffles on with vision on 'living water'', [*Rijkswaterstaat draaft door met visie over 'levend water'*], Gelderland, 12 June 2006.

²⁸⁸ 'An old wish, a new city bridge' [*Een oude wens, een*

nieuwe stadsbrug], Staatscourant, no. 111, 12 June 2006.

²⁸⁹ 'River may easily fit with less room' [*Rivier kan best met minder ruimte*], Gelderland, 29 april 2006.

²⁹⁰ 'Dike plan Lent faltering' [*Dijkplan Lent wankelt*], Gelderland, 15 June 2006 and 'Uncertainties in river plans to last years' [*Rivierplannen ook na jaren vol onzekerheden*], Gelderland, 15 June 2006.

²⁹¹ 'Lent continues lobbying in The Hague' [*Lent blijft lobbyen in Den Haag*], Gelderland, 16 June 2006.

²⁹² Email from the City Party Nijmegen [Stadspartij Nijmegen] to the Members of the House of Representatives, 16 June 2006.

²⁹³ 'Treatment SPKD part 3 Room for the River' [*Behandeling PKB-deel 3 Ruimte voor de Rivier*]: <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.

²⁹⁴ With the support of Group Wilders and the Socialist Party.

²⁹⁵ Socialist Party and Green Left: 'No compromise text in House about Lent' [*SP en Groen Links: geen compromistekst in Kamer over Lent*], Gelderland, n.d.

²⁹⁶ 'Dike relocation Lent: A scandal along the river Waal' [*Dijkteruglegging Lent: een schandaal aan de Waal*], opinion article by T. Berns representing the residents affected by the cut-off the bend in the Waal, Gelderland, 26 June 2006.

²⁹⁷ 'CDA surprises with opposition role' [*CDA verbaast met oppositie rol*]; 'CDA backs down on plan for rivers' [*CDA haalt bakzeil met plan over rivieren*], Gelderland, 20 June 2006.

²⁹⁸ 'House: Do river plan properly once and for all' [*Kamer: Rivierplan ineens goed doen*], Gelderland, 20 June 2008.

²⁹⁹ 'Dike relocation in Lent; the decision has been taken' [*Dijkteruglegging in Lent; het besluit is genomen*]: <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.

³⁰⁰ Interview with M.J. M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

³⁰¹ 'Dike relocation in Senate' [*Dijkteruglegging in 1e Kamer Staten Generaal*]: <http://wrlent.nl/printable/actueleonderwerpen/dijkteruglegging/>, accessed on 20 March 2008.

³⁰² 'Senate asks for clarity about Room for the River' [*Senaat vraagt duidelijkheid over Ruimte voor de Rivier*]: <http://www.eerstekamer.nl>, 15 November 2006, accessed on 20 March 2008.

³⁰³ 'Senate approved SPKD Room for the River' [*Senaat stemt in met PKB Ruimte voor de Rivier*], 20 December 2006: <http://www.eerstekamer.nl>, accessed on 20 March 2008.

³⁰⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³⁰⁵ 'Water floods Veur-Lent' [*Het water overspoelt Veur-Lent*], Gelderland, 21 June 2006.

³⁰⁶ The Council of State advises the Government and Parliament concerning legislation and administration and is the Supreme Court in administrative conflicts; citation from email by G.J.M. Verstappen to D. van der Graaf and others, 16 June 2006.

³⁰⁷ For example in the Gendtsche polder, the Groenlanden flood plain (Bisonbaai) and the Buiten Ooij flood plain.

³⁰⁸ 'No legal basis for dike relocation in Lent' [Geen wettelijke basis voor dijkteruglegging Lent], SPKD Room for the River hearing, 20 April 2006.

³⁰⁹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.

³¹⁰ The Lentse Federatie consists of GeWaLent [residents affected by the cut-off the bend in the Waal], Flotust [acronym of three streets in Lent where the residents would have a view of the new dike] and Veur-Lent [residents living in the part of the village near the dike].

³¹¹ 'Local group', 'residents' and 'citizens' will be used interchangeably here, although in fact the local group is an organisation with a certain number of members, some actively participating in the process, whereas 'residents' refers to everyone living in the area, and 'citizens' is a general term for anyone not holding a public office.

³¹² Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 20 June 2005.

³¹³ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

³¹⁴ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.

³¹⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³¹⁶ Interview with W. ten Brinke, C. Beekmans and W. Silva, 30 June 2004.

³¹⁷ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³¹⁸ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³¹⁹ The place where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.

³²⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³²¹ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³²² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

³²³ Report of the project group meeting, 17 March 2005.

³²⁴ Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 25 March 2005.

³²⁵ Plan for preparation project decision of the state secretary for Water Management, 4 July 2005.

³²⁶ Report of the project group meeting, 13 October 2005; interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³²⁷ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 18 June 2006.

³²⁸ Professor van Ellen had authority in the water field due to his experience with water management, both in the Netherlands and abroad, including the Flood Action Plan for Bangladesh.

³²⁹ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.

³³⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³³¹ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.

³³² 'VVD MP: many representations on dike relocation project' [VVD kamerlid: veel inspraak bij dijkverlegging], Gelderland, n.d.

³³³ 'Nijmegen trips us up' [Nijmegen licht ons pootje], Gelderland, 22 December 2000.

³³⁴ 'Nijmegen trips us up' [Nijmegen licht ons pootje], Gelderland, 22 December 2000.

³³⁵ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

³³⁶ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen' [Depla: Geen nader onderzoek Van Ellen], Gelderland, n.d.

³³⁷ 'Depla under attack after remarks about dike relocation' [Depla onder vuur na uittalingen over dijkverlegging], Gelderland, n.d.

³³⁸ The provincial government was also represented in the EIA. Gelderland province was in favour of the dike relocation and therefore took the side of the national government. The provincial government was very much involved in the controversy about calamity polders that was raging at the time (see Chapter 6).

³³⁹ Letter from the chair of the advisory group to executive councillor P.F.G. Depla, 29 June 2004.

³⁴⁰ Report of the advisory group meeting, 17 June 2004.

³⁴¹ Interview with H. Berg 15 June 2005.

³⁴² Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

³⁴³ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen, 10 December 2004.

³⁴⁴ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁴⁵ Report of the project group meeting, 2 December 2004.

³⁴⁶ Unlike roads, water projects do not have a preliminary design decision (voorontwerp besluit) that is available to the public; pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

³⁴⁷ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

³⁴⁸ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

³⁴⁹ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁵⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

³⁵¹ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

³⁵² Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2001.

³⁵³ 'Draft Communication Strategy for the Planning of the Dike Relocation at Lent to widen the river near Nijmegen' [Concept Aanpak Communicatie Planstudie Dijkteruglegging Lent voor verruiming van de flessenhals bij Nijmegen], 29 November 2002.

³⁵⁴ 'Dike relocating a necessity' [Verleggen dijk noodzaak], Gelderland, 2 June 2005.

³⁵⁵ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

³⁵⁶ 'De Vries acknowledges that the Van Ellen plan for the

Waal has some qualities' (*De Vries erkent paar kwaliteiten in plan Van Ellen voor Waal*), Gelderlander, 31 January 2001.

³⁵⁷ Interview with A. Augustijn, 10 January 2005.

³⁵⁸ News bulletin Room for the Waal, room for safety (*Nieuws-bulletin Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid*), no. 4, December 2004.

³⁵⁹ Plan for preparing the project decision by the state secretary on the dike relocation at Lent, 4 July 2005.

³⁶⁰ Letter from the project manager to the project group about design optimisation, 7 January 2005.

³⁶¹ Email from D. van der Graaf to J. Verstappen and others, 13 June 2006.

³⁶² Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.

³⁶³ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

³⁶⁴ 'Room for the river is not enough' (*Ruimte voor de rivier is niet genoeg*), Gelderlander, 24 March 2005.

³⁶⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³⁶⁶ Interview with W. ten Brinke, C. Beekmans and W. Silva, 30 June 2004.

³⁶⁷ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³⁶⁸ Lentse Federatie, SPKD Room for the River hearing, 20 April 2006.

³⁶⁹ Letter from the project manager to the residents of Lent, 25 March 2005.

³⁷⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

³⁷¹ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 18 June 2006.

³⁷² Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 18 June 2006.

³⁷³ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁷⁴ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁷⁵ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁷⁶ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁷⁷ 'An old wish, a new city bridge' (*Een oude wens, een nieuwe stadsbrug*), Staatscourant, no. 111, 12 June 2006.

³⁷⁸ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

³⁷⁹ Interview with G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.

³⁸⁰ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen' (*Depla: Geen nader onderzoek Van Ellen*), Gelderlander, n.d.

³⁸¹ Attachment 2 to the agenda for the advisory group meeting on 17 June 2004; Report of the advisory group meeting on 17 June 2004; letter from the chair of the advisory group to executive councillor Paul Depla, 29 June 2004.

³⁸² 'State secretary De Vries answers questions from of mu-

nicipality of Nijmegen' (*Staatssecretaris De Vries beantwoordt vragen gemeente Nijmegen*), press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 22 December 2000.

³⁸³ Report of the advisory group meeting, 17 June 2004; Letter from the chair of the advisory group to executive councillor Paul Depla, 29 June 2004.

³⁸⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

³⁸⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³⁸⁶ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³⁸⁷ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

³⁸⁸ The national government viewed Professor van Ellen as a representative of the residents, but at that time he did not represent any group but acted on his own behalf [see also section 5.2.6].

³⁸⁹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

³⁹⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³⁹¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

³⁹² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.

³⁹³ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

³⁹⁴ 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' (*Rivierwater fruikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevaarzone bij hoogwater*), NRC Handelsblad, 14 March 2000.

³⁹⁵ Interview with M.E.F. Leewis, 18 November 2005.

³⁹⁶ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

³⁹⁷ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council (Raadsvoorstel Nijmeegse gemeenteraad), 12 June 2002.

³⁹⁸ 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' (*Rivierwater fruikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevaarzone bij hoogwater*), NRC Handelsblad, 14 March 2000.

³⁹⁹ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen, 10 December 2004.

⁴⁰⁰ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.

⁴⁰¹ Proposal by municipal executive to approve voluntary agreement with national government (Voorstel B&W in te stemmen met overeenkomsten over dijkteruglegging Veurlent), 12 June 2003.

⁴⁰² Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

⁴⁰³ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

⁴⁰⁶ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen, 10 December 2004.

- ⁴⁰⁷ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴⁰⁸ Based on interviews with members of the advisory group and reports of the advisory group meetings.
- ⁴⁰⁹ Letter from the project manager to the project group concerning design optimisation, 7 January 2005.
- ⁴¹⁰ 'Schultz statement on Lent heightens tensions' [*Schultz zet met uitspraak Lent zaak op scherp*], Gelderlander, 9 March 2006.
- ⁴¹¹ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴¹² Both design standards concern the Rhine's discharge at Lobith, the place where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.
- ⁴¹³ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005; P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴¹⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ⁴¹⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴¹⁶ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁴¹⁷ 'Lent is right; Better for the environment and cheaper' [*Het gelijk van Lent; Beter voor het milieu en goedkoper*], De Nijmeegse Stadskrant, May 2006.
- ⁴¹⁸ Letter from the Room for the River programme manager to Mrs. van Ellen, 25 April 2006.
- ⁴¹⁹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ⁴²⁰ Interview with C. Beekmans, W. Silva, W. ten Brink, 30 June 2004.
- ⁴²¹ Interview with C. Beekmans, W. Silva, W. ten Brink, 30 June 2004.
- ⁴²² Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴²³ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.
- ⁴²⁴ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴²⁵ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴²⁶ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴²⁷ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁴²⁸ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ⁴²⁹ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴³⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005 and 30 October 2008; this was confirmed by the dike reeve G.N. Kok, 10 January 2005.
- ⁴³¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.
- ⁴³² Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁴³³ The Council of State advises the Cabinet and Parliament on legislative and administrative matters and is the Supreme Court in administrative conflicts; citation from an interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 oktober 2008.
- ⁴³⁴ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴³⁵ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 2 October 2007.
- ⁴³⁶ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ⁴³⁷ 'Lent dike committee explains preference to Schultz' (Lents dijkcomité legt Schultz voorkeur uit), Gelderlander, 19 March 2005.
- ⁴³⁸ 'Depla puts the residents of Lent in second place' [*Depla zet belang Lentse burger op tweede plaats*], Gelderlander, 5 February 2001.
- ⁴³⁹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.
- ⁴⁴⁰ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.
- ⁴⁴¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.
- ⁴⁴² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.
- ⁴⁴³ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁴⁴⁴ 'Depla: No further research into Van Ellen alternative' (Depla: geen verder onderzoek naar alternatief Van Ellen), Gelderlander, n.d.
- ⁴⁴⁵ 'River water obstructs new development; Housing development near Nijmegen in the risk zone during high water' [*Rivierwater fruikt nieuwbouw; VINEX-locatie bij Nijmegen ligt in gevarezone bij hoogwater*], NRC Handelsblad, 14 March 2000; interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴⁴⁶ Speech by state secretary Monique de Vries during the anniversary celebration of the Vereniging van Waterbouwers in Bagger-, Kust- en Oeverwerken (VBKO) in Rotterdam, 22 May 2000: www.nieuwsbank.nl, accessed on 12 December 2007.
- ⁴⁴⁷ 'State secretary Schultz drops emergency water storage plans' (Staatssecretaris Schultz laat plannen noodoverloop vallen), WaterForum Online, 30 March 2005: www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1.asp?paginanr=3123, accessed on 13 April 2009.
- ⁴⁴⁸ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁴⁴⁹ Proposal by Nijmegen City Council (Raadsvoorstel Nijmeegse gemeenteraad), 12 June 2002.
- ⁴⁵⁰ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.
- ⁴⁵¹ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen and D. van der Graaf, 10 December 2004.
- ⁴⁵² 'The Waalsprong Nijmegen will go ahead' (*De Waalsprong Nijmegen gaat door*), press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 20 September 2000.
- ⁴⁵³ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴⁵⁴ Pers. comm. J. van Dussen, 10 December 2004.
- ⁴⁵⁵ Interview with D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
- ⁴⁵⁶ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.
- ⁴⁵⁷ 'Dike relocation in Lent: a scandal on the Waal' [*Dijkeruglegging Lent: een schandaal aan de Waal*], Gelderlander, 26 June 2006.

⁴⁵⁸ Of this €315 million, €103 million was budgeted for land acquisition and planning, but part of this would be used as receipts as part of the budget would come from revenues (e.g. from housing). Source: Lentse Federatie, Room for the River hearing, 20 April 2006.

⁴⁵⁹ State secretary's answer to questions by MP Harry van Bommel (Socialist Party), 14 November 2000.

⁴⁶⁰ Letter from the state secretary to the chair of the House of Representatives, 23 March 2006.

⁴⁶¹ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005, and with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁴⁶² Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁴⁶³ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁴⁶⁴ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005, and with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁴⁶⁶ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 2 October 2007.

⁴⁶⁷ 'State secretary De Vries answers questions by the municipality of Nijmegen' [*Staatssecretaris De Vries beantwoordt vragen gemeente Nijmegen*], press release by the municipality of Nijmegen, 22 December 2000.

⁴⁶⁸ 'Depla under attack after comments on dike relocation' [Depla onder vuur na uitslatingen over dijkverlegging], *Gelderlander*, n.d.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁷⁰ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁷¹ Interview with P.F.G. Depla, 19 January 2005.

⁴⁷² <http://toinevanbergen.web-log.nl/log/5658116> and www.wrlent.nl, accessed on 12 May 2006.

⁴⁷³ Letter from the chair of the Lent Village Council to the management board of Royal Haskoning, 23 April 2006.

⁴⁷⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁷⁶ The relevant MP could not be reached due to the birth of his baby.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁷⁸ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁷⁹ 'Water floods Veur-Lent' (Het water overspoelt Veur-Lent), *Gelderlander*, 21 June 2006.

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005; M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2005.

⁴⁸¹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁸² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June 2005.

⁴⁸³ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁸⁴ Derived from 32 street interviews held by the author in March 2005.

⁴⁸⁵ Pers. comm. D. van der Graaf, 2 October 2007.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁸⁷ Interview with H. Berg, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁹⁰ The street interviews were held by the author in March 2005.

⁴⁹¹ Interview with J.A.L. Rikken, 13 January 2005.

⁴⁹² Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁹³ Interview with H.B.F. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with M.J.M. Broekman, 30 October 2008.

⁴⁹⁵ A 'calamity polder' is one in which controlled flooding takes place during high water periods. Calamity polders contribute to the safety of other polders or dike rings, especially when the inundation leads to a reduction in the water level during high water or prevents a further rise in the water level. This can be realised by topping off the discharge wave in the main rivers (peak shaving), for example in a retention area. Another option is water storage downstream when the discharge of excess water to the sea is impossible or hard to realise. This water can be stored in surface water bodies and on land in the river forelands outside the river dikes or areas inside the dikes, such as calamity polders. Not all calamity polders are real polders; they may also be flood plains or stream valleys (Klijn & van der Most, 2000:2-5,3-2).

⁴⁹⁶ 'Residual risk' in relation to calamity polders in the river landscape is connected with uncertainties about the design discharge and the average water levels, including a higher discharge than the calculated design discharge, a strong deviation of the peak shaving resulting in water lying against the dikes for a longer period (with a chance of saturation and collapse), a different distribution of the Rhine discharge between the three branches of the river than calculated, and a higher water level than expected from the calculated design discharge during high water periods. The residual risk downstream is also determined by the probable simultaneous occurrence of high (but not necessarily extreme) river discharges and closure of the storm surge barrier for an extended period during spring tides and storms in the North Sea (Klijn & van der Most, 2000:2-10).

⁴⁹⁷ Interviews with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005; G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005; J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

⁴⁹⁸ In this case description Ooijpolder covers the area from Nijmegen to the German border including Duffelt. Although this is geographically not correct, in common parlance the difference between Ooijpolder and Duffelt is rarely used.

⁴⁹⁹ The historical part of this case description has been based on Bullinga and Offermans (1993), Driessen (1994), Driessen & van de Ven (1999), Roth, Warners & Winnubst (2006a), van de Ven (2004) and van Eck (2005).

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with W. van der Kleij, 11 April 2005.

- ⁵⁰¹ Interview with J.F. Bekhuis, 4 August 2005.
- ⁵⁰² 'A retention polder, never' (*Een retentiepolder, dat nooit*), Agrarisch Dagblad, 30 August 2002.
- ⁵⁰³ East Netherlands regional office situated in Arnhem.
- ⁵⁰⁴ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.
- ⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Z. Stappershoef, 8 July 2005 and W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁵⁰⁶ Email from F. Klijn, 3 March 2009.
- ⁵⁰⁷ The report addresses the question to what extent the requirements from the perspective of water safety, quality of life and accessibility of the river landscape can be met in the end of 21st century.
- ⁵⁰⁸ Pers. comm. H. Saeijs, 12 August 2005. Over the centuries many areas of land have been reclaimed from the Rhine branches. Since 1850 a total area of about 35,000 hectares, which used to have a washland function, has been lost.
- ⁵⁰⁹ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.
- ⁵¹⁰ Interview with G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005.
- ⁵¹¹ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵¹² Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.
- ⁵¹³ Interview with R. Jorissen, 15 November 2005.
- ⁵¹⁴ Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.
- ⁵¹⁵ Interview with M.E.F. Leewis, 18 November 2005.
- ⁵¹⁶ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵¹⁷ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵¹⁸ Email from F. Klijn, 3 March 2009.
- ⁵¹⁹ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵²⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006, M. Leewis, 18 November 2005, L. de Jong, 4 October 2005.
- ⁵²¹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁵²² Interview with G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005.
- ⁵²³ See footnote 4.
- ⁵²⁴ Interview with M.E.F. Leewis, 18 November 2005.
- ⁵²⁵ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.
- ⁵²⁶ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵²⁷ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵²⁸ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.
- ⁵²⁹ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.
- ⁵³⁰ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.
- ⁵³¹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005, and H. Zomerdiijk, 10 November 2005.
- ⁵³² Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁵³³ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.
- ⁵³⁴ 'Broad opposition to calamity polders' (*Breed verzet tegen calamiteitenpolders*), Gelderlander, 27 April 2002.
- ⁵³⁵ Interview with D. Luteijn, 6 July 2005.
- ⁵³⁶ 'Commission selects three "calamity polders"' (*Commissie kiest drie 'calamiteitenpolders'*), NRC Handelsblad, 29 May 2002.
- ⁵³⁷ 'Luteijn Commission wants an adequate and clear damage compensation scheme' (*Commissie-Luteijn wil goede en duidelijke regeling voor schade*), Gelderlander, 30 May 2002.
- ⁵³⁸ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.
- ⁵³⁹ Interview with H. Zomerdiijk, 10 November 2005.
- ⁵⁴⁰ 'Construction of calamity polders unnecessary' (*Aanleg calamiteitenpolders overbodig*), Volkskrant, 26 November 2002.
- ⁵⁴¹ 'TAW report wipes the floor with the conclusions on emergency water storage in the Luteijn report' (*TAW-rapport haalt conclusies rapport Luteijn over noodoverloopgebieden onderuit*), WaterForum Online, 17 October 2002: www.netserver1.net/waterforum_new/bericht.asp?soort=nieuws&id=1467, accessed on 13 April 2009.
- ⁵⁴² 'The rivers demand attention' (*De rivieren maken zich breed*), Volkskrant, 3 August 2002.
- ⁵⁴³ 'Provincial agreement on water needed' (*Provinciaal akkoord over water gewenst*), Gelderlander, 9 August 2003.
- ⁵⁴⁴ 'Polders not for emergency water storage; CDA and PvdA majority in the House of Representatives opts for higher dikes and deeper rivers' (*Polders niet als noodoverloop; Kamermeerderheid van CDA en PvdA kiest voor hogere dijken en diepere rivieren*), Gelderlander, 2 July 2002.
- ⁵⁴⁵ 'State secretary starts debate about emergency water storage' (*Staatssecretaris start debat over noodoverloopgebieden*): www.minvenw.nl, accessed on 8 November 2008; 'Breaching dikes unnecessary' (*Dijken doorsteken onnodig*), Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.
- ⁵⁴⁶ 'Breaching dikes "unnecessary"; alternative proposal by Gelderland for emergency storage 'better, easier to implement and cheaper' (*Dijken doorsteken 'onnodig'; Gelders alternatief voor noodoverloop 'beter, sneller uitvoerbaar en goedkoper'*), Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.
- ⁵⁴⁷ 'Gelderland province wants to convince Schultz' (*Provincie Gelderland wil Schultz overtuigen*), Gelderlander, 19 August 2003.
- ⁵⁴⁸ As the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (KAN) did not play a significant role in the discussion on emergency water storage it is not considered as one of the key actors. The same goes for Rvierenland water board.
- ⁵⁴⁹ 'Province and KAN bury the hatchet' (*Provincie en KAN begraven de strijd bijl*), Gelderlander, 7 February 2003; 'KAN: No small retention areas' (*KAN: geen kleine overloopgebieden*), Gelderlander, 11 June 2003.

⁵⁵⁰ 'Province wants to convince Schultz; Gelderland: five plans to prove the futility of emergency water storage during high water' [*Provincie wil Schultz overtuigen; Gelderland: vijf plannen om onnut van noodoverloopgebieden bij hoogwater aan te tonen*], Gelderlander, 19 August 2003.

⁵⁵¹ Interview with H. Zomerdijs, 10 November 2005.

⁵⁵² The premise of this document was an extreme discharge and failure mechanisms, which involves uncertainties, including the wind, the discharge distribution, the form of the wave and the residual strength of the dike. Source: interview with W. Silva, W. ten Brink and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2005.

⁵⁵³ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

⁵⁵⁴ 'State secretary Schultz abandons plans for emergency water storage' [*Staatssecretaris Schultz laat plannen noodoverloop vallen*], WaterForum Online, 30 March 2005: www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1.asp?pagina=3123, accessed on 13 April 2009.

⁵⁵⁵ 'Ooijpolder and Rijnstrangen not emergency water storage areas' [*Ooijpolder en Rijnstrangen geen noodoverloop*], ANP, 15 April 2005.

⁵⁵⁶ Various people confirmed this, including J. de Ruig, 25 May 2005; W. Silva, W. ten Brink, C. Beekmans, 30 June 2005.

⁵⁵⁷ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.

⁵⁵⁸ <http://www.helpdeskwater.nl/projectvkn/>, accessed on 21 July 2009.

⁵⁵⁹ Her successor, Melanie Schulz van Haegen, made the same case in her Cleveringa lecture on 27 November 2003.

⁵⁶⁰ 'More room for the river' (Meer ruimte voor de rivier), NRC Handelsblad, 29 February 2000.

⁵⁶¹ Interview with D. Luteijn, 6 July 2005.

⁵⁶² Interview with J. de Ruig, 25 May 2005.

⁵⁶³ Interview with D. Luteijn, 6 June 2005.

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.

⁵⁶⁵ The Directorate-General for Water Affairs was established in 2001 in a reorganisation in which Rijkswaterstaat became a matrix organisation. The Directorate-General for Water Affairs is responsible for water management policy.

⁵⁶⁶ For many interviewees, including politicians, officials and residents, the difference between emergency water storage areas, inlet areas and retention areas was not clear. These were used interchangeably but not correctly. Source: interviews with C. Jol, 19 October 2005, and G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005. See the section 'Opposing voices from within' (page 147) for the correct interpretation.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005.

⁵⁶⁸ At that time he was working at Rijkswaterstaat head office; in 2001 he moved to a position at the newly established Directorate-General for Water Affairs.

⁵⁶⁹ The flood safety approach is based on design water levels and only looks into the probability of flooding. Dike reinforcement

measures are designed to cope with the design conditions. The designs are made with a minimum of costs, including preserving landscape values, nature and cultural and historic sites. A major drawback of this approach is that it is not possible to compare the costs and benefits of flood protection measures. It is also difficult to evaluate measures that aim to minimise damage, such as spatial planning and emergency measures (van der Most & Wehrung, 2005). Besides, in the probability of flooding 'external factors' are not included (Silva, 2001; Stijnen, 2007). The flood-risk approach leads to a spatial differentiation of protection standards, in which Ooijpolder remains a candidate for [uncontrolled] flooding (Roth & Warner, 2007).

⁵⁷⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁵⁷¹ Interview with J. de Ruig, 26 May 2005.

⁵⁷² Interview with W. ten Brinke, 30 June 2004.

⁵⁷³ Interview with R. Jorissen, 15 November 2005.

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with P. Berends, 1 March 2004, and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2004.

⁵⁷⁵ Interview with C. Beekmans, 30 June 2004.

⁵⁷⁶ A retention area is an area surrounded by a dike. It is used for storing the top of the discharge wave (peak shaving) via a spillway or other infrastructure. The total storage capacity of a retention area has to be large enough to store the total volume of the water from the peak shaving. The inlet has to be large enough to allow the difference between the top (peak shaving) and the remaining discharge water to flow into the retention area (Klijn & van der Most, 2000:3-2).

⁵⁷⁷ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁵⁷⁸ The Loevestein meeting is named after the place where the meeting was held, Loevestein Castle, which is situated on the afgedamde Maas, a northern tributary of the Meuse.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.

⁵⁸⁰ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.

⁵⁸¹ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

⁵⁸² Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.

⁵⁸³ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁵⁸⁴ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.

⁵⁸⁵ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005; W. Silva, W. ten Brinke and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2004.

⁵⁸⁶ 'Storing flood waves in Germany' [*Hoogwatergolf in Duitsland opvangen*], by Johan de Bondt, Gelderlander, 23 May 2002.

⁵⁸⁷ Interview with H. Zomerdijs, 10 November 2005.

⁵⁸⁸ 'Breaching dikes "unnecessary"; alternative proposal by Gelderland for emergency storage 'better, easier to implement and cheaper' [*Dijken doorsteken 'onnodig', Gelders alternatief voor noodoverloop 'beter, sneller uitvoerbaar en goedkoper'*], Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.

- ⁵⁸⁹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005; 'Tough guys' [*Zware jongens*], Gelderlander, 3 September 2005.
- ⁵⁹⁰ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.
- ⁵⁹¹ The then Noord-Brabant provincial delegate was very outspoken about this (interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005), in contrast to Rijkswaterstaat and the Directorate-General for Water Affairs, which have a somewhat difficult relationship with the province of Gelderland (pers. comm. H. de Hartog, 25 January 2007).
- ⁵⁹² 'Province wants to convince Schultz; Gelderland: five plans to prove the futility of emergency water storage during high water' [*Provincie wil Schultz overtuigen; Gelderland: vijf plannen om onnut van noodoverloopgebieden bij hoogwater aan te tonen*], Gelderlander, 19 August 2003.
- ⁵⁹³ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁵⁹⁴ 'Everything has a price in the high water plan' [*Alles heeft zijn prijs bij hoogwaterplan*], Gelderlander, 27 January 2003.
- ⁵⁹⁵ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁵⁹⁶ 'More room for the rivers; municipalities indignant about plans' [*Meer ruimte voor de rivieren; gemeenten verbijsterd over plannen*], NRC Handelsblad, 29 February 2000.
- ⁵⁹⁷ Interview with P. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁵⁹⁸ 'Ooijpolder: Luteijn is playing God' [*Ooijpolder: Luteijn speelt voor God*], NRC Handelsblad, 30 May 2002.
- ⁵⁹⁹ 'Rhine division favourite for "bathtub"' [*Rijnsplitsing favoriet voor 'badkuip'*], Gelderlander, 7 February 2002.
- ⁶⁰⁰ 'Rhine division favorite for "bathtub"' [*Rijnsplitsing favoriet voor 'badkuip'*], Gelderlander, 7 February 2002.
- ⁶⁰¹ Interview with P. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁶⁰² 'Municipalities up in arms against Luteijn' [*Gemeenten tegen Luteijn in geweer*], Gelderlander, 7 June 2002.
- ⁶⁰³ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁶⁰⁴ Derived from an interview with H. Zomerdijk, 10 November 2005, and an interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁶⁰⁵ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁶⁰⁶ Groot Maas en Waal polder district later became part of Rivierenland water board.
- ⁶⁰⁷ Interview with Z. Stappershoef, 8 July 2005.
- ⁶⁰⁸ 'De Vries will scratch her hand ten times' [*De Vries zal zich wel tien keer achter haar oren krabben*], Gelderlander, 28 August 2001.
- ⁶⁰⁹ 'Fierce protest village council against retention' [*Fel protest raad tegen retentiebekken*], Gelderlander, 2 July 2001; 'De Vries will be thoroughly bemused' [*De Vries zal zich wel tien keer achter haar horen krabben*], Gelderlander, 28 August 2001.
- ⁶¹⁰ 'Ubbergen struggles to balance emotion and common sense in resisting the water' [*Ubbergen worstelt in waterverzet tussen emotie en gezond verstand*], Gelderlander, 24 August 2002.
- ⁶¹¹ Interview with K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.
- ⁶¹² Interview with Z. Stappershoef, 8 July 2005.
- ⁶¹³ Interview with W.A. Arnts, 8 August 2005.
- ⁶¹⁴ Interview with M.P.J.M. Zegers, 1 July 2005.
- ⁶¹⁵ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶¹⁶ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.
- ⁶¹⁷ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁶¹⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶¹⁹ 'Protest against emergency water storage areas continues unabated' [*Verzet tegen noodoverloopgebieden blijft onverminderd groot*], WaterForum Online, 4 February 2004: www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1.asp?paginanr=2063, accessed on 3 July 2008.
- ⁶²⁰ 'State secretary bad-mouthed in Millingen' [*Staatssecretaris over de tong in Millingen*], Gelderlander, 17 December 2002.
- ⁶²¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶²² Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶²³ 'Politics come to talk about high water' [*Politiek komt praten over hoogwater*], Gelderlander, 4 December 2002.
- ⁶²⁴ Interview with K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.
- ⁶²⁵ Interview with K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.
- ⁶²⁶ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶²⁷ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.
- ⁶²⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.
- ⁶²⁹ 'Ooijpolder not an option for emergency water storage' [*Ooijpolder niet voor opvang hoogwater*], Gelderlander, 10 October 2005 and interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶³⁰ Interview with Z. Stappershoef, 8 July 2005.
- ⁶³¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.
- ⁶³² 'Opposition to emergency water storage areas continues unabatement' [*Verzet tegen noodoverloopgebieden blijft onverminderd groot*], Waterforum Online, 5 February 2004: http://www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1_print.asp?paginanr=2063, accessed on 3 July 2008.
- ⁶³³ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁶³⁴ 'Opposition to emergency water storage areas continues unabatement' [*Verzet tegen noodoverloopgebieden blijft onverminderd groot*], Waterforum Online, 5 February 2004: http://www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1_print.asp

p?paginanr=2063, accessed on 3 July 2008.

⁶³⁵ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶³⁶ 'Opposition to emergency water storage areas continues unabated' (*Verzet tegen noodoverloopgebieden blijft onverminderd groot*), Waterforum Online, 5 February 2004: http://www.netserver1.net/waterforum/template_a1_print.asp?paginanr=2063, accessed on 3 July 2008.

⁶³⁷ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

⁶³⁸ Interview with K. Nuijten and H. Sanders, 19 September 2008.

⁶³⁹ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁴⁰ 'Ooijpolder: Luteijn plays God' (*Ooijpolder: Luteijn speelt voor God*), NRC Handelsblad, 30 May 2002.

⁶⁴¹ 'And the milking robot?' (*En de melkrobot dan?*), NRC Handelsblad, 4 March 2000.

⁶⁴² Interview with Z. Stappershoeve, 8 July 2005.

⁶⁴³ Interview with J. Smit, 1 July 2005.

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with J.F. Bekhuis, 4 August 2005.

⁶⁴⁵ 'Local group', 'residents' and 'citizens' will be used interchangeably here, although in fact the local group is an organisation with a certain number of members, some actively participating in the process, whereas 'residents' refers to everyone living in the area, and 'citizens' is a general term for anyone not holding a public office.

⁶⁴⁶ 'State secretary blushes with shame' (*Staatssecretaris zit met schaamrood op de kaken*), Gelderlander 3 May 2001.

⁶⁴⁷ 'Protest does not mollify state secretary' (*Protest vermurwt bewindsvrouw niet*), Gelderlander 26 November 2002.

⁶⁴⁸ The place where Parliament and the government ministries are located.

⁶⁴⁹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁶⁵⁰ Interview with K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.

⁶⁵¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶⁵² Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶⁵³ Interview with K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.

⁶⁵⁴ Pers. comm. H.B.A.M. Sanders, 14 October 2005.

⁶⁵⁵ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

⁶⁵⁶ 'Storing flood waves in Germany' (*Hoogwatergolf in Duitsland opvangen*), Gelderlander, 23 May 2002.

⁶⁵⁷ 'Gelderland Provincial Executive: Emergency water storage not useful and not necessary' (*Provinciale Staten van Gelderland: Noodoverloopgebieden niet nuttig en niet noodzakelijk*), Rivierenmagazine, no. 9, Spring 2003.

⁶⁵⁸ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁵⁹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁶⁰ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005; 'Tough guys' (*Zware jongens*), Gelderlander, 3 September 2005.

⁶⁶¹ 'Helping hand' (*Opsteker*), Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.

⁶⁶² Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁶⁶³ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶⁶⁴ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁶⁵ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁶⁶ 'Rhine bifurcation favourite for "bathtub"' (*Rijnsplitsing favoriet voor 'badkuip'*), Gelderlander, 7 February 2002. This was due to the fact that the search area was located in Ooijpolder, while in fact what was meant was Ooijpolder and Duffelt (see also section 6.1). The municipality of Millingen a/d Rijn is situated in Duffelt polder.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁶⁸ Groot Maas en Waal polder district later became part of Rivierenland water board.

⁶⁶⁹ 'Straw dolls as opposition' (*Stropoppen als verzet*), Gelderlander, 21 August 2002; 'C'90 [a local political party] discusses retention area and emergency water storage' (*C'90 discussieert over retentiebekken en overloopgebied*), Gelderlander, 5 September 2002; interview with W.A. Arnts, 8 August 2005.

⁶⁷⁰ 'Straw dolls as opposition' (*Stropoppen als verzet*), Gelderlander, 21 August 2002.

⁶⁷¹ He did not play a role in starting up the residents' group; interview with W.F.T. van Ellen, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁷² Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁷³ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005; 'Protest does not mollify state secretary' (*Protest vermurwt bewindsvrouw niet*), Gelderlander, 26 November 2002.

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005; H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶⁷⁵ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁶⁷⁶ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁷⁷ 'Unique meeting: Municipalities thank High Water Platform' (*Unieke bijeenkomst: gemeenten bedanken Hoogwaterplatform*), Gelderlander, 12 May 2005.

⁶⁷⁸ 'High Water Platform asks for subsidy' (*Hoogwaterplatform vraagt subsidie*), Gelderlander, 1 March 2004; 'High Water Platform visits Millingen Municipal Council' (*Hoogwaterplatform op bezoek bij Millingse gemeenteraad*), Gelderlander, 14 December 2002.

⁶⁷⁹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁸⁰ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁸¹ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁸² Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁸³ 'Province wants to convince Schultz van Haegen; Gelderland: five plans to prove the futility of emergency water storage during high water' (*Provincie wil Schultz van Haegen overtuigen; Gelderland: vijf plannen om onnut van noodoverloopgebieden bij hoogwater aan te tonen*), Gelderland, 19 August 2003.

⁶⁸⁴ The Rijkswaterstaat official had a slightly different opinion about emergency water storage, see section 6.1 Arguments, Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office.

⁶⁸⁵ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁸⁶ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁸⁷ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁶⁸⁸ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁸⁹ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁹⁰ 'Ubbergen battles 'Luteijn'' (*Ubbergen ten strijde tegen 'Luteijn'*), Gelderland, 17 June 2002.

⁶⁹¹ Interview with H. Zomerdijs, 10 November 2005.

⁶⁹² Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.

⁶⁹³ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁶⁹⁴ 'The Hague can count on fierce opposition' (*Den Haag kan op fel verzet rekenen*), Gelderland, 14 August 2003; 'Breaching dikes "unnecessary"; alternative proposal by Gelderland for emergency storage 'better, easier to implement and cheaper' (*Dijken doorsteken 'onnodig', Gelders alternatief voor noodoverloop 'beter, sneller uitvoerbaar en goedkoper'*), Gelderland, 11 January 2003; 'Gelderland's high water policy is logical' (*Gelders hoogwaterbeleid is wel consequent*), Gelderland 6 August 2003.

⁶⁹⁵ 'Flood protection without water storage areas' (*Bescherming tegen hoog water zonder overloopgebieden*) by H. Zomerdijs, Gelderland, 14 November 2002.

⁶⁹⁶ 'High water policy is like a Whitsun dancing procession' (*Hoogwaterbeleid is net Echernachter processie*), Gelderland, 19 July 2003.

⁶⁹⁷ 'High water policy is like a Whitsun dancing procession' (*Hoogwaterbeleid is net Echernachter processie*), Gelderland, 19 July 2003; 'Gelderland's high water policy is logical' (*Gelders hoogwaterbeleid is wel consequent*), Gelderland, 6 August 2003.

⁶⁹⁸ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁶⁹⁹ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷⁰⁰ Interview with H. Zomerdijs, 10 November 2005; and P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷⁰¹ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷⁰² Interview with E. van Lith, 9 August 2005.

⁷⁰³ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷⁰⁴ Interview with H. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.

⁷⁰⁵ Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.

⁷⁰⁶ Particularly when the focus was on questions such as the need and purpose of the measure, and knowledge and expertise were involved, a clear distinction could be made between two types of officials: staff members and experts. As in the previous section, officials are here viewed as a uniform group, although they in fact were a diverse group. This will be noted only when a clear distinction is apparent.

⁷⁰⁷ Interview with W. Silva, W. ten Brink, and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2005.

⁷⁰⁸ 'State secretary blushes with shame' (*Staatssecretaris zit met schaamrood op de kaken*), Gelderland, 3 May 2001.

⁷⁰⁹ 'Protest does not mollify state secretary' (*Protest vermurwt bewindsvrouw niet*), Gelderland, 26 November 2002.

⁷¹⁰ 'Better controlled than uncontrolled flooding' (*Beter gecontroleerd dan ongecontroleerd overstroom*), WaterForum Online, 16 December 2002; http://www.waterforum.net/template_b_print.asp?paginaNr=80, accessed on 21 July 2009.

⁷¹¹ Interview with H. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷¹² Interview with H. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷¹³ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁷¹⁴ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁷¹⁵ Interview with H. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷¹⁶ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷¹⁷ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷¹⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷¹⁹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷²⁰ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷²¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷²² 'Chairman Sanders: "Luteijn is a disaster"' (*Voorzitter Sanders: 'Luteijn is zelf een ramp'*), Gelderland, 23 November 2002.

⁷²³ 'No Berlin Wall in Ooijpolder' (*Geen Berlijnse muur in de Ooijpolder*), Gelderland, 26 November 2002.

⁷²⁴ 'Do not drown Ooijpolder' (*Laat de Ooijpolder niet verzui- pen*), Volkskrant, 27 December 2003.

⁷²⁵ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷²⁶ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷²⁷ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷²⁸ Here, Rijkswaterstaat and the Department of Water Management are considered the same organisation.

⁷²⁹ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

- ⁷³⁰ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷³¹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷³² Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.
- ⁷³³ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷³⁴ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷³⁵ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷³⁶ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷³⁷ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷³⁸ 'Emergency water storage on the agenda again; Schultz van Haegen calls alternatives of Gelderland and Noord-Brabant provinces "prohibitively expensive"' [*Noodoverloop weer op de agenda; Staatssecretaris Schultz van Haegen noemt alternatieven Gelderland en Noord-Brabant 'onbetaalbaar'*], Gelderlander, 16 August 2003.
- ⁷³⁹ 'Better controlled than uncontrolled flooding' [*Beter gecontroleerd dan ongecontroleerd overstroom*], WaterForum Online, 16 December 2002: http://www.waterforum.net/template_b_print.asp?paginanr=80, accessed on 21 July 2009.
- ⁷⁴⁰ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁴¹ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.
- ⁷⁴² Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005.
- ⁷⁴³ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁴⁴ 'Better controlled than uncontrolled flooding' [*Beter gecontroleerd dan ongecontroleerd overstroom*], WaterForum Online, 16 December 2002: http://www.waterforum.net/template_b_print.asp?paginanr=80, accessed on 21 July 2009.
- ⁷⁴⁵ 'Do not drown Ooijpolder; critics argue that the characteristic polder near Nijmegen must not become a water storage area' [*Laat de Ooijpolder niet verzuipen; Karakteristieke polder bij Nijmegen moet volgens critici geen overstromingsgebied worden*], Volkskrant, 27 December 2003.
- ⁷⁴⁶ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷⁴⁷ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷⁴⁸ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷⁴⁹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷⁵⁰ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷⁵¹ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷⁵² Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.
- ⁷⁵³ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁵⁴ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁵⁵ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁵⁶ 'Cabinet reserves areas for emergency water storage' [*Kabinet reserveert ruimte voor noodoverloop*], press release by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 19 December 2003.
- ⁷⁵⁷ 'Emergency water storage not yet definite' [*Noodoverloopgebieden helemaal geen gelopen race*], Gelderlander, 9 April 2004.
- ⁷⁵⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.
- ⁷⁵⁹ 'Emergency water storage not yet definite' [*Noodoverloopgebieden helemaal geen gelopen race*], Gelderlander, 9 April 2004.
- ⁷⁶⁰ Interview with D. Luteijn, 6 July 2005.
- ⁷⁶¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 and 30 June 2005; K. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.
- ⁷⁶² Later this report was published under the title 'Limiting flood risk in the Upstream rivers area; Supplementary memorandum on 'An explorative policy analysis of disaster management and structural measures along the Rhine branches and the endiked Meuse'' [*Beperking van overstromingsrisico's in het Bovenrivierengebied; oplegnotitie bij 'Een verkennende beleidsanalyse van rampenbeheersing en structurele maatregelen langs de Rijntakken en de bedijkte Maas'*] (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004).
- ⁷⁶³ Interview with D. Klopstra, 15 February 2006.
- ⁷⁶⁴ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.
- ⁷⁶⁵ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 and 30 June 2005; H. Nuijten and H.B.A.M. Sanders, 19 September 2008.
- ⁷⁶⁶ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.
- ⁷⁶⁷ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.
- ⁷⁶⁸ 'Breaching dikes "unnecessary"' [*Dijken doorsteken 'onnodig'*], Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.
- ⁷⁶⁹ 'Emergency water storage not needed in Gelderland' [*Noodoverloopgebieden in Gelderland niet nodig*], Gelderlander, 13 January 2003.
- ⁷⁷⁰ 'Areas for water storage are not needed' [*Gebieden voor wateropvang onnodig*], BN/De Stem, 11 January 2003.
- ⁷⁷¹ 'Breaching dikes "unnecessary"' [*Dijken doorsteken 'onnodig'*], Gelderlander, 11 January 2003.
- ⁷⁷² Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.
- ⁷⁷³ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁴ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁵ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁶ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁷ 'Unique meeting: municipalities acknowledge High Water Platform' [*Unieke bijeenkomst: gemeenten bedanken Hoogwaterplatform*], Gelderlander, 12 May 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁸ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.
- ⁷⁷⁹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁷⁸⁰ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷⁸¹ Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 7 June 2005.

⁷⁸² 'Cabinet decides to provisionally reserve areas for emergency water storage' (*Kabinet besluit tot voorlopige reservering van noodoverloopgebieden*), press release by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 19 December 2003.

⁷⁸³ Interview with J.H. Jansen, 22 July 2005, and C. Jol, 19 October 2005.

⁷⁸⁴ Interview with R. Postma, 16 January 2005.

⁷⁸⁵ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁷⁸⁶ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁷⁸⁷ 'Emergency water storage not yet definite' (*Noodoverloopgebieden helemaal geen gelopen race*), Gelderlander, 9 April 2004.

⁷⁸⁸ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷⁸⁹ 'Better controlled than uncontrolled flooding' (*Beter gecontroleerd dan ongecontroleerd overstroom*), WaterForum Online, 16 December 2002: http://www.waterforum.net/template_b_print.asp?paginaNr=80, accessed on 21 July 2009.

⁷⁹⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁷⁹¹ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁷⁹² Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁷⁹³ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁷⁹⁴ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁷⁹⁵ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁷⁹⁶ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁷⁹⁷ 'Absolute flood protection is an illusion' (*Absolute veiligheid tegen watersnood is illusie*), Trouw, 14 March 2003.

⁷⁹⁸ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁷⁹⁹ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁸⁰⁰ Interview with P. Berends, 1 March 2004.

⁸⁰¹ Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.

⁸⁰² In a market economy a large quantity of sand or gravel coming onto the market would depress prices and reduce demand.

⁸⁰³ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

⁸⁰⁴ The large water systems include the rivers Scheldt, Rhine and Meuse.

⁸⁰⁵ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸⁰⁶ Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.

⁸⁰⁷ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸⁰⁸ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁸⁰⁹ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸¹⁰ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁸¹¹ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸¹² Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸¹³ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁸¹⁴ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁸¹⁵ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁸¹⁶ Interview with W. van der Kleij, 11 April 2005.

⁸¹⁷ Interview with W. van der Kleij, 11 April 2005.

⁸¹⁸ This is confirmed by various officials; interview with R. Jorissen, 15 November 2005; W. Silva, W. ten Brink and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2005.

⁸¹⁹ http://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/over_ons/missiekerntaken/, accessed on 5 September 2009.

⁸²⁰ M. Schulz van Haegen in her Cleveringa lecture, delivered on 27 November 2003.

⁸²¹ Interview with R. Jorissen, 15 November 2005.

⁸²² Interview with W. Silva, W. ten Brink and C. Beekmans, 30 June 2004.

⁸²³ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 20 January 2006.

⁸²⁴ 'Better controlled than uncontrolled flooding' (*Beter gecontroleerd dan ongecontroleerd overstroom*), WaterForum Online, 16 December 2002: http://www.waterforum.net/template_b_print.asp?paginaNr=80, accessed on 21 July 2009.

⁸²⁵ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005; pers. comm. H. de Hartog, 27 January 2007.

⁸²⁶ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

⁸²⁷ Interview with F. Verhoef, 21 June 2005.

⁸²⁸ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁸²⁹ Interview with J. de Bondt, 29 September 2005.

⁸³⁰ Data derived from www.millingen.nl and www.ubbergen.nl, accessed on 27 July 2009.

⁸³¹ Interview with P.G.I. Wilbers, 4 July 2005.

⁸³² Interview with H.B.A.M. Sanders, 30 June 2005.

⁸³³ The story which circulated among government officials is that these numbers were an extrapolation of the Rhine discharge during the 1926 flood (12,600 m³/s). The river discharges during the high water events of 1993 and 1995, which was not as high as the discharge in 1926, were not included. (Pers. comm. H. de Hartog, 24 October 2008). The peak discharge in 1993 was measured at 11,100 m³/s and in 1995 it was 12,060 m³/s.

- ⁸³⁴ A terp (mound) is a human-made elevation in the landscape, historically used to build farms and settlements on and as refuges from flooding before dikes were built for flood protection. The oldest terps are over 2000 years old.
- ⁸³⁵ This case description is based partly on Roth and Winubst (2009b).
- ⁸³⁶ Rijkswaterstaat is the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management, the executive agency responsible for the management of the rivers Scheldt, Meuse and Rhine in the Netherlands.
- ⁸³⁷ Habiforum is a non-governmental organisation for multi-functional land use.
- ⁸³⁸ The summary is based mainly on Warner et al. [2008a].
- ⁸³⁹ www.accanto.nl, accessed on 26 March 2009.
- ⁸⁴⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 27 May 2005.
- ⁸⁴¹ Dienst der Domeinen is a department of the Ministry of Finance.
- ⁸⁴² The Council of State advises the Government and Parliament on legislative and administrative matters and is the supreme court in administrative conflicts.
- ⁸⁴³ Interview with C. Jol, 19 October 2005.
- ⁸⁴⁴ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.
- ⁸⁴⁵ The place where the Rhine enters the Netherlands.
- ⁸⁴⁶ The place where the Meuse enters the Netherlands.
- ⁸⁴⁷ In the early 1990s the design discharge for the Rhine was reduced from 16,000 to 15,000 m³/s as a result of public pressure to protect cultural heritage value of the landscape by minimising engineering interventions [dike reinforcements]. After the 1995 high water episode the design discharge was restored to 16,000 m³/s.
- ⁸⁴⁸ 'Farmers in Overdiep Polder get political support' [*Boeren Overdiepse polder krijgen steun politiek*], Zuidland, 28 May 2004.
- ⁸⁴⁹ The Water Vision Group was established by the national government and consisted of politicians, elected officials, government officers and consultants.
- ⁸⁵⁰ Interview with B. van den Reek, 17 June 2005.
- ⁸⁵¹ 'A change in thinking about water down to the grass roots, proposal for two national demonstration projects [*Omslag in denken over water tot in de huiskamer, voorstel voor twee nationale spiegelprojecten*]', Water Vision Group, 21 May 2001.
- ⁸⁵² Letter from the provincial delegate, Jan Boelhouwer, to the state secretary, Monique de Vries, 18 May 2001.
- ⁸⁵³ Letter from the state secretary, Monique de Vries, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 12 July 2001.
- ⁸⁵⁴ This terminology was invented by Habiforum.
- ⁸⁵⁵ www.accanto.nl, accessed on 26 March 2009.
- ⁸⁵⁶ 'Water management is not as obvious as it seems' [*Waterbeheer niet zo vanzelfsprekend als het lijkt*], Magazine B&G, December 2003: <http://www.bng.nl/smartsite.shtml?id=52102>, accessed on 5 July 2009.
- ⁸⁵⁷ Pers. comm. J. Sonnevijlle, 10 June 2008.
- ⁸⁵⁸ Letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group Water, Neelie Kroes, to the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, 2 April 2003.
- ⁸⁵⁹ Memorandum by Habiforum, 'Feasibility study Overdiep Polder, input for the meeting of the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee', 24 April 2002.
- ⁸⁶⁰ Letter from the chair of the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, Lambert Verheijen, to the state secretary for water management and the ministers for agriculture and spatial planning, 29 October 2003; Letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, to the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, 2 April 2003.
- ⁸⁶¹ This plan included compensation measures for the construction of a sluice in the Heusdensch Kanaal that would cause the water level of the Bergsche Maas to rise by 1.7 cm. It was part of the Major Rivers Delta Plan, which was adopted on in the mid 1990s. Source: 'Alternative in Overdiep polder: Province says construction of channels too costly' [*Alternatief in Overdiepse polder; Provincie: aanleg geulen te duur*], Brabants Dagblad, 12 April 2003.
- ⁸⁶² Letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, to the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, 2 April 2003.
- ⁸⁶³ Interview with A. van Luin, 19 July 2006.
- ⁸⁶⁴ While in 1997 the costs of the side channels were estimated to be 4.5 million euros, this increased to 11.5 million euros in 2003, of which Noord-Brabant had to pay 45 per cent (in relation to the estimated 1.7 cm decrease in water level the initial cost estimate was 2.6 million euros per cm water decrease, rising to 6.8 million). The province was of the opinion that these costs were not in due proportion to the objective. This opinion was supported by the province of Gelderland, which was co-financing the project. Source: 'Alternative in Overdiep polder; Province says construction of side channels too costly' [*Alternatief in Overdiepse polder; Provincie: aanleg geulen te duur*], Brabants Dagblad, 12 April 2003.
- ⁸⁶⁵ Letter from the provincial delegate Lambert Verheijen to the dike reeves of the water boards involved, 3 October 2003.
- ⁸⁶⁶ 'Eels in the maize fields in Overdiep polder' (Palingen tussen de maïs in Overdiepse polder), BN/De Stem, 15 October 2003.
- ⁸⁶⁷ Letter from the mayor of Waalwijk, J. de Geus, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 20 May 2003.
- ⁸⁶⁸ Letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, to the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, 2 April 2003.
- ⁸⁶⁹ Letter from mayor of Waalwijk, J. de Geus, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 20 May 2003.
- ⁸⁷⁰ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.
- ⁸⁷¹ Interview with B. van den Reek, 17 June 2005.
- ⁸⁷² The cost of the terps plan was rather unclear as Rijkswaterstaat was not transparent in showing the methods for calculating the costs for the spatial infrastructure projects (also

referred to as PRI system) [Slootweg, 2004]. Figures ranging from 90 to 150 million euros were in circulation. Compared with other spatial measures in the river area the terps plan turned out to be one of the most cost-effective measures [relating to the estimated 30 cm water decrease, it would cost 3-5 million euros per cm water reduction]. Only technical measures like dike reinforcement or excavating the river forelands were cheaper. Source: Letter from the provincial delegate Lambert Verheijen in his capacity as chair of the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee to the Department of Water Management and the ministers for agriculture and spatial planning, 29 October 2003.

⁸⁷³ 'Terps plan Overdiep Polder in with a chance' (*Terpenplan Overdiepse polder maakt een kans*), Brabants Dagblad, 24 November 2003.

⁸⁷⁴ The budget was initially 1.9 billion euros, but later this increased to 2.2 billion euros.

⁸⁷⁵ 'Terps plan Overdiep polder is in with a chance' (*Terpenplan Overdiepse polder maakt een kans*), Brabants Dagblad, 24 November 2003.

⁸⁷⁶ Letter from the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 20 May 2003.

⁸⁷⁷ Letter from the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 20 May 2003.

⁸⁷⁸ Interview with B. van den Reek, 17 June 2005.

⁸⁷⁹ 'Farmers in Overdiep Polder get political support' (*Boeren Overdiepse polder krijgen steun politiek*), Zuidland, 28 May 2004.

⁸⁸⁰ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

⁸⁸¹ Letter from the state secretary, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, to the chair of the Steering Committees Room for the River, Lambert Verheijen, 28 June 2004.

⁸⁸² According to the Rijkswaterstaat regulations, there must first be a plan study decision (SNIP2), then a variant choice (SNIP2a) and after that a project decision (SNIP3); SNIP is a review procedure for flood safety and water management projects. Source: MER Nieuws, August 2005.

⁸⁸³ Pers. comm. J. Sonnevijlle, 10 June 2008.

⁸⁸⁴ Pers. comm. J. Sonnevijlle, 10 June 2008.

⁸⁸⁵ First progress report on the plan study 'River Widening Overdiep Polder', reporting period 14 December – June 2005.

⁸⁸⁶ Various respondents confirmed this view [A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005; C. Jol, 19 October 2005; H. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005; G. Verwolf, 11 November 2005].

⁸⁸⁷ This was how the Room for the River programme manager referred to problems without a standard solution. Source: interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2004.

⁸⁸⁸ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁸⁸⁹ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

⁸⁹⁰ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

⁸⁹¹ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁸⁹² 'Overdiep Polder' [Overdiepse polder], Rivierbreed, June 2006; interview R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁸⁹³ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006; a regional alternative which corresponds to the terps plan, a hydraulic, an economic and a most environmentally favourable alternative [meest milieuvriendelijk alternatief]. Source: River widening Overdiep Polder, summary EIA (Rivierverruiming Overdiepse polder, Samenvatting Project Nota/M.e.r.), Noord-Brabant provincial government, n.d..

⁸⁹⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 15 July 2005.

⁸⁹⁵ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁸⁹⁶ Interview with W. Tiggeloven, 13 November 2006.

⁸⁹⁷ The Team was set up to advise on land and other property acquisition. Its members include Rijkswaterstaat, the Government Service for Land and Water Management and external parties. They agreed that the project coordinator (in the case of the terps plan the province) should prepare an acquisition strategy and that the final decision rests with Rijkswaterstaat, with an advisory input from the Coordination Team.

⁸⁹⁸ 'Nine terps for "stayers" in Overdiep Polder' (*Negen terpen voor 'blijvers' in Overdiepse polder*), Land + Water, no. 8, August 2007.

⁸⁹⁹ 'Province pursues smoking out policy' (*Provincie voert uitrookbeleid*), BN De Stem, 27 June 2007.

⁹⁰⁰ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰¹ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰² Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰³ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰⁵ This was supported by various insiders, including Rijkswaterstaat officials, the provincial delegate and a provincial official; interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005 and 20 January 2006; W. van der Kleij, 11 April 2005; J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005; R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁰⁶ Speech by state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen at the 'Mirror Day' organised by Habiforum, 21 October 2003.

⁹⁰⁷ 'Overdiep polder wants clarity in June' (*Overdiepse polder wil in juni echte duidelijkheid*), Brabants Dagblad, 25 November 2003.

⁹⁰⁸ Speech by state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen at the 'Mirror Day' organised by Habiforum, 21 October 2003.

⁹⁰⁹ Interview with H. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

⁹¹⁰ Interview with A. van der Hoek, 24 March 2005.

⁹¹¹ 'Room for the river and for innovation?' (*Ruimte voor de rivier en voor innovatie?*), GeoVisie, no. 12, July 2006.

⁹¹² Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁹¹³ 'Front runners build up a head of steam' [Koplopers goed

op stoom], by I. de Boer, weblog 8 – June 2007: www.ruimtevoordervier.nl, accessed on 3 March 2009.

⁹¹⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹¹⁵ Pers. comm. H. de Hartog, 25 January 2007.

⁹¹⁶ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

⁹¹⁷ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

⁹¹⁸ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

⁹¹⁹ 'Overdiep Polder' [De Overdiepse polder], *De Water*, August 2003.

⁹²⁰ Speech by the provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer during 'Mirror Day' organised by Habiforum. The speech focused on the Overdiep polder and was entitled 'Room for the River starts with Overdiep Polder', 22 November 2002.

⁹²¹ EO Radio 1, 15 December 2004: <http://www.ikcro.nl/artikelen/eo151204.html>, accessed on 16 December 2004.

⁹²² Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

⁹²³ 'Terps plan Overdiep Polder in with a chance' (*Terpenplan Overdiep polder maakt een kans*), *Brabants Dagblad*, 24 November 2003.

⁹²⁴ Letter from the mayor of Waalwijk, Jan de Geus, to the chair of the Water Vision Group, Neelie Kroes, 20 May 2003.

⁹²⁵ For example, the letter from the provincial delegate, Lambert Verheijen, to the state secretary, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, 27 January 2004.

⁹²⁶ 'Brabant makes its own emergency water storage plan for Overdiep Polder' [Brabant maakt zelf plan voor Overdiepse polder als noodoverloop], *Waterforum* Online: http://www.netserver2.net/waterforum/template_a1_print.asp?paginaNr=2898, accessed on 14 July 2006.

⁹²⁷ Interview with J.P.M. Moons, 2 October 2008.

⁹²⁸ Report of 'Mirror Day', by J. Elshof (ZLTO), no. ZJEL 06.003, 27 April 2006.

⁹²⁹ Interview with J.P.M. Moons, 2 October 2008.

⁹³⁰ Interview with J.P.M. Moons, 2 October 2008.

⁹³¹ Interview with J.P.M. Moons, 2 October 2008.

⁹³² Pers. comm. R. Peusens, 17 June 2008.

⁹³³ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁹³⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹³⁵ Interview with R. Peusens, 10 August 2006.

⁹³⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹³⁷ Interview with R. Peusens, 10 August 2006.

⁹³⁸ 'New to planning: design your own polder. Residents, government decision-makers and developers jointly determine the area's future' [*Nieuw in planologie: richt je eigen polder*

in. Bewoners, bestuurders en project ontwikkelaars bepalen samen hoe het land eruit komt te zien], *NRC Handelsblad*, 26 May 2007.

⁹³⁹ An inpassingsplan is a land use plan made by the national or provincial government that replaces [overrules] the local land use plan by the municipality. It can be used when important national or regional interests are at stake.

⁹⁴⁰ Overdiep Polder Newsletter (Nieuwsbrief Overdiepse polder), no. 7, December 2008.

⁹⁴¹ Interview with B. van den Reek, 17 June 2005.

⁹⁴² 'Farmers in Overdiep not afraid of the water' [Overdiepse boeren zijn niet bang voor water], *Trouw*, 7 June 2008.

⁹⁴³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 27 May 2005.

⁹⁴⁴ 'Cumbersome government bureaucracy hampers unique water engineering project. Back to the terp in Overdiep Polder' [*Trage ambtelijke molens vormen hindernis bij totstandkoming uniek waterbouwkundig project. Terug op de terp in de Overdiepse polder*], *Volkskrant*, 22 October 2007.

⁹⁴⁵ 'The Overdiep Polder' [De Overdiepse polder], *De Water*, August 2003.

⁹⁴⁶ 'Water management is not as obvious as it seems' [*Waterbeheer niet zo vanzelfsprekend als het lijkt*], *Magazine B&G*, December 2003: <http://www.bng.nl/smartsite.shtml?id=52102>, accessed on 5 July 2009.

⁹⁴⁷ 'Farmers in Overdiep Polder get political support' [*Boeren Overdiepse polder krijgen steun politiek*], *Zuidland*, 28 May 2004.

⁹⁴⁸ In the project he also had a role as moderator, facilitator and mediator. Source: J. Forrester, Alexander von Humboldt lecture, Radboud University Nijmegen, 18 February 2009.

⁹⁴⁹ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

⁹⁵⁰ Pers.com. R. Peusens, 10 June 2008.

⁹⁵¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.

⁹⁵² Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.

⁹⁵³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 29 June 2007.

⁹⁵⁴ Report of an information meeting with the residents by A. van Luin, 9 February 2005.

⁹⁵⁵ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 July 2006.

⁹⁵⁶ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.

⁹⁵⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.

⁹⁵⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

⁹⁵⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 15 July 2005.

⁹⁶⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.

⁹⁶¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.

⁹⁶² 'Cumbersome government bureaucracy hampers unique

water engineering project. Back to the terp in Overdiep Polder' (*Trage ambtelijke molens vormen hindernis bij totstandkoming uniek waterbouwkundig project. Terug op de terp in de Overdiepse polder*), Volkskrant, 22 October 2007.

⁹⁶³ 'Poldering in the polder: Room for the River and the Meuse Works are all about residents' trust' [*Polderen in de polder; Bij Ruimte voor de rivier en Maaswerken draait het om bewonersvertrouwen*], RWS Geel!, May 2008.

⁹⁶⁴ Derived from an interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

⁹⁶⁵ 'Cumbersome government bureaucracy hampers unique water engineering project. Back to the terp in Overdiep Polder' (*Trage ambtelijke molens vormen hindernis bij totstandkoming uniek waterbouwkundig project. Terug op de terp in de Overdiepse polder*), Volkskrant, 22 October 2007.

⁹⁶⁶ Interview with J. Sonnevijle, 10 June 2008.

⁹⁶⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.

⁹⁶⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.

⁹⁶⁹ 'New to planning: design your own polder. Residents, government decision-makers and developers jointly determine the area's future' (*Nieuw in planologie: richt je eigen polder in. Bewoners, bestuurders en project ontwikkelaars bepalen samen hoe het land eruit komt te zien*), NRC Handelsblad, 26 May 2007.

⁹⁷⁰ In the meantime milk quota regulations changed.

⁹⁷¹ 'I do not want to move to a terp' (Ik wil liever niet naar een terp), Zuidland, attached to Oogst, 24 October 2003.

⁹⁷² He is an associate of Habiforum.

⁹⁷³ EO Radio 1, 15 December 2004: <http://www.ikcro.nl/artikelen/EO151204.html>, accessed on 16 December 2004.

⁹⁷⁴ 'Local group', 'residents' and 'citizens' will be used interchangeably here, although in fact the local group is an organisation with a certain number of members, some actively participating in the process, whereas 'residents' refers to everyone living in the area, and 'citizens' is a general term for anyone not holding a public office.

⁹⁷⁵ Peter van Rooy.

⁹⁷⁶ In particular Jan Boelhouwer, a former provincial delegate who became a member of the House of Representatives in January 2003, proved to be a key person for the residents; interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 15 July 2005 and 14 October 2005.

⁹⁷⁷ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

⁹⁷⁸ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

⁹⁷⁹ Interview with A. van Luin, 19 July 2006.

⁹⁸⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.

⁹⁸¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 8 March 2007.

⁹⁸² Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁸³ Report of an information meeting with the residents by A.

van Luin, 9 February 2005; 'Immediate concerns about Overdiep Polder' [Actuele aandachtspunten Overdiepse polder], 4 March 2005 by P. van Rooy.

⁹⁸⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 July 2006.

⁹⁸⁵ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.

⁹⁸⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁸⁷ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

⁹⁸⁸ Habiforum is a non-governmental organisation for multi-functional land use.

⁹⁸⁹ The Water Vision Group was established by the national government and consisted of politicians, government decision-makers, government officers and consultants. Its remit was to find projects in which the new water policy could be put into practice.

⁹⁹⁰ Memorandum by the provincial project manager to Jan Boelhouwer, provincial delegate, 24 October 2001.

⁹⁹¹ Letter from the chair of the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, Lambert Verheijen, to the Department of Water Management and the agriculture and spatial planning ministries, 29 October 2003.

⁹⁹² Pers. comm. J. Sonnevijle, 10 June 2008.

⁹⁹³ First progress report on the River Widening Overdiep Polder plan study, reporting period 14 December – June 2005.

⁹⁹⁴ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.

⁹⁹⁵ For example, both joined the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG).

⁹⁹⁶ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

⁹⁹⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008, and interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

⁹⁹⁸ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

⁹⁹⁹ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

¹⁰⁰¹ Report of an information meeting with the residents by A. van Luin, 9 February 2005; 'Immediate concerns about Overdiep Polder' [Actuele aandachtspunten Overdiepse polder], 4 March 2005 by P. van Rooy.

¹⁰⁰² Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

¹⁰⁰³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Pers. comm. R. Peusens, 17 June 2008.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 March 2006 and 14 October 2005.

- ¹⁰⁰⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 25 May 2005.
- ¹⁰¹⁰ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.
- ¹⁰¹¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.
- ¹⁰¹² Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 July 2006.
- ¹⁰¹³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.
- ¹⁰¹⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.
- ¹⁰¹⁵ Interview with H. Brouwers, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰¹⁶ Interview with H. Brouwers, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰¹⁷ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰¹⁸ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰¹⁹ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰²⁰ Pers. comm. H. de Hartog, 25 January 2007.
- ¹⁰²¹ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰²² Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰²³ 'Overdiep Polder' [De Overdiepse polder], *De Water*, August 2003.
- ¹⁰²⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰²⁵ Interview with H. Brouwers, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰²⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰²⁷ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰²⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.
- ¹⁰²⁹ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰³⁰ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰³¹ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰³² Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰³³ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰³⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰³⁵ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰³⁶ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰³⁷ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰³⁸ This is the power of a government to take private property for public use; 'Cumbersome government bureaucracy hampers unique water engineering project. Back to the terp in Overdiep Polder' [*Trage ambtelijke molens vormen hinderenis bij totstandkoming uniek waterbouwkundig project. Terug op de terp in de Overdiepse polder*], *Volkskrant*, 22 October 2007.
- ¹⁰³⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.
- ¹⁰⁴⁰ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁴¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.
- ¹⁰⁴² Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰⁴³ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰⁴⁴ Basic document Regulations, Noord-Brabant province in cooperation with Gloudemans Taxatie en Adviesbureau [Basis document Regelingen, Provincie Noord-Brabant in samenwerking met Gloudemans Taxatie en Adviesbureau], May 2006.
- ¹⁰⁴⁵ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.
- ¹⁰⁴⁶ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰⁴⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 March 2006.
- ¹⁰⁴⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 15 July 2005.
- ¹⁰⁴⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.
- ¹⁰⁵⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.
- ¹⁰⁵¹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.
- ¹⁰⁵² Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 March 2006.
- ¹⁰⁵³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.
- ¹⁰⁵⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.
- ¹⁰⁵⁵ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 November 2006.
- ¹⁰⁵⁶ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.
- ¹⁰⁵⁷ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 March 2006, 12 October 2007, 7 March 2008 and 28 October 2008.
- ¹⁰⁵⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.
- ¹⁰⁵⁹ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.
- ¹⁰⁶⁰ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶¹ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶² Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007.
- ¹⁰⁶⁴ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶⁵ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview with H. Brouwer, 12 July 2006.
- ¹⁰⁶⁷ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.
- ¹⁰⁶⁸ Pers. comm. J. Sonnevijlle, 20 June 2008.
- ¹⁰⁶⁹ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2008.
- ¹⁰⁷⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.
- ¹⁰⁷¹ Interview with R. Peusens, 10 August 2006.

¹⁰⁷² Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2008.

¹⁰⁷³ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2008.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 10 March 2006.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Interview with A. Moons, 2 October 2008.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

¹⁰⁷⁷ www.accanto.nl, accessed on 26 March 2009.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

¹⁰⁸¹ Interview with I. de Boer, 4 December 2006.

¹⁰⁸² Interview with B. van den Reek, 17 June 2005.

¹⁰⁸³ Interview with R. Peusens, 10 August 2006.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Interview with R. Peusens, 8 April 2008.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Municipalities and provinces are allowed to pass over tasks to regional authorities. Therefore, some regional authorities have an extended task; from www.stadsregios.nl, accessed on 30 May 2009.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 10 August 2006.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Derived from an interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 14 October 2005.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 29 June 2007.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Habiforum is a non-governmental organisation in the field of multifunctional land use.

¹⁰⁹¹ A moderator helps to structure a debate, a facilitator supports a dialogue and a mediator assists with negotiation (J. Forester, Alexander von Humboldt lecture, Radboud University Nijmegen, 18 February 2009).

¹⁰⁹² Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 25 May 2005.

¹⁰⁹³ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 28 October 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

¹⁰⁹⁷ 'Poldering in the polder: Room for the River and the Meuse Works are all about residents' trust' [*Polderen in de polder; Bij Ruimte voor de rivier en Maaswerken draait het allemaal om bewonersvertrouwen*], RWS Geel, May 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁸ 'Farmers in Overdiep not afraid of the water' [Overdiepse boeren zijn niet bang voor water], Trouw, 7 June 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Interview with S. Broekmans, 13 July 2006.

¹¹⁰⁰ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 7 March 2008.

¹¹⁰¹ The tasks of the new organisation did not include policy and research.

¹¹⁰² Interview with H. Brouwer, 24 July 2006.

¹¹⁰³ Interview with N. Hooijmaijers, 12 October 2007; interview with H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 December 2005.

¹¹⁰⁴ This was also affirmed by Rijkswaterstaat official H. Buitveld, pers. comm. 5 June 2009.

¹¹⁰⁵ Interview with R. Peusens, 28 September 2006.

¹¹⁰⁶ www.provincies.nl, accessed on 31 May 2009.

¹¹⁰⁷ Its statutory responsibilities are making water policy plans, the management of secondary flood defences, water retention areas (in cooperation with water boards), muskrat control and the management of groundwater and surface waters. Furthermore, it is the competent authority to which the water boards are accountable.

¹¹⁰⁸ As municipalities and provinces are allowed to transfer tasks to regional authorities, some regional authorities have an extended task; from www.stadsregios.nl, accessed on 30 May 2009.

¹¹⁰⁹ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

¹¹¹⁰ The Loevestein meeting refers to the launch of the White Paper Room for the River at Loevestein castle on 28 February 2000.

¹¹¹¹ Interview with J. Boelhouwer, 9 November 2005.

¹¹¹² Interview with S. Broekmans, 13 July 2006.

¹¹¹³ DLG is the executive agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.

List of interviewees

Dike Relocation in Lent case study Steering group

G.N. Kok

Dike reeve of Rivierenland water board, Tiel

P.F.G. Depla

Executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen

A. Augusteijn

Director of Water Management of East Netherlands regional office, RWS, Arnhem

Projectgroep

J. van Dussen

Communication adviser of East Netherlands regional office, RWS, Arnhem

J. Tielen

Assistant project director of the Dike Relocation in Lent, Rijkswaterstaat, Arnhem

G. de Vrieze

Policy adviser of Rivierenland water board, Tiel

E. Boere

Policy adviser of the province of Gelderland, Arnhem

G. Slendebroek,

Policy adviser of Legal Department of East Netherlands regional office, RWS, Arnhem

L. Koridon

Policy adviser of Planning Department of the municipality of Nijmegen

Advisory Group

O. Feitsma

Chair of advisory group, Dieren

P. Laukens

Member of Platform Waalsprong, Nijmegen

Th. Berns

Member of Lentse Ondernemersvereniging, Lent

G.J.M. Verstappen

Member of residents' group Lentse Federatie, Lent

J.A.L. Rikken

Chair of Dorpsraad Lent (Village Council of Lent), Lent

F. Mikx

Chair of residents' group Lent 800 and Stichting BOOM, Nijmegen

B.M. Hendriks

Director of Centrum Management Nijmegen, Nijmegen

R. van Loenen Martinet

Staff member of Gelderse Milieu Federatie, Arnhem

J.W.Th.M. Van Meegen

Member of Historische Vereniging Marithaime, Tiel

Additional interviewees

W. van den Akker

Resident of the village of Lent, Lent

H. Berg,

Policy adviser of City Development Department of the municipality of Nijmegen

M.J.M. Broekman

Chair of residents' group Lentse Federatie, Lent

W.F.T. van Ellen

Retired Professor of Water Management, Heilig Land Stichting

D. van der Graaf

Project manager of the Dike Relocation in Lent, Arnhem

A. van der Hoek

Head Water Infrastructure, Rijkswaterstaat, Zwijndrecht

J.H. Jansen

Director of East Netherlands regional office, RWS, Arnhem

C. Jol

Project manager Room for the River of regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Bennekom

H.T.C. van Stokkom

Director of Water Management of regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Breda

M. de Vriend

Consultant of Royal Haskoning, Nijmegen

Street interviews

32 respondents in the village of Lent, most of which were anonymous

Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study

Residents

C.B. Alewijnse

Member of De Ploegdriever, Persingen

W.A. Arnts

Member of residents' group Hoogwaterplatform, former executive councillor of the municipality of Ubbergen, Ooij

J.F. Bekhuis

Nature conservation manager Ark, Kekerdorn

R. Büchner

Resident of Ooijpolder, Ooij

R. Daamen

Resident of Ooijpolder, Leuth

W.F.T. van Ellen

Retired Professor of Water Management, Heilig Land Stichting

M. van Eupen

Member of residents' group Hoogwaterplatform, Ooij

R. van Laarhoven

Resident of Ooijpolder, Ooij

K. Nuijten

Member of residents' group Hoogwaterplatform, Kekerdorn

M. Oppenberg

Secretary of residents' group Bürgerinitiative Duffel, Niel, Germany

S.A. Provoost

Director of shipbuilding yard Bodewes, Millingen a/d Rijn

H.B.A.M. Sanders

Chair of residents' group Hoogwaterplatform, Kekerdorn

H.J.H. Sieger

Chair of residents' group Bürgerinitiative Duffel, Zylflich, Germany

J.G. Smit

Member of residents' group Hoogwaterplatform, Millingen a/d Rijn

Z. Stappershoef

Chair of Landinrichtingscommissie Ooijpolder, Erlecom

A.W. van de Ven

Resident, Ooij

M.P.J.M. Zegers

Director of Rabobank in Ubbergen, Ubbergen

Interviewees related to authorities, consultancy firms, university, and non-governmental organisation

B.A. Bannink

Policy researcher Water and Spatial Planning, Leystad

C. Beekmans

Project manager for the upstream rivers, RIZA, Arnhem

P. Berends

Policy adviser of Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague, Utrecht

J. Boelhouwer

Member of the House of Representatives and spokesman water issues for Social Democrats (PvdA), Den Haag

E. de Boer

Head of Public Works and Water Management Department, Delft University of Technology

J. de Bondt

Delegate of the province of Gelderland, Amsterdam

H. ten Brinke

Policy adviser RIZA, Arnhem

B.G. de Bruijn

Policy adviser of Rivierenland water board, Arnhem

A. van der Hoek

Head Water Infrastructure, Rijkswaterstaat, Zwijndrecht

J.H. Jansen

General director of East Netherlands regional office, RWS, Arnhem

C. Jol

Project manager Room for the River, regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Bennekom

S.A. de Jong

Policy adviser of Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague

R. Jorissen

Head Water Infrastructure, Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague

W. van der Kleij

Chair of the Technical Advisory Commission Flood Defence (TAW), The Hague

D. Klopstra

Adviser Water Management of HKV Lijn in Water, Lelystad

M. Kok

Director of HKV Lijn in Water, Lelystad

M.E.F. Leewis

Communication adviser Communication Department, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Leiden

N. Ligthart

Policy adviser Calamities of Ministry of the Interior, The Hague

E. van Lith

Member of the House of Representatives, spokesman water issues for the Christian Democrats (CDA), The Hague

R. van Loenen Martinet

Staff member of Gelderse Milieu Federatie, Arnhem

D. Luteijn

Chair of Advisory Commission Emergency Water Storage Areas, Nieuwegein

R. Postma

Policy adviser Integrated Water Policy, regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Arnhem

J. de Ruig

Secretary of Advisory Commission Emergency Water Storage Areas, Leeuwarden

W. Silva

Project manager Rivers, RIZA, Arnhem

H.T.C. van Stokkom

Water director of regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Breda

F. Verhoef

Policy adviser Water and the Environment, Gelderland province, Arnhem

G. Verwolf

Head Water Infrastructure, Directorate General Water, Apeldoorn

P.G.M. Wilbers

Mayor of municipality of Ubbergen, Ubbergen

A. van Winden

Adviser of Bureau Stroming, Ubbergen

H. Zomerdijk

Mayor of the municipality of Duiven, Duiven

Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study

Residents

S. Broekmans

Chair of residents' group Vereniging Belangen-groep Overdiepse polder, Waspik

N. Hooijmaijer

Vice Chair of residents' group Vereniging Belan-gengroep Overdiepse polder, Waspik

Authorities and non-governmental organisations

J. Boelhouwer

Member of the House of Representatives, The Hague

I. de Boer

Manager of Project Department Room for the River (PDR), Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague

H. Brouwer

River branch manager of Project Department Room for the River (PDR), Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht

A. van der Hoek

Head Water Infrastructure, Rijkswaterstaat, Zwijn-drecht

C. Jol

Project manager Room for the River, regional of-fice East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Bennekom

W. van der Kleij

Chair of the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence (TAW), The Hague

A. van Luin

Deputy director of Habiforum, Gouda

J.P.M. Moons

Delegate of the province of Noord-Brabant, 's-Her-togenbosch

R. Peusens

Project director of the Terps plan in Overdiep pol-der, Noord-Brabant province, 's-Hertogenbosch

B. van den Reek

Project director of the Terps plan in Overdiep pol-der, Noord-Brabant province, 's-Hertogenbosch

P. van Rooy

Associate of Habiforum, Gouda

H.T.C. van Stokkom

Water director of regional office East Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, Breda

W. Tiggeloven

Policy adviser of Government Service for Land and Water Management (DLG), Arnhem

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABG	Official supervisory group (<i>Ambtelijke Begeleidings Groep</i>)
CDA	Christian Democrats (<i>Christen Democratisch Appel</i>)
CPB	Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (<i>Centraal Plan Bureau</i>)
CSI	Cross-Scale Interaction
DLG	Government service for land and water management (<i>Dienst Landelijk Gebied</i>)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment (<i>milieueffectrapportage – m.e.r.</i>)
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EU	European Union (<i>Europese Unie</i>)
Flotust	residents of three streets Floralaan, Tuinstraat and Steltsestraat (<i>organisatie van bewoners van Floralaan, Tuinstraat en Steltsestraat</i>)
GeWaLent	the affected residents of the Waal river bend cut-off (<i>Gedupeerden van de Waalbochtverlegging Lent</i>)
GLTO	Farmers' organisation (<i>Gewestelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie</i>)
IPO	Association of Provincial Authorities (<i>Interprovinciaal Overleg</i>)
KAN	Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (<i>Knooppunt Arnhem-Nijmegen</i>)
LBOW	National Administrative Agreement on Water (<i>Landelijk Bestuurs Overleg Water</i>)
LPF	Nationalist party (<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>)
LTO	Farmers' organisation (<i>Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie Nederland</i>)
ME	Riot Police (<i>Mobiele Eenheid</i>)
MP	Member of Parliament (<i>lid van de Tweede Kamer</i>)
NAP	Amsterdam Ordnance Datum (<i>Normaal Amsterdams Peil</i>)
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation (<i>Niet-Gouvernementele Organisatie</i>)
NIMBY	Not in my backyard
NIMFABY	Not in my front and backyard (<i>Niet in mijn voor- en achtertuin, NIVEA</i>)
NIMTOO	Not in my turn of office
NOVA	Current affairs programme on the television (<i>actualiteitenprogramma op televisie</i>)
PDR	Project Department Room for the River (<i>Project Directie Ruimte voor de Rivier</i>)
PIMBY	Please in my backyard
PKB	Spatial Planning Key Decision – SPKD (<i>Planologische Kern Beslissing</i>)
PvdA	Social Democrats (<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i>)
SP	Socialist party (<i>Socialistische Partij</i>)
SPKD	Spatial Planning Key Decision (<i>Planologische Kern Beslissing, PKB</i>)
Veur-Lent	residents who are living near the dike of the village of Lent (<i>inwoners van Lent die aan de dijk wonen</i>)
TAW	Technical Advisory Committee on Flood Defence (<i>Technische Adviescommissie Waterkeringen</i>)
VVD	Conservatives (<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i>)
ZLTO	Farmers' organisation (<i>Zuidelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie</i>)

Curriculum Vitae

Madelinde Winnubst (1966) studied Social Anthropology at Utrecht University. After she completed her Master in 1990, she worked in various functions at the Dutch Organisation for Higher Education (Nuffic). Later, she worked as freelance communication specialist and editor/copywriter. In 2004 she became a researcher at the Department of Sustainable Management of Resources (DSMR) of Radboud University Nijmegen and started a PhD study in the framework of the European Freude am Fluss project (Interreg IIIB). Since August 2010, she is working as an assistant professor at the Utrecht University School of Governance. Her research interests include citizen involvement, government-citizen relationship and collaborative governance processes.